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Abstract
My thesis combines poststructnralist and psychoanalytic approaches to investigate the 
actual and the possible relations between art history and philosophical / critical 
discourses. To do so it combines framing case-studies of key art works in Chapters One 
and Five with more concentredly theoretical central Chapters. Although the work of 
Walter Benjamin and Slavoj Zizek strongly informs what I have done here, my primary 
theoretical orientation is towards Michel Foucault’s “genealogical” approach to 
historiography.
My thesis is underpinned by two assumptions: first, that the historico-philosophical 
writings of Foucault can be usefully deployed in relation to a number of theoretical and 
critical problems facing art histoiy in its interpretation of, and relation to, postmodern art 
practice; second, that Foucault’s work has been inconsistently and inadequately 
addressed by both proponents and detractors of his way of writing history. I argue that 
close reading of Foucault’s texts produces a more complex body of thought than art 
historical appropriations have allowed. It seems to me that it is the overdetemiination of 
both positive and negative readings of Foucault by the particular stakes surrounding 
critical-theoretical approaches to art that has produced this situation. In particular, the 
role of aesthetics in Foucault’s thought has been generally missed; on the one hand by 
those (such as Terry Eagleton) who argue that Foucault capitulates ethical and 
epistemological concerns into aesthetics in a characteristically postmodern and 
irresponsible way; on the other by those (such as Craig Owens) who see him as an
antidote to art history’s bourgeois aestheticism. In contrast to both these interpretations I 
argue that Foucault’s writing produces a complex interplay of epistemological, ethical 
and aesthetic levels. Specifically I contend that his epistemological insights are delivered 
via an “aesthetics of the text” that necessitates an appropriate “ethics of reading.” This 
reading looks at the development of Foucault’s thought as a whole, emphasising 
persistent themes (however radically reworked) rather than rupture. Central to my thesis 
is the claim that the truth value of Foucault’s work is both expressed, and needs to be 
interpreted, in Nietzschean terms. To that extent, my aim is to evaluate the actual and 
potential “uses and abuses of Foucault for Art Histoiy.”
The potential uses of Foucauldian principles are identified and enacted in two related 
case-studies of art historical / art critical problematics. The first centres on a reading of 
Cornelia Parker’s 2003 work The Distance (a kiss with string attached)^ an appropriation 
of Rodin’s Kiss which makes an allusion to Marcel Duchamp. Analysis of this work 
relates it to problems of institutional and “curatorial” art, to Duchamp as an originary 
figure for strategies of appropriation, and to broader issues of interpretation and visual 
culture. The second case-study concerns two appropriations of historical figures by the 
American artist Matthew Barney. These appropriations work according to a process of 
excessive identification within a hermetic narrative structure, and my reading of them, by 
extending this identificatoiy and narrative logic, attempts to reconnect Barney’s 
Cremaster Cycle -  a work deemed too “spectacular” to support such a reading -  to 
important critical perspectives on art, aesthetics, and theory. The thesis concludes, then, 
by offering an alternative paradigm of critical writing on art to that of the October group
“ whose influential texts form the interpretative context of Chapters One and Two. This 
alternate paradigm is based in looking back to Benjamin and Foucault and reinterpreting 
their relation to art historical discourse, but it does so in order to look, forward to new 
possibilities for engaging with cultural practice.
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Exactly how do I  write? I  had, like many others, the perverted desire to adopt a system 
and a norm. I t ’s true that I  wrote before having the norm and the system, but so did 
everyone else.
Fernando Pessoa, The Book o f Disquiet.
Introduction
JVe are hard at work trying to fulfill the impossible task o f reading from the moment we 
are born until the moment we die. We struggle to read from the moment we wake in the 
morning until the moment we fa ll asleep at night, and what are our dreams but more 
lessons in the pain o f the impossibility o f reading, or rather in the pain o f having no way 
whatsoever o f knowing whether or not we may have, in our discursive wanderings and 
aberrancies stumbled by accident on the right reading? ... The failure to read takes place 
inexorably within the text itself The reader must reenact this failure in his or her own 
reading. Getting it right always means getting it wrong. Each reader must repeat the 
error the text denounces and then commits again.
Hillis Miller, ‘Reading Unreadability’.
What counts in the things said by man is not so much what they may have thought or the 
extent to which these things represent their thoughts, as that which systematizes them 
from the outset, thus making them thereafter endlessly accessible to new discourses and 
open to the task o f transforming them.
Michel Foucault, The Birth o f the Clinic.
This thesis attempts to operate at the vital intersection between theoretical and historical 
perspectives developed to critique modernity -  perspectives including Marxism, 
psychoanalysis, and poststructuralism -  and artistic efforts to reflect on aspects of 
modernism. The most sophisticated practices emergent from both twentieth-century 
theory and twentieth-century art are committed to critique in the form of a historically 
based examination of the present and the conditions of its possibility. In the light of an 
increasingly a-hrstorical and commodified artworld, where such examination is no longer 
de rigueur, it is necessary to ask whether such a critical project extends to our present or 
has run its course. Further, might it be that the models of critical thinking developed in 
the 1960s, and collectively -  if misleadingly -  termed poststructuralism, should now be 
put to one side? My answer is an emphatic “no.” I believe the theoretical sources I draw 
on here, and indeed the artistic examples I discuss, are of central importance and do 
indeed speak critically to our times, though their voices now sometimes appear as 
untimely, spectral, or outmoded.
Christian Thome recently reworked the Benjaminian theme of a value particular to ideas, 
objects and images that are passing from newness into obsolescence; he did so under the 
excellent title of ‘The Revolutionary Energy of the Outmoded.’ ' If there is any 
“outmodedness” pertaining to the theoretical bases of my study, then I would suggest that 
it is in this sense only: poststmcturalist thought may no longer be modish, it may 
increasingly be historicized in its turn -  as La Pensée 68, for example -  but it still has 
much energy to impart.^ Likewise, if some theorists are now taking their distance from 
the way that, in the 1980s particularly, “the locus of aesthetic value [in art] shifted from
quality to criticality -  from the ‘good’ to the ‘subversive’,” I wish to continue to affirm 
the value of such criticality in art, with the recognition that its mode of appearance may 
have changed/ Criticality has to be found and made in interpretations, not only pointed to 
in works assumed to be inherently critical.
Chapter One functions in many ways as an introduction to this thesis, so I shall keep my 
remarks here brief, outlining the basic trajectory of my research project, and the way it is 
set out in the five chapters that follow. A number of initial assumptions informed the 
orientation of my research at its outset and, I think, remain implicit throughout its 
development. The first concerns art history as an interpretative practice: I consider art 
history (in the hands, at least, of its most critically aware practitioners) to be characterised 
by a committed attentiveness to its object(s)."  ^This commitment, which is present at the 
level of description as well as interpretation, is the lever for what may be termed, 
following Thomas Kuhn’s much-used phrase, disciplinary “paradigm shifts.”  ^The 
attention to particularities of objects can necessitate new epistemologies -  to describe the 
specificity of a postmodern ait work, for example, may require new interpretative 
strategies. (The temporality of these moments of interpretation and description is 
oversimplified here when they are rendered as successive. It is axiomatic that there can 
be no description which is not already an interpretation).
This is the case because -  here is my second key assumption -  “art” as an object of 
historical enquiry has no ontological consistency. Developments in twentieth-century art 
in particular, which are now treated as unproblematically canonical (Duchamp, and
especially the readymade strategy, is exemplary here), fundamentally alter what comes 
under the aegis of the history of art, by contesting the authorial, material, temporal, and 
aesthetic bases of the auratic art work. The acceptance of such contestatory work within 
the story of art is not (only) a recuperation of radical critiques of art-as-institution, but 
also a historical realisation of the possibilities opened up by “art” as a cultural locus 
emergent as a bourgeois category in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This claim is 
not intended to be read in terms of a Conceptualist notion of art-as-idea as the dialectical 
conclusion or completion of art history, but simply registers the fact that it continues to 
be necessary and usefril to relate such developments to a histoiy of ait. Further, it is not 
only that postmodern practices are elucidated by having their genealogies traced, but that 
they also work their way back into history and problematise any sense of a linear 
historical development. Again, Duchamp is exemplary here, with his reception in post­
war art formative of our current sense of his role as an originary figure.
With these precepts established, the third presumption to which I was conmiitted from the 
outset was a positive view of the productive possibilities in reading certain theoretical 
texts from within art history. This 1 conceive as a reciprocal process in which modes of 
thinking developed to deal with the particularities of aesthetically rich and complex 
objects (and especially images), and with the historical development of an object -  art -  
without ontological consistency, are hybridised with those which have sought to politicise 
historical thought and put it to use in the present. Specifically I intended to use Michel 
Foucault’s work to achieve such a hybrid form. At a conference on Rediscovering 
Aesthetics (University College Cork, July 2004) John Hyman argued that
whatever philosophers and art historians “can offer one another we can do only by 
remaining firmly on our own pa t ch . Th i s  division of labour, unsurprisingly, turns out to 
mean a philosophical elucidation of ideas grounding or influencing art history, and an art 
historical clarification of the particularity of cultural objects. Such a division seems 
unsatisfactory to me, not only in preserving a questionable metaphysical authority and 
notion of philosophical foundation, but also in its negation of art histoiy’s ability to go 
beyond a connoisseurly, perhaps even fetishistic, fixation on the individuality of objects. 
Art histoiy can, I believe, aspire to much more than this narrow particularism, and the 
relationship between art history and philosophy / theory need not be shaped only in such 
a mould.
Nonetheless, at the outset of this project I felt the need for some kind of methodological 
grounding or, at the very least some theoretical orientation, and this need motivated my 
initial interest in post-structuralist theoiy, and especially Foucault. The frequency with 
which texts relating to my initial research interests (museums, Duchamp, postmodern 
historiography) quoted and deferred to Foucault’s texts, and the authoritative and far- 
reaching character of the ideas cited, suggested to me that there was great potential for 
grounding and orientating my own work through them. In fact, when I turned to a close 
reading of Foucault’s texts themselves, I found that they were resistant to such a usage, at 
least immediately. As my research developed I became convinced that these writings, to 
which art historians of a critical bent so often referred and deferred, are themselves 
deeply implicated in the kinds of issues that they are asked to resolve. Rather than this 
leading to deadlock, I argue that it offers an opportunity to think through the applicability
of the work of Foucault and others. This is my fourth assumption, and leads on to the 
fifth. The oft-proclaimed transformation of art history by theory has not occurred, in the 
sense that it remains marginal to the discipline as it is habitually practised, and yet for art 
historians taught in the wake of postmodernism, poststmcturalism and the New Art 
Histoiy -  that is, those for whom these have been received as relative orthodoxies -  the 
possibility exists to read their key texts without overdetermining them in negative 
dependency on what they are supposed to overthrow. Most importantly, this means being 
able to think Foucault outwith an overdetermined historicism to which he was often 
conscripted as, essentially, source material for elucidating “context.” Rather than 
abandoning work like Foucault’s, or historicizing it in turn in a supposed poststructuralist 
moment in the late twentieth century, I wondered if it might not be available for a second 
reception, and that for art histoiy this might be akin to the “second trauma which makes 
the trauma,” to paraphrase Freud.
My final key assumption is that a relation to such works which treats them as candidates 
to displace the theoretical / philosophical foundations of art histoiy, as I initially hoped, is 
already on the wrong track. Whether or not we consider art histoiy as fundamentally 
Kantian in its basis it is by no means the case that poststmcturalist theoiy can take on this 
foundational role. I take issue with the treatment of such theoiy -  often registered in the 
deferential use of citation -  as a surrogate or placeholder for metaphysical truth. My 
objection, somewhat counter-intuitively, is not to a self-contradictoiy presentation of 
Foucault as tmthfully announcing the impossibility of truth (the immanent critique often 
made of poststmcturalism), but rather to the uncritical deference to texts whose efficacy,
as I see it, depends on active engagement. Art history’s own professional attentiveness 
provides a possible analogy or model here for a different strategy of reading.
It is undoubtedly the case that immanent critique can be usefiilly deployed -  as Slavoj 
Zizek has amply shown in his accounts of the workings of ideology, accounts which, like 
Foucauldian “archaeology,” operate with an almost formalist emphasis on describing the 
surface character of what is actually done and said (and thus may not be so far removed 
from art historical thought).^ But immanent critique is also problematic insofar as it tends 
to privilege the internal consistency of texts across constative and performative levels (in 
mimesis) and obscure the active processes of reading which animate them.^ Hayden 
White contends that the establishment of historical objectivity by the repression of 
characteristically literary / fictive tropes masked the persistence of such tropes within 
historical discourse.^ If both modes outlined above -  the mimetic / se lf consistent, and 
the open / reader-animated -  are both in the end aesthetic modes (corresponding to 
Modernist and postmodernist paradigms respectively) it needs to be emphasised that they 
make different uses of the aesthetic -  harnessing it either to se lf reference / se lf enclosure 
or to active interpretation. My contention, and my last assumption, then, is that it is an 
aesthetically as well as critically aware reading of Foucault’s work that can do justice to 
its potential as a counter-discourse. This means that the primary orientation towards it 
will be affective, committed, and arising from particular problems, rather than objective, 
foundational and deferentially generalised. My thesis attempts to relate this approach to 
specific problems in the histoiy of art, to justify its relevance as a reading of Foucault in 
contrast to existing readings, and finally, to demonstrate its usefiilness in an art historical
interpretation foimed in the light o f this approach, which constitutes my fifth and final 
chapter.
Foucault himself objected, in a thoroughly and properly Nietzschean fashion, to what he 
termed commentmy, by which he meant an attitude that “questions discourse as to what it 
says and intended to say, ... tries to uncover that deeper meaning of speech that enables it 
to achieve an identity with itself, supposedly nearer to its essential truth; in other words, 
in stating what has been said, one has to restate what has never been said.”^^  Foucault 
noted that commentary assumes an excess of signified over signifier, anon-symbolized 
“remainder” which becomes the locus of the essential. But “commentaiy” simultaneously 
entertains the thought of a “superabundance proper to the signifier” which enables it to 
bring out the hitherto silent content of the remainder. ^  ^  The problem with this stmcture, in 
Foucault’s analysis, is that “by opening up the possibility of commentary, this double 
plethora dooms us to an endless task that notliing can limit.. Foucault here values the 
endlessness ofinteipretation (as commentary) negatively, but he develops elsewhere an 
alternate, labyrinthine conception of language’s infinity, which, rather than a fiuitless 
search fo r  identity, becomes a flight fiom and beyond it. In his books of the 1960s 
Foucault proposed an alternate conception ofinteipretation, which he temied 
archaeology.*^ Whereas traditionally “to speak about the thought of others, to tiy to say 
what they have said” involved analyzing the signified and its remainder, Foucault argued 
for the possibility of an inteipretation “that would evade the fate of commentaiy by 
supposing no remainder, nothing in excess of what has been said, but only the fact of its
historical appearance.”*'* It is this that his archaeological writings attempted in relation to 
madness, medical knowledge, reason, and diseourse itself.
Two problems for any appropriation of Foucault for art histoiy emerge here. Firstly, there 
is his deep-seated hostility to the presumed unity of the author and his works, connected 
to his passionate commitment to anonymity, to not being known. *^ Second is the 
restriction he makes to analysis of the what has been said, or enunciated; a mode of 
inteipretation that Foucault rightly and polemically contrasts with the two traditional 
methodologies of the histoiy of ideas: an “aesthetic” methodology, involving either 
diachronic diffusion of “geneses, filiations, kinships, influences,” or sociocultural 
Weltanschauung', or a psychological methodology, denying “contents” by a method that 
has since become “a sort o f ‘psychoanalysis’ of thought.” *^ Thus many of the 
methodological tools of art histoiy as a mode of Humanist discourse seemed inapplicable 
from the outset, and in fact to be the target of Foucault’s critique. As much was surmised 
by some o f Foucault’s most committed readers, including Craig Owens, for whom 
poststmcturalism was a weapon to be turned against ‘Art Histoiy as a Humanist 
Discipline’ -  a discipline that he perceived as ftmdamentally implicated in critiques of 
representation and of power. *^ I take issue with Owens’s reading of Foucault in what 
follows, not out of loyalty to art histoiy or its disciplinaiy boundaries, but because I do 
not think it is ultimately satisfactoiy as an interpretation of Foucault. I trace this 
realization to two experiences: 1) reading (with veiy inadequate French) a short text in 
Dits et écrits (Foucault’s complete works) in which he reviews Panofsky’s Studies in 
Iconology and Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism with nothing but good-natured
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respect and admiration (and not the scathing anti-Humanist antagonism I had expected); 
2) reading Foucault’s The Order o f Things and finding -  eventually -  a quite different 
sense of the famous introductoiy chapter on Las Meninas than that set out by Owens.*® 
Through these and other experiences of reading it became apparent that there is not a 
straightfoi’ward zero-sum game to be played out between Foucault and art histoiy; it is 
not “winner takes all.” Foucault’s work speaks primaiily to the strategic use of histoiy for 
the undemtanding and transformation of the present. Its strategy is often aesthetic both in 
its treatment of its subject-matter and in its mode of address to the reader. With this in 
mind, it seemed that rather than reciniting him for an(other) attack on art histoiy’s 
Kantian / bourgeois / logocentric “foundations” it would be more useM, and appropriate 
to use Foucault to develop a critical approach to the immanent problems effecting art 
histoiy in the present.
These problems were, as one might expect in the post-millemiial atmosphere of the early 
2000s, fi'equently conveyed with a rather jaded sense of “crisis” in the journal articles 
which suiweyed the field of critical practice. Raphael Rubinstein, in ‘A Quiet Crisis,’ 
suggested that the problem was the lack of an inclination to engage in the serious critical 
business of making value judgements.*^ If this is an over-used battle ciy, given that crises 
in taste are endemic since modernism at least,^ ** other writers tried to pin the 
contemporary situation down more specifically. J. J. Charlesworth, for instance, 
attempted in an article in Art Monthly, to get to the bottom of what he termed ‘The 
Dysfunction of Criticism.’^ * In the 70s, he argues, criticism was still conceived as a vital 
part of the process of art making. That vital evaluative role has atrophied, Charlesworth
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daims, because of the replacement o f political commitment in criticism with a 
professionalized “low octane ethics”^^  producing an “obsessive deference to the primacy 
of the work.”^^  In paif he attributes this state of affairs to a postmodernist relativism, and 
to what he characterizes as the stagnation and institutionalization of identity politics, 
which he thinks had been contestatoiy in the 1970s and 80s. With contest off the agenda, 
the critical vacuum is filled by “a privatized, belletiistic form of art writing, concerned 
with the author’s subjective impressions or immediate sentiments, relentlessly affirmative 
in tone, and passively accepting whatever the art world decides to offer for its 
attention.” '^* It would doubtless not be too difficult to bring to mind examples of ait 
writing which deseiwe this characterization. But Charlesworth is doubly wrong, I think, in 
seeing subjectivity or affect as the negation of criticism, and in laying the blame for 
critical atrophy at the door of an exhausted identity politics. Identity remains political, 
artists continue to address this, poststructuralist critique continues to speak to our 
experience of subjectivity, and inteiwentions in identity, whether aitistic or critical 
continue to be problematic and ambiguous, and thus in need of constant and renewed 
thought in these terms. The notion that critical modes need to be constantly changed or 
replaced to stave off stagnation is itself a symptom of the commodification of intellectual 
as well as artistic practice. Innovations are required when critical modes are no longer 
adequate to the salient features of the objects to which they pay attention: I do not think 
this can be said of poststmcturalist theoiy or other manifestations of so-called “identity 
politics” (itself a loaded designation: as though identity isn’t always political, or politics 
not always implicated in identity).
12
Charlesworth’s argument ignores the fact that artistic practices and theoretical 
inteiwentions of the past 40 yearn have profoundly problematized the artist-object-viewer 
relation. To take just one example, perfoimative artistic practices such as those of Gina 
Pane or Marina Abramovic forced the issue of speetatoiial desire and involvement to the 
fore in a way that made detached critical commentary impossible, or at least inelevant.^^ 
The question of how to critically engage, and to appropriately historicize, such practices 
seems to me to he still open ~ and excitingly so. Matthew Barney’s work, the subject of 
my fifth chapter, may well have been received by “relentlessly affinnative” or belletristic 
“art writing,” but it seems to me still worthy of sustained attention, because it can open 
onto important issues (including those of the status of art-critical writing).
An even more pessimistic reading of the atrophy of criticism was apparent in 2002’s 
October roundtable discussion on the subject. Seeing, not unjustifiably, a shift in the 
balance of power between galleiists, museums and critics, with the latter no longer 
mediating between maiket values on the one hand and aesthetic judgements on the other, 
the panel appeai'ed lost as to how to redress this situation. As George Baker put it, the 
question is how to find an “outside” to the art world, which is no longer meant to have 
one, in a situation in which “there is almost immediate affirmation of almost any practice 
you can i m a g i n e . B u t  affinnation as well as denunciation has always been part of the 
dynamic of good criticism -  and, for that matter, of good theorizing. It is here that the 
October group, whose work has been at the centre of critical thinking on avant-gardist art 
and culture seems at a loss as to how to respond: what in, and of, the present can they 
affirm?
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I suggest that by embracing fonns of identification at work in the aesthetics of certain 
texts and artworks a productive revaluation of both critical / theoretical and artistic / 
contestatoiy projects can take place. Such a revaluation has in fact been central to the 
most insightful critique of the modem period. Walter Benjamin, for instance, sought to 
give art the not inconsiderable task of undoing alienation, and a restoration of bodily 
sensibility (aesthetics) by a f f i r m a t i v e l y through new technologies. The cmcial 
pomt is that Benjamin’s call for such a restoration entails a fondamental change in the 
meanings of “art” and “aesthetics”; contra their determinations in post-Kantian 
moàQmity, politicized art “would cease to be art as we know it” whilst aesthetics would 
itself be “transformed indeed, redeemed, so that, ironically (or dialectically), it would 
describe the field in which the antidote to fascism is deployed as a political response.”^^  
As Teny Eagleton quite rightly asserts, the aesthetic is too important to be abandoned to 
capitalist utilization in advertising and other spectacularised form sA lthough  in what 
follows I contest Eagleton’s reading of Foucault, I endome this valuation of the aesthetic. 
Here is one crucial locus for critical thinking on art to work with art's own innovations, 
in order to see the historical and theoretical lessons to be gained fiom aesthetic practices 
not entirely given over to Capital.
Though I had initially intended to write a monographic work on Foucault, I decided that 
this would not best serve either his work or my intentions, because it is precisely in the 
notion that some use might be made of what he wrote that “commentaiy” can be avoided. 
Using Foucault’s thought means, as he conceptualized his own use of Nietzsche, making
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it “groan and protest” by being treated as material for something new. In this context that 
means using Foucault with others, for instance Jacques Demda, who are not natural 
companions. There aie, in any case, many (too many) existing commentaries on Foucault, 
and they tend, perhaps inevitably, to be marked by the disparity between the urgency and 
intensity of Foucault’s prose and the force of his ideas, and the demands of academic 
notions of exegetical “good foim.” In contrast, this thesis detects and miiTors an 
excessive dimension to Foucault’s writing, which is amenable to analysis in aesthetic 
terms, and to deployment in aesthetic contexts. Consequently, the chapters of this thesis 
dealing with Foucault are framed by case studies which establish such contexts: the first, 
though retrospectively infoimed by Foucault, emerges fiom issues which preceded (and 
precipitated) my interest in him; the second, which concludes this work, suggests some 
future directions for the application and extension of this research. All are “author-ised” 
by my understanding of Foucault’s work (amongst other sources) as vindicating the 
utilisation of textual strategies which push historical writing into contact with what might 
be normally thought of as its ‘othem’ -  the fictive, the associative, and the identificatoiy 
-  whilst retaining its essential commitment to explanation. To this extent it takes fiom 
deconstruction the principle of deriving tropes fr om the objects of analysis and, in a 
sense, making them burgeon or hypertrophy, letting them foim and defoim the text. This 
is a matter, as Derrida writes a propos Hillis Miller, of finding “what [one] invents'' and 
undei-standing theory as “itself part of the fiction ... that thus comprises it at the veiy 
moment it allows one to comprehend it in tum.”^^  Implication in fiction, then, but not 
without comprehension.
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The foiin o f this thesis is roughly linear and chronological (in tenus of my own interests), 
but it is also conceived as three relatively autonomous sections, in which related 
problems are cast in different lights. To use a photographic metaphor, these sections 
could be thought of as separate “exposures,” which might be superimposed or projected 
on each other as much as placed in order. The convergences and discontinuities between 
them, for example when similar figures connote somewhat different meanings, have been 
left understated in most cases; both in deference to the reader’s attentiveness, and to, in 
what is a well-worn but still valuable strategy, resist a closure on imaginative engagement 
and inteipretation, at least within the confines of a historically grounded form that is not 
(only) fictive. Roughly speaking, the topoi of the three sections are: Duchamp and 
originality (Chapters One and Two), Foueault and aestlietics (Chapters Three and Four), 
and Matthew Barney and cinema (Chapter Five). Affinities exist between the sections, so 
that issues of appropriation are to the fore in Chaptem One and Five; of identification and 
loss of self in Two, Four and Five; of “vertigo” in Two and Three, and so on. In her 
inestimable study of the ‘Arcades Project,’ Susan Buck-Morss argues that Benjamin’s 
theoiy of the “dreamworld” of modernity draws on elements “bound together more by 
literaiy than logical means.” *^* Yet this is not to say that literaiy modes displace historical 
insights, because “the quality of historical experience that Benjamin was tiying to capture 
in this theoretical montage is conveyed, and it is vital to his project. Moreover ... the 
theoiy is unique in its approach to modem society, because it takes mass culture seriously 
not merely as the source of the phantasmagoria of false consciousness, but as the source 
of collective energy to overcome it.”®* It is here that an important, exemplaiy, model for 
an affiimative approach to culture starts to take shape.
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Georges Bataille dreamed of writing a book consisting only of prefaces, a work that 
would promise what was to come and not ever disappoint or beti'ay its promise by filling 
in what ought to remain incomplete and open. Walter Benjamin dreamed of writing, or 
rather compiling, a book consisting entirely of quotations, a montage of fragments that 
would reveal to the reader something of the past and/in something of the present. If it is 
not too pretentious to say so (it is, but...) this thesis is haunted by something of each of 
these dreams -  the inaugural and the re-collected, the introduction and the citation. The 
death of Jacques Derrida in 2004 brought home the generational passing of a certain 
moment in critical thought. But, for me, it is this thought that continues to inaugurate the 
possibility o f criticising the present, of framing and directing thought; it still functions 
“epigraphically” in that sense, and is perhaps now more than ever amenable to new re­
collections and juxtapositions. Though death is a fr'equent motif in what follows, I do not 
think there is yet a need to write epitaph for critical theory.
In order to advance these ai’guments the thesis is organised into the following chapters: 
Chapter One
To establish the parameters of my reading of Foucault, and my sense o f the problematics 
to which genealogy can useMly respond, I begin by setting out a case study of Cornelia 
Parker’s 2003 work The Distance (a kiss with string attached). The Distance, which
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received scant critical attention, makes reference to Duchamp both in its modus operandi 
(appropriation) and in a specific allusion to his 1942 “mile of string” installation.
Pumuing the thread of this allusion seives to open up questions in pertaining to the 
interpretation of the Duchampian tradition, and key texts here are Thieny de Duve’s Kant 
After Duchamp, which presents Duchamp as the knowing and subvei*sive manipulator of 
art histoiy, and Amelia Jones’s Postmodernism and the Engendering o f  Marcel 
Duchamp, which questions the paradoxical originaiy patriarchal status given to Duchamp 
by postmodern critics. Interestingly botli books aie explicitly Foucauldian in 
methodological approach, but rather than intenogating the validity of their claims to this 
position, I use them to address what I take to be a more fundamental problem -  that of the 
inevitably fictive and desire-driven basis of art historical nanative. Parker’s work leads 
on to discussion o f other instances of work that is either Duchampian or “curatorial” in 
mode, and raises the question of what art history’s function is in relation to such work, 
which is profoundly “at home” in the museum.
Chapter Two
This issue is pushed further in an extension of the case study of The Distance, in which 
the chain of associations derived fiom it is pushed further, to come full circle to a 
conclusion which suggests theoretical short-comings in the predominant models of image 
and refiexivity derived fiom a psychoanalytic fi'amework. The key problematic here 
centres on questions of reification and réanimation, fetishism (in a jointly Marxian and 
Freudian sense, as theorised by Meike Bal and Laura Mulvey, and photography, death 
and the image (theorised by Craig Owens and Victor Burgin). Finally, by following these
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linked theorisations, I address Vertigo, Alfred Hitchcock’s 1958 masteipiece, drawing on 
feminist and Lacanian inteipretations to elucidate its radical implications for 
conceptualising identification and the copy. Taking Slavoj Zizek’s synthesis o f Lacanian 
and Hegelian-Marxist insights as the most sophisticated such inteipretation available, I 
tiy to demonstrate that the models of “screening” and identification often used in visual 
theoiy disavow the most radical implications of their own insight, a half measure that, in 
Zizek’s terms at least, is politically regressive and philosophically problematic. Ciucially, 
this account also serves to open up an important critical response to the paradoxical 
originaiy status attributed to Duchamp as “author function.” In so doing I establish the 
pai’ameters which determine my own inteipretation of Foucault fi'om within art histoiy, 
and the limits which I see his own writing as consti’ained (and enabled) by.
Chapter Three
Beginning with alternate models for a positively “vertiginous” aesthetic, I address what I 
perceive to be a problem in the critical and historical inteipretation of art works which 
mine (or mime) various institutional procedures. I suggest that the typical deployment of 
Foucauldian thought in this field is too limited. Texts like Philip Fisher’s Making and 
Effacing Art, or Douglas Crimp’s On the Museum's Ruins invoke Foucault in support of a 
basically historicist analysis ofmodemity’s epistemological procedures as materialised in 
the museum. Other writers, including Hal Foster, use Foucault’s concepts of archaeology 
and discourse to critique Modernist assumptions about autonomy and authorship. This 
type of analysis is usefiil, but misses more troublesome aspects of Foucault’s histoiy 
writing, including his insistence that his works amount to “fictions” that he didn’t write
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himself, and related questions of inteipretation which emerge within their explicitly 
Nietzschean framework. This chapter thus begins a close reading of Foucault, in the light 
of the discoveries of chapter one. My approach is to focus on sections in Foucault that 
refer explicitly to art works and to recontextualise them in teims of the aesthetics of the 
text rather than as positive claims about the ontology of art. In other words, I show that 
Foucault’s writings on art (which constitute only a small proportion of his output), are not 
outlines of a putative Foucauldian aif histoiy, but serve rhetorical functions within his 
texts. Analysis of the passages on art in these terms does begin to throw light on the 
characteristics of Foucault’s writing of history, and I argue that the art work is in fact in 
its mobile historicity one paradigm for Foucault’s concept of historicity per se. In other 
words, contra the standard interpretation of Foueault’s notion of history as essentially 
static and synchronic, I emphasise that, particularly in The Order o f  Things and Madness 
and Civilisation, it is dynamic and not conventionally historicist. Central here are 
analyses of Foucault’s writing on Velazquez’s Las Meninas.
Chapter Four
Whilst my discussion o f Las Meninas enables identification of what I see as the 
hegemonic but misconceived art historical use of Foucault, a close reading of Foucault’s 
essay on the hyper-realist painter Gérard Fromanger establishes an alternative paradigm, 
focusing on the excessive qualities of his text, and its resonance with other examples of 
“laudatory exchange” between Foucault and other French intellectuals, including Gilles 
Deleuze, Pieire Klossowski, Maurice Blanchot and Georges Bataille. It investigates the 
intertwining of epistemological, ethical and aesthetic registers in a series of texts written
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by Foucault on other (primarily literaiy) French intellectuals. These essays are 
characterised by then affinnative and identificatoiy tone, as well as by the recuiTence of 
tropes that I read as deeply connected to Foucault’s project in general: the labyrinthine 
quality of language, anonymity, limit and transgression, the spectral or ghost-like. These 
themes are formative of Foucault’s texts insofar as they drive the ethics of his relation to 
others’ thought and provide the aesthetic which shapes his expression of that relation. 
(This is an aspect of the idea of “writing the self’ which is noimally only associated with 
“later” -  i.e. 1980s -  Foucault). These themes are in fact shared by the literaiy figures 
Foucault writes on, and the culture of laudatory exchange in French culture has been 
analysed in Eleanor Kaufinan’s book The Delirium o f Praise which is itself heavily 
indebted to Derrida’s The Politics o f Friendship. I use both these authors to analyse the 
form and context of Foucault’s writing and to assess the extent to which his own concept 
o f histoiy as fiction is to be understood in this light. I see such writers, and the mode of 
laudatoiy exchange, as providing Foucault with a counteiwailing force in his œiivre to the 
authoritative naiTative voice in which his histories are delivered. Via Denida’s analysis 
OÎ acolyte and anacoluthon (that is, he who follows and the rhetorical figure of that which 
does not follow) as not opposed, I address the question of the aesthetic and ethical 
problems of philosophical indebtedness. Here I pumue a closely intertwined set of texts -  
circling ai ound Nietzsche and Montaigne -  to establish a model of philosophical 
relationality that involves precisely the themes of the labyrinth, the selfless, the spectral 
established earlier, and also bearing on the aesthetics and ethics of epistemological 
appropriation. I analyse Foucault’s two essays on Nietzsche: Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, 
which foregrounds and privileges Nietzschean inteipretation; and Nietzsche, Genealogy,
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Histoiy, which (veiy) closely aligns Foucault’s notion of genealogy with that developed 
in The Genealogy o f Morals and elsewhere. I also analyse Foucault’s more passing 
references to Nietzsche, both in inteiwiews, and throughout his early texts (especially 
Madness and Civilization, The Order o f Things, and The Birth o f the Clinic). The main 
thmst of my argument here is: to show the importance of Nietzsche for Foucault; to show 
how this is registered in his texts, and to what effect; to address the problematic status of 
Nietzsche as originaiy (an echo of the problem identified in Chapter One in relation to 
Duchamp); to relate two fundamental characteristics of Nietzsche’s thought to Foucault’s 
-  namely, the radical emphasis on inteipretation over facticity, and the fictive production 
of authorial status.
Chapters Two-Four having established via close reading a more complex and nuanced (as 
well as more problematic) context for Foucauldian thought, I now attempt a “genealogy” 
of my own in relation to an artwork not generally thought of in such teims... ^
Chapter Five (Conclusion)
Here I make a second art historical case study, but this time one that looks foi*ward to 
emerging modes of ait production, rather than hack to the museal fate of modernism. I 
attempt a genealogical critique of Matthew Barney’s Cremaster films which draws on the 
identificatoiy logic internal to the films’ esoteric naivative. Here I take advantage of 
Barney’s appropriation ofiidentification with Harry Houdini to move beyond the fantasy 
o f the Cremaster nanative, whilst retaining an openly fictive approach to my analysis of 
the relation between Houdini’s “real” escapology and Bamey’s imaginaiy escapism, hi
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this chapter the Octoberist orientation of the first chapter is displaced by the 
interpretative model established via Foucault, and I point to an alternative model of 
critique.®  ^My thesis thus reaches a somewhat open conclusion, having displaced one 
reading of Foucault, and one problematic of critical art histoiy with another which I see 
as potentially more productive, but also perhaps more risky. The questions which remain 
open include: to what extent can art histoiy perfonnatively draw attention to its narrative 
and fictive procedures whilst retaining its explanatoiy historical force? To what extent 
can Foucauldian thought suiwive outwith the context of its initial appropriation into 
cultural discourse? How much fi eedom have we in articulating the genealogies of our 
present to critical effect?
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CHAPTER ONE: With Strings Attached...
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was ’ 
(Ranke). It means to seize hold o f a memory as it flashes up at a moment o f danger.... In 
every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that 
is about to overpower it.... Only that historian will have the gift o f fanning the spark o f 
hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the 
enemy i f  he wins.
Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy o f Histoiy.
It now takes about six hours to fly to New York City from Western Europe. It took 
Marcel Duchamp nine days to make the same journey onboard the Rochambeau when he 
first crossed the Atlantic in June 1915. The technologically driven collapse of distance 
has been one signal transformation of the world in the twentieth century, with high-speed 
transport dramatically shortening travelling times, and with electronic communication 
flirtlier rendering physical remoteness no barrier to co-presence (at least in the viitual). 
These transformations have, of course, impacted profoundly upon culture, and the 
consequences have been widely discussed. In particular, the way that historical memory 
is deleteriously impacted by the virtualised space and temporal immediacy of spectacle is 
a common theme of cultural and political critique, and has been, in fact, since Walter
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Benjamin’s classic essays of the late 1920s and 1930s, at least. * The question of how to 
rally an anamnesiac relation to the past pertains not only to historical art works, but also 
to theories such as Benjamin’s, which in some ways now appear historically distant 
themselves. Linear models of history seem inadequate to deal with the actual historicity 
of such critical moments, but whether they can be brought to bear in the present without 
effacing the specificity of their conditions of emergence, is a vexed question. It is the aim 
of this chapter to address this issue in relation to the artistic sphere, though the critical 
and political (and their interconnection) hopehilly remain in view, at least by implication, 
throughout.^
Just as Duchamp himself was to continue to move between the Old World and the New 
throughout his life, so the reception of his artistic influence has made many transatlantic 
crossings. This reception, ricocheting between figures such as Richard Hamilton in 
Britain, Jasper Johns in New York, Arman and Tinguely in France (and innumerable 
others ever since the 1950s), has occurred at varying speeds and “with all kinds of 
delays,” but it is no exaggeration to say that Duchamp is the art historical figure 
indispensable for the understanding of eontemporary art.® This chapter sets out to explore 
the implications of this exemplary status: both to question it as a problematic framework 
for reading Duchamp, and to attempt to displace the model of recuperation and regression 
with which Peter Bürger influentially conceptualised the relations between “historical” 
and “neo-” avant-gardes.'* The aim is to acknowledge the ambiguous status of neo-avant- 
garde strategies at the beginning of the 21®* century, whilst not foreclosing the possibility 
that they might continue to offer spaces of critique which can be exploited by critically
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committed writing. It does so by deriving a set of key terms and tropes from an art work 
which exemplifies both the ambiguity and possibility inherent in contemporary art; one 
which, moreover, explicitly references Duchamp.
The last time /  made the journey to New York City my flight left from Amsterdam’s 
Schiphol Airport. Schiphol is a perfect example of the homogeneity of airport design - its 
Duty-Free zones, cafés, and fast-food outlets would be familiar to any modem air 
traveller. Schiphol does have one claim to fame however; an innovation in bathroom 
fixtures that was quickly adapted by John F. Kennedy airport in New York too. The male 
visitor to its bathrooms finds, as he prepares to take a leak, that the urinals have a life-size 
fly etched into their basins (Fig. 1). This fly is located at the optimum point for the safe 
and hygienic conducting of urine into the drain at the bottom of the urinal, and thus for 
the avoidance of the all-too-familiar pools of piss that tend to accumulate below urinals in 
public toilets. Of course, the pragmatic rationale of the design doesn’t go through your 
mind when you are actually engaged in the task of having a pee at Schiphol airport. You 
don’t even know that “your” urinal isn’t the only one with a fly in it. What you do, and 
studies have been done to prove it, is take aim at the fly, and thus do Schiphol’s cleaning 
staff a favour without even knowing it.
When Marcel Duehamp, under the pseudonym of Richard Mutt, introduced the urinal 
into the array of readymade objects that he enunciated as art, his so-called Fountain was 
rejected, “suppressed” even, by the jury of the Society of Independent Artists in 1917. 
Duchamp was a member of the Independents’ Committee, and, apart from offering his
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opinion that “Mutt’s” urinal should be accepted, he did little to prevent them refusing it 
and thereby revealing that their commitment to independence was really in bad faith/
The urinal itself was removed from its concealed location behind a partition in the 
exhibition space, and after making a brief appearance to be photographed by Alfred 
Steiglitz at 291 (Fig. 2), disappeared. Whether Duchamp himself was the author of this 
disappearing act is unclear, but there is little doubt that he was the author of its 
reappearance in the art historical record via the second Number of the journal The Blind 
Man, where the justification for its artistic merit was couched in tellingly European 
terms: “America has given nothing except for its bridges and its plumbing.”^
Thierry de Duve, playing on Duchamp’s own description of The Bride Stripped Bare... as 
a “delay” rather than a painting, sees Fountain as a “delay in porcelain,” accurately 
naming the temporality of the work, both in Duchamp’s œuvre, and in art histoiy, where 
it has always arrived late, with all kinds o f delays J  The reappearances of urinals, or 
fountains, both by or c?/Marcel Duchamp, and more recently by a number of other artists 
participating in the ongoing elaboration of the Duchampian are well documented. To 
mention just some examples: in Duchamp’s own work there is Steiglitz’s photograph in 
The Blind Man, the Boîtes-en-valise (which included a miniature urinal place alongside 
the bachelors’ realm in The Bride Stripped Bare...), the urinal purchased by Sidney Janis 
and signed by Duchamp in 1950, and the Arturo Schwarz commissioned replica 
readymades of 1964 (Figs. 3-5); “fountains” have also been made by Bruce Nauman, 
Shenie Levine, and Robert Gober.® These artistic repetitions of Fountain trace a history 
of its changing valence as critical strategy. Nauman’s photographic self-portrait as
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fountain (Fig. 6) and the related neon text work The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous 
Fountain (Fig. 7) imply that the artist is himself a commodified, reified object, thus 
extending the critical thrust of the readymade against the aesthetic object in the direction 
of the aesthetic subject? Levine’s work opens up the gendered basis of the aesthetic 
subject-object relation, and uses appropriation to question the propriety of art.*** With 
Gober’s work in particular (for example, Three Urinals, Fig. 8) it is clear that among the 
meanings of his appropriation of Duchamp’s “original” readymade, alongside its 
reference to the proliferation or serialisation of urinals in art, is a playful, though not 
flippant, nod to the fact that such appropriations of appropriators, or of acts of 
appropriation, are rivalrous even if they comment, in an act of critical repetition, on 
artistic rivalry itself. In other words, with Gober the story of art remains to an extent a 
pissing contest, even amongst the postmodern appropriators.
Rosalind Kiauss addressed urination as an instance of rivalrous erotics in the final 
chapter of her book The Optical Unconscious Drawing on Freud’s Civilization and Its 
Discontents, where the primitive phallic rivalry with nature registered in the impulse to 
pee on the fire is read as “an enjoyment of masculine potency in homosexual rivalry,” 
Krauss argues that the relationship between Jackson Pollock’s drip works and Warhol’s 
Oxidation Paintings (Fig, 9) is a (sublimated) instance of the recuiTence of this 
enjoyment in the form of “mimetic rivalry.”*^  The dynamics of mimetic rivalry in the 
literaiy field have been extensively explored by René Girard, who theorises that all 
desires are triangulated - mediated by a relationship to an Other - and thus that no desire 
can be original. Whereas Krauss employs this theoiy to hypothesise that Pollock’s
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“ontological sickness” -  his uncertainty of being -  was rooted in mimetic rivalry (with 
his brothers, with Picasso), it is possible to argue that it bears as much on art historical 
writing as it does on art historical relationships of influence. This can be discerned in 
Girard’s description of triangulation as a narrative structure, in which the desiring subject 
is joined to its desired object via a mediator. The will to be oneself 2inô. occupy the 
position of narrative agent is borrowed from a mediating Other, and “the mediator is 
imaginaiy but not the mediation.”*® Thus a real structure is derived from a fictive base. 
Likewise, “the impulse toward the object is primarily an impulse toward the mediator,” 
the imaginaiy rival for possession of the object.*'* This is obscured in philosophical and 
aesthetic discourse because it gives the lie to the “illusion of autonomy to which modern 
man is passionately devoted.”*® The mediator as rival determines, by his relative distance 
or proximity, the strength of “metaphysical” (triangulated) desire, and as the object 
cannot be adequate to this desire, possession of it leads only to disappointment. Once 
acquired, “the object has suddenly been suddenly desecrated by possession and reduced 
to its objective qualities.”*^
Though mimetic rivalry persuades us of the mediator’s “divinity,” the notion of a truly 
original and self-possessed Other is a fiction; the mediator himself may end up “copying 
the copy of his own desire .... model-disciple and a disciple-model. Each imitates the 
other while claiming that his own desire is prior and previous.” *^ Duchamp was not 
unaware of the potential for “men [to] become gods in the eyes of each other” (to borrow 
one of Girard’s chapter titles); in his eatalogue entry on Picasso for the collection of the 
Société Anonyme he wrote: “Every now and again the world looks for an individual on
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whom to rely blindly -  such worship is comparable to a religious appeal and goes beyond 
reasoning. Thousands today in quest of supernatural aesthetic emotion turn to Picasso, 
who never lets them down.”*® Ironically, it is precisely Duchamp’s uncannily 
comprehensive occupation of the roles associated with the creation and dissemination of 
art -  artist, dealer, advisor to collectors, competition judge, publisher, cataloguer, 
librarian, slide-show lecturer (in his later years) -  that makes him into such an object of 
attention in post-war art, and which leads to more and more of his life becoming thought 
of as part of his work -  including obscure catalogue entries!
If all desire is mediated via “rivalrous identification,” then all desire is the copy of a 
copy. The ontological doubt which recognition of this structure must produce should 
surely be all the more sharply felt when the copied copy announces itself as such. This is 
the case with Duchamp, and particularly with the Readymades, yet his non-original status 
is rarely acknowledged within art historical narrative, perhaps because this would 
undermine the drive to possess (in knowledge) the trath of his works. The réintroduction 
of desire into the dynamic of appropriation, exemplified here by Gober’s urinals, 
complements the recent aeknowledgement of such problematic themes in theoiy too: 
Amelia Jones’s writing on Duchamp being the best example.*** Jones sees Duchamp as a 
counter-part to the figure of Pollock as re-read as “originary trope for the performative 
subject of postmodernism.” *^* Duchamp, on the other hand, is often thought as the 
“father” of the Johnsian line of artists “within the codes of an anti-masculinist and, in the 
U.S. context, potentially (if subtextually) homosexual artistic subjectivity.” *^ Though this 
validates a radical re-working of art history’s normative model in one sense, it relies on it
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in another: “Identifying Duchamp as “ancestor-hero” is a means of authorizing him, the 
ancestral line he “fathers,” and, by extension, the interpreter (as knowing the “true 
meaning” both of Duchamp and of postmodernism).”®^ But how is art history to narrate 
works structured by mimetic rivalry, to acknowledge that appropriation is not in itself a 
critique of such rivahy, as well as taking to heart the lesson that narrative too is 
stmctured by a desire that is not original, for objects that are not original? In attempting 
to propose one answer to this question I take as a privileged example an artwork that 
operates through a reference to Duchamp, and that has been considered in only one 
(limited) register by art historians so far: Cornelia Parker’s 2003 work The Distance (a 
kiss with string attached) (Fig. 10).
Parker’s work was made for Tate Britain’s 2003 triennial Days Like These, which 
featured, supposedly, a representative selection of British art at the start of the new 
millennium.®® The Distance was given a prime location, in the Tate’s Octagon, and 
attracted publicity thanks to its status as the nearest thing to “yBa” scandal-mongering in 
Days Like These. Its media-friendliness included, in a muted echo of attacks on works by 
Damien Hirst and Tracey Emin, an act of vandalism in which the string was cut from it -  
an event that gave it a second life in terms of newsworthiness.®'* The Distance is (initially 
at least) an incredibly simple work, and the inteipretation panel which accompanied it 
during Days Like These provides a very concise description of its material basis. I 
reproduce it in hill here to indicate exactly how the work was presented to the public by 
Days Like These'.
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The Distance (a kiss with string attached) 2003 
marble and string 
Courtesy the Artist
Cornelia Parker often works with found’ or pre-existing objects which she 
modifies or transforms in some way. For this piece she has worked with Tate 
Conservators, and has wrapped a mile o f string around Rodin’s sculptu?'e 
‘The Kiss one o f the most famous works in Tate’s collection. Parker is 
interested in the possibility o f taking something familiar or clichéd and 
changing it in an attempt to trigger new layers o f meaning. Here, the simple 
gesture o f wrapping string around this iconic work creates a sinister yet 
elegiac effect. Binding the two embracing lovers together in this way 
acknowledges the complexity o f desire, which can be suffocating as well as 
passionate.
The work also reflects the artist's interest in Dada and Surrealism and in 
Marcel Duchamp who, in 1942, contributed to a Surrealist exhibition by 
criss-crossing a mile o f string through the galleiy space in order to impede 
visitors access to the work.
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Auguste Rodin 1840-1917 
The Kiss 1901-4 
Pentelican Marble
Tate: Purchased with assistance from the National Art Collections Fund and 
Public Contributions.
In its 200 or so words this text rehearses several ways of describing (and accrediting) The 
Distance^ and more or less exhausts the themes that can be found in the critical responses 
to it -  yet, patently, it hardly says the first thing about it. It is the lack of critical 
commentaiy on The Distance which I want to address, and redress, here. The responses 
to The Distance were mostly journalistic, and all are perfunctory. Vov Art Monthly's 
Martin Herbert, it was a safe piece of “broadsheet-baiting” that paid too much homage to 
the “over-mentioned overlord” Ducham p.Perhaps it was the ongoing debates in art 
critical circles during 2003 about the “crisis of criticism” that got in the way of serious 
engagement with Parker’s work, perhaps it was simply deemed uninteresting. For my 
part, 1 find it an interesting challenge: if this work is so generic, so unremarkable as to 
provoke no art historical response, might it not exemplify, in a telling way, the conditions 
under which art is currently being made, and provide a challenge to art history’s ability to 
respond to these conditions, to connect a work like this to its genealogy? The context of 
its display, in an exhibition explicitly claiming to survey contemporary art in Britain, 
certainly invites an attempt to respond to that challenge. Most importantly, The Distaiice 
asks, in its seemingly unremarkable binding of Rodin and Duchamp, what it means to 
make such connections, an interpretative action which is, after all, one of art history’s
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most basic operations. What desires, what tensions, what knots operate in the 
articulations that underpin so much art historical narrative?
The majority of the reaction to Parker’s work came in the daily press. The most 
outspoken commentator was James Fenton in the Guardian, for whom The Distance was 
an insult to Rodin and to gallery-goers. Perceiving himself, as an art lover, to be the 
target of Parker’s “destructive fantasies” -  fantasies born, he asserts, of what he assumes 
to be her arrogance, vacuousness and self-importance -  he drew the conclusion that the 
Tate’s acquiescence to Parker’s whims was a sign that they too “despise” the sculpture, 
which Fenton argues should not have been subjected to such undignified treatment.
This outburst may represent a certain type of response to The Distance, but is, for all its 
bluster, essentially a red-herring -  neither opponents nor supporters of Parker’s work 
seemed really bothered by it; the arguments it might obviously provoke either way are by 
now so well rehearsed that no-one can muster more than a generic response. Yet, as 
already indicated, it is the work’s very generic status that gives it its putative interest. 
With its Duchampian “assisted” (or perhaps “reciprocal”) readymade mode of creation, 
its institutional context, its media-friendliness, its existence after the span of the 
exhibition only as photographic image, even its suitability for “public access” (witness its 
use for children’s education programmes. Figs. 11, 12)^ ,^ The Distance can be read as a 
particularly canny staging of the conventions of art making and viewing as they stand at 
the beginning of the millennium, and as an apt articulation of the historicity of a specific 
strategy of making with the poetics of (interpretative) desire. To address the historical
36
dimension I will refer to some relevant details of Duchamp’s interest in Rodin, and also 
revisit Adorno’s ‘Valéiy Proust Museum’ amongst other museal reflections.
Firstly, the life story of Rodin’s sculpture (Fig. 13). The Tate’s Kiss is one of three full- 
scale versions made during Rodin’s lifetime, and represents Paolo and Francesca, tragic 
adulterous lovers who feature in Dante’s Inferno and who first appeared in Rodin’s œuvre 
amongst the bronze reliefs of The Gates o f Hell. The particular version owned by the Tate 
is a copy of the first marble Kiss, commissioned by Edward Warren for his Sussex home 
in 1900. Spending most of the next 50 years in Warren’s stable block, it was briefly lent 
to Lewes Town Hall during WWl, but was deemed offensive by the locals, and 
potentially morally harmful to the troops billeted there. After a spell under tarpaulin it 
was sent back to the stables and was only rescued from that fate in the 1950s, when a 
public appeal raised funds for its acquisition. Its eroticism was still deemed strong 
enough in 1957 for its planned use in a London Underground poster to be v e to e d .A  hit 
with the public, the work has had less luck with critics. Leo Steinberg has argued strongly 
that to recover Rodin for modernism means removing from the equation works like The 
Kiss, which he argues, are in no real way by Rodin’s hand. Having signed them, Rodin is 
legally -  but not aesthetically -  responsible, for them Steinberg argues.
There are over 300 extant versions of The Kiss, not all authorized by Rodin, and they 
vary in technical q u a lity .F o r Rosalind Kimiss, it is precisely works such as this which 
undermine the confident claims of modernist authorship in relation to Rodin. In ‘The 
Originality of the Avant-Garde’ she compares the notion of the original in Rodin’s
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sculpture with the notion of the “original” photographic print, which Benjamin had 
pointed out in the Artwork essay was a contradiction in term s.K rauss identifies a far- 
reaching “ethos of reproduction” in Rodin’s working practices; from the manufacture of 
the plasters that constitute the “core” of his œuvre, to the foundiy casting in which he 
took no part.^^ This ethos was, however, covered over by another: the cult of Rodin’s 
genius, encouraged by the artist himself, supported in print by Rainer Maria Rilke, and 
publicised by the “hand-of-God” and “progenitor” imageiy implicit in the work, and 
reinforced in photographic portraits.T hus, though at the level of technical 
reproducibility there is not so much to choose between Rodin and Duchamp, in terms of 
the explicit acknowledgement of the fact, there is a profound difference.
The strongest expression of support for the uniqueness of Rodin’s genius comes from 
Rilke, whose critical distance was somewhat compromised by his presence in Rodin’s 
studio as secretary between September 1905 and May 1906, a fact registered in his 
deferential use of maître to address the sculptor. (Rilke was eventually sacked for 
replying to Rodin’s personal correspondence, i.e. for speaking on his behalf. Here we 
encounter a cautionary figure of the writer on art who abandons distance in favour of 
intimacy...). The profound connection assumed to exist between the uniqueness of the 
creative subject and the autonomy of the aesthetic object is clear in Rilke’s prose. The 
religious context which had formerly provided a sympathetic context for sculpture was no 
longer viable, but though sculpture had could now assume an independent existence:
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“it must be distinguished from the other things, the familiar things, which 
anyone could grasp hold of. Somehow it must become untouchable, 
sacrosanct, isolated from chance and from time, in which it rises, solitary and 
wonderfLil as the face of a clairvoyant. It must retain its own sure place, 
where no caprice had set it, and be introduced into the silent duration of 
space, and into its great laws.” "^^
This material instantiation of this space, evoked in ideal terms by Rilke, is the museum. 
As Ariella Azoulay has argued, once art was “faced with an accelerating loss of place” it
“denied this loss by establishing certain unique places in which the drama of 
the loss of aura (which makes it possible for the mourning to continue) is re­
enacted anew with each viewing. When the work of art loses its anchor in any 
particular place and does not need a place of presence to be, museums -  clear 
spaces, retrospective exhibitions, art galleries -  are constituted as its proper 
place.”^^
Thus a symbiotic relationship between the autonomous artwork as original and the 
museum as shrine to the loss of that auratic originality is established. Thus there is a 
mutual dependency between display space and dislocated art work. Rodin’s work is 
distinct from “familiar things” according to Rilke because it is “untouchable.” For 
Benjamin, this is one definition of aura; “the unique phenomena of a distance, however 
close it may be.”^^  It is the closure of this distance, effected by technical reproduction’s
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shift from cult/ritual value to “exhibition” value, which is the cause for Benjamin’s 
optimism about the utopian dimension of the loss of art’s aura. Rilke’s reading proceeds 
in the opposite direction, with the museum as the context for the preservation of aura.
The autonomy enabled by the museum and hymned by Rilke is coextensive with the 
sense of wholeness he believes is achieved in Rodin’s sculptures: beyond any mere 
“circumstantial” considerations, for instance the physical incompleteness of a body 
missing limbs, “one stands before them as before something whole, perfected, which 
allows no augmentation”.^  ^Not only can a fragmented body form such an autonomous 
whole, but figure groupings can likewise be thought as monads. Hence, for Rilke, the
“unexampled binding-together of figures, this cohesion of images, this never- 
letting-go at any price. He does not begin with figures that embrace one 
another; he has no models that he arranges and places together. He starts with 
the regions of most intense contact, as if at the high-points of the work.... The 
magic of that wonderful grouping of a girl and a man which is called The Kiss 
lies in such a wise distribution of its life.... This is why one seems to see the 
rapture of the kiss in every part of these bodies: it is like a sun that rises, and 
its light shines everywhere.
As to Rodin’s own relation to the autonomous life of his works, for Rilke it is not only 
his original creative act, but his continued power of animation over them, which binds 
artist and sculpture together. And this is the case, Rilke emphasises, for the works Rodin
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owned (as part of his collection) as well as those he made: “for when, often at night, he 
passes carefiilly about them, as if not to wake them all, and finally, holding a small light, 
steps up to an antique marble, which stirs and awakens and suddenly arises, it is life 
which he has come to find and which he now admires.. This intimate relationship 
between Rodin “as a lover, whom nothing could resist” and his works is characterized, 
significantly for the emergent terms of this discussion, by analogy to childhood object- 
re la tions.T o  imaginatively grasp this relation, Rilke suggests one “return now with a 
portion of your weaned and grown-up feelings to any of your childhood things, one 
which you always had with you. Think whether there was ever anything closer, more 
intimate or more necessary to you than such a t h i n g . O n e  becomes unaware in 
adulthood “that you still have need of things, which, like those things from your 
childhood, await your tmst, your love and devotion.”"^  ^It is the ‘thing’ in this sense which 
is the focus of Part II of Rilke’s text and which names the autonomous art work: “.. .the 
thing itself, which, irrepressible, comes forth from the hands of a man, is like the Eros of 
Socrates, is a daimon, an intermediary between god and man, itself not beautiful, but 
purest love of beauty and purest longing for it.”'^  ^ If Rilke’s Rodin is the animating force 
who produces objects which are themselves whole, and which we relate to as pre- 
Symbolic (pre-weaning) parts of ourselves (if we can put ourselves in Rodin’s intimate 
relation to them), then we must note that such a fantasy is doubly regressive in the sense 
that it returns to the narcissistic inability to recognise Other and object as separate from 
self, and in the sense that it radically precludes an acknowledgement of the actual 
conditions of production of the works, as detailed by Krauss. Already one aspect of The 
Distance’s seeming simplicity has been complicated. It doesn’t juxtapose, as one might
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imagine, Rodin’s sculpture as “original” to Duchamp’s string as “readymade” strategy, 
but points to the logic of reproduction already at work, but veiled, in The Kiss.
Parker’s intervention in The Kiss's history may, according to our feelings about the 
result, make us see the emotional/erotic charge of Rodin’s sculpture as either enhanced or 
negated; certainly as a representation of romantic love it has been complicated. We may 
feel the addition of the string either liberates the content of the original sculpture, 
releasing it from the hold of cliché by binding it to the present; or that it satirises the 
immobility, the constriction of the idea of love it has come to exemplify (as one of 
modernity’s characteristic traps...). Parker’s intervention in the presentation of the Tate’s 
sculpture seems to give it the kiss of life, redeeming it not only from its lapse into cliché, 
over-familiarity and kitsch, but also from the burden of its troubled relationship with 
Rodin’s authorship. Indeed, this last point begins to open the discussion of The Distance 
up, moving it from the poetic/redemptive/aesthetic aspect of Parker’s work to a critical 
dimension, latent but unexplored as yet by critical writing.
In attempting to make art historical sense of The Distance, then, one might proceed by 
taking different distances from  it: first thinking about it in relation to Parker’s own œuvre-, 
then in connection to related practices which operate in similar modes; then in terms of 
the art-historical equation Rodin + Duchamp = ?; and finally -  speculatively -  in terms of 
art history’s relationship to its objects, especially as a narrative form attempting to make 
sense of non-linear histories in a cultural field being continually transformed by the 
forces of Capital.
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Parker’s own stated understanding of how The Distance relates to her œuvre focuses on 
its punning quality -  its presentation of Rodin’s lovers in a “double bind”.'^ '^  The use of 
the pun as a strategy for undermining language’s referential function in favour of the 
poetic, and for materialising its plurivocality -  which is a defining characteristic of 
Parker’s work (see, for example, Words that define gravity, 1992, Fig. 14, ox Projection, 
1996), has its precedents in Duchamp; for instance in Fresh Widow, and the selection of 
25 puns printed for the Boite-en-valise as “Modified Printed Readymades” and referred to 
(punningly) by Duchamp as Morceaux moisis or “written rotten.”"^  ^The clichéd quality of 
The Kiss, as subject of many reproductions, as something, in her words, “done to 
d e a t h , a l s o  makes it of interest to Parker, who has an enduring interest in the 
relationship between the “monumental” and the “cliché,”'^  ^and who often works with 
objects which have known, or presumed, histories already attached to them,'^  ^This is 
sometimes a question of cultural associations (for instance in her wedding ring 
“drawings”), sometimes of acts of “cartoon violence” documented and materially evident 
in transformed materials (e.g. Cold Dark Matter, or 30 Pieces o f Silver -  both in the 
Tate’s collection), and sometimes historical associations (e.g. Grooves in a Record that 
Once Belonged to Hitler, Fig. 15). Though in some of these cases the pre-histories of the 
objects are evident, in many the viewer is placed in the position of having to take Parker 
at her word, and noting that the objects’ auratic character as souvenirs in narrative is 
contingent on what may be fictional constmcts.'^^ Parker also suggests that works which 
play on drawing and measurement, such as her metal “drawings” provide a context for 
the thematic content of The Distance. If, however, we put aside Parker’s own statements
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in favour of addressing the enunciative conditions of The Distance itself, another 
perspective on it can be opened up.
There are other works by Parker which have explicitly addressed the fate of auratic 
objects in the museum, and which arguably provide more relevant bases for comparison. 
In particular, Fly That Died on Don Judd’s Sculpture, (2001, Fig. 16) and The Maybe 
(1995, Fig. 17), can be usefully considered in this relation. The former humourously 
comments on the ineluctability of death even within the most carefiilly controlled temple 
to pure modernist aesthetics -  Judd’s collection at Marfa, Texas. The fly acts as a kind of 
messenger, intervening in the idealist space of the museum with an Et in Arcadia Ego. As 
well as echoing the fly etched in the airport urinal which was rather flippantly evoked at 
the outset of this discussion, and Duchamp’s own use of flies in the mordant 1959 works 
sculpture-morte and TORTURE-MORTE (Figs. 18, 19), this points to the use of flies in 
recent art which cathect Minimalist presentation with death as a figure for 
postmodernity’s parasitic relationship to Modernism, its “living on” by “living off.”^^  In 
particular, I am thinking of Damien Hirst’s 2002 Armageddon (Fig. 20) and Bing White’s 
photographs of flies trapped behind windows (Fig. 21). The former abjects the 
presentational format of minimalist monochromes by achieving its uniform surface 
through an amalgam of countless fly corpses, whilst the latter, more poetically, suggest 
resonances with photography’s own origins.^'
Connecting the Marfa fly to The Distance brings to the fore Parker’s interest in 
intimations of death in the museum context: a theme which is frequently explored in
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contemporaiy art. Whilst this begins to locate The Distance as object. The Maybe speaks 
to the subject’s inteipretative investment in such objects, particularly with regard to the 
narratives that fill out the horizon of their meaning. The Maybe, an installation at the 
Serpentine Galleiy, consisted of two components; first, a number of objects associated 
with historical figures, taken from various museum collections. These included: Charles 
Babbage’s brain (Fig. 22), the quill with which Dickens wrote his last novel, John 
Wesley’s spur, a fragment of the plane in which Charles Lindbergh crossed the Atlantic, 
Queen Victoria’s stocking, Faraday’s spark apparatus, and the rug and pillow from 
Freud’s analytic couch, amongst other items. The second dimension of The Maybe was a 
vitrine in which the actress Tilda Swinton slept during the exhibition’s opening hours, an 
“absent presence.”^^  Thus the auratic value accruing to the objects, and the poetic 
associations posited between them, were linked to the notion of dream or reverie; and the 
presence of a living (and famous) woman literally on display in the galleiy was 
juxtaposed with the metonymic and synecdochal fragments which represented absent, 
dead historical figures. We have to take it on faith that these objects are what they say 
they are, and Swinton’s presence implies that the connections between them owe more to 
the associative (fictive?) dynamics of dreams than to causal historical relationships. Lisa 
Tickner’s attempt to elicit a confirmation of a feminist agenda motivating this aesthetic in 
a recent interview with Cornelia Parker was notably unsuccessful, with Parker 
emphasising the distinction between her own attitude to her work, and that of art 
historical interpreters. This distinction is entirely relevant to the present interpretation 
also, but in terms of general methodology, and in the particular case of a work predicated 
on associative logic, this is not necessarily a weakness in the argument presented here.
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Indeed, Parker’s comment to Tickner that she is a “great admirer of Duchamp” but feels 
that for her, rather than taking objects “ready-made” she needs to first to “kill them off, 
so that I can remake them” both supports the basic thrust of my reading of The Distance 
and offers a rationale for my own “unmaking” of it.^ ^
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There is not a single one o f the divisions, a single one o f the double sides that the 
function o f vision presents, that is not manifested to us as a labyrinth. As we begin to 
distinguish its various fields, we always perceive more and more the extent to which they 
intersect.
Jacques Lacan, ‘ The Line and Light. ’
‘‘You have become the puppeteer o f your past."
Walter Arensberg, to Marcel Duchamp.
In The Maybe Parker worked, essentially, as a curator. She told Tickner that for her such 
works are like drawings: “the blank sheet of paper is the room.” "^^ Of course, Cornelia 
Parker isn’t alone in her interest in the museum as context. Increasingly, attention is 
being paid to the widespread utilisation of various museological practices and tropes by 
artists. These have taken many different forms, and some examples would include: Mark 
Dion’s archaeological works, Marcel Broodthaers fictive “Department of Eagles” in its 
various realisations;^^ Susan Hiller’s From the Freud Museum, the curatorial strategies of 
Readymades Belong to Everyone', Andrea Fraser’s performances as docent “Jane 
Castleton,” during her Museum Highlights: A Galleiy Talk in 1989 (Fig. 23). The 
use of museological strategies in an attempt to reveal the ideologies at work in the
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presentation of art has been a persistent strain of much of this “curatorial” art making. 
Amongst more strongly politicised versions of this practice are Hans Haacke’s use of 
provenance research as critical tool, and Fred Wilson’s recoveiy of revealing but hidden 
objects from the store room and re-curation of them, most notably in 1992’s Mining the 
Museum!’^  A show curated at Maiyland Historical Society, Mining the Museum 
juxtaposed a vitrine of repoussé silver with slave shackles also held, but not exhibited, in 
the same collection (Fig. 24). As Wilson put it “normally you have one museum for 
beautiful things and one museum for horrific things. Actually they had a lot to do with 
one another; the production of one was made possible by the subjugation enforced by the 
other.”^^  There is a clear resonance here with Walter Benjamin’s point that the historical 
materialist is always aware that cultural treasures “have an origin which he cannot 
contemplate without horror.... There is no document of civilization which is not at the 
same time a document of barbarism.” ®^ The curatorial mode of art making is, in this 
guise, continuous with the project of materialist histoiy.
One of the most significant -  in terms of critical sophistication -  of the artists working in 
this “curatorial mode” is Michael Asher. Asher is perhaps best known for his contribution 
to the 1979 American Exhibition at the Art Institute of Chicago, where he moved a 
replica of an eighteenth century statue of Georges Washington from the front steps at the 
museum’s entrance to an interior display space (Fig. 25). Asher locates his work under 
the rubric of “situational aesthetics” -  “an aesthetic system that juxtaposes predetermined 
elements occurring within the institutional framework, that are recognizable and 
identifiable to the public because they are drawn from the institutional context itself.
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Claude Gintz emphasises that Asher’s strategy is distinct from the Duchampian 
readymade paradigm, which he sees as succumbing, in its very enunciative conditions, to 
the institutional context whose legitimating fiinction it e x p o ses .In  contrast, Asher 
utilises elements already present in the closed institutional site, and does not leave a 
material trace to be recuperated under the sign of his authorship. Though I disagree with 
Gintz’s pessimistic analysis of the Readymade strategy, the issue of resistance or 
recuperation in relation to the art institution seems to me one of the key questions to be 
asked of The Distance.
The vitrine as display strategy, deployed by Parker in The Maybe, has been used 
frequently in recent British art in particular, and has attracted criticism for its problematic 
relationship with institutional power and aestheticisation. Jean Fisher has related her 
experience of working alongside forensic pathologists at the Human Pathology Museum, 
with its collection of abnormal bodies in Wunderkammer type displays, to the vitrine as 
art paradigm. The ubiquity of the vitrine as display mode in recent British art is extended 
by Fisher to include Cibachromes and lightboxes as “thin vitrines” and Damien Hirst’s 
notorious shark The Impossibility o f Death in the Mind o f Someone Living as a “thick 
vitrine,” with TV/video/computer screens as also part of this paradigm -  despite their 
moving images, in “space, content and affect, they always stay the same.”^’ In other 
words, the form in which such works present themselves produces a flindamental 
homogeneity of affect which overrides their otherwise marked heterogeneity. The texture 
of their enunciation has to be thought alongside the spectacular(ised) content they 
display.
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Just as in the Pathology Museum “the dismembered body” is rendered as an “utterly 
banal and anonymous relic: a perverse monument to the ideal,” so a new morbidity 
detectable in British art, seen in “pickled animals, heads of frozen blood, endoscopic 
excursions, mannequins mimicking genetically mutated humans, photos of the variously 
dysfunctional or the victims of pathological sexual acts,” ultimately banalizes art and 
But why has Fisher jumped from conditions of display (vitrines etc.) to a 
(questionable) morbidness of subject matter? She hypothesizes that “sensation" is sought 
vicariously in such work in an experience of “pathological excess” as it is absent from a 
mnemonically impoverished and banal everyday life.^  ^Such body horror seems to Fisher 
to be profoundly conserwative given the place given over to a monstrous otherness in the 
“normal” Western imaginary. '^* The question of art’s own morbidity, especially in its 
contemporary generalized museal context is not raised by Fisher, though it certainly 
seems relevant to a mode of art practice which has tried to solve the problem of this 
contextual but mortifying dependency on the institution and the increasing awareness of 
this fact. The “sensational” solution takes the form of “a hair of the dog that bit you” -  
which can also be read as an aestheticization of the very institutional features which came 
to be recognized as the ideological support of aesthetic experience.
Fisher links a Thatcherite nostalgia for Victorian mores to the Thatcherite generation’s 
(yBas) use of a quintessentially Victorian mode of display (vitrines) and way of looking 
(a fascination with “the relic, the primitive and the spectacle of grotesque and freakish 
humanity”).M oreover,
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“the vitrine is the display tool of the Victorian collector and rationalist; it is 
the place where the blood freezes and the body suffers a formaldehyde arrest, 
where the untidiness and chaos of life must be ordered and categorized. It is 
an idealizing frame that reduces the object to an image of itself. It doesn’t 
bring things closer to ‘life’, but, on the contrary, museifles, reifies, 
spectaciilarises and separates its contents (which can be anything whatsoever) 
from  life: everything is given an aura of value, but everything also becomes 
like the dead specimen of the Pathology Museum. The vitrine is therefore the 
terminal home of the dead.”^^
Here, to balance out Fisher’s notion of the categorizing, mortifying rationality of the 
vitrine, we could counterpose Benjamin’s figure of the collector and his chaotic passion -  
an anti-hierarchical and re-animating relation to objects which does away with use-value. 
Why has the vitrine returned now, Fisher asks, “what is in a state of terminal decay, or in 
need of artificial respiration?”^^  (Interestingly we see a double figure in the very terms of 
the question -  vitrine as mausoleum and hospital I.C.U. Does this not signal one reason 
why the vitrine is so central to fin-de-siecle British art; its dual role resonates with the 
fate of art in histoiy as dually, paradoxically present/absent, autonomous/institutional, 
singular/fragmented, dead/living, etc.? The use of the vitrine signals, on one level at least, 
that the artwork must both be mourned as lost, and preserved as melancholic love object 
-  which has indeed been its fate in many accounts of its histoiy, from pessimistic 
perceptions of its demise to attachments to its now outmoded and archaic aspects).
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In contrast to tliis moribund “British” art and its vitrines, Fisher highlights the work of 
politically-motivated postcolonial British artists. This work remains vital, she claims, 
perhaps because “the legacies of cultural trauma have yet to be fully narrativized and 
therefore cannot be laid to rest.”^^  In this final twist, then, Fisher suggests that 
narrativization allows the recognition of death proper, and shifts us out of the defensive 
melancholic attachment to the Victorian paradigm of the vitrine (where the dead object is 
held in suspension, a purgatorial limbo). Yet, with Benjamin, we see an alternate reading 
of this melancholic attachment, and its temporality and potential, one that might be put to 
critical, indeed revolutionary, use. In any case, it is by no means clear that we can pass 
from a fictive narrative that obscures out understanding, to a lucid one in which all the 
ghosts of our cultural legacies are banished. In fact, as both Susan Stewart and Hayden 
White alert us, the narrative that claims to renounce such fictive effect and rhetorical 
affects, is itself a trope which we would do well to be wary of -  as when, to take the most 
obvious contemporary example, George W. Bush or Tony Blair claim to bypass any 
mediation (“spin” etc.) and address us directly, by speaking “from the heart.”^^
If the vitrine as the display mode par excellence of the curatorial mode is a double figure 
-  both resting place of the dead and restorative place of the undead, so the curatorial 
mode itself as a critical strategy is marked by a duality of its own. For whilst the 
approaches of Asher, Broodthaers, Wilson, and other critical artists attempt to draw 
attention to the ideological status of the museum, others mine its aesthetic qualities, often 
through a return to modes of display that prioritise the enchanted associative logic of the
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“cabinet of curiosities.” Thus the critique of modern systems of classification and 
ordering is reworked into a return to the pre-modem paradigm of the WundeiLammer. 
Writing of this artistic approach to the museum, James Putnam describes it as motivated 
by “an instinctive and mysterious love of things which have no relationship to each other. 
This is the result of a sammeltrieb or primal urge to co lle c t.T h o u g h  he draws on 
similar sources to Putnam (including Benjamin and Broodthaers), Douglas Crimp draws a 
veiy different conclusion from them, arguing on the radical exteriority of the 
Wunderkammer to the modern museum. The evocation of the Sammeltrieb, which 
originates with Julius von Schlosser, is, rightly in my view, read by Crimp as an 
ahistorical essentializing of the property relations idealised in the museum, the histoiy of 
which he sees as culminating in “the conjuncture of exhibitions as a form of public 
relations, of the ultimate reduction of art to private property, and of the evolution of 
artistic strategies into those of a pure alignment of power.
Though museal ways of working have often been associated with an attack on modernist 
assumptions about autonomy, authorship and originality, there has also been a 
countervailing trend towards aestheticising museum conventions and “authorising” the 
role of the curator. The rise of the curator-as-celebrity (witness Rudi Fuchs, Harald 
Szeemann, Hans-Ulrich Olbrist, et al)', of the artist-as-curator (Richard Wentworth, 
Tacita Dean amongst many examples); and of the celebrity-as-curator (for instance film 
director Peter Greenaway) points to the ironic recuperation of institutional critique under 
the very figure of creative authorship it set out to challenge.^^ By a kind of “cunning of 
reason,” awareness of the specificity of the institutional conditions shaping modernist
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medium-specific aesthetic experience is turned into the aestheticisation of those framing 
conditions. The act of curation, of assembling and arranging art objects in a certain 
sequence in a particular place, has been reinscribed with all the creative freedom claimed 
for the creative subjects of Modernism. This condition has been aptly described by Philip 
Fisher, who suggests that in a reworking of Greenberg’s notion of an “area of 
competence” much post-war art is adapted to the museum as an “effacing” but 
inescapable context. The strategy often employed in response to this condition is a 
reduplication of the museum’s effects: “If the museum itself is a collection of the diverse, 
then the individual painting [or other artwork] might adapt itself to this heterogeneity by 
offering itself as suitable for a collection insofar as it already is one.”^^
Alongside the rise of the curator as auteur^^ and its recuperation of aura and authorship, 
has emerged the new exhibitionary form termed the “ahistorical” exhibition by Debora 
Meijers.^^ The name is taken from Harald Szeeman’s 1988 A-Historische Klancken, at 
Rotterdam’s Museum Boijmans-van Beuningen. In rearranging the museum’s collection 
Szeeman abandoned chronological or art-historically thematic principles of organization, 
instead curating rooms on the basis of ‘empathy’, which, supposedly, justified an 
aesthetic use of juxtaposition, the contiguity of the incongruent.^^ A-Historiche Klanken, 
as well as making such art-(a)historical connections, effectively joined a reactionary 
conception of art (rooms were themed according to such categories as “cryptic silence” 
and “sacral elevation”) and a claim for the authorial creativity of the curatov-auteur. In 
the ahistorical exhibition, having been “liberated” from the constraint of chronology and 
other classificatory schemas, the art works are intended by Szeemann to “resonate in
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other works of art to produce a spatial d ia lo g u e .T h e  exhibition visitor will therefore 
be witness to the inteiplay of autonomous art works. However, disposing with the burden 
of one classificatory system which spatially distributes objects merely opens the door to 
another which hierarchically stratifies subjects -  taste -  and empathetically links 
sacralized art and its learned congregation. As Pierre Bourdieu writes: “The fact of being 
devoid of keys is in no way favourable to the understanding of works which require only 
that all the old keys be rejected so as to wait for the work itself to deliver the key for its 
own deciphering.... In short, an ability to hold all the available codes in abeyance so as to 
rely entirely on the work itself... presupposes an accomplished masteiy of the code of 
codes.”^^  Bourdieu’s insistenee on the codedness of culture doesn’t mean that the fate of 
the readymade is simply to accede to a view of the institutional context as the ‘author’ of 
all works. For Thierry de Duve, “those who conceive of art in terms of the art context and 
its power are either true cynics or infantile leftists. If they were right the only artists 
would be the art curators.”^^  But increasingly the lines between art and curation are 
blurred.
There is a seeming homology between aspects of Greenaway’s curation-as-artistic act 
and Cornelia Parker’s artistic act-as-curation. In Greenaway’s exhibition The Physical 
Self(T\g. 26), as with The Maybe, living people were exhibited in vitrines, and, as with 
The Distance, we have a statue bound in rope (Man Ray’s Venus Restored, Fig. 27). But 
what separates Parker’s work from the restorative and regressive return to the enchanted 
world of what might be termed the “Wunderkammer-wiOaouX-waXXs" is its reference to 
Duchamp, which gives the critical viewer some purchase back into the strategies which
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have been pitted against the art work as (commodity) fetish, and the concealment of that 
status with recourse to naturalising concepts like Sammeltrieb.
To tie this back into the discussion of Duchamp’s authoritative status in art history, we 
need only note that the curatorial mode of art-making is often presented as originating 
with Duchamp -  primarily through the readymade strategy, and particularly via Fountain. 
For Putnam “the increasing assimilation of the found object into a work of art of course 
owes much to Marcel Duchamp,” who had demonstrated “that something as ordinary as a 
standard urinal could be accorded the title Fountain and transformed at will into an art 
object.” ®^ Such a characterisation elides the critical thrust of the readymade against the 
museum and art history, in favour of a reading which, in its very terms of expression, 
attests to the continuation of patrilinear and patronymic models. Is Duchamp, then, to be 
easily assimilated back into art historical “business as usual”?
One of the distinctive features of the belated reception of Duchamp is the inclusion of his 
non- or quasi-artistic activities within an ever expanding œuvre. These include catalogues 
and other publications, and, importantly, exhibition and store design .T hieriy  de Duve, 
one of the most informative interpreters of the temporality of Duchamp’s reception, is 
also perhaps the figure who most strongly asserts the centrality of Duchamp as someone 
who anticipated the historical fate of modernism. In a discussion of the Readymades’ 
reception in Conceptual art he asserted that Duchamp
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“pointed at the conditions of art making that are not just the ones valid for 
a decade but valid for 150 years.... in a nutshell what he accomplishes is 
revealing the transformations of modernity -all of them. So that in a sense 
you don’t need to establish a causal link or an influence to be able to say 
that once the finger has been put on the wound lots of things begin to 
burgeon all over the place.
Duchamp is presented by de Duve as “one who knew” -  as possessing a critical insight 
into the artistic a prioris of modernity to an extent that could justify the rather outlandish 
title Kant After DuchampP Duchamp’s biographer Calvin Tomkins also subscribes to 
this view. Duchamp assisted the Arensbergs’ in acquiring as much of his œuvre as 
possible, and then in arranging for it to find a home in a museum. Once his collection was 
in the hands of the Philadelphia Museum of Art, Tomkins writes, Duchamp was “poised 
to preside over his own p o s te r ity .T h is  estimation of Duchamp as someone who 
controlled to some extent the reception of his own work through varied phases suggests 
that his comment that “Posterity is a form of the spectator ... It’s the posthumous 
spectator” should be read as indicating that he aimed to position the historical “viewer” 
just as he did the museum v isito r.A fter all. Etant Donnés is a thoroughly “posthumous” 
work and is infused with death and desire as themes which the spectator is positioned, 
pinioned even, to become voyeur of (Figs 28, 29).
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The notion of Duchamp as the patriarch of postmodern critique is problematic on a 
number of levels, and Amelia Jones has given a very full account of this, but increasingly 
Duchamp’s own curatorial activities are coming to be seen as important to an 
understanding of his œuvre, and these activities do seem prescient of installation art. 
Lewis Kachur, for instance, in his recent book Displaying the Marvelous gives detailed 
accounts of Duchamp’s involvement in installing Surrealist exhibitions, including 1942’s 
First Papers o f Surrealism in New York. Here Duchamp criss-crossed the gallery with a 
mile of string (after a disastrous first attempt which caught fire...), the gesture to which 
The Distance refers (Fig. 30). Interviewed in 1966 by Otto Hahn, Duchamp responded to 
questions about his role in the Surrealist exhibitions, stating that he simply did “the 
décor” of such exhibitions, utilising strings or coal sacks “to try to get a bit of gaiety into 
it. The danger is of being academic; and one cannot put up a successful show without a 
bit of gaiety.” *^’
Duchamp’s multiply-invested roles in these exhibitions can be elucidated somewhat by 
drawing attention to their gendered b a s is .In  the 1938 Exposition Internationale du 
Surréalisme in Paris which Duchamp designed, he was represented by a mannequin of 
Rrose Sélavy, whilst in the First Papers catalogue he was represented by a 
“compensation portrait” of a female sharecropper.^^ The role of “decorator” is also coded, 
of course, not only as feminine, but as domestic. Helen Molesworth has emphasised that 
one of the key sites of reception for the Readymades was in fact Duchamp’s own studio- 
home. Photographs of them in this context were included in the Boites-en-valise, and 
these images reveal that they were conspicuously arranged to impede their quotidian use.
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Note that one of these photos shows the Sculpture for Travelling (1918) installed -  an 
important precedent for the “mile of string”: this suggests that one resonance of the latter 
is Duchamp’s home installation of the Readymades where they literally obstructed him, 
even as they themselves remained unused (Fig. 31). This is important in that it opens out 
the context of “art institution” to more sites than are usually discussed in debates about 
the institutional shaping of ait’s meaning. This point is reinforced by Molesworth when 
she notes that Duchamp’s avoidance both of artistic labour and domestic maintenance 
(both exemplified in the presentation of the Readymades -  works chosen not made -  in 
the photos which show them obstructing Duchamp’s home/studio) was contemporary 
with Taylorism, the “scientific management” theory of industrial production aimed at 
maximum efficiency for maximum profit.T aylorist principles, which are usually 
associated with the factory, were also carried over into the domestic setting. To represent, 
and thereby rationalise, the domestic worker’s time-motion (which Molesworth notes is 
usually characterised by its “virtual invisibility”) home economist Lillian Gilbreth 
proposed that an observer follow the worker around the home, “with a ball of twine, 
measuring the distance t r ave l l ed .Thus  a “resonance” of both Sculpture fo r Travelling 
and the First Papers labyrinths is to be found in this approach to diagrammatically 
analysing labour. Duchamp’s strategy, of course, celebrates the play of the labyrinth, 
rather than the economy of the diagram: “The readymades stymie a subject whose 
identity would be bound up with, and stmctured by, the phenomenon of work.” *^ In this 
reading, Duchamp’s string, as domestic and exhibitionaiy obstruction, frees the subject to 
be a “breather” rather than a worker, it unbinds?^
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Such a negation of work in favour of the ludic was proposed by the circumstances of the 
display of the mile of string. Duchamp arranged for Sidney Janis’s son Carroll and his 
friends to play ball amidst the strings during the preview of the First Papers exhibition, on 
the 14^ ’^ October, 1942. The children were instructed to say to anyone who objected to 
their presence that “Marcel Duchamp said we could play” !^  ^One strategy for avoiding 
the pitfalls of turning Duchamp’s activities as designer / decorator into further examples 
of his prescience and originality, might be to embrace the associative and contingent as a 
way of undermining the authority of the patriarchal author-function in both Duchamp and 
art-historical narrative, hopefully turning the regressive model by which Duchamp has 
been assimilated against itself. Playing amongst the contingent links between the 
components of The Distance might allow for posterity’s role to be turned to advantage.
String itself plays an interesting and important role in Duchamp’s work -  notably in 
Three Standard Stoppages and With Hidden Noise -  both works which challenge 
intentionality in authorship. Three Standard Stoppages which was used to determine the 
placement of elements in the Large Glass, subverts the measurement of distance by 
rendering the metre in idiosyncratic form, apparently derived by (“canned”) chance. '^  ^
Further, Duchamp was himself entwined in string for a film made by Maya Deren in 1943 
(Fig. 32). Man Ray, who was not included in the First Papers exhibition, made a solarized 
photograph of entangled strings, entitled Enough Rope (Fig. 33), with a text which states 
that “enough rope,” contraiy to the proverb, “is a very small portion of the total length 
allotted.”^^  “Thus his implicit satiric commentaiy” Kachur suggests, is “that the 
Surrealists “hung themselves,” in both senses, amidst the strings at the Reid mansion.”^^
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A more recent artistic reference to the First Papers installation was made in Mierle 
Laderman Ukeles’ 1973 performance Now That You Have Heirs/Airs, Marcel Duchamp, 
which used a mile of string to express Duchamp’s influence (Fig. 34). Beginning a walk 
in the Philadelphia Museum, Ukeles, like Theseus setting out to defeat the cunning of the 
labyrinth, unwound a ball of twine and used it to literally and symbolically connect the 
Large Glass to Moore College of Art, where her own work was on display. At the end of 
the performance she symbolically cut the string -  a perhaps wishful act of independence 
from the Duchampian paradigm. And one, interestingly, which expresses this in a way 
which cames connotations of both death (via Atropos, the Fate who cuts the thread of 
life), and of the cutting of the umbilical cord. Thus Duchamp is coded as a maternal 
figure, and Ukeles’ own position is implicitly that of the post-partum, out of bodily unity, 
but not yet symbolically autonomous. The theme of the Fates, and of the post-partum, 
will be returned to in Chapter Two.
If the connections made here seem somewhat forced, it is worth remembering that not 
only was Duchamp a consummate curator of his own work, but also that he explicitly 
licensed interpretative play with his œuvre, on the condition that it was recognised that 
this was the interpreter’s own contribution and not Duchamp’s, just as Parker has done. 
To take up some of the threads which Kachur leaves loose in his discussion of the 
resonances of string in Duchamp’s practice we might note that With Hidden Noise offers 
a figure for the idea of a secret kernel of tmth which it is the goal of the viewer to know. 
The object that produces the “hidden noise” was placed inside the ball of twine by Walter
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Arensberg, and was unknown to Duchamp himself. Was this perhaps a joke on 
Arensberg’s obsession with the secret of Shakespeare’s plays? He was founder of the 
Francis Bacon Foundation , which employed three researchers in an attempt to prove 
Bacon’s authorship of the plays. It was the Arensbergs’ intention to make it a condition 
of the gift of deed of their collection to the Philadelphia Museum of Art that the 
Foundation’s work be supported, though in the end this was not accepted.^^ A cautionary 
figure of the art historian/collector as someone who (obsessively) thinks there is 
something secret to be deciphered, is thus established here, and implicitly critiqued by 
Duchamp, who makes himself an author who is not “in the know.”
To turn now to the specific formula of The Distance, that is, Duchamp + Rodin; the first 
occurrence of a reference by the former to the latter occurs in a note written in Buenos 
Aires during his stay there in 1918-19 (Fig. 35). Duchamp’s decision to leave New York 
was prompted both by complex personal matters and by his dissatisfaction with the once 
lively city which no longer seemed so congenial under the cloud of war. Duchamp set sail 
for Buenos Aires with Yvonne Chastel aboard the S.S. Crofton Hall on the 14'*’ of August 
1918, intending his stay in South America to last several years (Figs. 36, 37). On board 
the Crofton Hall Duchamp wrote a note, later published by Pierre Matisse in the 
collection of Notes left out of the Green and White Boxes, that simply states “The string 
around the bouquet” . . As well as taking his notes for the Large Glass with him, 
Duchamp brought his Sculpture for Travelling, a number of coloured mbber strips cut 
from bathing caps, which could be attached by string to any room in which its owner
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finds himself, and, as already noted, a forerunner of the labyrinthine forms of the First 
Papers installation.
Interviewed at Richard Hamilton’s house for The Sunday Times in 1968, Duchamp 
discussed his stay in Buenos Aires, saying that while there he worked on “the problem of 
time and the successive image in art” so that the visit was “not really a matter only of 
daydreaming.”^^  Duchamp’s escape from the retinal mode of art, already pursued Via the 
Readymades, was advanced in Buenos Aires in his increasing interest in the mental 
activity of chess, and in a non-idealist conception of seeing. It was whilst in Buenos Aires 
that Duchamp’s interest in optics really developed, with works like Handmade 
Stereopticon Slide, and the so-called “small glass.” These works indicate that Duchamp’s 
rejection of the retinal was in part achieved through an interest in other modes of 
visuality, particularly those which due to their scientific character avoided the subjective 
pitfalls of painting. The “small glass” was originally conceived as a study for the Oculist 
Witnesses in The Bride Stripped Bare..., but with the addition of the instmction/title To 
Be Looked at (from the Other Side o f the Glass), with One Eye, Close to, fo r Almost an 
Hour (Fig. 3 8), the work also takes on something of the interpellatory aspect which 
characterises Duchamp’s final work. Etant Donnés, which institutionalises, as it were, 
voyeurism as the basic condition of viewing.
Duchamp’s interest in manipulating ways of seeing is seemingly the motivation for his 
first published reference to Rodin. This occurs in a note written on a telegraph card in 
Buenos Aires:
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Make: several sheets o f glass or cardboard glued one on top o f the other and o f different 
dimensions
[diagram]
a linear drawing (as much as possible) -  as i f  it were drawn on a fla t surface -  and 
which when seen from a point X, through a sight, gives the impression o f a fla t drawing. 
I.e. that a straight line from A to B (although A and B are on different planes appear 
straight from the sight and broken into several levels from a totally different point.
Look for the right use.
One can arrive at: Problem: trace a straight line on Rodin’s ‘Kiss ’ as seen from a sight, 
[viewfinder].
Duchamp, then, has The Kiss in his sights, and relates it to his interest in optics. Here the 
problem is one of producing a point of view that would produce a particular (misleading) 
perception of a tliree dimensional form. With Etant Donnés Duchamp would, of course, 
return to this interest in imposing points of view.
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Molly Nesbit has argued that Duchamp’s own attitude to the line drawing was structured 
by the French education system’s programme of “drilled” mechanical drawing: a 
mechanical reproduction aimed at justifying and facilitating mechanical production in the 
economy. Importantly, truth, behind mere appearance was ascribed in this system to 
mechanical rather than perspectival drawing. Truth was “nonretinal, and clearly identified 
with the croquis coté, the blueprint for production, the working drawing for the 
commodity. In practice, the language base was hardly neutral; it cheerfrilly ratified the 
means and ends of industrial production.. It was this language of line, Nesbit argues, 
that facilitated Duchamp’s abandonment of easel painting. Drawing thus played a part in 
naturalising an instrumentalised objectification; it established as given, “full of the latent 
idea of work,” as it provided “a tool by which one ordered visual experience.” The 
drawing programme was designed by Eugène Guillaume, who differentiated the 
pragmatic visual language taught from the aesthetic one of art:
“Drawing expresses the most sublime notions of artists; it is the starting point 
and the last word of the painter’s, sculptor’s, and architect’s masterpiece; and 
at the same time it is a means of communication and a practical instrument 
used by the worker-artist and the artisan. If it has its poetics; it also has in 
some respects its business language.
Thus, a resonance of ‘drawing a line’ on The Kiss is the imposition of the language of the 
commodity on a work taken to aesthetically transcend that l anguage .Thi s  connects it 
to the readymade strategy, which was a way of drawing a line under that sense of the
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aesthetic. Ironically, when Alfred Kreymborg, writing in the Boston Evening Transcript 
on 18*'^  September 1915 commented that the audience of the Armory Show “could not 
distinguish between a Rodin and a canary bird’s cage” he meant to indicate that there was 
as valid an aesthetic justification for the seeming “quackery” and “self-advertising” of the 
Nude Descending a Staircase as there was for the established modern genius of Rodin’s 
sculpture. With the Readymades and related works -  including Why Not Sneeze Rose 
Sélavy? of 1921, a bird’s cage filled with marble sugarcubes -  Duchamp inverted the 
terms of this comparison, validating, in effect, the equivalence of Rodin and the bird’s 
cage. It is this equivalence that The Distance underscores; it stymies The K iss’s 
“originality,” just as Duchamp stymied the working of the quotidian objects he 
appropriated: “you could pluck one of those marble sugar cubes ... for your coffee (like a 
plastic fly in a bowl of soup); and if a man pees in the Fountain his urine will drip on 
him.”'^^  With Duchamp there is an ongoing oscillation between the object as artwork and 
as quotidian thing, with neither role ever secure.
For Nesbit, Duchamp staked a claim with the Readymades for a mastery over the 
commodity and its language, but ultimately an unsuccessful one: “Nobody except 
industry gets control over its symbolic means, let alone its models of repetition, not even 
artists.”*®^ Thus with the Boites-en-valise -  the travelling salesman’s suitcase in the form 
of a portable “museum-without walls” Duchamp was, in her view, “just plain repeating 
himself. .. .Outside, unperturbed, the industrial model of repetition rolled along under its 
own steam.” Yet to ask art to transcend such conditions is surely asking the impossible. 
Duchamp’s repetitions of the Readymades -  including for instance the “reciprocality” of
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installing Fountain in 1951 in its “useftil” orientation -  remain within the equivocal locus 
where art and commodity co-exist. It is this model of repetition, to reiterate, that 
authorises The Distance, though it does not guarantee, as a transcendent origin, its critical 
efficacy. One can’t be sure what will happen when one pees (in rivalry) into Fountain.
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Alfred Barr [re: the readymades]: Bu t , oh, Marcel, why do they look so beautiful today? 
Marcel Duchamp: Nobody’s perfect.
The idea of “drawing a line” on The Kiss was jotted on a telegram card. Interestingly, 
Duchamp makes a couple of references to telegraphic communication in minor works 
from his œuvre. In the First Papers catalogue, on the page entitled “Science Triumphant” 
a text by Alfred Jariy appear s . ' I t  reads: “Science with a capital S, or rather, because 
that is still not imposing enough ... Science with a capital SCYTHE.” This was 
juxtaposed with Duchamp’s In the Manner o f Paul Delvaux', a bat (an animal which can 
perceive sound-waves inaudible to humans); and Puvis de Chavanne’s Good and Bad 
News, which features in the foreground telegraph pole and wires (Fig. 39). Puvis 
described this work as “Physics'. By the wondrous agency of Electricity, Speech flashes 
through Space and swift as lightning bears tidings of good and evil.” That science, 
particularly communications technology is here linked to death is perhaps not suiprising. 
Duchamp might well have remembered receiving the traumatic news, via transatlantic 
cable from Suzanne Duchamp, of his brother’s death, just three weeks after arriving in 
Buenos Aires.'" On a less speculative and biographical note however, it is clear that 
Duchamp associated the advance of science with the death of art. Interviewed by 
Newsweek in 1959 Duchamp emphasised that he was a non-artist, not an anti-artist, 
seeing the latter, like an atheist, as someone who “believes negatively.” Duchamp makes
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it clear: “I don’t believe in art. Science is the important thing today. There are rockets to 
go to the moon, so naturally you go to the moon. You don’t sit at home and dream about 
it, Alt was a dream that’s become unnecessaiy.” Science then is that which both 
eradicates distance and art -  a claim with increasing resonance in our electronically 
mediated age.
Finally, the telegraph pole appears twice more in Duchamp’s œuvre, in drawings made 
whilst on holiday in France in the summer of 1959. One of these drawings is of the lane 
by the house in which Marcel and his wife Teeny were staying, and was a thank-you gift 
to their host. The other is entitled Cols Alité (“bedridden mountains,” but also 
phonetically “causality,” and colles alitées: “bedridden glues”) and features the 
Bachelor’s machineiy from the Large Glass hooked up to telegraph wires (Fig. 40). Carol 
James has suggested, in a reading of these puns, that the cols or mountain passes depicted 
are a connecting passage between the Large Glass and Etant Donnés, which certainly 
seems to be a tenable interpretation on iconographie and thematic grounds."^
Duchamp’s second reference to Rodin and The Kiss occurs in a series of etchings 
produced for Galerie Schwarz in 1968. This series of images takes as its theme ‘the 
lovers’ and includes images of The Bride, Etant Donnés, and Duchamp’s appearance as 
Adam in a live divertissement during the last night of Picabia’s play Relâche in 1924."^ 
Also included in the series are four images which deal with the erotic in nineteenth 
century art. These “Selected details...” {Morceaux choisis) after Courbet, Ingres and 
Rodin emphasise the libidinal basis of art making and viewing, by subtly altering the
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content of the original images to reinforce their erotic content, and by cormecting them 
with the themes of The Bride Stripped Bare and Etant Donnés (Figs. 41-46). In Selected 
Details After Courbet a bird has been added to Courbet’s Woman with White Stockings, 
making a phonetic joke on the fact that there are now two faux cons in the image. This 
again relates to the mis-en-scene of Etant Donnés. Selected Details After Rodin takes The 
Kiss and makes only one slight adjustment -  moving Paolo’s hand to what Duchamp 
termed its “natural position,” and restoring what he told Schwarz must have been Rodin’s 
original intention."'' A complex chain of punning associations is also operative in this 
work, playing on the connections to be made between the names Auguste and Marcel."^ 
Having already noted that The Kiss was “targeted” by Duchamp, can we now draw any 
conclusions about its meaning for him, and thus for the historical connotations of 
Cornelia Parker’s work? The answer lies, I think, in Duchamp’s association of The Kiss 
with the other images of the Lovers series and especially with Courbet (whose Realism 
Duchamp saw as the origin of retinal painting), and Etant Donnés, with its emphatically 
libidinal account of what we are looking for in museums. “Drawing a line” might mean 
recoding a work in the (readymade, repetitive) language of commodity. It is also 
resonant, in The Lovers, with an act of de-sublimation. In order to develop this I want to 
turn now to Claudine Mitchell’s analysis of Rodin’s own drawing practice and the 
understanding of his art’s eroticism in poet Arthur Symons’s early Century criticism.
Rodin liked to make gifts of sculptures of embracing female figures to male intellectuals 
who supported his work. Examples of works used in this practice of gift-giving include 
The Fallen Angel and the Metamorphosis o f Ovid, both now in the V&A, and The Siren
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on a Pillar, given to Arthur Symons and now in the Tate’s collection. All these works, 
like The Kiss were conceived in relation to The Gates o f Hell, and Claudine Mitchell 
notes that “As gifts and creative works ... that artists exchanged among each other, these 
sculptures are the reminder of a form of bondage, the certainty of sharing an intellectual 
territory, a common understanding concerning the purpose and nature of art practice.”"^ 
Statements of such common purpose first appeared in British cultural discourse precisely 
around the work in progress for The Gates o f Hell. W.E. Henley, for instance, writing in 
the Magazine o f Art mentioned the preparation of elements of the Gates, including what 
he termed “a lovely and affecting “Paolo and Francesca” .. Henley had seen this early 
realisation of The Kiss in a photograph, but it was not published, and readers of The 
Magazine o f Art had to make do with the description by Julia Cartwright in 1884 in 
which she wrote: “M. Auguste Rodin ... has sculpted the veiy instant of the kiss, and that 
with such a union of purity and passion, of lofty art and intense humanity, as places his 
work on a pinnacle apart.” Mitchell notes that the use of “purity” in this context 
conveys the sense that the work respects public decency laws.
She develops her discussion of the “bondage” of shared understanding in an essay on 
Symons’s Baudelairean reading of Rodin’s erotic sculptures and drawings, emphasising 
that the poetry of Baudelaire, particularly The Flowers o f Evil, provided a common 
vocabulary for discussion of themes of sexuality in art."^ Yet Mitchell argues that for 
both Symons and Rodin, while sexuality was at the centre of creativity, their particular 
“aesthetics of desire” involved a necessaiy veiling of the sexual by the beautiful. Symons 
saw this as producing an aesthetics of the “suggested,” in which the viewer’s own
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interpretation of the implied content is key to the experience of the work. Symons had put 
foiward this position in an essay of 1900 on Mallaraié, arguing in favour of allusion and 
suggestion, and stating that “to name is to destroy, to suggest is to create.”' '^'
This argument is used to help Symons differentiate Rodin’s practice from “imitation” and 
characterise it as a kind of poetic “re-creation”. This is achieved, argues Symons, through 
Rodin’s technique of “logical exaggeration,” an approach to modelling which “involves 
complex processes of selection, omission of details, and the sculptor’s decision not to 
register certain transitions between the main sections of human anatomy.” '^' The specific 
use which Symons understood Rodin to make of “logical exaggeration” and suggestion in 
The Gates o f Hell relates to desire and original sin. Rodin’s figures are described as living 
“with a life of desire,” an obsession which “has carried them beyond the wholesome 
bounds of nature, into the violence of a perversity which is at times almost insane. 
Symons reads all the gestures and contortions of these figures as signifying sexual desire. 
The particularly Baudelairean dimension of Symons’ interpretation is registered in his 
use of the phrase femmes damnées which conveys both the relation of sexuality to evil, 
and in its effectively coded reference to Baudelaire also the shared understanding of 
Rodin and his critical supporters.
Symons, the literal recipient of one of Rodin’s drawings, played an important role in the 
critical reception of them. Mitchell notes that to discuss the drawings required a critical 
mode that could deal with the problems of both subject matter and issues of 
representation in Rodin’s aesthetic. Whereas some critics simply sidestepped the explicit
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content of the drawings, Symons connected it to the interpretation he had already 
established in relation to the female figures of The Gates o f Hell. For Symons, the 
drawings’ suggestiveness was an aesthetic matter and not an ethical one; thus Mitchell 
finds him continually resolving the dualism of desire/Hell versus beauty/purity in a third 
term, an ideal moment of aesthetic experience. This dialectical metamorphosis, which 
Mitchell terms the “alchemy of desire,” is, in Baudelairp, Symons, and Rodin, linked to 
a concept of the nude which “provided a paradigm metaphor for the process of artistic 
creativity whereby sexual desire was understood to be the very material the artist worked 
upon to create the work of art.” ' '^' That such work upon desire has an essentially 
sublimatory structure is emphasised further in Symons’s interpretation of Rodin’s line as 
having “the distinction of all abstract thought or form.”'^  ^Line itself then becomes the 
medium by which desire is transformed into beautiflil images. Duchamp’s own line, as it 
appears in the etchings of The Lovers could likewise be read as an intellectualizing of 
desire, but with quite the opposite aim to that attributed to Rodin by Symons. As 
Duchamp’s etching of The Kiss makes abundantly clear, Duchamp’s line redraws the 
boundary between desire and image achieved in sublimation. This difference suggests 
perhaps the key reason why Duchamp had Rodin, and particularly The Kiss, in his sights 
at least twice in his career. “Using these stolen paintings to play with the tradition he 
called retinal painting, the precision detail of Ingres and the realism of Courbet, Duchamp 
showed how what we see masked as the beautiful body, the aesthetic object, is wrapped 
in worn out repressions.”'^ *’
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In pointed contrast to Nesbit’s understanding of Duchamp’s later work (and by 
implication the work of those artists who take him as a model) as a capitulation to the 
logic of the commodity, James interprets the etchings as “something of the final avatar of 
the readymade, a version that comes around to using art as non-art.... By the time 
L.H.O.O.Q. is rasée, art ‘quoting’ and self-reference are the common material in need of 
demythologizing.”'^  ^And, as with Fountain, Duchamp treats his trademark motifs and 
gestures in different ways at different times: they have a tendency to change valence, to 
come and go, like ghosts moving across barriers that ought to be impermeable.
Symons’s writing on Rodin draws on three registers of language: religion, intellectuality 
and sexuality; and the fact that these could be made to overlap seems essential to his 
mode of thinking. He employs the term “ecstasy” to describe the creative process and 
“the appreciation the beholder experiences before the work of art, for the interpretation of 
“the suggested” gives the beholder an active role.” Duchamp also makes religion , 
intellect and sexuality overlap, but he does so in drawing attention to, rather than 
participating in, the disavowal productive of the fetish character of the artwork. It is this 
that the viewer of Etant Donnés and/or the Readymades becomes aware of. The museum 
context fetishises art objects both in attempting to make the inanimate animate and in 
facilitating the disavowal of primaiy attachments in favour of substitute objects which 
veil a presumed lack. These two functions relate to Marx’s and Freud’s respective 
understandings of fetishism. This thinking of both commodity and sexual fetish together 
will be discussed further in Chapter Two.
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If the museum aims to bring its objects to life, this may be a disavowed recognition of its 
actual function. Theodor Adorno famously opens his discussion of the fate of art in the 
museum by setting out the unpleasant connotations of the word museal (museumlike):
“It describes objects to which the obseiwer no longer has a vital relationship 
and which are in the process of dying. They owe their preseiwation more to 
historical respect than to the needs of the present. Museum and mausoleum 
are connected by more than phonetic association. Museums are like the 
family sepulchres of works of art. They testify to the neutralization of culture.
Art treasures are hoarded in them, and their market value leaves no room for 
the pleasure of looking at them. Nevertheless that pleasure is dependent on 
the existence of museums.”
In seeking to formulate a viable response to this that won’t just despairingly abandon art 
as dead, Adorno turns to the contrasting writings of Valéry and Proust. Valery’s essay 
‘The Problem of Museums’ is concerned primarily with the chaotic overabundance of the 
Louvre. Lamenting the constraints placed upon his person -  “no smoking,” the 
confiscation of his cane etc. - Valéry is also confounded by the sheer quantity of visual 
stimuli addressed to his attention by so many works, which as Adorno puts it are “frozen 
creatures each of which demands the non-existence of the others.. In such 
circumstances, an excess of riches is ultimately impoverishing, and even the arch­
conservative Valéry can register this - his analysis acknowledges metaphorically in
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relation to art what can be literally ascribed to the capitalist economy: “The shock of the 
museum brings Valéry to historical -  philosophical insight into the perishing of art 
works; there he says, we put the art of the past to death.” Valéiy’s essay breaks off 
before reaching what Adorno sees as its logical conclusion from the conservative position 
it articulates -  “the renunciation of culture out of loyalty to it.” '^'
Proust’s contrasting view is woven into sections o f In Search o f Lost Time. For Proust the 
museum context is precisely appropriate to the experience of the artwork because its 
abstraction of the work out of its surroundings is analogous to the mental event that 
produced the work in the first place. For Proust the “exhilarating happiness” of aesthetic 
experience “can be had only in a museum, where the rooms, in their sober abstinence 
from all decorative detail, symbolize the inner spaces into which the artist withdraws to 
create the work.” '^  ^We might note here that from the 2U' century perspective of The 
Distaitce, this museological blank canvas is no longer available, and creative acts must 
now respond to this fact. The Distance brings together both museum as muse (Proust) and 
the cacophony of histoiy (Valéiy).
Adorno notes that both writers assume art works are there to be enjoyed, and 
unsuiprisingly he is dubious about this notion of aesthetic pleasure: “For anyone who is 
close to works of art, they are no more objects of delight than is his own breathing.... it is 
only when the distance necessary for enjoyment to be possible is established between 
observer and works of art that the question of their continuing vitality can arise.”
Valéry and Proust occupy the double position of those both at home with art (as
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producers) and distanced enough from it (in reflection) to understand the pleasure it can 
give others. As a creator himself, Valéry has developed a great sensitivity to the physical 
and intellectual contexts in which art is presented. His art-for-art’s-sake stance is pushed 
to its own negation as the intensity of his reflection leads him
“to see that the object of such pure contemplation must wither and degenerate 
to commercialized decoration, robbed of the dignity in which both its raison 
d ’être and Valéry’s consist. The pure work is threatened by reification and 
neutralization. This is the recognition that overwhelms him in the museum”;
Valéry is left merely to “mourn for art works as they turn into relics.
For Proust, in contrast, it is the afterlife of the artwork that is the starting point for 
reflection. For Proust’s relation to art is not that of the intimacy of the producer, but 
rather the distanced admiration of the amateur-as-consumer, a position alien to the 
‘hand’s on’ artist, Proust’s genius lies, Adorno suggests, in making an essentially 
spectatorial attitude into a new productive mode. While Proust as amateur is at home in 
the museum, Valéiy as artist is at home in the studio, but ironically it is Proust who 
Adorno sees as ultimately less naïve in his conception of art. Valéry is in thrall to “the 
unconditional fetishism of the artist who makes the things himself,” but Proust sees 
works of art as sets of aesthetic qualities which are “part of the life of the person who 
observes them.”'^  ^This mode of experience has as its precondition the “death of the 
living intention of the work” This formulation is echoed in Duchamp’s statement in his 
text ‘The Creative Act’ to the effect that the spectator (who stands also for posterity in the
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form of art history) constitutively interprets a work which is not identical with its 
intention, a process he describes as “comparable to a transference... through inert 
matter.” '^ *’ That the work, for Duchamp, is thus completed posthumously is clearly seen 
in his (uncannily prescient) statement that the artist’s true audience doesn’t appear for 
“fifty years or a hundred years.
Valéry’s conservative perspective allows him to criticize the destruction of autonomous 
culture, whilst Proust’s sensitivity to changes in structures of experience also gives him 
an acute historical awareness: “Proust knows that even within works of art themselves 
histoiy rules like a process of disintegration.” Proust’s conception of this historicity could 
be translated, according to Adorno, as “posterity is the afterlife of the work”; again we 
resonances with D u c h a m p . T h e  vital role of memory in Proust’s idea of aesthetic 
experience is the reason why the museal chaos perceived by Valéry is, for Proust that 
which brings the art work to life. The uniqueness of a work, and its life for the consumer 
of aesthetic experience, only comes into being in the mnemonic experience of afterimage, 
in which it is “severed from the living order in which it functioned.”
Adorno asks who is right: Valéry, with his emphasis on the sanctity of culture, and his 
conservative defense of autonomy; or Proust, with his insistence on flux and 
indeterminacy, which risks affirming the impermanence wrought by Capitalism? Neither 
position is acceptable to Adorno, nor does he hope for resolution in a mid-point between 
them. “The conflict between them points up in a most penetrating way a conflict in the 
matter itself, and each takes the part of one moment in the truth which lies in the
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unfolding of contradiction... The fetishism of the object and the subject’s infatuation 
with itself find their correctives in each other”; each writer has access to what are 
“contradictory moments of the truth.” ''"' Adorno questions whether there could be 
artworks without museums, in as much as the death they suffer is part of their own 
mortality under capitalism. The museal environment is the inevitable locus of art works, 
but Adorno sees some hope in this irreversible situation; it might dialectically lead art so 
far from its embeddedness in human rationality that it comes to life again in that very 
autonomy. Proust to an extent conveys this promise of reconciliation in his subjective 
mnemonics in which “the chaos of cultural goods” in Adorno’s words “fades into the 
bliss of the child whose body feels itself at one with the nimbus of distance.”''"
Here we find an echo of Benjamin’s conflicted attitude to the death of aura as an effect of 
distance. In the ‘Little Histoiy of Photography’ Benjamin reads this positively:
“What is aura, actually? A strange weave of space and time: the unique 
appearance and semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be....
Now, to bring things closer to us, or rather to the masses, is just as passionate 
an inclination in our day as the overcoming of whatever is unique in every 
situation by means of its reproduction.” '''^
This was replaced by a much more hesitant tone in the Artwork essay, which, though 
echoing almost exactly these words in defining aura, sees its loss as leading to “a 
tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and
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renewal of mankind.”'''  ^Reading across Benjamin’s key texts on this double shattering of 
tradition and the revolutionaiy potential inherent in technology, it is clear that of the key 
figures of the outmoded to be found in them, it is the auratic art work which is the most 
dispensable, whereas the collector and the storyteller are more melancholically presented 
as those able to invest objects with significance and narrate experience respectively/'''' 
The ambiguity of both Benjamin’s and Adorno’s essays on the conclusions to be drawn 
on art as an object of ‘exhibition value,’ reliant on the museal context, was certainly 
justified at the time of their composition. Such ambiguity continues to be relevant in the 
contemporary situation, where the possibility of experiencing art and of narrating it is 
compromised by the hyper-extension of the technological transformations which 
Benjamin was in many ways premature in diagnosing.'''^
Reproduction in Benjamin’s essay stands in for the general process of fetishization and 
commodification as described by Marx. The extension of this process of commodification 
produces an equivalence between people, places and things. Thus art is exchangeable 
apart from the privileged loci of its presence -  cathedral, concert hall etc. This state of 
affairs refers to, but contradicts, actual existing property relations. Whereas ritual 
demands an invisibility of the source of power, once this is revealed, conditions change 
from those of ritual to those of display. Ritual is opposed by Benjamin to three new 
conditions designated as display, exchange, politics. The aestheticization of politics 
amounts to the mles of ritual being brought to bear on conditions which should contradict 
them.
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Hal Foster has recently argued that the dialectical relationship between reification and ré­
animation set out in ‘Valéry Proust Museum’ in fact structures all thinking on modem art 
and the museum. Art history as a modern discipline responds to a mnemonic crisis 
wrought by the reification of tradition, but it cannot resolve such a crisis, only displace or 
repeat it.'''^ The Distance re-members Rodin and Duchamp and in doing so participates in 
the processes of reification and réanimation constitutive of museal aesthetic experience.
If it has a critical dimension it is not a transcendent one: it may open onto a critique of 
sublimation, via a contrast between Duchamp and Rodin, but it does not escape from the 
fetishising logic of the reifying and reanimating museum-without-walls in which it 
continues to circulate as (after)image. Crucially, though, it is possible to think through the 
role of the critic as viewer (in accordance with Duchamp’s own idea of creative 
collaboration) in a way that bears directly on the strategy pursued by Cornelia Parker in 
her reiteration of Duchampian appropriation. Just as Duchamp did in the Selected 
Details... series, Parker used artworks as Readymades. Writing of Duchamp’s “original” 
repetition Carol James argues that the late Readymades, amongst which she numbers the 
Selected Details..., “show how iterability is different from mere repetition, that each 
instance is both new in time and a combination of all previous instances, that the 
regardeur is responsible for the ordering of the experiences.”'''^ Thus, as with Barthes, the 
death of the author is here the birth of the reader / viewer. Such a viewer is not external to 
the work he / she narrates, but is, rather, an integral mediator of art’s positioning 
“inbetween” of aura and agora.
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This chapter opened with a discussion of the sublimated role of the mediator in 
“triangulated” desire. It has strayed, via a reading of Cornelia Parker’s The Distance and 
its problematic relation to Duchamp as “originary” authoriser of its procedures, into 
questions of aura, museum, and their relation to commodification. Homi Bhabha has 
offered a veiy nuanced account of art’s place in relation to aura (which stands for rapture 
and transcendence in his argument) and agora, as the locus of quotidian, commercial 
negotiation.'''^ “Negotiation,” Bhabha writes, connotes “a form of trade or traffic, 
articulation and exchange, connection with contention, which seeks equivalences in the 
everyday world. Concerned principally with making relations ... negotiation is, most 
significantly, a discourse of disclosure [my emphasis].”'''^ Bhabha qualifies this 
definition, stressing that what negotiation discloses is not a “common currency” but a 
“dis-ease” of exchange, precisely insofar as it, negotiation, is concerned with the “the 
5e//’-disclosure of the agents ... negotiation is the veiy essence of human action and 
utterance.”'^" Bhabha’s argument here is explicitly derived from Hannah Arendt’s point 
that without such negotiated disclosure man is “dead” -  no longer part of the world in 
which he lives. This provides us with one part of an answer to the question of how art 
histoiy might deal with the absence of original desire, and of an originary mediator; a 
question raised at the outset here, and cmcial where Duchamp is concerned. There is no 
transcendence of the need for disclosure without “death”; narrative must disclose its 
enunciative conditions. Bhabha’s insistence on narrative as the medium of such 
negotiation is set out in terms which resonate with the procedure followed in this chapter:
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“Concerned primarily with the disclosure of the human subject as agent, 
negotiation is the ability to articulate differences in space and time, to link 
words and images in new symbolic orders, to intervene in the forest of signs 
and mediate what may seem to be incommensurable values or contradictory 
realities.... negotiation insists on the necessity o f narrative
For Bhabha as for Arendt, then, narrative is where human beings appear to each other as 
such. In art the seeming exteriority of aura, as rapture or transcendence, to negotiation as 
activity of the agora (marketplace) is disclosed as an illusion; rapture has its agency, just 
as negotiation is marked by “an uncharacteristic moment of radical uncertainty of 
selfhood and subjectivity.”'^  ^The spectator of art is neither in the rapturous position of 
the inspired artist, nor the distracted one of the occupant of the agora -  both positions are 
passively receptive in a way which Bhabha insists misses art’s ambivalent and dialogic 
relation to the world it inhabits. “For art has the capacity to reveal the almost impossible, 
attenuated limit where aura and agora overlap, to find a language for the high horizons of 
humanity itself and . . . to reveal its own fabulation, its fragility, at the moment o f its 
articulation [my emphasis]” and, further, art’s disclosure of the overlap of aura and agora 
is made possible by its mediatory in between-ness; a human position that belongs to 
neither.
As his key example of this positionality, Bhabha takes W.H. Auden’s famous poem ‘The 
Musée des Beaux Arts.’'^'' (Auden is, then, added to the list of museum visitors already 
crowded into this text: from the children playing amongst the string of the First Papers
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exhibition in 1942; to Valéiy and Proust -  as mediated by Adorno; the voyeur of the 
Etant Donnés-, and, implicitly, myself as visitor to Days Like These). Auden’s poem 
describes Brueghel’s painting o î Icarus (Fig. 47) and "how everything turns away / Quite 
leisurely from the scene of the disaster.” This juxtaposition of the miraculous and the 
quotidian occurs throughout and Auden’s poem, fitting it to Bhabha’s puipose. He 
stresses that there is a double framing, or mediation, of the "Old Masters” to whom 
Auden refers -  as painting (Brueghel) and poetiy (Auden). Thus Icarus’ fall, and the 
everyday life which carries on oblivious to it, are joined in/by "the poet’s narrative voice 
and the artist’s vision, which reside neither inside nor outside the poem or painting but 
hover on the edges of inscription and spectation. ... In the role of translator between 
painting and poetry, the narrator engineers the juxtaposition of aura and agora and then 
produces the necessaiy negotiation of r a p t u r e . T h e  exterior interpretative mediation 
upon which art’s articulation depends is, paradoxically not exterior to the work itself, but 
rather “part of the process by which art comes to be authorized in the acts of 
spectatorship and interpretation.” ^ ^The artwork is not temporally or hierarchically prior 
to its interpretation, which is the process by whieh its multiple elements signify. 
“Interpretation is not so much an adjunct activity as it is a disjunctive process that 
questions the veiy presenee or ‘being’ of the work of art as a beginning, as an activity o f 
authors h i p . Bhabha is himself, as narrator, arranging the negotiation of poet and 
painter by reinscribing the poet as narrator / spectator of the painting -  which role he 
doubles {en abyme) without necessarily attaining a metadiscursive, non-implicated 
position. Indeed, his argument is opposed to such a position, and instead “speaks 
between.” The juxtaposition of the miraculous and the quotidian in Brueghel and Auden,
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then, is read by Bhabha as affirming “the human position” as Arendt theorises it. “For art, 
in the irresolvable “side-by-sideness” of insight and insouciance in that uneasy space and 
time in between birth and death, opens up a space of survival in the interstices between 
aura and agora.”
Bhabha stresses that the distance between the sublime, as figured by Icarus, and the 
everyday of the agora is not merely a matter of “narrative pathos” or a sign of “an ethic of 
narcissistic self-absoiption.”^^  ^In ‘The Museum des Beaux Arts’ it is the very “turning 
away” from Icarus’ fate which opens the possibility of a mediation of the 
rapturous/divine and the quotidian.
“Between the fleeting visibility of art [note here that Icarus now figures art'] 
and the position from which a possible narrative or plausible record might 
emerge [art history?]... both Brueghel and Auden pose the poignant issue of 
art’s survival: as translation, revision, recognition, communication, 
misrecognition, circulation, mischance...
The tentative terms of this interpretative position, as registered in Auden’s language {may 
have, must have) suggests that art-as-rapture is contingent upon “interpretation as an 
intervention into the very signifying structure of the artwork” and that art’s “power of. . .  
persuasion through time, depends upon an attenuation and relocation of its “being” as 
both event and significance. In the veiy act of mediation or representation there is a 
necessary threat to art’s originary or essentializing presence. ... in order to ensure the
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survival of art, its authenticity or autonomy has to be partially erased.” '^"' To rephrase this 
somewhat, if art can only be inscribed as event through a mediation which is internal to 
it, but nonetheless undermining of its “originary presence” then art history as narrative 
mediator is both preserver and destroyer of art - both at once - and necessarily so. This is 
recognised, but not developed, in Bhabha’s claim that art (both visual and textual) 
produces narratives which “survive and seduce because they continually raise alternatives 
and agonists to their own existence -  spectres of memory, phantoms of the future, proxies 
for the present.”*^  ^Thus art lives on in the spectral by dint of the contradictions and 
antinomies it produces.
However, Bhabha’s account needs to be made more historically specific, to avoid simply 
being the retroactive fantasy of “originary or essentializing presence” as a product of a 
perceived lapsarian historicity. Walter Benjamin’s account of the loss of aura in the 
Artwork essay is once again cmcial, in that it offers a historically informed explanation 
for the reprodueed work as “aura-less.” If we can accept that all art works are mediated 
into “legend,” it is works made and circulated after the advent of mechanical 
reproduction which bring the interpreted historical character of their being as art to the 
fore. To paraphrase Heidegger, they are works for whom this historically mediated 
charaeter is at issue. Thus The Distance and its economical condensation of these issues 
doubles back to the very moment when the aura of art was fought for (by Rodin) and 
abandoned (by Duchamp). In doing so it forces the problem of what possible narrative or 
plausible record of it can do justice to its simultaneous presentation of itself as art as 
museal corpse and force of poetic réanimation.
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Bhabha’s account of art’s “inbetween-ness” offers a tremendously attractive notion of 
narrative self-disclosure as participation in human discourse; attractive particularly in the 
context of the present discussion because of the resonance of its key terms with those 
established in the preceding discussion. It opens out to an understanding of the fictive as 
the basis for such self-disclosure, which is itself the basis of the mediated and mediating 
“human position.” But we have seen with Adorno and Benjamin that to be between aura 
and agora is not only to be the (nearly) rapturous spectator of art, to be Icarus before he 
falls to earth, but also to be between a rock and a hard place. For when aura and agora are 
given their properly historieal determination, as part of the dialectic ambiguity of 
modernity (and after), they can be mapped onto the contrast between the loss of art 
(Valéry) and the loss of affective experience (Proust); between ritual value and display 
value; between the mysteiy of the religious fetish and the banality of the commodity 
fetish. Taking a more historically specific view of art (and of agora) than Bhabha allows, 
we must remain sceptical of his positing of art’s capacity for “rapturous negotiation,” 
even whilst acknowledging its attractions. As will be argued in the conclusion to Chapter 
Two, the notion of self-disclosure at work in Bhabha’s account can be shown to be bound 
up with aura and agora in a way that, in acknowledging their historical determination, 
makes it epistemologically and politically difficult to accept.
In the context of “crises” in critieism and ongoing debates about criticism’s relationship 
with art history. The Distance has been singled out here because it is exemplary of a 
certain mode of art making in its very generic, unremarkable way. I have pursued both a
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“respectable” following of clues “in” the work itself, and also a somewhat more 
outlandish articulation, or suturing, of art works together to produce a horizon of 
historical meaning. The fictive nature of this articulation, I suggest, is both a beti'ayal of 
the fragmentary condition of the historical revealed in the incoherence of the 
Duchampian references in The Distance, and an acknowledgement of the provisional and 
inconclusive basis on which (art) histoiy’s stories must themselves be articulated -  an 
acknowledgement which Hayden White has argued provides the very conditions for 
critical engagement in h i s t o r y . Whi t e ’s contention is that history’s objectivity is a 
product of the constitutive exclusion of fiction, rhetoric and politics -  dimensions which 
in fact continue to haunt it. This exelusion serves to cover over the traumatic equivalence 
of two possible theses regarding history: that it is meaningful, and that it is Sublimely 
meaning/(25.s', an equivalence that White argues is not resolvable on epistemological 
grounds. He proposes that an acknowledgement of the Sublimity of history as empty of 
meaning is the condition for a recovery of historical agency. But such a recovery depends 
on the de-sublimation of interpretation as a drive towards meaningfulness in favour of an 
acceptance of contingency. This chapter has attempted a strategic articulation of art 
works which are not causally connected, and which do not support an originaiy authorial 
position in art history or art historical discourse, as a step towards such a desublimation.
The Distance draws on the histories of both Rodin and Duchamp and in binding them 
together provides new “after-images” for both. Just as Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. became 
part of the Mona Lisa in art historical memory (a fact he registered with L.H.O.O.Q. 
Rasée), so Parker’s string may become, through photographs, part of the memory of The
Kiss an after-image that works its way into the original. The crucial question is whether 
this amounts to an act of critical comment on the museal fate of the work, its inevitable 
entanglement with an institutional afterlife, or whether it is instead a fantastical attempt at 
re-viviflcation. Writing of Michael Asher’s “situational aesthetics” Claude Gintz argues 
that given the seeming inescapability of reification,
“a paradigmatical change such as the substitution of installation for painting 
as an art categoiy does not suffice to escape that condition. This is probably 
why a practice like Asher’s is acceptable only as long as it remains strictly 
marginal within an institution that could easily function without it, whereas 
the existence of that practice is entirely dependent on institutional 
administrative experienee.” '^"'^
These concenis apply equally to The Distance, which is undoubtedly acceptable and 
legitimating for the Tate, but which also, as hinted at here, provides the potential of art 
historical reflection on institutional conditions, at least in an associative and perhaps 
fictive way akin to Parker’s own relation to historical objects. In the context of an art 
world which increasingly reifies its own procedures, and in which communications 
technology frirther extends the art objeet’s historieal trajectory from fetish to image, this 
is a question that goes beyond The Distance to art history’s mnemonic and critical 
function. Are its articulations inevitably fictional, and if so how can they be deployed? 
And if such fictions are inevitably the result of interpretation, what desires are at work in 
them, and what interpretative tools might allow us to reflect on this process itself?
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The ambiguity of the reiteration of Duchampian strategies is clear, and is clearly 
structuring for the enunciation of The Distance. But if this is relatively uncontroversial in 
recent scholarship, what is less frequently addressed are the related questions posed, and 
left open, by both Adorno and Benjamin: how is the critical to respond to the dialectic of 
re-animation and reification?; how is art to be politicised, to counter the aestheticisation 
of politics? If art histoiy no longer imagines itself to have access to a transcendent point 
above the field it surveys, if it can’t be figured by Icarus in flight, can it avoid the fate of 
an endless aftermath, an endless fall back to earth, by playing amidst the labyrinths of 
connection, fabulation, articulation, which works like The Distance seem to authorise? If 
this chapter has embraced and enacted a positive answer to that question, the following 
chapter raises an agonist to it, re-emphasising the ambiguity inherent in the dialectic of 
re-animation and reification. The key issue is what kind of ambiguity this is -  is it 
dialeetic, or merely an accession to the inbetween-ness of a limbo between art’s death 
and the viewer’s birth -  the dead and the living all subject to display value in “death’s 
showcase”?
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CHAPTER TWO -  Vertiso and the Copy
Every passion borders on the chaotic, but the collector’s passion borders on the chaos o f 
memories. ... For what else is this collection but a disorder to which habit has 
accommodated itself to such an extent that it can appear as order? ... And indeed, if  
there is a counterpart to the confusion o f a library, it is the order o f its catalogue.
Walter Benjamin, ‘Unpacking My Library’
I  defy any amateur ofpainting to love a picture as much as a fetishist loves a shoe. 
Georges Bataille.
The preceding chapter took Cornelia Parker’s The Distance (a kiss with string attached) 
as a work exemplary of one strand of contemporary artistic practice, and attempted to 
show that its frame of reference could be used to open up critical issues relating to the 
fate of art in the museum and in the age of its technical reproducibility. The justification 
for the approach taken in analysing this work was, in part, grounded in a conviction that 
an immersion in the “iconography” of the work and its enunciative conditions would 
inevitably lead to issues “beyond” art and the museum. This process, and the chain of 
associations it produces, is extended in this chapter. The relevance to art of culture and 
history beyond the museum’s walls is of course axiomatic to the accounts of modernity
given by Adorno and Benjamin. Yet the historical distance from their writing to the 
present necessitates that the contemporaiy, in art and culture, be theorised in its 
relationship to the transformations they describe. Hal Foster has used the concept of 
“deferred action” to argue that rather than supplanting the discourses of subject / culture / 
technology established in the 1930s and the 1960s, the much discussed concepts of the 
posthuman, identity politics, the post-colonial, virtuality, technoculture, electronic 
communication, and so on, in fact realise them. The transformations of the cultural field 
wrought by modernity are extended into the present, not supplanted by qualitatively new 
phenomena.^ Thus both the negative and positive dimensions of Benjamin and Adorno’s 
accounts of art’s fate have to be extended to the present; both the potential for a non- 
auratic art and the risk of reification’s colonisation of all spheres of affect. Foster argues 
that one of the consequences of the postmodern realisation of a fully reified culture is that 
design becomes the paradigmatic form of expression, collapsing the distance between art 
and life in an ironic realisation of the aims of the historical avant-garde.^ If postmodern 
art (as practised in the 1970s and 80s) had reacted to the transformations of modernity in 
its turning on / troping of modernism -  in Bhabha’s terms treating modernism as a 
narrative producing agonists to its own existence -  contemporary art is characterised by 
its “after-ness,” its attempted escape from anti-modernist negative dependency as it seeks 
to negotiate itself a space of survival, without succumbing to the affirmative logic of the 
design paradigm.^ This chapter pursues the connotations of art’s “living on,” from an 
analysis of the subjective basis of the collection as narrative, via the technologically 
mediated image (in photography and cinema), to resolve the epistemological questions 
left unanswered in the preceding discussion, and their consequences for critical writing.
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Foster suggests that there are four modes of “living on” of art in contemporary artistic 
practices: the traumatic, the spectral, the nonsynchronous, and the incongruent.^ These 
modes are not proposed as discreet categories, but often overlap and combine. Again, The 
Distance is exemplary in relating to all these modes -  its recollection of the trauma (for 
art histoiy) of Duchamp’s readymade strategy; the spectral existence of the work as 
(photographic) afterimage, its nonsynchronous combination of different historical 
moments; and its incongruent combination of aesthetic and anti-aesthetic impulses (of 
Rodin and high modernism with Duchamp as and his reception in neo-avant-gardism). In 
contrast to postmodernist pastiche, Foster suggests that these modes “trope” genres and 
mediums reflexively, aiming to open out to social praxis. “Through formal transformation 
that is also social engagement, then, such work helps to restore a mnemonic dimension to 
contemporary art, and to resist the presentist totality of design in culture today.”  ^It does 
not, however, do so alone; critical writing is required to underscore the contingent 
oppositional potential of art as re-membering. Moreover, it is faced with the difficult task 
of negotiating the relation between art’s auratic museum life, and its death as critical 
practice in a commodified, spectacular visual culture, recuperated under the sign of 
design or style.
The most important of Foster’s four modes of “living on” in the present context are the 
first two; it is the spectral and the traumatic which allow us to move from the analysis of 
a particular work to broader questions of (visual) culture as both symptomatic of
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postmodernity and potential site of resistance to it. In the traumatic, Foster contends, the 
failure of historical memory is met by a “compensatory imperative to remember,” most 
obviously seen in Holocaust commemorations, but also taking the form of museums 
dedicated to preserving traumatic episodes in history.^ The museum itself is implicated in 
this dynamic of loss and compensatory memories; it is an institution which “builds a 
secret monument to the end of history. ... In lifting art out of the hurly-burly of historical 
survival, the museum strips the artwork of its historical existence. It replaces historicity 
by historiography.”  ^Its relationship to trauma is thus implicitly repressive; it 
monumentalises rather than activates the historical openings created by traumatic 
ruptures in the symbolic order of things.
Georges Bataille insisted in the “critical dictionary” published in Documents on the 
sublimatory role of the museum for culture in general. Denis Hollier’s analysis of 
Bataille's radical opposition to architecture as the form of “edifying” systematicity, and 
as a kind of social mirror stage productive of “We” rather than “I,” emphasises this 
point.^ The museum is here a veil for the sacrificial, archaic and labyrinthine space of the 
slaughterhouse, the truth of which can no longer be faced up to: “those who could not 
bear the image of decomposition reflected to them by the slaughterhouses go to museums 
to compose themselves again. They flee the unredeeming ugliness of slaughterhouses for 
the beauty of museums.”  ^The museum is a crucial architectural edifice in that it not only 
has this veiling flmction for Bataille, but also figures the museal dimension as co­
terminous with the very possibility of a histoiy of art, a historiography standing in for 
historicity. Hegel’s aesthetics, emergent from a supercession of art by philosophy.
101
depends on the presumption that art is a thing o f the past: “Art is dead. With his 
Aesthetics. Hegel constmcts its tomb.” *^^ For Phillip Fisher, the act of walking past art in 
our museal perambulations “recapitulates ... the motion of art history itself, its 
restlessness, its fbiivard motion, its power to link. ... The rapid stroll through a museum 
is an act in deep harmony with the nature of art, that is, art histoiy and the museum itself 
{not with the individual object, which the museum has profoundly hidden in histoiy).”’* 
This alignment of art as such with art history and the museum needs to be supplemented 
by the recognition that we now “wander through museum spaces as if after the end of 
time.”’^  It is the ambiguity of art’s relationship with an institution that both obscures and 
creates it, and a discourse that is mutually dependent on this institution, that I wish to 
underscore here. As was argued in Chapter One, the recognition of the constitutive role of 
the museum’s / art histoiy’s procedures in producing art risks turning into an 
aestheticisation of them, just as the fantasy of being “after histoiy” risks abandoning 
culture as a site of contest within histoiy. If the photographic image is, paradoxically, the 
final site of cult value in modernity, for Benjamin “it is also that which enables the 
recuperation of the ethical stance and a certain resistance to the threat of 
aestheticization.”’^  It is this possibility which Foster wishes to extend in his notion of 
art’s survival in traumatic and spectral modes.
Trauma has become a general signifier for contemporary understanding of history and the 
subject, and indeed the privileged mode of access to shared affective “publicity,” via 
what Mark Seltzer has termed the “sociality of the wound” in the stmcturally transformed 
public sphere.'"* Foster notes that many novelists and filmmakers present experience in
102
the guise of the traumatic paradox of “experience that is not experienced, at least not 
punctually, that comes too early or too late to be registered consciously, that can only be 
repeated compulsively or pieced together after the fact.”’^  His examples of traumatic 
narrative include the novels of W, G. Sebald, Paul Auster and Toni Morrison, but recent 
movies such as Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000), David Cronenberg’s Spider (2003) 
or The Machinist (Brad Anderson, 2004) exemplify this phenomenon even better -  in 
each of these films the narrative which the viewer is presented with as (disturbing, 
enigmatic) reality, turns out to be the protagonist’s fantasy. The diegetic reality with 
which we are engaged is in each case a result of these protagonists’ failure to bring some 
trauma to full consciousness -  the death of a wife in Memento, the Oedipal scene in 
Spider, the accidental killing of a child in The Machinist. Hence, in each case the 
revelation of the tme content of the traumatic episode ruptures the texture of the fantasy 
which has driven the narrative, and must mean the end of the story and our return to the 
real in an act of narrative and psychological “closure.” In this sense -  to give advance 
notice of an argument made in more detail later in this chapter -  Alfred Hitchcock’s films 
are more radical than traumatic postmodernist cinema in allowing for a more complex 
process of spectatorial identification which configures fantasy, cinematic texture and 
narrative in such a way as to prevent an easy acceptance of the closure of fantasy and a 
return to the real. In Vertigo, for instance, we know before the protagonist does that his 
experience is fantasmatic, and do so for almost half of the film. In his famous discussion 
with François Truffaut, Hitchcock justified this unusual plot structure, in which the twist 
is given away early, as follows; “I put myself in the place of a child whose mother is 
telling him a stoiy. When there’s a pause in her narration, the child always says, “What
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comes next Mommy?”’  ^Hitchcock, thus “imagines himself in the double role -  a 
bisexual role -  of the little boy (the audience) who listens to the story and the mother (the 
director) who tells it.”’  ^For this account of the traumatic as a mode in contemporary 
cultural production Hitchcock’s statement suggests that the boundaries between 
knowingness, narration, and the unconscious are stmcturally ambiguous. Vertigo, unlike 
more recent films in the traumatic mode, allows that narration might persist beyond the 
point at which trauma is brought to consciousness -  in doing so it resists closure and 
allows the space for critics to transform it, in much the same way as Foster posits the 
critical potential in art’s condition of aftermath.
If all art exists in the shadow of previous art, as the very condition of its disciplinarity, 
Foster claims that in contemporary art this shadowing is spectral -  it is a question of 
haunting, to be distinguished from Harold Bloom’s theory of the anxiety of influence and 
from postmodernism celebratory homage, or pastiche. The difference lies in the effect 
that the spectral as cultural has on what it haunts; spectral works are those which render 
the genres they come after “at once archaic and exotic, strangely animated,” in a kind of 
active production of “outmodedness” in Benjamin’s sense.Further, they work to 
inscribe themselves in the pasts that make them possible. I have tried to show that The 
Distance, as a relatively unprepossessing example of art operating in the modes Foster 
identifies, can support a close-reading that helps animate -  that is, keep moving -  the 
(Duchampian) tradition to which it belongs, and in doing so, haunts the very past which 
provides the condition of its existence; in other words, it effects the very
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conceptualisation of that past. This is the counterpart to the museum’s immobilization of 
histoiy -  a dynamic historicity which problematizes historiography as linear succession.
The preceding chapter indicated that art history as narrative is bound up with the ré­
animation of its privileged objects in their museal context. With Bhabha’s emphasis on 
the inte?io?ity of processes of interpretation as articulation-fabulation to the aitwork, the 
blow against art’s autonomy struck by the historical avant-garde, figured most 
particularly by Duchamp, was extended to become a general condition of art per se. 
Though the radical thmst this provides against autonomy as an objective property of art 
(and as a prop for subjective autonomy, as in Rilke’s discourse on Rodin) is to be 
endorsed, Bhabha’s account leaves the historical dimension of his key terms -  aura, 
museum, agora-marketplace -  unaddressed. This chapter picks up the threads of his 
conception of narrativity, but brings it to bear on the historical context of art’s dual status 
as auratic ritual object and reproduced display object. Positing the museum as the key 
context for the duality of death and aura in art, it opens up the problem of subjective 
investment in the narratives emergent in processes of collection and curation -  the 
fundamental procedures of museological practice. This leads beyond the museum’s walls 
to the problematic of fetishism, in a double Marxist-Freudian sense, and thereby to image 
and after-image as sites of investment in photography and in cinema. Finally, these 
arguments lead to a suggested conclusion to the problem of narrative and mediation in 
relation to copy-as-original -  the question set out at the start of Chapter One.
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Consonant with Bhabha’s argument that narrative is intimately part of the signification of 
artworks, Mieke Bal has proposed that collections themselves have a narrative form, and 
that they are therefore interpretable in semiotic te rm s .Ju s t as Bhabha insists on the 
intersubjectivity of the “human position” and of narrative, so Bal stresses that whilst 
artistic / cultural production and spectation are ultimately subjective, nonetheless codes or 
conventions of meaning must be intersubjectively available in objective form for such 
production/reception to occur. Narrative doubles this situation insofar as it is constative, 
it recounts facts, but does so via a narrator whose subjective viewpoint directs our 
interpretation of events; thus, all naiTatives are “by definition more or less fictional,” and 
inquiry into narrative forms must therefore acknowledge that the fictive cannot be 
entirely eliminated.^’
Collecting cannot be easily defined, because knowledge based on definition itself 
depends on procedures of collection and classification, and is therefore implicated in 
what is at stake here. To get round this difficulty Bal switches her focus to the attitude of 
the collector, and presents collecting as a confrontation between his subjective attitude 
and the objects collected. These narrative components can then be analyzed in semiotic 
terms, though, as is often the case when a position between two opposing poles is argued 
for, there is the suspicion that one side of that opposition is already privileged. Here,
Bal’s initial promise of treating the collection itself a naiTative has quickly slid over 
into study of the nan ative investment of the collecting subject.
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What drives this investment? According to Bal, the narrative of the collecting attitude is a 
response to a necessary ambiguity in the collection’s origin. The first object of a 
collection never appears as such; it is bought, but not yet collected. “In relation to the plot 
of collecting, the initial event is arbitrary, contingent, accidental. ... Only retrospectively, 
through a narrative manipulation of the sequence of events, can the accidental acquisition 
of the first object become the beginning of a collection.C ollecting is meaningful once 
it is a narrativized sequence, but this meaningfrilness is not transparent to a narrative 
agent (the collector); an “initial blindness” is a precondition, with this only 
retrospectively overcome.^^ Thus the shift of attention from collection-as-narrative to 
collector-as-narrator is not a recourse to a self-transparent and originary subject. The 
narrative of subjective motivation is a supplementary device to repress the “other 
beginning” -  that of the object which was merely bought, not collected (perhaps 
illustrating the Hegelian point that a quantitative change, in this instance the 
accumulation of objects to form a “collection,” can become a qualitative one).^ "* Here we 
must underscore the resonance with art history’s own narrativizing of Duchamp, whose 
act of introducing the Readymade into the repertoire of art has been given meaning 
through subsequent re-collections of it: in the narrative of anti-art; the repetitions of its 
strategy by other artists, (and, indeed by Duchamp himself); and in the establishment of 
Duchamp as “author-function.
Bal is aware that there is a risk of naturalizing a socially specific form of engagement 
with objects by giving it an essentialised subjective definition, in seeing the collecting
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attitude as a matter of the subject’s desire (as with Schlosser’s Sammeltrieb). What is 
required is a concept that keeps open the social/historical dimension even as it tells the 
stoiy of the subject’s desire, and Bal argues that this concept is fetishism. Collecting can 
thus be conceptualised as a fetishistic, possessive strategy deployed in both individual 
and cultural forms. The collection is here a project of mastery, of the appropriation of 
otherness. Thus collecting as an extension of self operates in an act of appropriation as 
de-othering that produces alterity so as to overcome it, and it is this paradoxical move 
which defines fetishism for Bal. If collecting is a (fetishistic) project of mastery, then the 
contingency of the object which (retrospectively) initiates its narrative is deeply 
problematic, for it is an origin which depends on a potentially unstable distance and 
alterity, which the subject may fail to dominate. It is also a project with a troubled 
relationship not only to this retrospectively attained origin, but also to its possible 
completion, which inevitably threatens the death of subjective investment. At the turn of 
the twentieth century Adolph Loos argued against Art Nouveau’s ornamentalization of 
the commonplace, imagining the subject’s response to the hilly aestheticized 
environment to be one of horror. For Loos, it is with the full subjectivization of the world 
-  its appropriation into the collection of art -  that the aesthetic project turns sour; the 
subject is “precluded from all future living and striving, developing and desiring” and the 
consequence of completing the subjective investment in objects is living “with one’s own 
corpse.”^^  This point will be expanded upon when fetishism is discussed in the context of 
cinema, and another conceptualisation of the relationship between subjective and cultural 
investment in objects is considered. But how does fetishism itself operate in narrative 
terms?
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Marx and Freud provide the seminal accounts of fetishism in the social and subjective 
registers. Drawing on both, Bal insists on the usefulness of a hybrid concept of fetishism, 
a concept which promises to reveal collection as situated in the hybridic capitalist / 
individualist social sphere. Her reading of Freudian fetishism in semiotic terms runs as 
follows; the fetishistic investment in an object is explained by a naiTative of origins in 
which three acts of symbolization respond to an initial (visual) perception of lack. 
According to Freud, faced with this perception, “a child is able to satisfy both the demand 
to acquiesce in the reality of castration and a conflicting, narcissistic desire to disavow it 
by maintaining both beliefs concurrently.”^^  Thus a primal traumatic moment is placed at 
start of the story. In fact, this initial moment is itself indistinguishable from the fictive 
symbolic determination of “absence of penis” as lack, a supplementary, metaphorical 
effect of the subject. This visual inteipretation leads on to a second symbolization, which, 
by “superimposing fiction upon fiction,” denies the absence seen in the first -  a denial of 
absence later eroticised into fetishism in a third symbolic act. The object which is to be 
the paradigm of “object-ivity” is made to mean according to a system of rhetorical tropes: 
the fetish as penis substitute synecdochally stands for the (unity of the) whole body, of 
which it is itself part; metonymically, objects like stockings or a chain are valued through 
their contiguity to the body.^^ But in a second aspect of the fetishistic process, wholeness 
is itself defined by the presence of a single part. As Freud writes, “the normal prototype 
of fetishes is a man’s penis,”^^  and it the fetishized penis as phallus that represents / 
guarantees wholeness. As synecdoche the penis can only represent masculinity -  but the 
object of fetishism (that which it tries to preserve as wholeness) is the female, maternal,
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body. This discontinuity is bridged by metaphor. “The wholeness of the female body can 
only be synecdochally represented by the stand-in penis that is the fetish, if that body is 
simultaneously to be metaphorically represented by the male body.”^^  Thus the male 
body establishes the normative principle by which wholeness as such is possible.
This sequence of metaphoric, synecdochal and metonymic substitutions is also, for Bal, 
the semantic basis of the collection as nanative. An object in a collection means 
according to its relations to other objects, synecdochally (part of a whole), metonymically 
(as it relates to another proximate object or idea) but always also metaphorically -  the 
object is representative insofar as it can represent other objects. The semiotic logic of the 
collection is dependant on the “violence” of this process; “each episode of collecting, 
each event of insertion ... is also an act of deprivation.”^^  As with the doubly fictional 
erasure of the 'original’ traumatic absence in Freudian fetishism, the collector’s narrative 
is a violent rewriting of an object’s history. This requires an effect of narrative closure 
that is achieved retrospectively by the insertion of an original moment that marks the 
boundary of the narrative, once it has been established. This beginning-as-boundary is 
thus a retrospective projection which enables the very possibility of narrativization. This 
violent event of semantic deprivation is, for Bal, the very core of collecting’s narrative.^^ 
It is also, insofar as the museum not only relies on the practice and logic of collection but 
also continues the re-writing of object histories, the core of museology. The problem 
here, however, is that there is a tendency to valorize the meaning of the object before its 
collection; to assume a natural/original meaning before appropriation and narration. Thus 
the radical implications of Bal’s semiotics are not carried through to their conclusion.
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Ill both Marxian and Freudian theories of fetishism there is a reciprocal subjectivation o f  
objects, and objectification of subjects, and Bal locates the interconnection of these 
processes in the role of the visual in both theories. In the Marxist account it is as a visual 
projection that the reciprocal misperception of objects as animate and subjects as images 
is figured, indeed “this equation of subject and image is isomorphic with the stmcture of 
commodity fetishism.”^^  As presented in the Freudian account of the child’s 
(mis)perception of female lack, the objectivity of vision is deceptive -  it is always 
already directed by subjective fictions, it is always already a semiotic/rhetorical activity, 
Bal insists. Thus the basis of the collection as narrative is not the object in its material 
specificity, but rather its existence as image for the subject. If for Adorno museums are 
tombs for dead objects, for Benjamin it is photography (and other technologies of 
reproduction) that kills off auratic art and thereby opens the possibility of a 
transformation of image into revolutionary tool. Yet photography is also a determining, 
necessary if not sufficient, disciplinary condition of art history’s disciplinarity. As well as 
undermining originality in its own procedures, it also produces it retrospectively for art 
and discourses on art. In the age of mechanical reproduction, the fetishistic character at 
least minimally present in the art-collecting impulse is revealed clearly, but in a 
paradoxical way. The ineffable quality of the desired object is veiled / disavowed in an 
ideal projection of its innate value. But, as reproduction makes a version of this ideality 
generally available as image, so the originality of the object comes to be guaranteed by 
its materiality. There are therefore two versions of the ideality of the art work -  that 
pertaining to the image as freely circulating reproduction (commodity form), and that
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paradoxically ascribed to the materially original work (as fetish). The fetishism of 
collection-as-narrative is violent in that it obscures both this ambiguity and its own 
rhetorical basis in order to impose its object lessons. Can, then, the two classic theories of 
fetishism -  those of Marx and Freud -  undo this narrative, whilst at the same time telling 
their own?
For Marx it is commodities which represent to producers their relation to manufactured 
goods as an objective social relation pertaining between goods, not men. With the 
commodity form, material properties bear no relation to (exchange) value; rather “it is a 
definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a 
relation between th in g s .M a rx ’s clarification of the mystified relations between goods 
and men brings this to the fore in its combination of the quotidian and archaic / religious 
connotations;
“In order ... to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped 
regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human 
brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into 
relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of 
commodities with the products of men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism 
which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced 
as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of 
commodities.”^^
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The phrase “commodity fetishism” thus gains its force from an internal tension, which 
depends for its effect on an Occidental projection of anthropological otherness, and the 
spectral is associated with the seemingly ordinary objectivity of the commodity.
Both Marx’s and Freud’s narratives start out from a “primal” scene of visual 
apprehension which leads on to the relations between objects, and Bal stresses that in 
both accounts “vision as both positive knowledge and perverting subjectivity constitutes 
the core event.”^^  For both, she argues, there is a discrepancy between narrator and 
“focalisor,” her name for the subjective prism through which the narrative is presented to 
us. The Freudian subject narrates via the symptoms of his fetishism, the Marxian one by 
fulfilling his historical class role.
“For Freud, the narrator is an adult male agent, for Marx, the historical agent.
This narrator is by necessity stuck within a double vision, embedding the 
focalisation of adult and child, of lucid agent and deceived idolater, 
indistinguishably. Freud’s focalisor has frilly endorsed the doubly negative 
vision of the child, including the remedial denial and the fetishistic 
displacement. Marx’s focalisor is a selfconscious agent standing within the 
historical process and endorsing as well as denouncing false consciousness 
and the idols of the mind.”^^
Crucially, then, we have narratives in which both knowing and not knowing, lucidity and 
deception, mark the subject’s relation to the absent origins which begin these narratives.
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But BaTs analysis does not move on from this insight to address the problem of the 
focalisation of the Marxist and Freudian focalisors: the subjects she interrogates are the 
analytic patient and the historical (proletarian) agent, and the plausibility of the Marxist 
and Freudian insights which narrate them, and claim to state the truth of their beginnings, 
is left untheorised.
BaFs hybridized notion of fetishism suggests that the subjective positions which focalise 
the narratives of object relations, whether sexually fetishistic, commodified, or mediated 
into collection or art history as narrative, are inevitably double -  both knowing and 
unknowing. But is this itself a critical perspective, or merely a narratively satisfying 
conclusion to the paradoxes set out? Is this an affirmation of a fundamental 
schizophrenia, brought about by the triumph of capital?^® Or perhaps a sign that with this 
theorization we remain in a historically interstitial moment? All these questions point 
towards the need either for a metadiscursive/metahistorical perspective from which to 
answer the question, or, as an alternative, a tactical guide to advancing through this 
ambiguous territory positively. It is in response to this need that Chapter Three 
commences. First, the problem of fetishism as interpretative category needs to be 
developed further.
If BaFs consideration of practices of collection and its semiotic logic from the dual 
perspectives of narrative and fetishism usefully elucidates the fictive / subjective base of 
practices normally presented as disinterested, it is less clear that she achieves an entirely 
satisfactoiy epistemological resolution to her argument. This is arguably a result of her
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lack of attention to the historical/social dimension in favour of the Freudian/subjective. 
Most importantly, the historical relevance and justification for the synthesis of the two 
theories of fetishism remains unaddressed here, as does the basis on which we can undo 
narrative’s obscuring of ambiguous beginnings and its own rhetorical acts. In other 
words, the epistemological and historical basis of critical engagement with fetishism as 
semiotic mode is still unclear.
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The cinema is the ‘negative’ o f the gallery.... In the cinema we are in darkness; the 
gallery is light. In the cinema we are immobile before moving images; in the galleiy it is 
we who must move.
Victor Burgin
A more detailed account of fetishism as a concept through which to attempt a synthesis of 
Marx (and the social / historical) with Freud (and the subjective) has been given by Laura 
Mulvey/^ Like Bal she uses semiotic theory to provide a meta-interpretive position from 
which to combine Marxist and Freudian perspectives; relating their respective concepts 
of the fetish to the Piercian categories of index, sign, and symbol, and suggesting that our 
relation to image is produced in the structural homology that cathects subjective (sexual) 
disavowal with the collective (economic) invisibility of labour. Mulvey performs a kind 
of double palinodie return; to the presuppositions of her own intellectual milieu in the 
1970s, and to her own disavowal in the landmark essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema,’ of what she now recognises as a critically valuable aesthetic -  that of studio- 
system Hollywood cinema."^ ®
Mulvey notes that fetishism was a key concept for anti-Hollywood cinema and 
psychoanalytically-inspired feminist theory in the 1970s, specifically for the “politieal 
aesthetics” of such practices. In the case of Screen magazine, it was a Brechtian aesthetic
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that resulted, with the revelation of cinema’s mechanics of production taken as pointing 
towards the similarly obscured reality of labour power. Fetishization was, then, 
something to be undone. Initially this seemed possible via the celebration of the 
instability of meaning, but with the transition to postindustrial capitalism, and the 
slippage of referentiality internal to it, this came to be synonymous with a cynical and 
affirmative notion of the postmodern free-floating signifier. Disavowal -  the Freudian 
name for the partial acknowledgement of traumatic realities -  and its structure “I know 
veiy well, but all the same...” provides the key epistemological as well as aesthetic 
orientation of Mulvey’s argument against such cynicism. From a perspective likewise 
informed by Freudo-Marxism, Victor Burgin has insisted on the relevance for this 
structure in relation to art history: the “splitting between knowledge and belief’ which 
characterises disavowal as the ‘form  of fetishism” is played out in the failure to 
acknowledge in institutional and historiographic contexts the impact of social 
transformation on artistic production and reception. “Today,” he argues, “what has 
become in effect the ‘official’ posture of the art establishment is a disavowal in respect of 
histoiy.”'^ ^
In redressing such amnesia, Mulvey’s concern is to replace the Brechtian aesthetic and its 
homologous revelation of material production in cinema and capitalist society with an 
“aesthetics of disavowal” that addresses the symbolic supports of capitalist culture. It is in 
response to this problem that fetishism emerges as a promising topos for a provisional 
synthesis of Marx and Freud. Although important differences exist between the two 
conceptions of fetishism, they become, for Mulvey, complementary. Thus, whereas
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Marx’s notion of fetishism deals with the failure of inscription, the inability of labour to 
mark its value on the commodity, the Freudian fetish, in contrast, result fi'om an 
excessive inscription of a sign to substitute for a perceived (misrecognized) lack. In 
consumer culture these two logics supplement each other, binding subjective passion to 
abstract symbolic system.
Mulvey’s account of Freudian fetishism does not differ significantly from Bal’s, but her 
use of Pierce’s triad of index, sign, and symbol to treat the problem of inscription in Mai"x 
significantly advances our argument. Marx’s account of the commodity form is translated 
into Piercian terms as follows: labour power produces an object and is the source of its 
value, but does not indexically inscribe it with the time or skill that went into its making; 
value then is established in exchange, in the equivalence or mirroring of commodities 
(akin to Pierce’s “iconic” level); finally, circumventing the need for the actual presence 
of objects in exchange, money as an abstract, symbolic, language-like sign-system 
completes the erasure of labour power as the source of value. Hence the apparent 
autonomy, and thus the fetishistic character, of the commodity; any index of its origins in 
labour are erased, and its true source of value is disavowed. Crucially, Mulvey argues 
that “capitalism resurrects the commodity as image [my emphasis]”; an image 
characterised by its “seductive sheen, competing to be desired.”'^  ^The commodity fetish 
masks the secret of capitalist exploitation and “represents the logic of symbolic exchange 
as an imaginary investment in object as such.”'^  ^This “return to the image” as part of a 
spectacular commodity culture is mirrored in Duchamp’s L.H.O.O.Q. rasée and indeed in 
any art object which, like The Distance, circulates primarily or exclusively as after-
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image, as pure exchange value in the absence of any object. The key question, already 
raised in Chapter One, is whether such minoring does more than accede to such a reified 
exhibition value, and if so, how critical/historical writing may support it?
If the postmodern celebration of the sliding signifier indicates spectacle’s defeat of 
referentiality at both economic and superstiuctural levels, Mulvey proposes that it is 
precisely the mechanism of disavowal that allows critical access to this process. The key 
problematic here is the relationship between disavowal and the possibility of “actually 
articulating the Real” in both subjective and social senses.T he  social/political real is no 
more representable than the Lacanian Real, she argues, but analysis of its superstructural 
discursive products might provide insight into transformations in the base/real. The key 
question is how many superstiuctural products “may be related back, as symptoms, to the 
forces that generated them?”'^  ^Fetishism as concept is deployed here: firstly in using 
“structures of disavowal” as a way to reformulate the question of reference, with the 
over-inscription at the centre of Freudian fetishism providing the epistemological support 
for analysis of the abstracted symbolic system of capital, and its relation to culture.
Freud emphasised that the key feature of disavowal is its status as a half-measure that 
only partly fends off an external threat by a partial detachment from reality. As Adam 
Phillips puts it, the fetish is for the Freudian subject a kind of obstacle which “secretly 
confronts the fetishist with what it protects him from,” which allows both the loss and the 
retention of the fantasy of the phallic mother.'*  ^In response to castration anxiety the fetish 
commemorates the point of lack, and thus includes “a residual knowledge of its origin.”'^ ^
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Mulvey relates this to the Real as uiinameable: “disavowal acknowledges its own origin 
in an unspeakable, and its consequent displacements thus both acknowledge and deny a 
relation of cause and eftect.”^^  We might speculatively suggest here that the art historical 
response to museal objects is fetishistic in precisely this sense; it has the classical 
stmcture of disavowal, the “I know very well... but all the same,” i.e. “I know this work 
is institutionally framed, but all the same I can treat it as autonomous...”; “I know that it 
is “dead,” but I can give it the kiss of life...” etc. Fetishism attributes self-sufficient 
autonomy to an object, disavowing what is known and replacing it with belief; though 
being haunted by the fragility of this mechanism. This constmction of the fetish from 
contradictory ideas is precisely, Freud argues, what makes it particularly durable.
How, then, does the stractural homology of over-inscribed sexual fetish and under­
inscribed commodity come into effect, how are the two fetishisms bound together? 
Mulvey argues that the successful fetishization of cinema is supported by its eroticization 
through the image o f woman. Reciprocally, the constmction of erotic femininity depends 
on fetishism.
“The popular cinema, itself a commodity, can form a bridge between the 
commodity spectacle and the figure of woman as spectacle on the screen.
This, in turn, leads on to the bridging function of woman as consumer, rather 
than producer of commodities. ... The formal structures of disavowal create a 
conduit, linking different points of social difficulty and investing in ‘sight’ as 
a defence against them.”^^
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For Mulvey, then, the screening function of disavowal in cinema is also a suturing one, in 
which erotic investment in the image of woman is bound to the commodity form. As 
spectacle the commodity object “becomes image and belief and is secured by an erotic, 
rather than a religious, aura.” *^ While woman as surface “fronts for” cinema’s productive 
machineiy, a similar relation pertains between woman and commodity.^^ However, the 
veiy strength of the investment in surface raises the question of what is concealed, 
Mulvey argues, and the anxiety thus aroused is deflected by further investment in image.
The fetish, by its only partial displacement through disavowal of the traumatic Real, 
allows its causal link to that Real be known; the key epistemological feature which 
Mulvey adds to Bal’s account. This is tiue of culture in general, according to 
psychoanalytic film theory, which conceives mass culture as a screen “on which 
collective fantasy, anxiety, fear and their effects can be projected.”^^  The forms thus 
projected are symptoms of the displaced socially traumatic. It is the mother’s body (for 
Freud) and the worker’s labour (for Marx) which “become the unspeakable, and the 
unrepresentable, in commodity culture.” '^^  The two repressions -  of labour and of the 
maternal body -  are mutually reinforced in image as the site of both commodity as 
spectacle and woman as surface. Both cinema as surface (which stands in Mulvey’s 
argument for the conjunction of commodity and image per se) and woman as surface (on 
screen and off it) are sites where an aesthetics of disavowal can operate, in forming 
passionate attachments and opening critical perspectives. Both, in “implying and
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concealing an elusive, unknowable essence,” draw attention to their own function as 
screen/^
In distinct contrast to this partial referentiality is postmodern mass culture’s 
spectacularization, for which sight itself, rather than the individual fetish, is the locus of 
symbolic “richness.” Given complex technological support in an image-saturated culture, 
such “rich sight” is itself developed from stiuctures of disavowal in mass culture, but a 
disavowal now displaced and doubled. If disavowal maintains, through excessive 
inscription, a residual connection between cause and effect even as it conceals it, the 
“investment in visual excess and displacements of signifiers produces a very strong 
texture that can come to conceal this need to conceal the relation between cause and 
effect... the blind spots that generated the processes of disavowal get further lost on the 
way [my e m p h a s i s ] . I t  is questionable here whether Mulvey doesn’t disavow her own 
claims re: the loss of referentiality: “I know veiy well that cause and effect are severed, 
but I can nonetheless articulate them as if that were not the case...” The tenuousness of 
disavowal can easily slip into the spectacular, and it is here that artistic strategies based 
on complicity with institutional procedures require critical attention to delimit and 
specify their potential as sites of critique. My contention is that The Distance (and other 
work like it) both enacts institutional spectacularization and points to its contingent 
supports. If, as Burgin argues, the impact of twentieth-century history is disavowed by 
art’s institutions, we must note that an attempt to avow this history via a transition to 
Visual Studies as paradigm (and, for that matter, via categories such as the spectral) run
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the risk of reinforcing the centrality of the image, and thus acceding to the invisibilities it 
produces.
Mulvey’s notion of a Lacanian “screening” of the tiuumatic real is developed fiirther by 
Hal Foster in the Return o f the Real and, although he is more aware of the problems 
implicit in such a concept, he too remains constrained by the tension between narrative 
exposition and posited unspeakability. In Foster’s exposition, “screen” is taken to refer 
“to the cultural reserve of which each image is one instance. Call it the conventions of art, 
the schemata of representation, the codes of visual culture, this screen mediates the 
object-gaze fo r  the subject, but it also protects the subject from  this object-gaze.”^^  The 
screen tames the gaze in an image. Foster sees some contemporaiy art as attacking, 
tearing this screen, and thus effecting a “shift in conception -from  reality as an effect o f 
representation to the real as a thing o f trauma” that is characteristic of contemporary 
culture in myriad forms.Thi s  does seem to be borne out in the passion for “reality” 
manifest in phenomena such the confessional T.V. talk show, or even more, in the 
gravitational pull which traumatic events (whether physical or psychic, personal or 
collective) have for the media. Yet as all such mediations function themselves as 
screening mechanisms it has to be questionable whether the really Real that Foster and 
Bal stage behind the “screen” appears in culture at all.
The Real as a thing of trauma has been termed the abject by Julia Kristeva, a category 
which is “neither subject nor object, but before one is the former (before full separation 
from the mother) or after one is the latter (as a coipse given over to objecthood).”^^  Thus
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for Foster, an artist such as Cindy Sherman stages the obscene “as i f  there were no scene 
to stage it, no frame o f representation to contain it, no screen.”^  ^Foster acknowledges 
that the abject is profoundly ambiguous as a critical concept: “If it is opposed to culture, 
can it be exposed in culture? If it is unconscious, can it be made conscious and remain 
abject? In other words, can there be a conscientious abjection, or is this all there can 
be?” '^ Kristeva splits the operation of (expelling the) abject as fiindamental to 
subjectivity, and the condition of abjection (which undermines the subject). Ciucially, on 
this model, with the collapse of the Other of symbolic law, the artist’s role is to plumb the 
depths of the abject. This is how Foster theorizes the image-screen as torn, or under 
attack. He stresses the need to “rethink transgression not as a mpture produced by a 
heroic avant-garde outside the symbolic order but as a fracture traced by a strategic 
avant-garde within the o r d e r . T h e  avant-garde then is tasked with revealing the 
productive aspects of symbolic disorder, a project in which “abject ait” has tended to fail, 
Foster argues. He draws on the history of Surrealism’s similarly desublimatoiy project, 
noting that it marked the point where Surrealism split, between the “excremental” 
Bataille, and the “Icarian” Breton (transgressing to invoke the paternal law). For Foster 
contemporaiy artists are likewise split between “Oedipal naughtiness” and “infantile 
perversion.”*'^
We find, then, that what is argued for by Mulvey -  and Foster -  is a kind of balancing 
act on the precarious line dividing “good” and “bad” symptoms: we need a bit of 
fetishistic disavowal (to hold open partial access to the social real) but not so much that 
we fall into a totally reified and doubly displaced fetishism of the postmodernist
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spectaciüarized variety; enough mpturing of the screen of the real to open possibilities of 
transformation, but not so much that we fall into abjection.,. What is the significance of 
this figure of the interstitial, or of the third position, (which was present in Bal’s 
argument, and Bhabha’s, and will recur in other texts considered here)? Is it itself a 
symptom of the unresolved epistemology implied by the hypothesis of a constitutive 
iinnameable -  which has to be acknowledged but can’t be represented? We have to 
conclude that what this eminently historical approach can’t do is account for the status of 
its own insight, insofar as it hypothesises unnameable / unrepresentable dimensions 
which are constitutive of culture, yet can also be simply named and represented within 
the terms of the argument. As with Bal, Mulvey posits a state of affairs which should 
undermine the very possibility of the narrative argumentation presented. Neither really 
address the limits of what can be avowed. How can these processes be spoken/articulated 
if their constitutive ‘Real’ cannot? In the end, Mulvey’s palinodie return to reinscribe her 
own passion for the ‘aesthetics of disavowal’ ironically misses the lesson of her own 
epistemology) o f disavowal. This is understandable inasmuch as it relies on a disavowal of 
its own -  it both posits an inarticulable Real and speaks its name. To pursue Mulvey’s 
feminist linking of fetishism to veiling via the image, I will consider the critical 
elaboration of “image” in this sense. This entails a movement through sculpture-as- 
metaphor, to photographic image, and cinema as site of narrative investment, that 
recapitulates the arc of The Distance, this time not to elucidate it, but to drawn on its 
metaphorical resonances as a pretext for shifting attention to much broader (and more 
important) theorisations of culture and criticism.
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Bal and Mulvey appear to exempt their own narratives from the subjective entanglements 
of desire that they present as constitutive of narration and image-formation respectively. 
In Bal this is a question primarily of the Oedipal subject, in Mulvey of the subject of 
postmodern spectacle. But how does the Freudian narrative both rely on operate? Freud’s 
1927 paper on fetishism gives a special place to foot-fetishism as exemplary of the 
general dynamics of this form of psychological investment. The dual “affection and 
hostility in the treatment of the fetish” which results from its function as screen of/for the 
absence of the maternal phallus is figured by Chinese foot-binding, which both mutilates 
and reveres.*''  ^The foot is also key to Freud’s explanation of fetishistic object choice. “It 
seems ... that when the fetish is instituted some process occurs which reminds one of the 
stopping of memoiy in traumatic amnesia. ... it is as though the last impression before 
the uncanny and traumatic one is retained as a fetish.”^^  The primal scene of traumatic 
sight thus produces compensatory images to disavow the absence that is its cause. Hence 
feet, shoes, and underwear, are common fetishes because of their circumstantial 
connection to the scene of visual apprehension of lack -  they point back to the last 
possible moment when the little boy really didn’t know, the last moment in which the 
maternal body was “whole.”
The foot-as-fetish plays a key role in Freud’s 1907 essay ‘Delusion and Dream in 
Jensen’s Gradival To return to this essay is to return both to the first outlines of Freud’s 
theory of fetishism, and to a problematic mythic origin of psychoanalysis as discourse on 
art. It was, interestingly, of key importance for the Surrealists’ understanding of the
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operations of repression. David Lomas notes that the Gradiva text was an object of social 
exchange, for instance as a gift from Paul Elouard to Gala and Dali.*'*' André Breton’s 
small Left Bank gallery and paradis des livres was, moreover, named Gradiva. In 1937 
Duchamp made a door for the galleiy which consisted of a piece of glass cut with the 
outline of a couple. This was, significantly, his first work in glass since the abandonment 
of The Bride Stripped Bare... and suggests, along with a 1945 window display for 
Brentano’s in New York (which included what can be inteipreted as a reappearance of 
Ri’ose Sélavy as mannequin), that Duchamp connected seeing-through glass with both the 
erotics of vision, and the commercial display of the commodity (Fig. 48). The headless 
mannequin had a tap attached to its right thigh, and this, and the display’s title, Lazy 
Hardware, refer back to Duchamp’s 1926 îi\m Anémie Cinema, one of the rotary disks 
for which was inscribed “Among our articles of lazy hardware we recommend the tap 
that stops running when it is not listened to.”*'^  This phrase was also related back to 
Fountain when it (re)appeared in the 1964 drawing Mirrorical Return (Fig. 49). For 
Arturo Schwartz, a psychoanalytic explanation cathects the window-display to the tap to 
the urinal; it is another confirmation of his notorious theoiy of Duchamp’s incestuous 
love for his sister Suzanne, and a recognition that the Bachelor’s (narcissistic) desire is 
only satisfied if there are witnesses to his violation of that taboo. In the case of the 
Mirrorical Return, this reading operates through the urinal’s changed fimction:
“Duchamp colored certain letters of the title and the text in red to spell out 
urinoir (urinal) and urine, thereby equating the revolutionary tap with a urinal 
and the liquid that comes from it with urine. Seen in this context, the tap
127
becomes a penis; urine is sperm; and the urinal, a vagina. It is indeed a 
revolutionary organ that infringes the incest taboo.”*'®
The excessive crudeness of Schwarz’s explanation makes it counterintuitively attractive, 
but in its very form -  as an assertion of interpretative mastery -  it becomes untenably un- 
Duchamp ian. Schwartz forgets that to pee into the urinal (in interpretative / appropriative 
rivalry) is to turn it into a fountain, to pee on oneself.*'  ^Schwarz, like Arensberg, is a 
cautionary figure for the interpreter of Duchamp: someone who thought he could find a 
traumatic kernel of truth in his work. This leads not only to a theory which projects a 
narcissistic and hermetic interpretation of Schwarz’s own devising onto Duchamp, but 
also to an epistemologically questionable assumption that such traumatic kernels can be 
simply divined by iconography, and narrated by art history. It is to question this 
confidence in narration that we turn to Freud himself, and the Gradiva analysis.
‘Delusion and Dream. . . ’ is significant as it is Freud’s first application of his developing 
concepts of psychoanalysis ~ particularly the idea of the unconscious -  to artistic 
narratives or objects. It is also of specific interest in the present context as it establishes 
the space into which the concept of fetishism and the castration complex will later fit, and 
does so in a treatment of themes of “living death” and “réanimation” which, we have 
already seen, emerge as key terms for art history’s relation to museal objects; in 
particular, it uses the statue as a figure for psychic immobility. In fact, Neil Hertz has 
argued that “moments of immobilization -  literal and figurative -  are sufficiently 
frequent in Freud’s writings to warrant our attention.” ®^ These moments begin with
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studies of paralysis written under Charcot’s supervision, but gradually move to more 
general considerations of paralysis as related to sexual taboos and the castration complex. 
For Freud, even analysis itself is figured as “temporary immobilization,” a “symmetrical 
stasis” in which the analysand’s chain of associations meet the passive attention of the 
analyst . Just  as repressed affects produce such immobilisation, so, for Freud, the art 
work is paralyzing of our powers of reflection but subsequently opens up to study of its 
psychological implications, and of the psychic investment of the subject.
Freud’s account of Wilhelm Jensen’s 1903 novella Gradiva is an application, and a 
defence, of his theory of dream interpretation in the field of literature, and it is pitted 
against scientific accounts of dreams as meaningless responses to somatic stimuli. Freud 
emphasises that mental life is not arbitraiy, but governed by discernible laws, and he 
stresses that Jensen need not have known anything of psychoanalytic concepts for his 
novel to illustrate such laws. In fact, such ignorance on the author’s part wouldn’t make 
Freud’s reading a mere subjective projection, for as an assiduous reader of symptomatic 
clues he has “not discovered anything in his work that is not already in it.”^^  The 
narrative of Jensen’s Gradiva is glossed as follows: archaeologist Norbert Hanold 
discovers, in a museum in Rome, an ancient relief of a girl. He obtains a plaster copy and 
hangs it in his study, transfixed by what to him is its defining feature -  the girl’s 
particularly attiuctive gait, the way the relief captures her feet in motion (Fig. 50). 
Explaining this interest is the aim of both Jensen and Freud, and Freud’s account consists 
in restating the narrative and translating it into his terms. Various aspects of the narrative 
are then shown to be displaced acknowledgements of the repressed truth of Hanold’s
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desire. Thus his repeated fantasies of statues come to life, of living in the past, of the 
instant of death in Pompeii, of the return of the dead, are shown to relate to a childhood 
love of a living woman -  Zoe Bertgang - feelings which persist in his unconscious. 
Freud, following Jensen, shows how displacements and substitutions form the fantasy 
which appears in Hanold’s dreams and delusions.
Pursuing his delusion to Pompeii itself, Hanold tries to carry himself back to the past, not 
by means of archaeology, but rather via his imagination. Freud quotes Jensen, setting out 
Hanold’s perspective:
“What [science] taught was a lifeless, archaeological way of looking at 
things, and what came from its mouth was a dead, philological language.
These were of no help to an understanding through the spirit, the feelings, the 
heart -  put it as you please. Whoever had a longing for that must stand here 
alone, the only living creature ... among the relics of the past, and look, but 
not with bodily eyes .... And then ... the dead wakened and Pompeii began to 
live once more.’^ ^
This Freud terms an imaginaiy process of “animating the past.” '^^  When a walking, 
talking Gradiva appears in this imaginary scene, no longer sculpture but rediviva, there is 
a problem for both Hanold and reader: What kind of event is this?: “real” ghost?; product 
of Hanold’s delusion?; living person? The answer, in the end, is all of these...
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The Gradiva who “comes to life” in Hanold’s fantasy of Pompeii is none other than the 
real Zoe Bertgang, coincidentally also in Pompeii and aware that Hanold loves her but 
doesn’t yet recognise it. He remains within fantasy, and can’t acknowledge what he 
already knows, what is “in him more than himself.” For Freud a problematic 
identificatory structure marks his account of Zoë’s efforts to conspire with and against 
Hanold’s fantasy and bring him back to the present and reality. He presents Zoe as an 
exemplary analytic figure, but is also suspicious of her as an “unusually [read overly] 
clever girl.”^^  Freud’s own transferential feelings towards clever young women famously 
mark his analysis of “Dora,” and were responsible, in part, for the failure of that analysis. 
Even his choice of the pseudonym “Dora” reflects this problematic antagonism to clever 
girls, and has been shown to result from a complex overdetermination.^^ The key point 
here is that, as subsequent developments in Freudian theory have stressed, there is no 
position of totally self-transparent reflexivity to be claimed for the analyst. This is hardly 
registered in Freud’s prose however, and his preferred identification is with Jensen -  
controller of the narrative. He notes, for instance that Zoë’s explicatory speech on 
Hanold’s delusion “is in reality a speech made by the author” to the reader, and thus 
becomes an exchange between Jensen and Freud, a male dialogue from which the upstart 
female voice is excluded.^^ Indeed, Zoë’s struggle in the narrative is essentially a struggle 
for recognition with the male characters’ visual interest in ghostly images or dead 
animals. Her father is more interested in zoological specimens than in her, she complains 
-  one reason for her transfer of affection to Hanold, a love which grew as he withdrew 
into science too. “Thus it was made possible for her to remain faithfiil in her 
unfaithfulness -  to find her father once more in her loved one, to include both of them
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with the same emotion, or, as we may say, to identify both of them in her feeling.” ®^ Y et 
Hanold too fails to notice her, and she has “long grown used to being dead.”^^
Freud emphasises that repression is not the extinction of memory, but its preseiwation and 
the condition of its return, often as the very vehicle of such a return -  here archaeology, 
which had been the defensive screen against desire, returns Hanold to it. The narrative of 
Gradiva furnishes Freud with a perfect analogy for repression conceived in this sense. 
Just as Pompeii is buried alive, so repression is the mechanism “by which something in 
the mind is at once made inaccessible and preserved,” and its re-emergence is akin to 
archaeology.®*  ^Here we discover how the repressive screen which should protect the 
subject from his problematic desire also serves as the agent of return of the repressed: “It 
was right that an antique, the marble sculpture of a woman, should have been what tore 
our archaeologist away from his retreat from love and warned him to pay off the debt to 
life with which we are burdened from our birth.”®' This process is first registered in 
Hanold’s sense of the very “lifelikeness” of the relief, his sense that it has something 
contemporary about it. His (seemingly) arbitrary daydreams of details of Gradiva are 
shown in fact to be returns of his erotic feelings toward Zoe. Hanold’s conscious, 
archaeological motives “cover” his unconscious erotic ones -  but “the unconscious 
determinants could not effect anything that did not simultaneously satisfy the conscious, 
scientific ones.”®^ The fantasy is thus a compromise between the two determinants. In 
this light, Mulvey’s notion of an aesthetics of disavowal in which the screen of the Real 
returns us to it, can be seen as a very orthodox Freudian concept, explicitly articulated in 
his first attempt to theorise fetishistic attachment in the cultural sphere.
132
As well as treating the motif of immobilization and animation as it appears in Jensen’s 
text, Freud also adds several other active/static distinctions of his own: repression (“a 
dynamic expression, which takes account of the interplay of mental forces.”) / 
unconscious (“a purely descriptive term, one that is indefinite in some respects and, as we 
might say, static,”); also Hanold’s eroticism / its repression: “The ancient relief aroused 
the slumbering eroticism in him, and made his childhood memories active.”®"^ Further, we 
might note that Freud’s own authorial strategy shifts from a passive / static reiteration of 
the narrative into an active analytic mode which unravels the mystery of that narrative. 
Hanold’s delusion is advanced by his dream of discovering Gradiva in Pompeii, in which 
he witnesses the city’s burial, and sees his love become as though a statue. This is, for 
Freud, a displacement and an assurance about the real state of affairs; Hanold had indeed 
“transferred his interest from the living girl to the sculpture: the girl he loved had been 
transformed into a marble relief.”®"' Thus the (seeming) obstacle to Hanold’s happiness is 
the very condition of his achieving it. With Zoë’s arrival we are no longer witnesses of 
delusion but of cure. Zoë effected such a cure when she “accepted the role of the ghost 
awakened to life for a brief hour” -  immersing herself in Hanold’s fantasy to guide him 
out of it.®^  Zoë’s therapeutic discourse entails the redeployment of elements from 
Hanold’s fantasy to lead him to his own revelation of the trath. Such ambiguous speech is 
characteristic of both analyst and analysand, and is the means by which inteipretation-as- 
cure -  for which Freud’s text effectively polemicizes -  is effected.
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Freud’s 1912 postscript to his Gradiva essay announces the progress of psychoanalysis in 
treating not only correspondences between its theory and certain fictive narratives, but 
also in dealing with the author’s own psychological material and displacements. In the 
case of Gradiva and other stories by Jensen, Freud (prefiguring Schwarz) detects the 
theme of love as “an after-effect of an intimate association in childhood of a brother-and- 
sister kind.”^^  He corrects Jensen’s attribution of the Gradiva re lief- it is not Roman but 
Greek -  and suggests that the female figure depicted was a representation of one of the 
Horae, the Greek goddesses of vegetation, which in his analysis of ‘The Theme of the 
Three Caskets’ Freud links to woman as both force of life and d eath .T hus we have an 
account of how the subject’s investments may be decoded, which utilises sculpture as an 
allegory for psychic immobilisation, and presents analysis as a tactical conspiracy in 
reanimating the past so as to bring it to consciousness and effect cure.
The Gradiva stoiy presents the analytic nanative as a kind of art historical investigation; 
a matter of iconography and attribution.^^ Its easy acceptance of the réanimation of the 
world in a return to love and life marks it as structured as much by narrative conventions 
as radical psychoanalytic insight. Craig Owens notes that in Jensen’s stmcturing 
opposition between mobility and immobility Gradiva herself can be seen as representing, 
within the text, “the mobility which recent criticism attributes to eveiy text.”®^ It is this 
mobility which is effectively silenced in the narrative closure of Freud’s essay. If Freud’s 
essay proclaims psychoanalytic narrative as restorative of both lost memories and of the 
real, it does so via his complicity with Jensen as narrator. As indicated above, this 
obscures Zoe’s role as figure of textual mobility in her very immersion in the terms o f
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delusion. The essay can thus be read as one of those instances where Freud in effect 
disavows the radicality of his own insight, here relating to nan ativity / interpretation as a 
desire-driven project which does not operate externally to fan tasy .A s a “primal scene” 
for the concept of fetishism, it also presents a problematic origin, one rooted in the 
fictive. The accounts of fetishism given by Bal and Mulvey likewise operate according to 
a relatively facile notion of the repressed or disavowed as elements recoverable (at least 
partially) in nanative. To push this discussion on towards a more troubling, and more 
valuable, concept of image I turn to Craig Owens, who elucidates the role visual culture 
plays in social immobilisation, particularly via the photograph, and thence to a discussion 
of cinema which both builds on and reworks the notions of narrative and image 
considered so far.
The logic of disavowal leads from object to image, and the photographic image 
encapsulates this dynamic. Two closely related essays by Owens on art and visuality 
explore the thematic links between photograph, immobilization, death, image and 
animation in psychoanalytic tenns. Both ‘Posing’ and ‘The Medusa Effect’, cmcially, 
extend this analysis into the social field, to conceptualise both the bind of a patriarchal 
regime of visuality and a strategy for escaping it. The terms of this account, amongst 
which statue, fetish, image, unrepresentability, are cmcial, make it pertinent to the 
problematic of The Distance, which in my reading, exemplifies the ambivalent dialectic 
of réanimation and reification Hal Foster has identified at the heart of the art history 
/museum complex. In these essays Owens endorses the critical strategy of reduplication 
as operated by Barbara Kruger and Victor Burgin in their respective photographic/textual
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practice, seeing in it the apotropaic mirroring of the immobilizing visual regime of the 
“stereotype.”
Ki'uger’s 1981 work Your Gaze Hits the Side o f my Face alludes to the power of the evil 
eye to “suspend movement and arrest life.” '^ Owens stresses that the Medusa myth itself 
elides into instantaneity two moments which must logically be sequential: the 
decapitation and the petrification of Medusa. This central episode is almost “proto­
photographic” for Owens, in that the pose captured by studio photography is “an 
animation performed only to be suspended,” a defensive mimicking of immobility to 
ward off the immobility induced by the gaze (or cam era).K ruger’s apotropaic images, 
it is claimed, redouble the operations of the stereotype back on itself, and in doing so 
bring the viewer to reject the double position of the ideological stereotype (a generic 
personal address). Owens reads this as a liberating, politicising gesture: “Against the 
immobility of the pose, Kruger proposes the mobilization of the spectator.”^^
This ‘Medusa Effect’ in relation to the ideological imaginary stereotype is extended in 
‘Posing,’ where Owens addresses the apotropaic function of Madomia and child imagery, 
which presents the wholeness of the phallic mother -  a wholeness valorized in Western 
culture as virginity. '^^ (Interestingly, the ubiquity of this image of maternity even lead to it 
being one of the associations immediately directed at Fountain, which Beatrice Wood 
records being renamed “Madonna of the Bathroom” following Stieglitz’s photographing 
of it, a name also used by Carl Van Vechten) (Fig. 51).^  ^For Owens, the figure of the 
Virgin is regressive: “not only does it stage that split between knowledge and belief
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characteristic of fetishism; it also suspends ... the incest prohibition (in medieval 
tradition, the Virgin is both mother and bride of Christ).” Breaking the Mosaic taboo, 
Christianity introduces “an entire regime of representation based on the maternal body.”^^  
This image of the maternal becomes apotropaic when read in the light of Freud’s 
insistence on the psychic triple status of the mother as creator, lover and destroyer.^^ The 
Virgin allows all three functions to be mastered in a symbolic which Herman Rapaport 
conveys in explicitly photo-graphic terms: “annihilation (castration, death) can be 
defeated by means of mastering events through overcoming time, that is, by image 
formation, immortalization in terms of photography (or Photo-Graphie: pictures but also 
narratives).”^^  The fetishistic defence against castration anxiety, in this view, is not 
investment in object, but in image, and is cast, once again, in terms which recall the bases 
of the art histoiy-museum-photography nexus.
Owens’s focus on the apotropaic turning of the immobilizing gaze against itself relies on 
a Barthesian conception of photography, but overlooks the very basis of that conception -  
which lies not in transcending photography’s mortifying dimension, but immersion in it. 
Camera Lucida has two related unrepresentable / unspeakable aspects: the “Winter 
Garden Photograph” in which Barthes famously finds the punctum of his mother’s 
essence -  a photograph not reproduced in the book, explicitly on the grounds that it is 
only real for Barthes; and Barthes’s pain at the loss of his mother. In his outstanding 
reading of Camera Lucida, Jay Prosser argues that Camera Lucida is “a classical case of 
melancholia, corresponding to Freud’s conception of melancholia as inarticulable and 
frozen in his famous distinction of melancholia from m o u r n i n g . T h e  Winter Garden
137
Photograph, and via it, photography in general, is thus read as a melaneholic wound, one 
which “doesn’t move forward but remains frozen. Unlike cinema, it presents the moment 
of intense immobility, and it is this temporal immobilization that renders photography 
melancholic.”*^  ^The Punctum, the Real encounter in the photograph, is unspeakable but 
although Barthes does link this to the maternal body it is a matter of personal affect, a 
personal experience of loss. There is a fantasmic quality to photography which produces 
the sense of being borne back to where one has been, or forward to where one is going. 
For Freud (and Barthes) this place is the maternal body. But photography is not only 
melancholic in holding onto this place, but also palinodie “for it gives us the thing only to 
retract or lose it, only to present it as already lost. ... It is this pastness of the referent, the 
repeal of presence, that makes photography so fatal, so inextricably tied to death.”**** 
Despite its evidentiary and indexical nature, photography “cannot return memory: it is ... 
not an aide-mémoire but a memento-mori.”***^
Barthes consistent generational slips in identifying the subjects of photographs by Nadar 
(wife or mother?). Van der Zee (sister or daughter?) culminate in the “Winter Garden 
Photograph” which returns Barthes’s mother to him as (his) child (as she was, effectively, 
as an invalid). But if these slippages are part of the “unconscious logic” of Camera 
Lucida, this is not a Freudian Unconscious. As Prosser stresses, Barthes has lost not the 
mother but his}^^ Prosser insists on the more primordial and unspeakable love of the 
mother, rather than Barthes’s homosexuality, as the structuring elusive subject matter of 
the book. This is the love that is “inexpressible, that is not simply representable as 
unspeakable ... that ultimately may be this absence of or antecedence to language.”***"*
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This in contrast to Barthes’s homosexuality, which is spoken elsewhere in his work, 
albeit in coded terms.
This signal quality of Barthes’s text (and what makes it deeply problematic for those who 
perceive him as a strict stmcturalist) is its rootedness in such ineffable love and loss, and 
its consequent recourse to terms thought discredited by deconstmction and semiotic 
knowingness. Hence, Prosser is quite right to emphasise that in Camera Lucida “only 
masks (veils, language) enable him to real [that is, to insist on its referential character] 
photography, to talk about “photography” at all. And when the mask dissolves as it does 
in the Winter Garden Photograph the soul is left. Photographs for Barthes are like masks 
for primitives. Magical, photographs manifest the souls of ancestors.”***^ So Barthes’s 
notion of the photograph doesn’t function apotropaically for theory, warding off the 
spectre of fetishism, but rather is deeply, passionately caught up in it. For Barthes death is 
culturally present now in photography, not religion, but ironically it is repressed, 
sublimated via images. “The choice in conceiving photography he presents as that 
between photography as madness (the real), or photography as tamed (the sign): 
photography’s frozen stillness or its mediation; its silence or its narrative movement into 
language. Barthes chooses madness, silence, stillness.”***^ Thus, there is a very real 
problem in maintaining a critical discourse on the foundation of this melancholic 
withdrawal.
Victor Burgin’s photo series Gradiva (Fig. 52) extends Freud’s own reading of Jensen’s 
text as an allegory of repression, symptom formation, and analytic resolution, to suggest
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that the photographic image is itself the fetishistic screen by which repression and 
disavowal operate. Owens emphasises that Freud’s reading of Jensen’s nanative, because 
it precedes his theory of the castration complex, gives an incomplete account of the 
fetishistic dimension; this Burgin reinstates via photography, which, like fetishism, 
produces its object in a framing, fragmenting and immobilizing gaze. Burgin’s Gradiva 
series is made up of seven photographs, two series of three with narrative captions, and 
one photographic reproduction of the artist’s hand-written transcription of Sacher- 
Masoch’s Venus in Furs. In Burgin’s Gradiva three of the images are close-up film stills 
photographed in a cinema screening. These “figurations of the photographer’s 
immobilizing gaze” alternate with three images of Gradiva as bas-relief, in Pompeii, and 
finally in contemporary Warsaw -  “reflected in what appears to be the mirrored façade of 
a building, next to an advertizing poster of a couple locked in an embrace.”***^ This image 
completes the chain of associations set up by Burgin, from the constituent parts of 
Jensen’s -  and Freud’s -  narrative (sculpture, scene of fantasy, contemporary reality), to 
the immobilization of the photographic image (its condensation of cinematic narrative), 
and finally to the social and libidinal scene of image-saturated consumer culture.
Gradiva appears in Hanold’s fantasy as undecidably dead and alive, an undecidability 
which Owens locates in the Oedipal seene, the moment of lack and substitution. This 
moment “is an arrest, which is also an arrêt de mo A...” both a death sentence and a stay 
o f execution -  “the arrêt both condemns and grants reprieve, postpones the deciding of an 
antinomy.”**’^  This is a fetishistic stmcture in which fetishistic monuments {niomumentsl) 
to the phallic mother (and child) appear, as defences against knowledge. Moreover, the
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analogous intimate connection between death and desire in the photograph is a familiar 
trope. For Walter Benjamin, as the “secularized portrait of death ... which restores its 
unique and one-time status,” the photograph works to “transform the camera into a useful 
weapon in the efforts to control death and to prevent or delay its onset.”***^ For Roland 
Barthes, the photograph “mortifies” the body;**** it transforms the subject into object,
“and even, one might say, into a museum object,” a “statue.”*** Even as it does this it 
testifies to the life of the image. The photograph’s evidential/indexical testimony to what 
was, and its cariying of what was into the present, are its ontologically defining features. 
Thus a photographed corpse is horrifie “because it certifies ... that the corpse is alive, as 
corpse: it is the living image of a dead thing... by attesting that the object has been real, 
the photograph surreptitiously induces the belief that it is alive.”* *^
In Slavoj Zizek’s terms we can say, therefore, that the photographic image is located in 
the death-driven space where we find “the so-called undead in horror fiction: the ‘living 
dead,’ indestructible monstrous entities that return again and again from their death.”**^ 
One of the most persistent themes in Zizek’s thought is the relationship between two 
determinations of death-drive, both of which pertain to Foster’s notion of art’s “living 
on” as speetral, traumatic, etc. The first conception of death-drive, relating to the undead, 
sees it as a product of the “indestmctible stupidity of superego enjoyment,” which leads 
to the subject entering the “spectral phantasmic domain of unconstrained peiwersion, of 
‘eternal life’.. .”* *"* The key point here is that “our fiindamental fantasy, the kernel of our 
being, is itself such a monstrous thing, a machine ofjouissanceP^^^ Against this 
determination of death-drive Zizek posits another, figured by the immortal Wagnerian
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hero, whose problematic is "'the very opposite o f dying” namely entrapment in the 
“ultimate horror” of living forever.'**  ^A key distinction in Lacan is between desire’s 
striving after elusive jouissance, and drive’s similarly impossible task of “getting rid o f 
This second component of the death-drive is the very opposite of the first, the 
escape from living death in “traversing the fantasy.” The choice between these two 
modes is the choice between bad and worse, and Zizek insists that the only ethically and 
politically viable choice, is the worse, the path which does not compromise one’s desire. 
For Zizek, Lacan’s development of the idea of death-drive is absolutely key to a 
philosophical elaboration of psychoanalysis; it figures what in German idealism was 
thought as subjectivity’s “self-relating negativity.”**^  Art’s dependency on photographic 
image places it in this death-driven sphere. How then can the image be thought not in the 
first determination of death-drive; the idiocy of jouissance and fetishism, but in the 
second; an escape from it? To elaborate on the locus of the image in the “stay of 
execution” I now shift from Burgin’s Gradiva series to another work which sutures the 
cinematic and the photographic, his photographic appropriation of Hitchcock’s Vertigo, 
and its textual theorisation in the essay collection Formations o f Fantasy.
In common with Bal and Mulvey, Burgin sees a psychoanalytic semiotics as capable of 
illuminating the ideological internalisation of the social in the very production of 
subjectivity. For Burgin, film stills and the memory-images that cinema can leave with 
the subject, are both fragments “which have nevertheless achieved a sort of representative 
autonomy.”**** Burgin’s argument is that a highly cathected image-fragment “Takes the 
place o f , ‘stands in for’, a narrative: it is the representative of a narrative.”*^** This
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situation, in which an image-fragment stands out against the vague background of the 
textual account of it, locates us, for Burgin, in fantasy, which ‘stands for’ “the absence in 
the real, and the absence o/the real in discourse.”**^* Fantasy’s sequential basis is abrupt, 
Burgin argues, and is akin to a series of “stills” -  it is represented in a condensed image 
designated in his argument as tableau. Fantasy is to the “otherwise formless” 
transformations of the subject’s desire, as the tableau is to “the endless dispersions and 
indéterminations of the meanings of material events, o f ‘history
Burgin gives a brief genealogy of the tableau as descended from the idea of the 
peripateia (decisive moment) of history painting; his key example is Rubens’s The 
Judgement o f Paris. The subject matter of this work leads us back to Freud’s essay ‘The 
Theme of the Three Caskets,’ where the psychoanalytic significance of the choice of the 
third in several myths and other narratives is set out. In The Judgement o f Paris and other 
instances of the theme, “the choice between the women is free, and yet it falls on death,” 
Freud w r i t e s . T h e  question is: how this can be?
Freud’s analysis ‘The Theme of the Three Caskets,’ argues that the “choice” of death is a 
case of “replacements by the precise opposite.” *^"* The Moerae, or Fates (descendants of 
the Hoerae, and like them represented as spinners, measuring out men’s lives in thread), 
were created, Freud argues, in response to man’s realisation of the inevitability of death.
“Man, as we know, makes use of his imaginative activity in order to satisfy
the wishes that reality does not satisfy. So his imagination rebelled against the
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recognition of the truth embodied in the myth of the Moerae, and constracted 
instead the myth derived from it, in which the Goddess of Death was replaced 
by the Goddess of Love and by what was equivalent to her in human shape.
The third of the sisters was no longer Death; she was the fairest, best, most 
desirable and most lovable of women.
The stoiy of the three caskets and its related themes effect a “wishfiil reversal” in which 
choice takes the place of the ineluctable.”*^*’ Thus in Freud’s counterintuitive reading of 
King Lear, he stresses that Cordelia’s silence points to her as the third Fate Atropos, an 
avatar of the Goddess of Death. (It is worth noting that Atropos was the Fate who cut the 
thread of life with the “abhorred shears,” and that there is an obvious comic connection to 
Parker’s work, and the fact that it itself had its thread cut...).
Burgin offers as an example his own condensation of naiTative to image in precisely these 
terms, a memory of Hitchcock’s Vertigo which “surfaces in the form of two images 
superimposed as one,” a composite image which forms “the very screen upon whieh my 
memory of the reel-û\m (the object of ‘criticism’ and most film theory) is projected.”*^  ^
This initial image (which Burgin specifies as a superimposition of Vertigo’s “ideal” 
woman as masquerade, and the heroine after her suicidal leap into San Francisco Bay) in 
its turn
“immediately dissolves into a myriad other delegates from a history of 
Western representations with watery images of women -  from the Birth o f
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Venus to the Death o f Ophelia. For example, in pursuit of these last two, I am 
returned to Vertigo by way of the bridge over the bay, in whose shadow 
Madeleine cast flowers on the water as she prepares to jump, leaping the gap 
between Hitchcock’s and Botticelli/Millais’ images of 
woman/ water/flo wers. ”
Thus, in rather confessional terms, Burgin indicates that his fantasy elides a narrative of 
death with an image of beauty. It is this veiy associative sequence that makes up the 
images of The Bridge (1984, Figs. 53, 54), a work thematically and presentationally 
related to the Gradiva series.
Burgin presents Vertigo as exemplifying a certain formation of male desire, in which 
“passionate attachments” to “exact replica[s]” leads back to a primary Oedipal scenario -  
“the adult man’s love-attachments form an endless series of similar types for the simple 
reason that, as mother surrogates, they can never match the irreducibly unique qualities of 
the original.”*^** This is what Kristeva identifies as the adult fantasy “of a lost continent 
... not so much an idealized primitive mother as an idealization of the -unlocalizable -  
relationship between her and us, an idealization of primary narcissism.”*^** Yet the very 
idealization of maternity, exemplified in Mariolatry, is what makes the subject possible, 
and sublimates and bars primary narcissism. In the idealized mother “Man surmounts 
death, the unthinkable, by postulating instead -  in the stead and place of thought as well 
as of death -  maternal love.”*^* Is Burgin, then, in offering his mnemonic condensation of 
image(s) claiming to undo this work of sublimation?*^^ If so, how does his authorial
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subjectivity remain so authoritative? As with Mulvey’s argumentation, and indeed with 
Bal’s and Owens’s, it is far from clear how the constitutively excluded / repressed returns 
without radically undermining both the agency of the subject and its desired objects and 
protective/disavowing images.
The discursive nexus photograph-museum-art history conforms, then, to the stmcture of 
disavowal as outlined above. Each aspect of the nexus can be shown to point back to 
death, even as it attempts to defend against it. The photograph is ontologically an 
intimation of the ineluctability of death, argues Barthes, even as it offers eternal life to 
artworks in their transformation into pure image; the museum is a mausoleum that attests 
to art’s need for “artificial respiration” even as it announces the “edifying” sublimation 
that it as architecture and art as beauty are meant to attain; finally, art history, profoundly 
dependent on both photograph and museum, is also made possible by a historical 
supercession of its object, registered in the often melancholic character of its 
articulation.*^"* Like the fetish as prop of disavowal, these discourses / institutions 
maintain contradictoiy positions, preserving belief by warding off knowledge. But if the 
image is the affective site of investment then what of materiality? What figure of 
knowledge can describe the significance of the material object? Can we get back to the 
thing in itself? To answer this question and close the discussion set out in the first two 
chapters of this thesis, I turn now to Vertigo, which -  it has already been claimed -  offers 
a radical inteipretation of desire for the image in relation to death.
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I  think o f cinemas, panoramic sleights
With multitudes bent toward some flashing scene
Never disclosed, but hastened to again,
Foretold to other eyes on the same screen 
Walter Hart Crane, ‘To Brooklyn Bridge’
From the demands o f the shop windows, from the inevitable response to the shop 
windows, comes the end o f choice.
Marcel Duchamp.
In ‘The Three Caskets... ’ Freud suggests that to understand King Lear we have to invert 
its ending. When Lear carries Cordelia’s dead body onto the stage, Shakespeare 
establishes her as Death itself. In fact, argues Freud, as Death, it is Cordelia who carries 
the old and enfeebled Lear away: he is bid “to renounce love, choose death and make 
friends with the necessity of dying.” Implicit in the theme of the Three Caskets are the 
three relationships man has to woman, that is “the woman who bears him, the woman 
who is his mate and the woman who destroys him” all of which are “forms taken by the 
figure of the mother in the course of a man’s life -  the mother herself, the beloved one 
who is chosen after her pattern, and lastly the Mother earth who receives him once 
more.”’^  ^Thus it is with the Virgin as Mother, Bride, and (in some representations of
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Domiition) daughter of Christ -  a single defensive image against the psychic threat posed 
by the maternal body.*^ ** Thus it is also with Hitchcock’s Vertigo; there are three female 
characters -  Madeleine, Judy and Midge -  who are indeed figures of desire, death, and 
maternity. Burgin’s photographic works provide a bridge linking the narrative thematics 
of Gradiva and that of Vertigo, Freud’s redemptive stoiy of the femme fatale as “she who 
(is supposed) to know,” with Alfred Hitchcock’s cinematic reworking of that theme. In 
the latter work, though, it is the male protagonist who is set the task of analyzing and 
curing the woman he desires.
Vertigo’s central theme is the entanglement of Woman, death and the copy. It’s famous 
Saul Bass/John Whitney title sequence presents spinning geometrical oval spirals 
(named, after their inventor, “Lissajous waves”) -  spirals that figure the dizzying loss of 
reason in the film itself, and, it has been noted, recall Duchamp’s Anemic Cinema: which, 
indeed, Octavio Paz termed a “vertigo in delay” (Fig. 55).*^  ^The film proper opens with 
a rooftop chase sequence, in which San Francisco detective Scottie (James Stewart) 
looses his footing and saves his life only by desperately clinging to a gutter (Fig. 56). A 
second cop comes to his aid, but he too slips, and falls to his death. This opening event is 
quickly contextualised in a second scene, inside Midge’s (Barbara Bel Geddes) 
apartment, where it is established that Scottie is suffering from vertigo as a consequence 
of his traumatic near-death experience, and has retired from his job. However, he is soon 
hired by an old college acquaintance, Gavin Elster (Tom Helmore), whose wife 
Madeleine (Kim Novak) believes herself possessed by the spirit of a long dead woman, 
Carlotta Valdez. Scottie is thus the “focalisor” of Vertigo’s narrative, to recall Meike
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BaTs term, the subjective agency that stmctures our access to it. In the course of his 
enquiries Scottie discovers that Carlotta, who was Madeleine’s great-grandmother and is 
therefore “in her blood,” had lost her only child when her husband discarded her, a loss 
that drove her to madness and finally suicide.
Vertigo provides another yet figure of the museum-goer to add to those mentioned in 
Chapter One (Valéiy, Proust, Auden). In his initial trailing of Madeleine, Scottie is lead 
in quick succession to a department store, a church, cemeteiy, and finally a museum, The 
Museum of the Legion of Honor, where she gazes at the portrait of the woman, Carlotta 
Valdez, whom (the film has led us to think) haunts her (Fig. 57).’^  ^Her investment in 
looking at the image is, as we understand it at this point in the film, heightened and 
complicated by her failure to recognise where reality ends and representation begins: she 
believes the image to possess a power we rationally know it does not. The chain of 
associations outlined above (woman / copy / death) is reinforced in this scene by the fact 
that Madeleine has her hair styled in imitation of the image of Carlotta and by the 
fimereal association of the flowers, painted and real, that both women possess. Our proxy 
as viewers of this scene is Scottie, whose physical presence goes unnoticed, and who is 
acting as a “private eye.” Like the viewer of Duchamp’s Etant Donnés, Stewart is in the 
position of the museal voyeur, and it can be argued that a similar undermining of idealist 
conceptions of viewing, and of the gender-relations implicit therein, is at work in both.
As Scottie spies on Madeleine, he soon falls in love with her. Once Scottie and 
Madeleine’s romantic relationship develops, he becomes obsessed with convincing her
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that she is not possessed, that he can discover real explanations of her supernatural 
reveries: “there’s an answer for everything” he claims. Briefly, it seems as though a 
happy ending might be possible for the couple, but death makes its presence felt 
continually. When they go for a trip into the redwood forest Scottie points out that the 
trees are properly called sequioa supeiwirens -  “always green, ever living,” -  but 
Madeleine counters, “I don’t like them, knowing I have to die.” Her belief in the 
ineluctability of her fate is ultimately proved correct. Scottie recognises the location of 
one of Madeleine’s dreams of death as a Spanish mission preserved as a museum. No 
wonder, he tells her, that she has vivid memories of the place, though she misrecognises 
it as nineteenth-century Spain: she must have been there before. A return to this place 
might finally free her of delusion, “destroy” her dreams of death, so Scottie drives her 
there. However, as Scottie sets about decoding the elements of the dream, Madeleine runs 
into a bell-tower, where his vertigo prevents him from pursuing her. Thus he is powerless 
in the end to prevent her acceding to the drive to repeat Carlotta’s suicide, and she jumps 
to her death from the bell-tower. If Vertigo were to end here it would be merely a 
diverting melodramatic tragedy, and one, moreover, that operates according to a 
misogynist association of woman with irrationality and death. It would, in other words, fit 
perfectly with Laura Mulvey’s characterisation of Hollywood cinema as an 
institutionalisation of fetishistic and voyeuristic “defences” against femininity.*^** 
However, the film does not end here, but instead has a second act which renders its 
narrative far more interesting (and problematic) than a typical tragic plot.
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We begin part two of the film with Scottie now in the position of being haunted by the 
return of the dead. In a famous animated dream sequence he is now the subject drawn 
into a vertiginous fall into the grave. Scottie revisits the locations to which he had 
followed Madeleine, and on several occasions “sees” her, only to discover on a second 
look that he is mistaken. Hitchcock cunningly connects the audience to Scottie’s 
misrecognition in one key scene when, in the restaurant where his first (voyeuristic) 
sighting of Madeleine took place, he (and we) see Kim Novak walk towards us, but a 
subtle cut has her replaced by another woman, a poor copy of Madeleine. Yet we are 
about to discover that Madeleine herself was not an “original.” When Scottie meets Judy, 
a woman who reminds him of his dead lover, we discover via her flashback sequence that 
the first hour of Vertigo has fooled us: “Madeleine” was a mse, an impersonation by Judy 
of Elster’s actual wife. It was the real wife who died at the bell-tower, and the flashback 
elicits our sympathy with Judy as an unwitting participant in Elster’s scheme, and 
someone who really fell in love with Scottie. Scottie’s focalising point-of-view is thus 
revealed as fallible and it is clear that the gaze of Hitchcock’s camera and Scottie’s 
subjective vision are not straightforwardly aligned.
Judy resolves to tiy to make Scottie love her a second time, this time for herself, but he is 
driven to remake her in the image of Madeleine, to try to remove the “common” aspects 
which Vertigo emphasises mark out Judy as an “earthier reincarnation” of the dream-like 
image Novak initially appears as.*"*** It is apparent in several key scenes that Judy’s 
physicality is disturbing to Scottie, who can hardly bring himself to touch her. Whilst 
Judy is trapped by her own masquerade -  the man she loves, loves her only insofar as she
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approximates to an ideal she created but cannot embody -  ironically, Scottie busies 
himself making Judy approximate a non-existent original object of his desire. Once he 
succeeds, his fantasy collapses. It is exactly at the point at which he has reproduced 
Madeleine that he discovers that Judy is/was Madeleine, and thus that she never 
originally existed. In a fit of rage he takes her back to Spanish mission, and, overcoming 
his vertigo at last, drags her back up the bell-tower. Scottie finally learns the tmth of his 
deception, which we as viewers have known for almost half the film. Just as he appears 
reconciled to Judy, her shock at the figure of a nun emerging from the shadows in the 
bell-tower (to us too this figure seems spectral, an augurer of death) culminates in the 
repetition of the scene of Madeleine’s death, this time for real. As Scottie unravels the 
narrative and resolves it, he brings it to a disastrous conclusion. The implications of this 
for a gendered interpretation of Vertigo (its political dimension) and a reflection on the 
issues of image/representation/narrative/knowledge raised above (its epistemological 
dimension) will be set out in the remainder of this chapter.
The origin of the woman/copy/death linkage “in” the narrative of Vertigo, as we first 
encounter it (through an identification with the character of Scottie), is explicitly linked 
to the ghostly return of a mother (Carlotta Valdez) driven to suicide by the loss of a child. 
The loss of the wholeness of the mother-child dyad is thus linked to death. But this 
dynamic is not a female prerogative alone in the film. Tania Modleski argues that 
narrative identification in Vertigo is more complex than many feminist readings allow, 
and not only splits the spectator between Scottie and Madeleine/Judy, but also implicates 
Scottie within the problematic of femininity as presented by the film (just as Duchamp’s
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museal voyeur is likewise forced into an uncomfortable identity with the target of his 
gaze).*"*’
The film starts out suggesting that Scottie will be able to reassert (male) reason over 
(female) hysteria and irrationality, yet his actions in the film could be read as a parable of 
analytic fallibility. In contrast to Gradiva / Zoë as the analyst leading her patient back to 
reason and out of the realm of the dead, Scottie’s attempt to show Madeleine that her 
hallucinations of death and of Carlotta’s memories are based in her own (and his) reality 
end in disaster. It is in this attempt that he both fails to recognise that he is already caught 
in a masquerade, and in so doing condemns Judy to actualising Madeleine’s symbolic 
death later in the film. Various moments in Vertigo subtly associate Scottie with 
femininity, and link this to his vertigo. For example, in the first scene in Midge’s 
apartment, he complains about the corset he has to wear; it “binds” him he says. This 
feminine accoutrement is linked to vertiginous locations in the film when Midge shows 
him a new bra designed on the “principle of the cantilever bridge” (Fig. 58). For 
Modleski, such moments in the film jokingly imply that femininity is a male construct or 
masquerade, but the humorous tone hides a more troubling recognition; “for if woman, 
who is posited as she whom man must know and possess in order to guarantee his truth 
and his identity, does not exist, then in some important sense he does not exist either.”*"*^ 
Vertigo’s interest in fashion, in particular the scenes in which Scottie makes Judy over 
and is told on three separate occasions that he “knows what he wants” more than most 
men, figures this troubling existential dilemma (Fig. 59). For Walter Benjamin “fashion 
was never anything but the parody of the gaily decked-out corpse, the provocation of
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death through the woman, and ... the bitter, whispered tête-à-tête with decay.”*"*^ In 
attempting to overcome this provocation, Scottie attempts to re-fashion Judy in his own 
image of Madeleine. This project must rebound on him, for, as Susan Buck-Morss 
argues, fashion turns the body into a commodity because it “knows to escape from death 
only by mimicking it.”*"*"* The honor of what lies beyond this parody is also the occasion 
of desire. Vertigo suggests that “the source of the man’s fascination with the woman is 
her own fascination with death, with the gaping abyss, which she hallucinates as her open 
grave and which is imaged continually in the film in its many arched-shaped forms of 
church, museum, cemeteries, mission.”*"*^ Again, it is not too far-fetched to see this in 
connection to the problematic of the museum as site of both death and desire -  an 
association forced by Duchamp, most particularly in Etant Donnés, in which the “gaily 
decked-out corpse” is finally “stripped bare” and the viewer / voyeur’s idealised notion of 
sight both gets what it wants, and rebounds on the subject.
For Modleski, what is at work in Vertigo, with its multiple ghostly returns that Scottie 
cannot master -  of Carlotta-as-Madeleine, Madeleine-as-Judy -  is the troubling 
disavowed partial recognition of male identity with the feminine as double. She quotes 
Sarah Kofman’s assertion that “men’s fascination with the eternal feminine is nothing but 
fascination with their own double, and the feeling of uncanniness, Unheimlichkeit, that 
men experience is the same as what one feels in the face of any double, any ghost, in the 
face of the abrupt reappearance of what one thought had been overcome or lost 
forever.”*"*^ Scottie’s repeated attempts at cure only realise the outcome he wishes to 
avoid, but which is implicit in the (masculine) logic of representation he seeks
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reassurance from -  “The very effort to cure her, which is an effort to get her to mirror 
man and his desire, to see (his) reason, destroys woman’s otherness.”*"*^ The consequence 
of this failure, as Scottie’s dream sequence suggests, is his vertiginous fall into the 
psychic disintegration initially proposed as a feminine, indeed matrilinear prerogative.
Just as completion, closure, ends the collector’s narrative in (subjective) death, the loss of 
investment in the objeetive, so Scottie’s overcoming of his fantasy and his vertigo, the 
completion of his narrative, is only achieved with the double loss of ideal image and 
material object of desire. In contrast to the examples of traumatic cinematic narrative 
given at the start of this chapter, then. Vertigo takes seriously the notion that beyond the 
fantasy there may be nothing (no subject, no reality).
The insistence on this position as both psychoanalytic and philosophical necessity is 
axiomatic to Slavoj Zizek’s Lacanian-Hegelian theorization of subject and culture. Zizek 
uses Hitchcock’s Vertigo specifically to illustrate the radical implications of 
psychoanalytic subjectivity -  implications which tend to be overlooked in the accounts of 
fetishism discussed above -  and links this to the political consequences of postmodern 
Capitalism. The two crucial aspects of Zizek’s thought for the present argument are: 1) 
his insistence on the opacity of the subject to itself, specifically in relation to the gaze; 2) 
his opposition to false solutions to the political and psychic antinomies of postmodernity. 
It is these aspects that I will focus on here.
Zizek contends that Kant is the first theorist of the decentred subject, in establishing the 
inaccessibility of self as “Thing-which-thinks” as the very condition of autonomous
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agency.*"*^  Zizek’s reading of Kant with Lacan corrects the common misconception that 
the accession to the Symbolic is what cuts us off from the plenitude of the Real as ding- 
an-sich, with objet petit a as surplus enjoyment left over. For Lacan, rather, “there is no 
substance of enjoyment without, prior to, the surplus enjoyment. The substance is a 
mirage retroactively invoked by the s u r p l u s The Thing’s unattainability becomes 
eonceived as fundamental unknowableness “the moment we “substantialize” it and 
assume that it ontologically precedes its loss, i.e., that there is something to see “behind 
the curtain” (of the phenomena).”*^** One of art’s characteristic procedures is just such a 
production of unknowableness, with artistic Beauty serving as “the mask in the guise of 
which the abyss of the Real Thing, the Thing resisting symbolization, appears.”*^*
Zizek’s key example of this is, strangely enough. Fountain, a work which he describes as 
transubstantiating “materiality into the mode of appearance of the Thing.” The key 
point is that materiality is not therefore the true thing-in-itself to which a non-fetishistic 
mode of apprehension could return, and Fountain, in its trajectory from mass-produced 
commodity, to exhibition entry, to photograph, and finally accepted art-historical event, 
renders this palpable. Just as Fountain is the epoch-defining art work for Zizek -  the 
“zero-level” of appropriative strategies -  so Vertigo is the film, figuring einema’s special 
relationship with subjective fantasy. Vertigo’s attack on the Platonic triad of Idea, 
material copy, and copy-of-copy is also applicable to Fountain. Zizek argues that what 
emerges from Scottie’s failed attempt to make Judy into a copy of Madeleine is that
“the Idea can emerge only in the distance that separates our ordinary material
reality ... from its copy. When we copy a material object, what we effectively
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copy, what our copy refers to, is never this particular object itself but its Idea.
... the Idea is something that appears when reality (the first level copy / 
imitation of the Idea) is itself copied. It is that which is in the copy more than 
the original itself.” *^"*
What has to be emphasised here is that the copy of a copy competes not with the 
intermediate material object but the Idea itself.
The “scandal” of psychoanalysis, and its difficulty for metaphysics, is that the "decentred 
hard kernel which eludes my grasp is ultimately self-consciousness itself Self- 
consciousness is not therefore self-transparency. This is why “in psychoanalysis, the 
subject is not the (potential) reader but the bearer of a message addressed to the Other and 
therefore, in principle, inaccessible to the subject himself.”*^*’ The special conception of 
the symptom’s legibility offered by psychoanalysis must be taken seriously if it is not to 
be generalized out of all validity. The role played by the analyst is much more complex, 
and libidinal, than the symptomologies of fetishism, considered above, allow. If they 
have recourse to psychoanalytic vocabularies, haven’t they to pay proper heed to its 
actual fimctioning as a discourse?
For Zizek, Kant shows us that “if our experience is to retain its consistency” it is 
unavoidable that we posit ‘things-in-themselves ’ in a way that not ultimately 
philosophically grounded or justifiable.*^^ Zizek reads Kant’s claims here via Bentham’s 
theory of the fictive basis of language, which he sees as articulating avant la lettre
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Lacan’s distinction between Symbolic and Imaginaiy registers; for Lacan “truth has the 
stmcture of a fiction: the dimension of tmth is opened up by the order of discourse which 
loses its consistency without the support of fietions.” *^  ^For Kant the regulative flinction 
of transcendental Ideas (fictions) is inseparable from human reason, and is not dissolved 
by simple reference to their deceptiveness -  as, Zizek notes, Marx had warned was also 
the case with commodity fetishism. Here we find a cmcial point of difference between 
Zizek and the argumentation of Bal, Mulvey, Owens, and Burgin: they seem to assume 
that such a naming of the problem makes it disappear. Zizek allows us to rethink this with 
a conception of ‘traversing the fantasy’ based on excessive processes of identification, 
which amounts to a reconfiguration of the way in which fantasy frames reality, and is 
thus an intervention in the Real. The fundamental paradox delineated from reading Kant 
with Bentham and Lacan is that symbolic fictions both bar us from reality and provide 
the only possible access to it: “fictions are a semblance which occludes reality, but if we 
renounce fictions, reality itself dissolves.”*^** Hence, in Vertigo, because Scottie fails to 
move from a traumatic encounter with the Thing to a reconfigured fantasy, cleaving 
instead to an idealization of courtly love even as it collapses around him, nothing comes 
after the revelation of the Madeleine’s non-existence.**’*
With Kant neither Reason nor suprasensible Intuition (“ghost-seeing”) provides access to 
the noumenal beyond; all that is possible is to “delineate its empty place.” '*’* The 
dialectical point about this, which Zizek stresses, is that against appearances. Reason and 
“ghost-seeing” are not opposed, but are on the same side as regulative ideas supporting 
reality. This is also tme of das Ding which is both external traumatic X, and the very
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kernel of the subject’s being, the unthought which must be sacrificed to produce 
“reality,” This is the way Lacan reads the îdiVcioviS fort-da game: it is not that the spool 
substitutes word (representation) for (maternal) Thing, the price being paid being the loss 
of “mother qua Thing.” Rather, it is the part of the subject itself sacrificed to accede to 
the Symbolic, that which ends its fullness of being as an object for the (m)Other.
It is precisely Scottie’s own melancholic internalisation, via identification, of Madeleine 
as loved object that violates this principle in Vertigo. Following Freud, Modleski presents 
melancholia as a regression to a primary narcissism, and in Vertigo this regression 
plunges Scottie into the very madness he had attempted to correct in Madeleine. His 
failure to recognise Judy as the “real” Madeleine leads him to treat her as the “fully 
fetishized and idealized ... ‘constmcted’ object of male desire and male ‘design’.” *^  ^
There is no “original” woman in the logic of Vertigo, and it is this, and the threat it poses 
to masculine identity that Modleski valorises. Freud linked the “enigma of woman” to the 
bisexuality that results from the female Oedipal scenario, which, like the masculine, 
begins with desire for the mother. Against the normative heterosexuality of his narrative, 
he did recognise the persistence of this identification/desire -  which Teresa de Lauretis 
argues establishes a double positionality of female identification, both active and passive, 
desire for and desire to be desired by the other. This “enigma of bisexuality .... provides 
a model of ‘overidentification’ in which the boundaries between self and other become 
blurred, and desire for and identification with the other are not clearly separable 
process.”**"'^  The particular importance of cinema in this connection is the way that it can 
not only figure such transgressive/excessive identification within its diegetic space, but
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also go beyond it to produce complex spectatorial identifications on the part of its 
viewers.
The frmdamental insight that fictions structure tmth, that tnith is possible only via a 
“fantasy frame” is extended into Zizek’s interpretation of key aspects in Vertigo. How, 
then, does the film reflect this? Zizek notes that the reverse-shot mirror scene at the 
florists figures the fantasy-frame and its consequences. If Magritte’s La Lunette 
D ’Approche (1963) illustrates the Kantian point that we can but point to the “empty 
space” of the Thing-in-itself, Vertigo supplements this by locating the gaze in this veiy 
impossible-Real dimension. In the reverse-shot mirror we see both Madeleine and 
Scottie; although in the diegetic logic Scottie is “really” there and Madeleine only as 
mirror image, the effect is that Madeleine is real and Scottie “a phantomlike protuberance 
who ... lurks behind the mirror” (Fig. 60).^^  ^Whilst Magritte illustrates Kant’s point that 
we can only indicate the empty space of the Thing, Hitchcock supplements this with a 
Lacaiiian theme, by locating in this space the gaze, the Otherness which precedes 
intersubjectivity. The gaze is another name, in Zizek’s reading of Lacan, for the Thing- 
in-itself qua opaque Thing-that-thinks. It is this which analysis proper exploits; the 
analyst fulfils the function of the objet petit a qua gaze: “the gaze in the precise point of 
view from which the stain [as the locus of the subject’s unthought] can be perceived in its 
“true meaning”. T h e  analyst is he who is supposed to know the meaning of the stain. 
This externality of the kernel of the (decentred) subject’s being is found also in the gaze -  
“I am aware of myself only insofar as outside of me there exists where the truth about me 
is articulated.”'^  ^This is the first cmcial point to be underscored. For psychoanalysis (in
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its most advanced form) there can be no easy dispersion of fantasy and a return to the 
real. The Freudian subject is not self-transparent, and emerges when part of “the subject’s 
phenomenal (self) experience (his ‘frmdamental fantasy’) becomes inaccessible to 
him.” '"’^  In analysis, this point relies on the uncanny experience of the analyst taking on 
the role not of the confident narrator, but of the disturbing Thing. The notions of analytic 
diagnosis underpinning the theories of fetishism and the image fail to take this into 
account.
Vertigo initially seems to be composed of two sections, before and after Madeleine’s first 
death. Zizek suggests that there are actually three; each ended by a suicidal leap. The 
first, concluded by Madeleine’s jump into San Francisco Bay, presents her as imaginaiy 
image; the second which ends with Madeleine’s death, presents her as “barred Other ... 
the signifier of a certain mysteiy”; the third presents Judy as objet petit a “the 
excremental abject-remainder.”' '^' The point is that in Scottie’s fantasy these moments are 
overlaid, and each represents an attempt to defend against the threat of the abyssal das 
Ding, the Thing which is the cause of his vertigo. To understand how woman as abyssal 
Thing operates as a “fatal attraction” Zizek emphasises that the gaze is crucial. “The gaze 
is not simply transfixed by the emergence of the excessive-unbearable Thing. Rather, it is 
that the Thing (what we perceive as the traumatic-elusive point of attraction in the space 
of reality) is the veiy point at which the gaze inscribes itself into reality, the point at 
which the subject encounters itself as The vital conclusion to be drawn from all
this is that, for Zizek, two seemingly contradictory positions have to be thought at once. 
Against the conceptions of fetishism outlined above, it must be emphasised that the
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radical insight of psychoanalysis is that there is no “reality” without the structuring 
fantasy-frame, and that there is no traumatic Real as prior site of plenitude which is 
repressed or screened. On the other hand, there is, as a consequence of the subject’s 
decentred status as opaque to itself, the possibility of traumatic Real encounters. This is 
what Vertigo suggests, and its lesson lies in Scottie’s failure to meet the challenge it 
makes to him to restructure his fantasy. Against what he terms the “poetic” notion of the 
Real as impossible, figured in objects which always elude our grasp, Zizek stresses that 
“the problem with the Real is that it happens and that’s the trauma.”
So much, then, for the notion that psychoanalysis simply speaks the Real. What of the 
political dimension of this? Zizek’s recent critiques of postmodernity have centred on 
what he argues is its false model of reflexivity. Just as the theories of fetishistic image- 
making claim to read symptoms of fundamental disavowal in culture at large (whilst 
seemingly exempting themselves from it), so for psychoanalysis there is the veiy real 
problem of postmodern j^eflexive symptoms: if the Unconscious is no longer inaccessible 
to reflection, then analysands can now produce already interpreted symptoms and “the 
analyst’s inteipretation loses its performative “symbolic efficiency” and leaves the 
symptom intact in its idiotic jouis sance.'”^^ ^
The loss of patriarchy’s fundamental symbolic efficiency is welcomed by Zizek, as it is 
by feminists, queer theorists and postmodernists. But he cautions against seeing this as a 
utopian escape from the big Other -  this role is filled by something even if it not a priori 
by the Father. For Zizek, the promise of a world of desire perfectly transparent to the
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subject as reflexive consumer is the fake content of the postmodern concept of 
knowledge and choice. The positive interpretation of postmodernity offered by “risk 
society” theorists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens depends on endorsing the 
Marxist maxim that “all that is solid melts into air.” Against such a positive reading Zizek 
insists on Marx’s point that individualism’s free choice is constrained by a secular 
version of Destiny in the form of market relations: “the big Other survives as the social 
substance in which we all participate by our acts, as the mysterious spectral agency that 
somehow re-establishes the balance.” '^ "' The big Other’s withdrawal (from the symbolic 
efficiency of patriarchy) shifts responsibility onto -  a gesture exploited to the full in 
the political dogma of choice currently employed in making the Welfare State 
accountable to Capital. The fully reflexive subject must take responsibility for choices 
which are not in fact radically free decisions of an autonomous agent, but one handed 
over entirely to the law of the market. The real risk, for Zizek, is that the diminution of 
patriarchal symbolic authority is paid for “by an even more ‘passionate attachment’ to 
subjection.
This ties together the “curatorial mode” with the epistemological problem emerging in 
Mulvey’s, Bal’s and Burgin’s texts: how can we reflexively know the complete 
conditions of cultural production and subjective investment?'^'’ Psychoanalysis, of 
course, sees this as resolved via a dialogue shaped by desire in the form of transference 
and counter-transference; it cannot be simply a matter of choice. And the exemplification 
of this fake reflexivity for Zizek is precisely the rise of curation as creative practice:
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“Is not the ultimate example of reflexivity in today’s art the crucial role of the 
curator! His role is not limited to mere selection -  through his selection, he 
(re)defmes what art is today. That is to say: today’s art exhibitions display 
objects which, at least for the traditional approach, have nothing to do with 
art, up to human excrement and dead animals -  so why is this to be perceived 
as art? Because what we see is the curator’s choice. When we visit an 
exhibition today, we are thus not directly observing works of art -  what we 
are observing is the curator’s notion of what art is; in short, the ultimate artist 
is not the producer but the curator, his activity of selection.”
This is the ultimate recuperation of the readymade strategy: aesthetic aura is now a 
property bestowed via a transubstantiation performed by the creative subject. Exactly this 
point was Robert Smithson’s objection to Duchamp, articulated in 1973 as what he 
termed “Duchampitis” took hold in American art. Smithson’s criticism was that “his 
objects are just like relics, relics of the saints or something like that,” and that the 
Readymade strategy is ultimately “a kind of religion in drag” with “Duchamp as a kind of 
priest of a certain so rt... turning a urinal into a baptismal font.” '^ ® Smithson’s 
rébarbative remarks are more apposite in terms of the reception of the Readymades as 
transubstantiated objects than they are of Duchamp’s own practice. Yet it is precisely the 
“religion in drag” dimension of this reception which seems to be winning out in the 
present; not, however, as a return to a cerebral / aristocratic religious culture in which art 
is not idealised but integral (which Duchamp might well have endorsed, as a positive 
“end” to art)'^^, but in the drab clothes of a contemporary religiosity configured as New
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Age spirituality, which shirks Christianity’s once radical rearrangement of the symbolic 
order in favour of postmodernity’s affirmative reflexivity and ethos of “self- 
determination.”' '^' The notion of a self-reflexive art which could unveil all its institutional 
conditions needs to be viewed in this light. At least on Zizek’s account, its reflexivity 
must either fail, or testify to the extinction of the symbolic order it claims as its 
constitutive-repressed.
If, according to the Marxist part of Zizek’s argumentation, reflexivity does not surpass 
the relation to an ideological big Other per se, but rather emerges in the wake of the 
Oedipal symbolic order, what form does the big Other take in the postmodern imaginary? 
The postindustrial figure of the Other as father/master is “a lone figure of uncanny, 
ethereal, frail materiality, devoid of a sexual partner.” '^' This is not the (Name of the) 
Father as guarantor of symbolic status, but the Evil Genius as Maker/manipulator of 
subject as Thing/artifact. In Vertigo this role is taken by Elster -  the most mysterious 
character in many ways; the orchestrator of Scottie’s deception, but also he for whom 
Scottie’s fantasy is staged.
To return to Duchamp, in conclusion, and to Schwarz’s thesis of his œuvre as a masterly 
sublimation of incestuous desire, we can see that its real failure lies not in its 
reductiveness -  this is a reproach that is ultimately derived from art history’s disciplinaiy 
attachment to particularism, underwritten by its connoisseurly interest in the specificity of 
objects -  but rather its attachment to a big Other-who-knows. In other words, it is not just 
that he posits the legibility of what is supposedly a fundamental taboo in Duchamp’s
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work, but that he imagines Duchamp has orchestrated this in order that he, Schwartz, can 
decipher it. This both operates with a banal notion of the Unconscious, and establishes 
the Other as an infallible omniscient being, rather than acknowledging the radical import 
of the unconscious and realising the stupidity of the big Other (as ideological injunction, 
inaugural patriarch etc.). This is the lesson Zizek insists we must draw from 
psychoanalysis, in opposition to the profound mutuality of consumer capitalism and 
reflexivity in its contemporaiy form. Amelia Jones has written extensively against the 
image of Duchamp as patriarch; but more often now he appears in the role of knowing 
orchestrator -  the bachelor as “uncamiy, ethereal, frail ... devoid of a sexual partner,” as 
(Evil) Genius -  hence the increased interest in all his activities, including exhibition 
design, window-dressing and so on. Might this image of Duchamp be a defense against 
the radical (traumatic) event of the Readymade, the appearance of the urinal as Maternal 
Thing (“Madonna of the Bathroom”!) and commodity within the space of art? And if this 
Event is the symbolic death of art, a death that according to Zizek’s reading of Lacan 
leaves it in the realm of the “undead,” how can we engage in the project of escaping from 
such immortality? The key, perhaps, lies in Zizek’s interpretation of Lacan’s analytic 
discourse.
Lacan distinguishes the analyst’s role from the other discursive modes of the Master, the 
Hysteric, and the University. The Master’s role “is to change the act into a new Master- 
Signifier, to guarantee the continuity and consequences of the Event,” whereas the 
Hysteric insists on the discontinuity between Event and symbolization, each 
symbolization produces the reaction “eg ’est pas g a f  finally, the perverse University
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discourse “disavows that there was the event of an act in the first place -  with his chain of 
knowledge, he wants to reduce the consequences of the act to just another thing that can 
be explained away as part of the normal run of things.” In contrast to this triad is the 
analytic discourse, which affirms the gap between Event and symbolisation as 
productive; “it asserts the Real of the Event as the ‘generator,’ the generating core to be 
encircled repeatedly by the subject’s symbolic productivity.” '^  ^The unnameable core of 
the Event for Lacan
“is stmctured in a fundamental fantasy -  that is, it is the core of jouissance, 
and an authentic act does inteiwene in this core. So -  to put it succinctly -  for 
Lacan, the authentic act itself in its negative dimension, the act as the real of 
an ‘object’ preceding naming, is what is ultimately innomable. ... For this 
reason, one should stick to Lacan’s thesis that ‘truth has the structure of a 
fiction’ : tmth is condemned to remain a fiction precisely in so far as the 
innomable Real eludes its grasp.
According to Julia Kristeva’s polemic reading (aimed against what she considers the 
neutralization of psychoanalysis in American university discourse), analytic 
interpretation aims to effect an action by means of its correspondence to a repressed 
event/sign. It is a connection between disparate parts of the analysand’s discourse, but 
even more, connects signifieds of the analyst with those of his patient. Interpretation is 
thus what moves across the space of intersubjectivity and here Bhabha’s account of 
interpretation as the negotiation/mediation of aura and agora is echoed.
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“This second circulation, dependent on the analyst’s desire and operative 
only with him, departs from inteipretive mastery and opens the field to 
suggestion as well as to projection and interminable drifts. In this way, the 
analyst approaches the vertigo of delirium and, with it, the phallic 
jouissance of a subject subsumed in the dyadic, narcissistic construction of 
a discourse in which the Same mistakes itself for the Other. It is, however, 
only by detaching himself from such a vertigo that the analyst derives both 
his jouissance and his efficacy.” '^  ^ ^
Analyst and analysand alike have to traverse fantasy and to engage the vertiginous 
openness of inteipretation without succumbing to it. The analytic position is not 
exempted from the misrecognitions and desires it locates in the subject. Vertigo as 
presented by Modleski, indicates that the reinforcement of the subject attempted by the 
fetishist can never succeed due to the veiy structure of desire in which the boundaries of 
the self are undermined in the desire for the object. Her account suggests a liberating 
perspective is opened up for viewers of Vertigo and other of Hitchcock’s films, by the 
foregrounding of the mechanisms of identification. The consequences of such 
foregrounding for critical writing are explored in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE: Foucault. Fiction. Aesthetics
The Greek sage, the Jewish prophet, and the Roman legislator are still models that 
haunt those who practice today the profession o f speaking and writing. I  dream o f the 
intellectual destroyer o f  evidence and universalities, the one who, in the inertias and 
constraints o f  the present, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines 
o f power, who incessantly displaces himself doesn’t know exactly whei^e he is 
heading nor what he j l  think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the present... 
Michel Foucault, The End o f the Monarchy o f  Sex.
I  sat at a table near the open terrace door, my papers and notes spread out around 
me, drawing connections between events that lay fa r  apart but which seemed to me to 
be o f the same order.
W.G. Sebald, Vertigo.
The previous chapter concluded with the suggestion that the tmly radical 
consequences of realising that the original was always-already a copy has been 
evaded in Duchamp scholarship -  and hence in art history -  via the retention of the 
authorial originality of Duchamp himself. This move was seen as analogous to, 
perhaps even symptomatic of, the false reflexivity which Zizek identifies with 
postmodern subjectivity as an aesthetic project of self-fashioning, entwined with a 
politics and ethics of choice. The character of Scottie in Vertigo figured the negative 
consequences of the disillusion felt when the object-cause of desire, and hence the
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subject itself, is recognised as a (copy of) a void. For Zizek this recognition is a 
fundamental psychoanalytic insight, and he insists that it is canied through to the end 
to show how the subject as such is its opacity, its radical negativity or “death drive.” 
The chief objection raised to the psychoanalytic, and more particularly Lacanian, 
analyses of Bal, Mulvey, and Burgin -  which are estimable in many ways -  was that 
they disavowed this insight; drawing on the rhetorical force of Lacanian 
argumentation whilst eliding its consequences for their own authorial positioning.
The previous two chapters drew on a variety of theoretical sources which deal in 
critiques of modernist originality, and offer, as part of this critique, historical accounts 
which displace this originality. This is an eminently valuable project, especially as it 
works to open up the autonomy of both art work and creative subject to the 
recognition of specific historical and social conditions. However, we have seen that 
when this is carried out according to a Freudo-Marxist logic of unrepresentability, it 
runs into either the trap of self-contradiction in speaking the “unspeakable,” or the 
necessity of conceiving of abject excluded positions as the only locus of critique. This 
is also an objection which can be directed at Zizek’s position, as Judith Butler has 
argued. Indeed, for her the psychoanalytic framework itself is structurally unable to 
realise its excluded positions as speakable, livable or viable -  clearly an unsatisfactory 
model for critique if normative identity (particularly normative “sexed” identity) is to 
be challenged. Butler’s reading of psychoanalytic concepts is, as a consequence of 
this, aimed at deconstructing the Lacanian symbolic / real / imaginary triad in an 
effort to prevent the reification of “contingent regulatory mechanisms of subject- 
production ... as universal laws.” ' Butler employs two strategies in pursuit of this 
goal: a deconstmctive demonstration that the symbolic and imaginaiy registers cannot
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be consistently distinguished (and a consequent elevation in importance of the latter); 
and a Foucauldian historical analysis aimed against the reification of any particular 
content of the Real.
In Butler’s view, both these moves are necessary rejoinders to Zizek. However, his 
recent books -  including those cited in the previous chapter -  turn much more towards 
the imaginary as the key term in the Lacanian triad, and it is the Foucauldian 
historicity of the Real-as-socially-excluded that continues to be the real bone of 
contention between them.^ For Zizek, Foucault thinks identity in the “reflexive” sense 
and is thus more a symptom than a diagnostician of postmodemity. Whilst Michel 
Foucault is often celebrated as establishing the performativity of identity, Zizek 
argues that
“all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building 
multiple ad hoc conditions, and so on, has something inauthentic about 
it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the 
time and is otheiivise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that 
something -  what really matters -  will not be disturbed, that it will 
remain iiumobilized. So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and 
responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, it is much 
more crucial to focus on what remains the same in this global fluidity 
and reflexivity, on what seiwes as the very motor of this fluidity: the 
inexorable logic of Capital.”^
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This “spectral presence of Capital” is the figure of the big Other which persists after 
its destmction of other symbolic orders (including patriarchy)."' Hence for Zizek, 
identity politics is haunted by the spectre of Capital, whilst for Butler, in her synthesis 
of Foucault and psychoanalysis, what haunts identity itself are the historically 
contingent constitutive “outsides” of nonnative identity. The crucial question for 
Butler is, then,
“how might the excluded return, not as psychosis or the figure of the 
psychotic within politics, but as that which has been rendered mute, 
foreclosed from the domain of political signification.... How might such 
socially saturated domains of exclusion be recast from their status as 
“constitutive” to beings who might be said to matter?”^
Against Zizek’s negative estimation of Foucault’s value for such a questioning, I 
argue that Butler is quite right that the historicity on which he insists is vital to 
preventing the ossification of excluded subject positions and identifications as “Real.” 
Such historical contingency keeps open the possibility of political contestation.
For Butler, the signifier operates reiteratively to give the impression that it names and 
guarantees a “unity” of the signified, but this fails, not because of “an existential 
void,” but rather because of its “incapacity to include the social relations that it 
provisionally stabilizes through a set of contingent exclusions. This incompleteness 
will be the result of a specific set of social exclusions that return to haunt the claims 
of identity defined through negation; these exclusions need to be read and used in the 
reformulation and expansion of a democratizing reiteration of the term.”'’ What is
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most valuable for Butler in Zizek’s work, then, is precisely the democratic potential in 
his analysis of political signifiers as “empty signs which come to bear phantasmatic 
investments of various kinds” and it is the very failure of signification that establishes 
political signifiers “as sites of phantasmatic investment and discursive 
rearticu lation .W hat Butler aims to add to this is the dimension of historicity, 
provided in her argument by Foucault.® In crafting this position she is able to 
articulate the subversive potential in the vertigo of the copy or the double. “The loss 
of the sense of the “normal” ... can be its own occasion for laughter, especially when 
“the normal,” “the original” is revealed to be a copy, and an inevitably failed one, an 
ideal that no one can embody ... all along the original was derived.”'' How, then, to 
think and write this positive failure of originality without recapitulating it into the 
figure of an even more deep-seated originality, as is often the case with Duchamp?
Although it went unremarked until now, many of the texts used in the previous two 
chapters are predominantly (and explicitly) Foucauldian in inspiration. ThieiTy de 
Drive’s reading of Duchamp is set out as a Foucauldian archaeology of artistic 
modernism; Amelia Jones’s concept of the Duchampian author-function derives from 
Foucault’s essay ‘What is an Author?’ -  to which Hal Foster’s notion of the value of 
radical returns in deferred action is also indebted; elsewhere Foster uses the 
Foucauldian sense of “archive”; Douglas Crimp’s and Philip Fisher’s histories Of the 
museum rely on Foucault’s analysis of the classical '"episteme’"; Judith Butler too, as 
we have just seen, insists on Foucault’s importance. I note this for two reasons: firstly, 
because it is through these texts that I came to read Foucault at all; secondly, because 
I did so as a result of the deferral to Foucauldian concepts as the grounds of historical 
and philosophical truth, the very condition of possibility of the critiques being carried
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out by de Duve, Foster et al. The antinomies of reification / réanimation, copy / 
original, pathology / normativity which emerged in consideration of Cornelia Parker, 
Duchamp and a broader field of visual culture and interpretative praxis, strongly 
imply the need for a turn to the meta-dis cursive level. If the path through such 
antinomies frequently seems to turn on a negotiation of two extremes, how ai e we to 
gain critical distance on this and justify or account for our position taking? At a more 
empirical level, if art practices increasingly expand the frame to include conditions of 
enunciation, how are we to enunciate this? Against what limits does such a move 
come up against?
A meta-discursive approach that could account for both the historical position in 
which art finds itself, and the critical perspectives from which we comprehend this 
position, would certainly be an attractive prospect. Such a position would hopefully 
also serve as a regulating principle for the kind of associative naiTatives that seem 
necessitated by art that operates via suggestion and an appeal to historical 
“articulation.” However, in the readings of Foucault which follow, I hope to show that 
art historical appropriations of his work have not been attentive to several of its 
constitutive features which undermine its meta-discursivity. In tiying to rectify this by 
focusing on aspects of Foucault’s work that concern art, aesthetics, interpretation and 
the writing of history I conclude, that it doesn’t provide a meta-discursive perspective, 
but theorises an immanent one that returns us to many of the problems established so 
far, although it does so in a way that at least accounts for our critical position, even if 
it doesn’t allow us to defer our responsibility for it.
180
Before turning to Foucault, however, I would like to establish that there is another 
way to conceptualise the vertiginous experience which accompanies what Foster 
terms art’s (and indeed our) condition of “living on” in postmodernity. I draw here on 
two examples; one anthropological, and one literary. Both recapitulate the themes of 
spectrality and animation discussed previously,
W. G. Sebald’s novel Vertigo is an enigmatic combination of biographical reverie, 
historical reflection and novelistic fiction, punctuated by a collection of image 
fragments -  photographs, receipts, documents, postcards -  which likewise relate 
sometimes to Sebald himself, sometimes to historical moments, sometimes to his own 
research (for example research into Kafka’s travels during 1913). Like art history, 
then, its narrative is punctuated by images. For the reader, the relationship between 
text and image often provokes the sense of the uncanny that is, with the melancholic 
and the mnemonic, one of the characteristics of the vertiginous in the book. Do the 
images illustrate the nanative, do they supplement it, authenticate it? Does the 
naiTative perhaps imbue them with a fictive meaning, an appearance of 
interconnection that holds only insofar as it meets our expectations of narrative 
coherence? It is the undecidability of this dichotomy that draws us into the field of the 
“unfathomable contingencies,” of the novel, the “details imperceptible to us [which] 
decide everything.” Though the images reproduced in Vertigo are on one level 
evidential, they are also spectral, akin to the visions which haunt Sebald’s narrator in 
his travels -  his ‘recognitions’ of Kafka, of Elizabeth, daughter of James I, in young 
men and women he encounters. Vertigo arises where these two modes overlap -  as 
they do notably when Sebald attempts to determine through research what films 
Kafka saw at the cinema in Verona, on the night of September, 1913. Kafka’s
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notes provide no cine, so Sebald cannot know which of the two possibilities his 
research identifies it actually was: Pathé newsreels, or a doppelganger fantasy set in 
Prague? The protagonist in the latter, at the beginning of the film, confronts his own 
mirror-image which “steps out of the frame, and henceforth follows him as the 
ghostly shadow of his own restlessness.”"  Faced with this horrific haunting of 
himself by himself, the protagonist can only release himself from (what must be) 
delusions by shooting the doppelganger, “realising in the same instant that the bullet 
has penetrated his own heart” (Fig. 61).'^ The vertiginous feeling, then, as figured in 
this cinematic episode, is connected to a sense that one’s delusions cannot be 
abandoned except by some kind of death, and that there is no empirical way to 
recover what may be determinant contingencies, either in personal or collective 
history, Sebald’s novel, however, emergent from this condition, demonstrates that art 
can be made out of such contingency, through fictive modes which draw connections 
between historical and personal events.
To rework Hal Foster’s notion of the four modes of art’s condition of aftermath, we 
might say that it is the spectral and traumatic notion of experience, as emplotted in 
psychoanalysis and much contemporaiy cinema and literature, which necessitates the 
deployment of “incongruous” and “nonsynchronous” strategies in writing. To follow 
the deferred action of trauma and of its ghostly returns, critical writing needs to work 
with a form of narrative open to non-linearity, and thus it must, perforce, tarry with 
the fictive (the component which Hayden White argues is constitutively excluded in 
histoiy’s disciplinary foundation). One of the crucial lessons to be drawn from 
Foucault’s work is that it is possible to do this whilst emphatically not acceding to a 
bland relativism. This is the meaning of Foucault’s statement a propos The Order o f
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Things that “my book is a pure and simple fiction: it is a novel, but it is not I who 
invented it.”'® Such statements, which are not infrequent in Foucault, are not the sign 
that truth is irrelevant to him, that he is just playing games with language. Rather 
Foucault’s “historical fiction” is aimed at using fictive strategies “to provoke an 
interference between our reality and the knowledge of our past histoiy.” '"' The ghosts 
of that histoiy haunt the present and disturb it: Foucault’s hope is that his books, in 
providing the occasion of such disturbance “become true after they have been written 
-  not before.” '  ^It is perhaps the defining feature of Foucault’s historico-philosophical 
project that whilst formations of knowledge are co-extensive with power, knowledge 
can also be the locus of a transfomiation that alters the self and its relation to truth and 
power. For Foucault the possibility exists “for a fictional discourse to bring induce 
effects of truth, and for bringing it about that a true discourse engenders or 
‘manufactures’ something that does not yet exist, that is ‘fictions’ it. One ‘fictions’ 
histoiy on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one ‘fictions’ a politics not 
yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth.” This statement seems to me to be 
fundamental to reading and understanding Foucault’s work. It operates in the 
articulation of a genealogical past the truth of which is a property of its conditions of 
enunciation in the present, with the consequent possibility of moving towards a new 
politics, the discursive conditions of which, including constitutive exclusions, whilst 
inevitable, are not yet prescribed. If Sebald’s Vertigo exemplifies the fictive and 
haunted status of texts punctuated by photographic images (and thus stands for art 
history), so my next example of the vertiginous exemplifies the transformative 
potential in the loss of the centred self, a key Foucauldian premise related to the 
political and philosophical ambition of his “fictions.”
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In the preceding chapter Hitchcock’s Vertigo stood for the consequences of not 
acknowledging the psychoanalytic undermining of Platonic idealism. Alfred Gell 
provides an alternate determination of vertigo, one which suggests a positive 
experience of it is possible. His anthropological account is speculative, but does 
provide a usefully analogous reading of the kinds of subjective dissociation which 
figure in Sebald’s novel and in psychoanalytic readings of Hitchcock’s film. Cell’s 
1980 essay ‘The Gods at Play: Vertigo and Possession in Muria Religion’ proposes a 
general account of the vertiginous in secular games and in religious ritual.'^ This 
discussion also importantly serves to propose another model for investment in object 
as fetish, in a way that offers an understanding of fetishistic ritual and goes beyond a 
solely condemnatory response to engage with its “cognitive-aesthetic” potential.
Cell’s observations of Muria “swinging” practices in Madhya Pradesh, India leads 
him to a theory of vertigo as a kind of “equilibrium play” which modulates self-world 
relations in a process of de-automatization. “In all swinging,” he writes, “there is an 
element of self-surrender to a loss of individual equilibrium ... capable of being 
invested with religious significance.” ^^  Two examples of this investment are given: 
firstly, the rituals involving the log-gods or anga, which work as a kind of inverted 
swing; secondly induced “possession” trance states, which Gell reads as operating in a 
similar cognitive modality as autism.
The anga ritual revolves around the anga itself -  a quadrangular framework with a 
caiwed horse-like head piece, which is supported by between two and four young 
devotees. The ritual, in which the whole community participates as active witnesses, 
culminates in the possession of the anga by a divinity, something made apparent by 
its violent swinging motion and the altered states of the bearers. What is observed,
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Gell notes, is a process in which the divinity “animates it [the anga], but is not 
visually imitated by it.”^^  The divinity is in the kinetic force, not the object itself, 
which is merely a vehicle for it. Here we may note that animation in this instance is a 
question not of a magical object, but the temporary transformation of such an object. 
In Bhabha’s terms, this is a culture located in the “between” space where aura and 
agora, God and man, aren’t radically opposed, but can co-exist on the same 
vertiginous plane. This is evidenced in brass representations of Muria deities as 
“swinging” beings. In Muria culture “to swing, to ride, is to enjoy the vertiginous 
triumphs the Gods alone can know.”^^  Without, seemingly, the inevitability of an 
Icarian fall...
Gell’s own explanation of the phenomena is, of course, more down-to-earth, but 
nonetheless provides the basis for his general theory of vertiginous play. .The very 
construction of the anga, he argues, because it dissociates the intentionality of the 
individual bearer and his body from the consequences of his actions, produces a 
“positive feedback” of involuntaiy motion, and thereby leads the bearers to attune 
themselves “to the ‘will’ of the assemblage as a whole.”^^  The anga dance disrupts 
self-possession in this loss of will, which is the root of vertiginous pleasure for Gell; it 
instantiates Divinity in the gap opened up “between the structures of intentionality 
which underlie normal motor activities, and the consequences of the carriers’ actions 
as perceived by themselves.... In other words, vertigo threatens intentionality, and the 
structures of intentionality underlies our sense of ‘s e lf” (226). How is this so? .
In physiological terms, vertigo as a sensory experience is a consequence of disruption 
of the “vestibular apparatus” in the inner ear. But why should this experience, usually
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conceived as deeply unpleasant, be both a religious technique, and a secular game 
(and the latter by no means restricted to Muria culture)? Gell’s answer turns on the 
way that such play “raises to explicitness the performance of behavioural routines 
which are, or will become, subliminal. It is activity engaged in for its own sake, and it 
always takes place within a frame which isolates it from the context of action 
performed with an ulterior end in view.”^^  If this latter point seems to align it with the 
rhetoric of “disinterestedness” and thus with a disappointingly conservative notion of 
aesthetic experience, the notion of “de-sublimation” put forward is much more 
interesting. For Gell, this bringing into view of subliminal bodily experience is 
achieved not via ratiocination, but through vertiginous play itself. This operates 
through the abstraction of the body’s “equilabratoiy activity” from its normal role in 
loco m o tio n .It is by putting one’s self out of equilibrium (literally), that one is able 
to derive pleasure, and knowledge, from bodily technë. The significance of this 
account of vertigo and dis-equilibrium as de-sublimation is three-fold: firstly, it 
establishes a model of animation that offers potential beyond the negative accounts of 
fetishism emergent from Mai’xism and Freudianism (especially in tandem); second, it 
conceptualises de-sublimation as embodied experience, and thus reconfigures the 
epistemological problematic of the “return of the Real” in a more fmitful direction; 
finally, it does so by affirming the experience of dis-orientation and loss of self as 
opening onto possibilities for reframing the “body-world-self’ relation. Gell’s 
position is tentatively physiological, involving speculation about the interconnection 
of motor function, perception and the central nervous system, through his hypothesis 
that the vestibular apparatus “modulates” the cognitive input and output which assures 
the consistency of sense of “self.” But its significance is not, I would argue, 
dependent on proof of such connections. If for the Muria “the primordial ‘non­
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normal’ experience, in play, in secular pleasure-seeking, and in religious ecstasy, is 
the dislocation of the structures of body-world-self intentionality,” then it can be 
argued that the vertiginous is paradigmatic for all such attempts to open a space for 
the reconfiguration of self/^ Its particular significance here lies in the relation 
between a concept of bodily experience as occasioning the shattering of the self, the 
aesthetics appropriate to the writing of such an event (as exemplified by Sebald), and 
the (utopian) political possibilities implicit in both. Thus this account prefigures, in 
the context of this thesis, the insistence on the centrality of loss of self in Foucault -  a 
loss for which both textual and experiential aesthetics are proposed as means in his 
work.
If Foucault’s emphasis on the body as a site for the inscriptive operation of power- 
knowledge is a much-discussed feature of his work, as is his enthusiasm for bodily 
practices that rework such operations, the concomitant emphasis on writing as an 
aspect of the same project is less frequently discussed. As Foucault makes clear in late 
texts such as ‘Technologies of the Self,’ power-knowledge produces or forms subjects 
through the very mode in which they have access to their truth. '^  ^Foucault uses a 
historical analysis to show that whilst this once operated through an ascetic practice of 
self-renunciation, in the modern era of the human sciences it occurs through the 
“verbalization” of the self.^^ In contrast to this discursive model (which, it should be 
stressed, is not only linguistic -  Foucault gives ample demonsti ations elsewhere of the 
material / spatial correlates of verbalization)^^ there is a call for a contemporaiy 
ascesis. If psychoanalysis is Foucault’s prime example of the centrality of the 
“speaking subject” in the modem era, it is S&M, read as an innovative 
“desexualization of pleasure” and “eroticization of the body” that stands for a positive
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loss of self that Foucault validates/^ Again drawing on Ancient texts, Foucault puts 
what he terms “self writing” on the side of ascesis rather than “verbalization”: in 
Seneca, for instance self writing is the necessary partner of reading others. This is the 
process by which an identity is formed that doesn’t simply ingest the thoughts of other 
authors, but digests them, makes them one’s own. The role of self writing in Seneca, 
Foucault writes, “is to constitute, along with all that reading has constituted, a “body”
... writing transforms the thing seen or heard “into tissue and blood” {in vires et in 
sanguinem)"’^  ^For Seneca, Foucault claims, it is through “the interplay of selected 
readings and assimilative writing” that one forms a legible identity, which he, Seneca, 
contrasts with the “lifeless” portraits of others that over-faithful reading produces.^’ 
Writing in this sense becomes a part of the “care of the self’ or the “aesthetics of 
existence” to which Foucault devoted his attention in the years before his death. But 
how does his own writing relate to aesthetics, and is this an issue that might have 
implications for art historical uses of it?
The relationship(s) between critical theory, art and aesthetics are problematic.^^ In 
what follows I wish to indicate both the importance of aesthetics as a cognitive and 
political topos for Foucault, and to suggest that conhaiy to the meta-discursive role he 
plays in much art-theoretical and art-historical writing of a poststructuralist bent, his 
writing does not, and does not seek to, transcend the problematics of originality in 
relation to histoiy and tmth, neither does it establish a meta-historical or meta- 
discursive perspective. To demonstrate this I will give a close reading of one of 
Foucault’s interpretations, or, rather, uses, of art in his writing, and of some art 
historical responses to it. First, though, the role of aesthetics in a more general sense.
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In a recent issue of the journal Art History devoted to the rise of Visual Culture as a 
disciplinary field, Peter Osborne argues persuasively that the philosophical tradition 
of aesthetic theory in its Kantian form has become divorced from the critical task of 
thinking about the specificity, the historical ontology, of contemporary art.^  ^
Contemporary art is “post-conceptual,” Osborne claims, and as such has moved 
beyond aesthetics. Nonetheless, he sees philosophical or critical thought as key to the 
possibility of re-empowering art critical discourse and assessing its relationship to art 
history. His aim, which I endorse, is to think through the historicity of contemporary 
art criticism and its relationship to art histoiy. That this aim derives from a conscious 
need is axiomatic for my argument here. I will return, later in this section, to another 
invocation of a “historical ontology” that announces its grounding in a contemporary 
critical need -  one that appears in the work of Foucault -  to sketch some general 
principles for a rediscovered use for aesthetics.
Key to Osborne’s argument is his hypothesis that Kant’s Critique o f  Judgement 
inaugurated a tradition that wrongly identifies aesthetics with the philosophical 
discourse on art. Though an aesthetic dimension may not be eliminable from art (this 
Osborne sees as one lesson of Conceptualism), it is nonetheless the case that the ‘art 
as aesthetics’ discourse mns aground in tiying to deal with contemporary artistic 
practices that do not operate primarily via aestheticism. Here, of course, Duchamp 
and the Duchampian figures large, as art to which the honorific aesthetic predicates 
developed in modern philosophy -  sublime, beautiful, harmonious amongst others -  
would not usually (or usefully) be applied. One response to the historical success of 
such works, in what Osborne terms “a form of philosophical ressentiment^ is the ‘end 
of art’ thesis, in various modes.^'^ (Here what might be termed the ‘end of art’ theses
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of Benjamin and Adorno, with their grounding in the social transformations of 
modernity, must be distinguished from the end of the “art as aesthetics” line. For 
Adorno, Modernist art preseiwes the aesthetic, for Benjamin aesthetics is never 
identified solely with the artistic). The conception of art developed by Jena 
Romanticism, which Osborne terms “art as ontology” is presented as more adequate 
to the historical specificity of contemporary art and the critical scene than “art as 
aesthetics.” But how is this contemporary reality itself characterized?
The reconfigurations of discourse within the Humanities, as well as the effects of 
postmodernism understood both as late capitalist epoch and as post-stmcturalist 
theory, have led to much debate within theoretically-inclined art histoiy concerning its 
relationships with philosophy -  especially insofar as art histoiy is understood as 
founded on Kantian principles -  and with criticism, perceived as undergoing a crisis 
induced by its institutional redundancy.^^ One consequence of these reconfigurations 
is the increasing prominence of Visual Culture, with its massive expansion of the 
types of objects considered along with paintings and sculptures under one remit, 
which promises to democratise art history at the same time as it threatens to shatter 
the specificity of its relationship to a set of privileged and canonical objects.^^ As 
Osborne notes, one of the problems raised by ‘visual studies’ as adjunct or 
replacement for art history is that it runs the risk of affinniiig the idealist emphasis on 
opticality characteristic of formalist modernism, and of treating synchronic 
connections across an expanded cultural field of analysis, whilst neglecting the 
historical dimension.^^ That art historians might seek interdisciplinaiy connections 
with philosophy in these circumstances is understandable, though the extent to which 
this necessitates rediscovering aesthetics remains to be seen. As Osborne argues, the
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aesthetics which philosophy has traditionally associated with art is not what is needed 
to understand, or to try to remedy, the negative effects of convergent historical 
processes on art critical thought.
The term “aesthetics” and its derivatives might in fact be a complicating factor 
inhibiting the establishment of such connections. “Aestheticism” is generally used to 
denote a negative, retrogressive turn when applied to contemporary art and criticism, 
whilst “aestheticization,” especially in sociological discourse, refers to the reifying 
drive of consumer culture. “Aesthetics” itself signifies not only a branch of 
philosophy -  itself hardly homogenous -  but also serves within recent art history as a 
placeholder for the interpellatory dynamics of art works, or other cultural objects and 
practices (where it is a question of delineating the phenomenological specificity of 
cultural operations),and  as a name for the “period eye,” a historically specific 
sensibility. If there has been a recurrence of aesthetics as a theme in recent art history 
and art criticism, it often signifies not the philosophical tradition, but the specifics of a 
particular art work’s mode of producing meaning, understood as relating to a broader 
system of “aesthetics-at-large.”^^  Critical writing of this kind has tended to be more 
interested in the way aesthetics make an artwork woi^k than in how they make it art. 
This usage extends to other areas of contemporaiy critique where cultural practices 
are treated in terms of aesthetics in this sense."^  ^It might seem that the solution to this 
confusing state of affairs should be a rigorous separation between aesthetics in a 
philosophical, specialist sense, and general discussions of period sensibility etc. But a 
critically useful invocation of aesthetics cannot abandon either, not least because 
aesthetic experience as it takes place in relation to art of the 20^ *' centuiy is deeply 
engaged “with aesthetics-at-large” or “at work.”
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As Osborne notes, the aesthetic is a necessary dimension of the historico-ontological 
conception of art, but is “both partial and relationalC^^ As such, the analysis of a 
given work will need to treat the specific historically determined character of the 
relationship between aesthetic and other factors, and from “their relations to the 
equally variable aesthetic dimension of other (non-art) cultural fomis.”'^  ^The multiple 
meanings and sites of “aesthetics” are thus what we must reckon with, rather than try 
to reduce to a harmonious and well-ordered organisation of clearly defined terms. If 
the predominant metaphors that describe the role of aesthetics within the changing 
relationships between philosophy, art practice, art criticism and art history, are of 
spatial expansion and retraction (the “wider field” of visual culture, and so on), it is 
also important to figure these relationships as dispersal. The multiple loci of 
invocations o f ‘the aesthetic’ effect a decentring of its philosophical determination, 
and while this is to an extent a consequence of processes of aestheticisation and of 
critical atrophy, it is also the condition for a possible renewal of art histoiy’s place in 
the critical project in the wake of poststructuralism.
The death of Jacques Deii'ida in 2004 marks a key moment in the recent histoiy of 
critical thought, one in which the possibility emerges of a drawing a line under those 
who reconfigured so much of “theoiy” in the late twentieth century. With his passing, 
after that of Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, et al, do we have, finally, closure on these 
authors, on this period, which is part of the histoiy of critical thought, but perhaps no 
longer defines it? One way of understanding the reemergence of aesthetics might be 
to see it as a return to a way of thinking about philosophy and about ait that was 
obscured by the emphasis in poststmcturalist theory on textuality, discourse, power
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etc., and by the (supposedly) irresponsible “aestheticization” of critical writing. But 
the most urgent need for a rediscovered aesthetics results from the historical 
specificity of the place(s) of aesthetics in the present, not least in the textual strategies 
of poststructuralism itself, which largely still await an aesthetically aware reading. 
Rather than the rediscoveiy of a disciplined and secure locus for aesthetics within a 
hypothetically ideal architecture of knowledge, I would argue that the task facing us is 
the discovery of modes of critiquing and thinking about the ubiquity, undecidability, 
and centrality of aesthetics in every aspect of our culture and our knowledge. As may 
be gathered from the terminology I use here, I think that this necessitates a continued 
engagement with poststructuralist thought. Particularly within art history as it is 
practiced this means a repetition of the reading of the now canonical texts that were 
received within it as theoiy at least 30 years ago. If, as Freud suggests, it takes two 
traumas to make a trauma, I hope that such a continued engagement will facilitate a 
traumatic rupturing of disciplinaiy boundaries and enable a more far-reaching critical 
investigation of aesthetics.
Historical distance makes it clear that even those works that seemed the last word in 
the anti-aesthetic in the 1970s -  Fm thinking of video art in particular -  in fact 
partook of a highly particular form, a mode of meaning that constitutes, and is 
usefully named, their aesthetic.'^^ O f course, this inteipretation might seem too 
general, too much in tune with common usage, which tends to employ ‘aesthetic’ as a 
synonym for ‘style,’ and thus apply it to almost all cultural objects. But it is the 
ubiquity, the pervasiveness of aesthetic questions that seems to me precisely what 
needs to be theorized - an analysis of the aesthetics at work in all the ways in which 
the world is interpreted and changed for us is politically important. I would argue,
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then, that what Roland Barthes does in Mythologies, when he critiques the semantic 
function of haircuts in Julius Caesar, the symbolic import to French culture of steak 
and chips, or the political connotations of a photograph showing a black child saluting 
the French flag, is an analysis of the aesthetic at the level of the social im a g in a ry I f  
we assume that all cultural stylizations are products of an aesthetic by which they 
mean, then analysis of specific aesthetics means seeing cultural forms, modes, 
objects, as determinate (to a degree) and knowable; and what is to be analysed is the 
specificities of form, of surface.
It was just this analysis of surface that Foucault proposed as the aim of what he 
termed “archaeology” in the 1960s, and later augmented with “genealogy.” It is 
Foucault's generation and their followers who may well be held accountable for the 
“loss” of the aesthetic tradition, (particularly in art history where to their detractors 
they are synonymous with the elevation of the textual as the paradigm for all cultural 
production), and it is a certain distance from the hegemony of poststructuralism that 
may make a restitution of traditional aesthetics possible. However, though 
theoretically-inclined art historians have long utilised poststructuralist texts in the 
general project of an attack on their discipline’s bourgeois, connoisseurly bases, its 
“bad” aestheticism, they have paid little attention to the aesthetics at work in 
poststructuralist texts themselves. Michel Foucault has been both enlisted by art 
historians wishing to overthrow their discipline’s aestheticism, and been indicted by 
theorists (primarily Habermasians) who read him as an irresponsible aestheticist 
(especially with regard to questions of normative judgement) That diametrically 
opposite readings of Foucault’s position in relation to aesthetics can be made is all the 
more surprising when we consider that similar interpretations of aesthetics are made
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by each camp. Both sides in this example interpret aesthetics negatively because 
aestheticism is identified with complicity with forces of capital. How can Foucault be 
both a weapon against, and a victim of, these forces?
‘From Polis to Postmodernism,’ the concluding chapter of Teny Eagleton’s The 
Ideology o f the Aesthetic -  which includes a lengthy discussion of Foucault's The Use 
o f Pleasure -  questions the historical position of aesthetics in late capitalism, and the 
discourses that seek to describe it.'^ '^  In The Ideology o f the Aesthetic Eagleton traces 
the historical fate of the concept of the aesthetic, with particular sympathy for the 
meanings ascribed to -  or imposed on -  it by Kant and by Marx. As the product of a 
response to historical developments including particularly the rise of the bourgeoisie, 
the aesthetic is from the start implicated in what it opposes:
“On the one hand, it figures as a genuinely emancipatory force - as a 
community of subjects now linked by sensuous impulse and fellow- 
feeling rather than by heteronomous law, each safeguarded in its 
unique particularity while bound at the same time into social harmony.
The aesthetic offers the middle class a superbly versatile model of their 
political aspirations, exemplifying new forms of autonomy and self- 
determination, transforming the relations between law and desire, 
morality and knowledge, recasting the links between individual and 
totality, and revising social relations on the basis of custom, affection 
and sympathy. On the other hand, the aesthetic signifies ... a kind of 
'internalized repression', inserting social power more deeply into the
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veiy bodies of those it subjugates, and so operating as a supremely 
effective mode of political hegemony.
This basic model of the contradictory status of the aesthetic is found again and again 
in The Ideology o f  the Aesthetic, but it is given different inflections along the 
historical path Eagleton narrates.
Eagleton imagines that there was a time, before the rise of the bourgeoisie, when “the 
three mighty regions of the cognitive, the ethico-political and the libidinal-aesthetic 
were still to a large extent in te rm esh ed .W ith  modernity however, each region 
became autonomous; knowledge slipped free of ethical constraint, and ethical 
questions became detached from cognitive ones. Ethics now looked to the model of 
autonomous aesthetics as its guide, while the aesthetic, for its part, became an end in 
itself, so detached from economic and political systems as to have little choice in the 
matter. Of course, this autonomization is one way of characterising the achievements 
of Enlightenment, and is thus not seen entirely negatively by Eagleton. Rather, and art 
is given as the key example, an ambiguous process of autonomization as both 
increasing room for manoeuvre and diminishing of critical purchase characterises the 
historical fate of the “three mighty regions” in modernity. Art becomes autonomous, 
paradoxically, in its integration into capitalist production and while art is 
marginalized, the aesthetic is generalized. “Indeed one might risk the rather 
exaggerated formulation that aesthetics is bom at the moment of art’s effective demise 
as a political force, flourishes on the corpse of its social r e le v a n c e .A r t  production 
withers in significance, but bequeaths aesthetics as an ideological salve to a social 
order which has “marginalized pleasure and the body, reified reason, and stmck
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morality entirely empty. The aesthetic offers to reverse this division of labour, to 
bring these three alienated regions back into touch with one another, but the price it 
demands for this generosity is high: it offers to interrelate these discourses by 
effectively swallowing up the other two. Everything should now become aesthetic.”^^  
It is worth noting here that Eagleton’s diagnosis is the opposite of Osborne’s, 
according to which it is art that outlives aesthetics and not vice versa.
In the post-war period instrumentalization cannot be simply opposed to “culture” any 
longer; “civil society” reshaped by consumer capitalism becomes “pervasively 
aestheticized” via the saturation of late capitalism’s “fetishism of style and surface, its 
cult of hedonism and technique, its reifying of the signifier and displacement of 
discursive meaning with random intensities.”^’ Where capitalism had first severed the 
symbolic and the economic, it now harnessed the former to the latter. Though the 
resultant postmodern culture could be viewed as a new variant of avant-gardism, it is 
clear that Eagleton sees it in a negative light, as a ressentiment against truth, morality 
and beauty, and against any hope of recovering them from instrumentality. This 
capitulation is witnessed, or so Eagleton would have us believe, in postmodernism’s 
“consumerist hedonism and philistine anti-historicism, its wholesale abandonment of 
critique and commitment, its cynical erasure of truth, meaning and subjectivity, its 
blank, reified technologism.”^^  The stage is thus set for his attack on poststructuralist 
theoiy generally, and Foucault in particular.
Eagleton, keen to diagnose poststructuralism as ailing from the same disease as late 
capitalist culture generally, sees Foucault’s “radical, implacable refusal” as 
compromised by his relativism. If politics must have recourse to normativity, and
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cultural relativism undermines this ground, Eagleton sees Foueault’s objection to 
^'regime as such'' as his response to this problem .Foucault, Eagleton argues, is both 
a fantastical escapist, imagining life outwith institutional regime, and a pessimistic 
pragmatist dismissing the possibility of any escape from power. “This ambivalence 
then allows him to combine, in a manner typical of much post-structuralism, a kind of 
secret apocalyptic ultra-leftism with a dry-eyed, pragmatic political reformism. It 
protects him at once from the reactionary and the romantic.. Thus, for Eagleton, 
Foucault has neither the grounds nor even the desire to distinguish fascism from 
liberalism -  an objection not uncommon in Habermasian responses to Foucault.
Nancy Fraser also makes the inverse criticism, arguing that Foucault “explicitly 
renounced the moral-theoretical resources necessary to account for [his] own implicit 
normative j u d g e m e n t s .F o r  Eagleton then, Foucault can’t make the right moral 
choices because he doesn’t normatively ground his judgement, whilst for Fraser he 
might imply a normative dimension but can’t back it up with the right moral 
framework. Both approaches are unconvinced by Foucault’s actual record of political 
engagement, which as an example of committed intellectual praxis is not to be 
gainsaid.^^ Eagleton and Fraser are both engaged here in what can be termed the 
“hermeneutics of suspicion” -  they want to find out what lies beneath the surface of 
Foucault’s aesthetic, whilst for Foucault himself critique takes place exactly at the 
level of surface.^^ What both seem unwilling to countenance is that Foucault’s 
rhetoric is aimed at animating the reader as historical agent, and that this is achieved 
not through a systematic, philosophically consistent argumentation, but by the 
confrontation of specific features of the present with specific histories.^^ This strategy 
is a gamble with the openness of histoiy, which is not a necessaiy progression for 
Foucault, but a discontinuous and contested field of practices and discourses. Against
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Eagleton, we should affirm that Foucault’s “ambivalence” is not undermining of 
historical transfomiation, but in fact its condition.
Eagleton accuses Foucault of being in thrall to power, of finding “aesthetic 
gratification” in it, something that is apparently betrayed by Foucault’s stylistic 
“carefully calculated clinical n e u t r a l i t y .T h e  ethical judgement which relativism 
had undermined as epistemologically viable is in fact passed over into the realm of the 
aesthetic, leading Foucault, according to Eagleton, to display a “dangerous inclination 
towards absolutist coercion as against Enlightenment hegemony.”'"’’ In the light of this 
reading of Foucault’s general project, which does not in the end seem to do more than 
exemplify the double-bind Eagleton associates with the modern aesthetics and power 
per se (“In so far as power remains politically oppressive, it must call forth refusal and 
resistance; in so far as it is aestheticized, it acts as the medium of a pleasurable 
expansion and productivity of capacities”). The Use o f  Pleasure is presented as an 
aesthetic response to an ethical lacuna in Foucault’s œuvre.^^
From Foucault’s presentation of Greek sexual ethics as based on an aesthetics of 
conduct and an economics of pleasure, Eagleton extrapolates the total renunciation of 
any criteria of judgement other than the stylistic, and reads The Use o f  Pleasure not at 
the level it was written, as counter-point to the modern “hermeneutie of the subject,” 
but as if it intended to found a social morality in general on the Greek model.
Foucault stated unequivocally that this was not his intention: “The Greek ethics of 
pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetiy, exclusion of the other, an 
obsession with penetration ... All that is quite disgusting! ... there is no exemplary 
period that is not our period ... it is not anything to get back to.”^^  Eagleton’s decision
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to overlook such statements (and, more importantly, the clearly defined project of The 
Use o f PleasureŸ^ licenses, it seems, a piece of insinuation that sits uneasily with 
Eagleton’s tone of ethical outrage. Having claimed that “it is true... that Foucault, at 
least at one point in his life, opposed the criminalization of rape,” (itself a severe 
simplification)^'’ Eagleton amplifies its rhetorical force when later in the same 
paragraph he asks “Does it all come down to a question of how, in postmodernist 
vein, one ‘stylizes’ one’s conduct? What would a stylish rape look like, precisely?”^^  
The rhetorical escalation that occurs here shows how Eagleton’s own understanding 
of an aesthetic that should function in relation to, but in distinction from, the ethical 
and the cognitive leads him to read Foucault as symptom of a contemporaiy malaise -  
the aesthetic subsumes the e th ic a l . I t  does so, moreover, in a most ironic way, for 
Eagleton’s own unethical recourse to an aesthetic device, a rhetoric of persuasion, 
shows that he too cannot keep these realms as pure as he would like. Unable to read 
Foucault’s text as an aesthetically charged response to ethical and cognitive problems 
in contemporary Western society, Eagleton performs the operation he accuses 
Foucault of, the dissolution of ethico-political and epistemological concerns in a 
hypertrophied aesthetic.
Eagleton’s idealised / idealist view of the aesthetic, his attempt to keep it separate 
from the life-world he sees as disastrously aestheticised by capital, in fact works 
counter-productively. Unlike Foucault he is unable to rearticulate historical processes 
and their concomitant transformations of subjectivity as sites of critical intervention 
and resistance. Thus, whereas the late Foucault began a project of “the aesthetics of 
existence” that took contemporary narcissism as one of its inspirations, Eagleton 
remains unable to utilise any of the aestheticising developments he can so lucidly
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describe, instead harking back to a prelapsarian and narrowly metaphysical version of 
the aesthetic as the ludic grounds of affective community. This particular and elusive 
version of aesthetics is not only unjustifiably kept separate from aesthetics-at-large, 
but also fails to respond to the critical need for a counter-ideological investigation and 
use of such aesthetics as at work not only in commodities, but also in art works, and 
in critical and theoretical writing.
Why is it that Eagleton, whose project as set out in the foreword of The Ideology o f  
the Aesthetic takes place under the Marxist-Benjaminian mbric of “use what you 
can,” and aims at the recoveiy of “whatever is still viable and valuable in the class 
legacies to which we are heirs,” should be accommodating to Foucault, finds it 
necessary to refuse him so thoroughly?^^ The answer to this lies, I think, in a 
resistance to one of the consequences of his own argument regarding the ubiquity of 
the aesthetic. Capitalism having so thoroughly and insidiously disseminated aesthetics 
via the commodity, Eagleton wishes to re-establish the grounds for a more decorous 
and restrained aesthetics that is kept in check by ethics and epistemology. This 
triangulation of powers has an aesthetic dimension of its own, of course, as Eagleton’s 
frequent recourse to a vocabulary of “harmony” and “balance” indicates. The problem 
Eagleton both recognises and obscures in The Ideology o f the Aesthetic is the 
impossibility of keeping the aesthetic in its place. This is one reason, perhaps, why his 
reading of Foucault proves unproductive for him -  because he cannot make sense of 
the aesthetics at work in the text, aesthetics which play out the ethical and 
epistemological effectiveness of Foucault’s writing. That Eagleton’s oversight on this 
point is inseparable from the unethical use of insinuation with regard to Foucault, and 
from the epistemological shape of his reading demonstrates the inevitable coexistence
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of these three hypothetically separate modes. The supposed incommensurability 
between the aims of Eagleton’s analysis of the ideology of the aesthetic and 
Foucault’s genealogical project remains undecidably located, neither finally 
assignable to epistemological or aesthetic objections. The role ethics plays here is key. 
If, as Den'ida has argued, the ethical moment occurs precisely when one is faced with 
genuine undecidablility, then we might question Eagleton’s ethical response to 
equivocations that occur both within Foucault’s text and in Eagleton’s reading of it.’"^  
Despite his efforts, it seems to me that Eagleton’s reading performs the undecidability 
of the ethical, aesthetic, or epistemological judgement as pure or foundational, and by 
not recognising this fails to pay attention to the implications of Foucault’s textual 
aesthetic for his epistemology. If I designate this as an ethical failure on Eagleton’s 
part, it is nonetheless clear that its consequences extend to the epistemological claims 
and aesthetic qualities of The Ideology o f the Aesthetic. That Eagleton seems blind to 
the consequences of the ubiquitous “aestheticisation” he theorises as the postmodern 
condition does not invalidate his project, but it means that we cannot expect a rigid 
architecture of aesthetic, ethical, epistemological to satisfactorily analyze a state of 
affairs in which such an architecture doesn’t (any longer?) exist.
That Foucault’s project can in fact be seen as contributing to the “historical ontology” 
outlined by Osborne as the motivating need behind the rethinking of the relations 
between philosophy, art histoiy and art criticism, is clear from his essay What is 
Enlightenment?^^ This essay, hirther, shows how aesthetic concerns are indeed central 
for Foucault, but that they do not, contra Eagleton, overwhelm or undermine 
historico-critical ones. What is Enlightenment? brings together two perspectives on 
the critical project, that of Kant, summarised as the posing of the question Was ist
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Aufklarung? (seen as a new way of reflecting on the present) and that of Baudelaire, 
whose aesthetic theory facilitates Foucault’s transition from the self-questioning of 
the Enlightenment to what he temis “the historical ontology of ourselves.” ”^ This 
transition both locates, in Kant’s critique, the point of departure for modernity, and 
conceives modernity not as an epoch, but as an “attitude,” by which Foucault means 
“a mode of relating to contemporaiy reality; a voluntaiy choice made by certain 
people; in the end a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving 
that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a 
task.” *^ Baudelaire, acutely aware of modernity, does not see being modern as merely 
a matter of recognizing its fleetingness, its contingency. Rather, Foucault stresses, it is 
a matter of adopting a deliberate attitude which “consists in capturing something 
eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it... Modernity 
... is the will to ‘heroize’ the present.”^^  Baudelaire’s famous comments about the 
“poetic beauty” of the black frock-coat as “an expression of the public soul,” 
indicative of a society in mourning, and on Constantin Guys as the “Painter Of 
Modern Life” who accepts the task of “distilling” from the present “the mysterious 
element of beauty that it might contain, however slight or minimal that element may 
be” support this interpretation.^^ Guys is quintessentially modem for Baudelaire in 
that he doesn’t just depict, but transfigures the world he sees. Foucault glosses this in 
arguing that “for the attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is 
indissociable from a desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it 
is, and to transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is.” '^’ But, 
further to this, modernity is a relationship to oneself not just to the present, and for 
Foucault, the attitude of modernity is “tied to an indispensable ascetism.”^^  Ascetism 
is perhaps Foucault’s key term for the understanding of the relation to self as aesthetic
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practice, for the self as work of art. The brief characterisations of Kant and Baudelaire 
in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ are not given as historical summaries of epochs: while 
for Foucault we remain rooted in the Enlightenment, this connection is found not in 
“faithfulness to doctrinal elements” but in “the permanent reactivation of an attitude -  
that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our 
historical era.” '^" It is in this light that his “fictions” take shape for us.
The “historical ontology of ourselves” Foucault proposes in What is Enlightenment? 
reflects on limits, but in a way that departs from Kantianism proper:
“if the Kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge 
had to renounce exceeding... the critical question today must be turned 
back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, 
obligatoiy, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, 
and the product of arbitraiy constraints? The point, in brief, is to 
transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation 
into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing- 
over.”^^
If Eagleton reads Foucault as dissolving the ethical and the cognitive into the 
aesthetic, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ makes it clear that the role of aesthetics for 
critical thought is thoroughly historical, and connected to an ethics at both personal 
and societal levels. Foucault’s thought has been analyzed in detail in terms of its 
progression tlirough different phases, in which aesthetics is generally conceived as 
playing a role within texts on literature in the early 1960s, a role which is superceded
204
by first the archaeology of the classical (seventeenth-eighteenth centuiy) and modern 
(nineteenth centuiy, Kantian) periods, then by the genealogy of subjection and 
techniques of bio-power in the 1970s; aesthetics then returns in the final two volumes 
of The History o f Sexuality as the “care of the self.”^^  Leaving to one side for a 
moment the question of whether this périodisation is entirely satisfactoiy, it is 
significant insofar as the division of Foucault’s work into these different phases has 
largely determined its reception. Thus, in queer theoiy it is the three volumes of The 
Histoiy o f  Sexuality that are most often referred to when Foucault’s name is invoked; 
in sociological critical theory it is the work on power; likewise in studies of visual 
culture, it is Discipline and Punish and “paiiopticism”; finally, in art history it is most 
often the archaeological phase, and especially The Order o f  Things of 1966 and The 
Archaeology o f  Knowledge of 1969 which represent Foucault’s th o u g h t .T h e  recent 
publication of English editions of Foucault’s Essential Works and several of his 
lecture series, provides the occasion for a more comprehensive analysis of the 
different configurations of aesthetics, epistemology and ethics in his thought, and thus 
for a more satisfactory reception of his work in the English-speaking Flumanities.^” 
Thus, for example, consulting the Essential Works we can find aesthetic experience 
expressed as the “transformation of oneself by one’s self,”^’ knowledge as “a process 
by which the subject undergoes a modification through the veiy things that one 
knows, or, rather, in the course of the work that one does in order to know,”^^  and 
ethics as an ascetic practice conceived not as “a morality of renunciation but as an 
exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to develop and transform 
oneself.”^^  For Foucault, his work was an aesthetic / ethical transformation of himself 
through knowledge. As his analysis of power amply demonstrates, this is not a 
question of a vohintaristic reflexivity, but rather of the use of knowledge (particularly
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historical knowledge) to open up whatever spaces of resistance and transformation 
power brings into being. The challenge for the reader / interpreter is to participate in 
this process.
As an astute and committed reader of Foucault, Judith Butler has perhaps done most 
amongst recent authors to think through the implications of the interrelation of 
knowledge, aesthetics, ethics and power in his work. In a close analysis of ‘What is 
Critique?’ she poses precisely the question of what Foucault understood by an 
“aesthetics of existence” '^’ that would be a practice of the self, but not intentional in 
the Humanist sense?^^ Her answer turns on the notion of reiteration discussed at the 
outset of this chapter, and addresses the accusation of ‘normative confusion’ directed 
at Foucault by Habermasians. In a move that enhances our understanding of both 
texts, Butler splices the key terms of The Use o f  Pleasure (by and large an aesthetic 
vocabulary) with the political insights of the ‘What is Critique?’ (which trades in 
terms such as “governmentalization”), and her own terminology of “styling” or 
“crafting” the self. For Butler, critique operates at the limits of intelligibility, and 
contra Habermas she argues that normativity in his foundational sense remains within 
the limits already established for it in the status quo. In Foucault’s project, in contrast, 
Butler finds “strong normative commitments that appear in forms that would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to read within the current grammars of normativity.” *^" 
Critique is a response to the production of “realms of unspeakability” by social 
orderings, realms which are not conceived as abject or “Real-impossible” but as 
“impasses” in the discursive framework.^^ It is this conception that allows for an 
ethical art of the self. If subjects are formed in practices which instantiate norms, then 
the historically contingent “settled domain of ontology” that results does not mle over
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the subject it produces in a “predictable” or “mechanical” way, rather, a critical 
relation to such domains is possible which would “constitute an interrogatory relation 
to the field of categorization itself, referring at least implicitly to the limits of the 
epistemological horizon within which practices are formed.”^^  In contrast to 
Eagleton’s characterization of Foucault’s project as hyperbolic “fantasies of escape” 
fading into banal liberal pragmatics, Butler’s reading establishes it as a pragmatic 
acknowledgement that power / knowledge sets limits on the functioning of truth and 
the legibility of subjectivity, whilst seeing within the veiy dynamics o f this process 
the occasion of its possible subversion. It is here that the “aesthetics of existence” 
comes into play.
As often in Butler’s work -  most particularly The Psychic Life o f  Power -  the 
problem to the fore in ‘What is Critique?’ is how to contest subjectivity in its 
normative mode when the terms used, especially insofar as they evoke agency, 
assume that subjectivity. Foucault’s approach to this problem is to ride roughshod 
over it, as though by stating a situation he might bring it into being:
“if governmentalization is really this movement concerned with 
subjugating individuals in the very reality of a social practice by 
mechanisms of power that appeal to a truth, I will say that critique is 
the movement through which the subject gives itself the right to 
question truth concerning its power effects and to question power 
about its discourses of truth. Critique will be the art o f voluntaiy 
inservitude, of reflective indocility. The essential function of critique
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would be that of desubjectiflcation in the game [of] the politics of 
truth.”*®
Butler’s contribution to this is to validate such a gesture of speaking as z/...as a 
necessary part of the art of the game. In a formulation which could stand, I believe, as 
a definition of critical ait history, Butler states that “critique will be dependent on its 
objects, but its objects will in turn define the very meaning of critique.” ”^ The 
Foucauldian point upon which she insists here is that the very terms by which this 
mutual definition establishes criteria of evaluation, and in framing its objects 
forecloses alternate configurations of truth, does not totally preclude other possible 
criteria. Part of the process by which power-knowledge produces subjects is through 
the “crafting” or “stylizing” of selves. Just as in Butler’s own work there is an 
ambiguity between the implied intentionality of gender as performative, and the 
insistence on the constraints of discursive nomiativity, subjection and materiality; so 
in Foucault she finds a similar equivocation between the voluntaiy and subjugated 
dimensions of stylization. This is accounted for by the indeterminate possibilities that 
lie beyond critique’s positing of a value “which it does not know how to ground or to 
secure it for itself,” a positing which “shows that a certain intelligibility exceeds the 
limits on intelligibility that power-knowledge has already set.”^’
The notion of style as part of the subject’s subjection “will be critical to the extent 
that, as style, it is not fully determined in advance, it incorporates a contingency over 
time that marks the limits to the ordering capacity of the field in question.”^^  This is 
what Foucault means when he speaks of critique as taking place “in the direction of a 
philosophy to come.”^^  Such as yet indetemiinate futurity, in ‘What is Critique?’ as
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elsewhere in Foucault, turns on the role of “fictive” histories. “Critique begins with 
the presumption of govemmentalization and then with its failure to totalize the subject 
it seeks to know and to subjugate” Butler writes, but “the means by which this very 
relation is articulated is described, in a disconcerting way, as f i c t i o n . T h i s  
fictionality is not external to critical methodology but part of it, part of the way that 
rationalization (bio-power, govemmentality) and the practices of the self as an art of 
freedom are distinguished. Fiction, as Butler quite correctly suggests, here signifies a 
relationship to genealogy in the sense Nietzsche gave to it, wherein “in the place of an 
account that finds the origin to values or, indeed, the origin of the origin, we read 
fictional stories about the way that values are originated.”^^  Such fictions operate not 
only to displace the ‘original origin’ but work according to a positing which is 
released from “usual discursive constraints” in which one would have grounds for 
one’s assertions. Not in its content, then, but in its form, Foucault’s statement is for 
Butler “an allegoiy for a certain risk-taking that happens at the limit of the 
epistemological field.”^^  This risk-taking with one’s very subjectivity is the core of 
critique as an art, and furthermore, it is precisely as an art that “voluntary 
insubordination” can take place. As Butler writes, “style will be critical to the extent 
that, as style, it is not fully determined in advance, it incoiporates a contingency over 
time that marks the ordering capacity of the field in question.”^^  On this reading, in 
which notions like style play a key role, it should seem that Foucault’s work will be 
invaluable in thinking through an “indocile” art history and a wider politicized sense 
of aesthetics. The formulation of “aesthetics of the self’ does not fall into self- 
contradiction by assuming what it contests, but gambles with a positing of the 
mutability of relationships of power-knowledge. The agent of this gamble is a self 
“compelled to form itself, but to form itself within forms that are already more or less
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in operation and undemay.”^^  The project is, in Butler’s poetic phrase, to “yield 
artistiy from constraint” or, in the present context and if you will excuse the pun, 
perhaps to yield art history from constraint/^
Osborne’s analysis of the conditions under which art criticism might be reimagined as 
a historical ontology of the present establishes both the inadequacy of the “art as 
aesthetics” thesis, and the ineliminability of the aesthetic dimension of art works. 
Eagleton’s The Ideology o f the Aesthetic offers a historical analysis of the social 
forces that have shaped the contemporary scene from which Osborne starts out. Yet it 
is Foucault, I would argue, overlooked by Osborne and rejected by Eagleton, who 
comes closest to articulating aesthetic concerns with the ongoing critical task of a 
“historical ontology of ourselves.” It is in the service of this aim that a rediscovery of 
aesthetics would be most useful. I now turn to the actual rather than potential way in 
which Foucault has been received in the histoiy of art, which, I argue, has been 
hampered in utilising its insights by the overlooking, ironically enough, of the 
aesthetic dimension at work in his texts. Likewise, philosophical treatments of these 
passages have taken them for the work of ‘Foucault as an Art Historian’ in a way that 
is inherently problematic, as I shall seek to demonstrate.
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Foucault and Art History
In the serious play o f  questions and answers, in the work o f reciprocal elucidation, 
the rights o f  each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion . . . Questions 
and answers depend on a game - a game that is at once pleasant and difficult - in 
which each o f  the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the 
other and the accepted form o f the dialogue. The polemicist, on the other hand, 
proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to 
question . . . Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out o f a polemic?
Foucault, ‘Polemics, Politics and Problematizations. ’
Explaining history and making it explicit consists in perceiving it whole, in relating 
the so-called natural objects to the specifically dated and exceptional practices that 
objectivized the objects, and in explaining the practices not on the basis o f  a unique 
motive force but on the basis o f  all the neighboring practices in which they are 
anchored. This pictorial method produces strange paintings, in which relations 
replace objects. To be sure, the paintings are indeed o f the world we know. Foucault 
is no more an abstract painter than Cézanne.
Paul Veyne, ‘Foucault Revolutionizes Histoiy.’
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What uses and abuses can be made of the texts of Michel Foucault in art history? Two 
uses, seemingly opposed but fundamentally linked, need, I think, to be rejected, if this 
“game” of questions and answers is to be productive as well as difficult. The first 
would take Foucault for a philosopher capable of providing art history with a series of 
restorative concepts to put a contemporaiy spin on its founding philosophical precepts 
-  its Kantian or Hegelian epistemological inher i tances .The second would present 
Foucault’s thought as fatally undermining such foundations, as ending the 
metaphysical reverie in which humanist art history has carried out its comically 
outmoded p ro jec t .W he the r  proposing restoration or ruin these views agree 
fundamentally on the type of relationship “tlieoiy” or philosophy can have with art 
history. In both cases philosophy is seen as determining the form art histoiy takes; it 
provides it with a determinant content. The histoiy of art history, in this view, must 
be written as a histoiy of its engagements with the master discourse of philosophy, its 
entanglement in totalized systems. This is the realm of the “history of ideas,” which 
Foucault has rightly criticized and contrasted with the critical project of the “history 
of thought.” The difference lies in that it is the latter that affords the elaboration of a 
properly critical historical project, rather than the mere appearance of history. 
Foucault articulated this distinction in a discussion with Paul Rabinow just a month 
before his death, and in which, as in other late interviews, he sought to re-collect his 
œuvre under a general rubric:
“For a long time I have been trying to see if it would be possible to 
describe the histoiy of thought as distinct from the histoiy of ideas (by 
which I mean the analysis of systems of representation) and from the 
histoiy of mentalities (by which I mean the analysis of attitudes and
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types of action). ... Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and 
gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this 
way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of 
thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its 
goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by 
which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and 
reflects on it as a problem.”
At this stage I will merely note the combination of genealogical questioning and a 
certain (aesthetic) detachment in Foucault’s statement, and the emphasis on the 
identification of problems rather than their solution. If Foucault’s warnings against 
polemics, cited epigraphically at the beginning of this section, seem ironic given the 
style of his own writings - “imperious and doubt-ridden at the same time,” in the 
words of Clifford Geertz -  we must note that a certain amount of force is required, to 
shake “evidences and universalities,” before dialogue becomes productive. If, in 
Madness and Civilization, in The Archaeology o f Knowledge, or in Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault roughly casts off forms of inquiry previously considered essential to 
the study of madness, of discourse, or of punishment, if  he does not affirm the 
historical refinement of reason’s knowledge of madmen or criminals, this is 
necessitated by the attempt to recover problematizations and make a questioning of 
reason possible. The regime of tiuth in which one is situated can be questioned as to 
its “meaning, condition and goals” only when its self-evidence has been shaken. To 
this end, then, Foucault acknowledges that there is an “apparently polemical 
character” to his writing.
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“owing to the fact that one has to delve into the mass of accumulated 
discourse under our own feet. Through gentle digging one can uncover 
the old latent configurations, but when it comes to determining the 
system of discourse on the basis of which we still live, as soon as we 
are obliged to question the words that still resonate in our ears, that are 
mingled with those we are trying to speak, then archaeology, like 
Nietzschean philosophy, is forced to work with hammer blows.” *^^*^
Archaeology is, then, conceived by Foucault as a means of bringing our attention to 
the present through its history. Polemics contributes to this project by forcing (or 
fictioning) certain histories into view, the acknowledgement of which may enable the 
phrasing of appropriate questions, the description of problematizations. Polemics are 
part of archaeology, but they cannot form part of the ethics of contemporary 
intellectual relations, Foucault argues, for the most pragmatic of reasons -  nothing is 
achieved in polemical exchange.
In his 1982 essay ‘Representation, Appropriation, and Power’ Craig Owens put 
forward the argument that there was no satisfactory rapprochement possible between 
an art historical discipline founded on humanist precepts and a poststructuralist 
critique that radically undermined the foundations of humanist thought. He expressed 
this antinomy in clear terms: “the poststructuralist critique could not possibly be 
absorbed by art history without a significant reduction in its polemical force, or by a 
total transformation of art history itself.” ^^  ^We cannot doubt that of these two options 
the latter is the only one we can endorse, though we may reflect that, since Owens 
composed his argument, it is the former that has been most studiously put into
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practice. Art historical writings are commonly littered with the debris of 
poststructuralist theory (Lacan on the gaze, Foucault on panopticism etc.) -  as though 
it were a bomb that has been defused and dismantled, its various components added to 
the art historical edifice. If we agree that this situation is unsatisfactoiy we might look 
back to Owens’s essay with a sense of nostalgia for a revolution that never came. 
Alternatively, it could be that, as with other revolutions before it, this art historical 
revolution was poorly conceived. (We are no longer surprised, surely, when 
revolutions turn out to be rearrangements, rather than eradications of the status quo; 
when they appear to have been mistaken in their conceptions of themselves). We 
might, then, look back to ‘Representation, Appropriation and Power’ and wonder if it 
set out the problem of the relation of art history to poststmcturalism correctly 
(productively) in the first place. In a postscript to the essay Owens concluded that, in 
its failure to deal with poststmcturalist critique and its concerns, art histoiy had 
become alienated from the best contemporary art, which shared similar 
preoccupations. Pessimistically, he characterized the situation as follows;
“Isolated not only from the most significant body of criticism of the 
present, but also from its art, art history has denied itself any connection to 
the vital present - which as Walter Benjamin understood, is absolutely 
prerequisite for all historical investigation. Lacking that connection, the 
art historian lapses into antiquarianism - which may, in the end, be the fate 
of art histoiy in the postmodern age.”*®^
Is a vital art histoiy an impossibility? If theory and art are so well matched, what 
intellectual role might it play? Would it be reduced to an auditing of the theorization
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of art as the only alternative to antiquarianism? If Visual Studies and “cultural theory” 
now seem to have subsumed the most vital areas of art historical inquiry this does not 
indicate the definitive supercession of art history. I argue that problematics basic to 
modern art histoiy can be of use in a critical analysis of the vital present; most 
specifically its attentiveness to the fomi, and especially the changing form, of its 
objects of study which, insofar as they are instances of “art” are not guaranteed by an 
ontologically ahistorical consistency. (Perhaps the most important contribution of 
Duchamp is to make this palpable; in de Drive’s phrase to point to the existence of 
“art in general,” not anchored in the inherent qualities of a medium or representational 
convention). Looking back to the polemical encounter of poststmcturalism and art 
histoiy in Owens essay we might be able to see the beginnings of an alternative 
relationship - more reciprocal and more productive.
Prominent in Owens’ discussion, along with Louis Marin’s essay ‘Toward a Theory 
of Reading in the Visual Arts: Poussin’s The Arcadian Shepherds' i s  an analysis of 
a controversy around Michel Foucault’s famous characterization of Velazquez’s Las 
Meninas as “the representation, as it were, of classical representation” (Fig. 62).^ ^® 
This is without doubt the most frequently cited of Foucault’s discussions of art, but it 
has proved opaque to interpreters who have generally appropriated it to their own 
polemics. The reception of this brief passage of which opens The Order o f  Things is 
exemplary, I would argue, of the way in which readings of Foucault in art history 
have been overdetermined by the polemical confrontation of theoretically orientated 
and traditional factions in art histoiy. Keen to see in Foucault’s Las Meninas decisive 
proof of either art history’s invalidity or of theoiy’s inattention to specifics, neither 
side engages with what Foucault is actually attempting in this passage.
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Foucault’s textual setting of the complex dynamics of mirrorings, gazes, and 
representational modes in Las Meninas is a tour-de-force of ekphrasis, and to do 
justice to it as a piece of writing would take lengthy exposition. For my purposes here 
it is only necessaiy to sketch the main points of Foucault’s description. First, he notes 
that Velazquez as represented in the painting cannot behold the canvas on which he is 
representing something and appear in the representation that is Las Meninas -  he is 
“at the threshold of these two incompatible visibilities.” *^^  The painted Velazquez 
gazes out at the spectator of the painting, seemingly the subject of the painting he is 
working on -  we are thus implicated as spectators in these visibilities. Yet this 
position is already occupied by the “actual” model the painted Velazquez is painting, 
or rather, since that canvas is invisible to us and thus indeterminate, “the painter is 
observing a place which, from moment to moment, never ceases to change its form, 
its face, its identity.”**^  The gaze of the painting assigns to each viewer “a place at 
once privileged and inescapable.”**^  This position is further complieated by the 
presence on the back wall of a mirror which “offers us at last that enchantment of the 
double that until now has been denied us” -  denied, that is, by the fact that we can 
only see the back of the represented canvas.**"* No one in the painting looks at this 
miiTor, and it mirrors what is in “our” space not that represented -  “it is not the visible 
it reflects.”**^  What it does, instead, is combine the two invisibilities -  of the model 
and of the spectator -  in an “unstable superimposition” represented “in the far recess 
of the painting’s depth.”* *^  Now, as Foucault notes, there is no problem in identifying 
any of the figures represented in Las Meninas, including those who appear in this 
miiTor; undoubtedly it is Philip IV and Mariana.
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Proper names might sei*ve here to “give us a finger to point with” as Foucault puts it, 
as we tiy to “say what we see,” but in doing so they foreclose what is interesting in 
this attempt -  the possibility that the incompatibility of language and vision might be 
treated “as a starting-point for speech instead of as an obstacle to be avoided.”’ 
Forgetting about “Philip and Mariana” allows Foucault to think about the dynamic of 
representation in Las Meninas in its own temis, which emerge in the relationship 
between hidden canvas, luminous miiTor (which reveals the model “full face” -  which 
the canvas, were it to be turned round, would not do; it would reverse left and 
right...), and the other “opening” represented in the depths oILas Meninas, from 
which a silhouetted figure emerges. Or, rather, appears, for he is also on a threshold 
“like a pendulum going caught at the bottom of its swing,” between the depths of the 
picture and the implied space before it.”  ^Across Las Meninas, then, from left to right 
we have represented the three figures who, by the logic of invisibilities at work in the 
canvas, occupy the position upon which the gazes of the Infanta and her entourage, 
and the reflective surface of the min or, converge. We have Velazquez, the man who 
stood before Las Meninas to compose and execute it, the King, who, the mirror tells 
us, occupies the space in front of the scene Las Meninas represents, and finally, in the 
figure of the silhouetted man on the threshold of the scene, a representation of the 
spectator. The point is, then, that if this painting is “the representation of classical 
representation” it is constituted as such by the fact that the subject who makes the 
representation, the Sovereign subject for whom the representation is made, and the 
subject who views this representation are not representable as one subject within its 
veiy conditions of visibility.
Foucault’s puipose in analyzing Las Meninas in these terms can only be understood in
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relation to the rest of the text that this ekphrasis introduces. But art historians, in a 
huiTy to read this as a proto-type for Foucauldian art history have elided this point. 
Svetlana Alpers offered an objection to Foucault’s analysis on the (not unpredictable) 
grounds that it neglected the art historical specificity of Las Meninas’s composition. 
Alpers contends that the picture has remained a problem for art historical 
interpretation because of an excess of attention on matters of identification and 
narrative, and not enough on “the nature of the pictorial representation.””  ^The 
naiTative discerned has frequently been that of painting’s (and the painter’s) claim for 
status amongst the liberal arts -  which Alpers does not attribute to Velazquez as a 
motive -  and whilst one might assume that Foucault’s reading would fulfil Alpers 
demand for attention to representation, in fact she sees his argument as faltering on 
the question of the absence of the subject-viewer.
“For the reciprocity between absent viewer and world in view is produced 
not by the absence of a conscious human subject, as Foucault argues, but 
by Velazquez’s ambition to embrace two conflicting modes of 
representation, each of which constitutes the relationship between the 
viewer and the picturing of the world differently.
These two types coiTespond to picture as window, framing the world, and to picture as 
surface, onto which an image of the world is projected: the first is “Albertian” and 
makes the claim “I see the world”; the second is “northern or descriptive” and claims 
that the world is “being seen.”” ’ Each mode of pictorial representation establishes a 
different role for the artist in relation to his representation: with the viewer before the 
scene in the Albertian, and within the representation (as in Van Eyck’s Arnolfini
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Wedding) in the “northern.” The difficulty of reading Las Meninas for art history is 
that it compounds these modes, but once Alpers has shown this to be the case, it is 
Foucault, not art histoiy that is sidelined. For it is not “classical” representation that 
deteiinines the nature of Velazquez painting, in Alpers view, but “specific pictorial 
traditions of representation.”” ^
Alpers presented this argument to the Modern Language Association in 1981, at a 
panel on “The Applicability of Literary Critical Methodology to the Analysis of 
Painting.” Craig Owens responded to this version of the paper in ‘Representation, 
Appropriation, and Power’ by accusing her of ignoring the radical thrust of Foucault’s 
argument about the ineluctability of “the anonymous, impersonal mles which 
regulated the Classical system of representation.””  ^Whilst Alpers stated her 
dissatisfaction with conventional art history, she was prepared to defend its borders 
against the perceived “literary” invasion; and its right to making truth claims against 
poststructuralist critique. Foucault may have sei*ved the painting well, she argued, but 
he had not seiwed it tally. To Owens, the “guild mentality” exemplified by Alpers 
indicates art history’s repression of a body of thought that connected representation 
and power - indeed showed representation to be power’s founding act. If social 
dimensions are increasingly scrutinized in analyses of art, from relations of patronage 
to economic systems, why would this thought provoke repression, Owens asks? 
“Could it possibly be because art histoiy - conceived, in Panofsky’s phrase as a 
humanist discipline - is itself implicated in the poststructuralist critique?”” "* This is 
indeed, as already noted, at the heart of Owens’s inteipretation of Foucault, and Las 
Meninas stands here for the definitive incommensurability of his critique and art 
historical precepts.
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Owens turns to Derrida, to his discussion of Heidegger’s famous Origin o f  the Work 
o f Art and Meyer Shapiro’s art historical response to it, to argue that art history is 
essentially humanist in a negative sense. Faced with a representation of a pair of 
shoes it asks only “to whom do they belong?” When this question is correctly 
answered -  whether by “a peasant woman,” in Heidegger’s case or by “Van Gogh” in 
Shapiro’s -  interpretation is at an end. The meaning of a work is restored when it is 
attributed to the subject to whom it rightly belongs. Art histoiy, on Derrida’s account, 
presupposes a lack in its objects that can then be supplemented by its interpretative, 
attributive, restitutive, activity; an activity that takes its place in the humanist, 
historicist project of revivifying the past. Panofsky’s emphasis on iconographical 
attribution is an example of this tendency - specifically linked in his case to the 
preservation of humanist culture.”  ^Having characterized its project as attributive, 
Owens identifies art history’s motives as follows:
“a desire for property, which conveys man’s sense of his ‘power over 
things’; a desire for propriety, a standard of decomm based upon respect 
for property relations; a desire for the proper name, which designates the . 
specific person who is invariably identified as the subject of the work of 
art; finally, a desire for appropriation.
Drawing a distinction between theories of representation (Panofsky’s of “symbolic 
form,” Gombrich’s of “making and matching”) and the critique of representation, 
Owens argues that it is the latter that art histoiy needs. He proceeds to set out 
Foucault’s famous description o f Las Meninas as just such a critique. Lacking a
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critique of representation and in thrall to art history’s pathological need for attribution 
Alpers concluded that the “uniqueness” o f Las Meninas lies in the “paradoxical” 
circularity it sets up in its admixture of two representational, pictorial modes so that 
the prior world it depicts depends on our presence as viewers. Owens is not convinced 
that such circularity can stand as evidence of the specificity of Velazquez’s painting. 
Against this reading he sets Foucault’s, which he takes to use Las Meninas as the 
exemplification of representational limits shared by all other paintings, all works of 
literature, indeed all knowledges, of the seventeenth century. It is not a unique 
pictorial paradox, but “the unfolding on the surface of the canvas of the Classical 
system of representation itself.””  ^Further, if we take Foucault and Marin seriously, 
we can see that this representational system is imbricated with power.
For Owens, Foucault has demonstrated that the network of gazes in Las Meninas 
places the viewer in the position of the Classical subject - at once able to appropriate 
the scene as his and yet subject to the absolute authority of the King - revealed in the 
vague reflection in the mirror depicted at the back of the painting as the tme author of 
the work: “For the painting represents not the painter’s but the King’s vision; 
Velazquez appears to have abdicated his own role as ‘author’ of the image to that 
superior authority that sustains him and his art.””  ^Las Meninas (and Classical 
representation with it) is, then, twice implicated in power; first by its appropriating 
subject; second by its deference to absolute sovereignty. The paradox of its circularity 
becomes eminently explicable if we see it, as Owens suggests we must, as an 
imaginaiy resolution of real social contradictions. Thus the two representational 
modes Alpers detected correspond to the Absolutist separation of the claims of 
property and sovereignty; its “paradox” to the power struggle between landed
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aristocracy and monarchy.
If Owens had seemed to imply that a “critique of representation” would supplement a 
lack in art history we can now see that it rather supercedes it altogether. For once we 
have connected representation and power in this way what remains to be done - the 
repetition of the same procedure for any other paintings we might want to study? We 
can be sure in advance of the same outcome, for in Owens’s view Foucault has shown 
that art works are “conventional,” that they conform to the limits imposed by the 
epistemes in which they were made. Art histoiy, in Owens account, must face up to its 
redundancy, because poststmcturalism has undermined its modes of inquiry, exposed 
its complicity with power, and, crucially, given a better reading of its objects of study 
than it could achieve. There is therefore no problem of the relation between art history 
and poststmcturalist theory because only one of the combatants survives the 
encounter.
Yet we might well ask if Owens has served Foucault tmly rather than well. Does 
Foucault’s analysis o f Las Meninas really place it firmly within the horizon of the 
Classical episteme, or rather, is this all that it does? Consulting The Order o f  Things 
we must answer “no.” The project of that book was to awaken its readers from the 
“anthropological sleep” of the “human sciences,” a sleep “so deep that thought 
experiences it paradoxically as v i g i l a n c e . T h e  figure of “Man,” which Foucault 
has shown to be a historical product of our disintegrating modernity, has become an 
“obstacle” to thought.” ’ “It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the 
void left by man’s disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does 
not constitute a lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than
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the unfo ld ing  o f  a space in  w hich  it is once m ore possib le  to th in k / , 1 3 2
The reputation of The Order o f  Things rests on a series of simple, connected claims 
Foucault makes, which are no less disarming for their simplicity. Firstly, he shows 
that anthropological Man, the object of study of such “dubious sciences” as 
psychology or sociology is not present in Classical thought, despite its frequent 
references to “man,” or “mankind.” Thus discontinuity is introduced into the histoiy 
of thought. Secondly, Man, as constituted from the end of the 18th centuiy, is a kind 
of impossible object. From the Kantian critique on, Foucault argues, the study of 
human beings has been based on an “analytic of finitude,” in which “limitation is 
expressed not as a determination imposed upon man from outside (because he has a 
nature or a history), but as a fundamental finitude which rests on nothing but its own 
existence as fact, and opens up the positivity of all concrete limitation.””  ^This 
analytic produces a contorted series of “doubles” which have defined the deadening 
path that the knowledge of human beings has taken since Kant: the empirical / 
transcendental (man as a fact among others / man as condition of possibility of 
knowledge); the cogito / unthought (man surrounded by the obscure / man as lucid 
source of intelligibility); the retreat / return of the origin (man as alienated from his 
own beginning / histoiy as promising its return).” "* Anthropological thought has 
merely played out variations on these doubles, absorbing one side into the other (for 
example, the empirical / transcendental is worked out in opposite ways by 
behaviourism and phenomenology). Foucault demonstrates that Man as the grounds 
of the possibility of knowledge functions as the negation of knowledge. Thirdly, 
Foucault argues that the epistemological ground “is once more stirring under our 
feet,” *^  ^ that he senses the possibility that the arrangements of knowledge that
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appeared with man could crumble and that man might “be erased, like a face drawn in 
sand at the edge of the sea.””  ^It is this possibility, the consequences of which are 
keenly anticipated but not yet known, that motivates Foucault’s writing of the 1960s; 
whether on literaiy themes or scientific-historical ones.
The strategic role o f Las Meninas in the argument of The Order o f Things can only be 
understood in the context of these claims; on a careful reading (and one, 1 might add, 
that reads the book beyond the first sixteen pages!) Las Meninas figures the 
unprecedented emergence of Man on the historical stage. Having described the 
Classical episteme at great length, Foucault returns to Velazquez’s painting when he 
evokes the historical transformations coterminous with Man.
“When natural history becomes biology, when the analysis of wealth 
becomes economics, when, above all, reflection upon language 
becomes philology, and Classical discourse, in which being and 
representation found their common locus, is eclipsed, then, in the 
profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation, man appears in 
his ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and a subject that 
knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectator, he appears in the place 
belonging to the king, which was assigned to him in advance by Las 
Meninas, but from which his real presence has long been excluded. As 
if, in that vacant space towards which Velazquez’s whole painting was 
directed, but which it was nevertheless reflecting only in the chance 
presence of a mirror, and as though by stealth, all the figures whose 
alternation, reciprocal exclusion, interweaving, and fluttering one
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imagined (the model, the painter, the king, the spectator) suddenly 
stopped their imperceptible dance, immobilized into one substantial 
figure, and demanded that the entire space of the representation should 
at last be related to one coiporeal gaze.”” ^
Las Meninas functions to mock the pretensions of the Age of Man when it places the 
subject of representation within representation. If Velazquez had included this 
amalgamated “sovereign subject” in his painting it would have filled the foreground, 
and the scene would be obscured. Rather than merely epitomizing Classical 
representation and its limits, Foucaulf s Las Meninas stages the emergence of man 
and his place in a new order of knowledge - a place unknown to Classical thought.
Thus we can correct a common (mis)reading of another famous cultural reference in 
The Order o f Things', Foucault’s evocation of Jorge Luis Borges’s “Chinese 
encyclopaedia,” which he credits with enabling the book. The Order o f  Things, he 
writes in another oft-cited paragraph, arose “out of the laughter that shattered, as I 
read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought - our thought.””  ^Borges’s 
encyclopaedia relates a taxonomy of animals, ordered as follows:
“(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs,
(e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present 
classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a veiy fine 
camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) 
that from a long way off look like flies.
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We are faced, reading this outlandish taxonomy, with what Foucault tenus “the stark 
impossibility of thinking But this is not to be understood, as it usually is, as
an Orientalist evocation of otherness. Foucault is not suggesting that we simply see 
our systems of classification as another historically, culturally specific ordering, 
thrown into relief by the exotic taxonomies of other periods or places.
Foucault remarks that his laughter lasted a long time, but was uneasy. The uneasiness 
was the result not of the juxtaposition of fantastic categories but the presence of 
“included in the present classification.” “[I]f all the animals divided up here can be 
placed without exception in one of the divisions of this list, then aren’t all the other 
divisions to be found in that one division too? And then again, in what space would 
that single, inclusive division have its existence?” ” ’ David Carroll, in an otherwise 
perceptive analysis of The Order o f Things, is misled by Foucault’s use of “Same” 
and “Other” in describing the relationship of this impossible ordering and our own 
epistemology, and interprets this as meaning that Borges presents us with an 
unassimilable “Otherness” that seiwes as a defamiliarizing critique. He writes:
“Without such disturbance and defamiliarization, the familiar aspects of 
thought would continue to be taken for universal truths, the Other kept in 
a relationship of dependency or derivation in terms of the Same. When the 
familiar is made unfamiliar, thought is forced to question itself and 
confront alternatives to itself; it loses its self-certainty and begins to have 
trouble recognizing itself in the mirror it holds up in order to send back a 
reassuring image. For Foucault, critical thought begins in non-recognition, 
as a result of the distorted mirror in which the confrontation with radical
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alterity forces it to see itself.”” ^
In fact the logic of Foucault’s argument works in the opposite direction: the 
“impossibility of thinking that” connects to Foucault’s uneasy laughter not through an 
otherness that relativizes our thought, but through a familiarity that makes apparent its 
absurdity. The mirror Borges’s encyclopaedia holds up to Western thought shows us a 
distorted figure, an impossible figure, one might say, but not through its own 
distorting powers. For the figure Foucault recognizes in Borges is that of 
anthropological thought, the sovereign subject of the analytic of finitude, “included in 
the present classification.” Both Las Meninas and the encyclopaedia figure man for us 
before Foucault has explicitly historicized him. We might say that rather than locating 
this painting and its contemporaries in the power stmctures of the 17th century (as 
Owens argued), Foucault places it within the artifice of his own text - his 
appropriation of Las Meninas is not in the seiwice of art history but of his own need to 
break free from anthropological discourse. This resonates with Foucault’s 
aforementioned strategy of writing “fictional constructions with authentic 
elements.””  ^His choice of Las Meninas, from this perspective, is a question of the 
aesthetics of his text as such a fiction.
In this light, the careful analysis of Las Meninas given by Joel Snyder and Ted Cohen, 
which undermines the presumptions of the function of the mirroring relied on by 
Foucault, Alpers and Owens, (and by John Searle, to whom Synder and Cohen were 
responding) does not invalidate Foucault’s argument as a whole.” "* The status of Las 
Meninas as paradox depends, ultimately, on what seems to be the impossibility of the 
reflection. It should include us, and Velazquez, according to the logic of the canvas,
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yet it shows Philip and Mariana. However, there simply is no paradox because, as 
Synder and Cohen demonstrate by working out the perspectivai construction of the 
painting, the minor reflects not what lies beyond the canvas, but what is on the canvas 
whose back faces us (Fig. 63). Searle’s supposition that the mirror causes the slippage 
of “the firm ground of pictorial realism” and a consequent state of “vertigo” in the 
beholder, is thus disproved: the picture is entirely ‘realistic.’”  ^But Foucault’s reading 
is not disproved, because it was not primarily a claim about the painting, but a use of 
that painting to figure something else; namely, pre-Kantian non-anthropological 
thought. Its advantage for Foucault is that what it seems to do (i.e., before one 
analyses the perspectives and so on) in superimposing painter, spectator and monarch 
in one “impossible” and invisible locus, figures not only Classical representation, but 
also, by implication the “impossibility” of the sovereign subject of the human 
sciences who is assumed to occupy such a position. The (possible) truth of Foucaulf s 
reading of Las Meninas lies not in the seventeenth century but in the 1960s, as part of 
a polemic against the subject.”  ^This is not the only example of Foucault using art 
works to figure the relations between two epistemes. In Madness and Civilization, it is 
time and again literary and art historical works from Bosch to Don Quixote, that stand 
at, and for, the limits of the Classical and modem configurations of madness.”  ^
Likewise, the opening tableaux which are such a distinctive feature of Foucaulf s 
books, from the Narrenschiff or Ship of Fools m Madness and Civilization, to the 
water-cure for hysteria that begins The Birth o f  the Clinic, to Las Meninas in The 
Order o f  Things, the torture of Damiens the regicide juxtaposed with a reformatoiy 
timetable in Discipline and Punish; enable Foucault to furnish the reader with 
startling images which, in their double role as figures of historical alterity and ciphers 
for aspects of the present, for its non-essentialness exemplify his entire
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historiographie approach.”  ^Against the synchronic reading of Foucault (generally 
accepted by both supporters and detractors) we can interpret the function of these 
images as precisely the activation of a diachronic dimension that depends on the 
reader’s own “projections” and retentions of them.
Owens revealed various contradictions in Alpers’s reading of Foucault, but he did not 
stop to ask “why are art historians so interested in this brief (less than twenty pages) 
section of a book its author intended for a few specialists in the history of thought?” 
For Foucault’s description of Las Meninas, his analysis of its system of 
representations and exclusions, is neither a piece of art history, nor a sketch of a 
possible poststmcturalist theoiy of art interpretation. Rather, along with the laughter 
evoked at the beginning and end of The Order o f  Things (Foucault’s laughter at 
Borges’s Chinese Encyclopaedia, the übermenschean laughter that bids farewell to 
“Man”) it is a privileged motif in a text seeking to displace a certain reading of the 
past 500 years of Western scientific thought. Why would this interest art historians, or 
rather, given that this theme (along with others in Foucault’s work) bears so clearly on 
art historical thought, why has its interest been diffused in a reading that mshes to 
extract a theory, a method, a programme, from a text resistant to such appropriations? 
We can extend this further, asking the same question of those approaches to Foucault 
that assess the usefulness of his (supposed) theory of visual regimes to art history,”  ^
or those that seek an elaboration of historical context all the better to restore an art 
object adrift in time to the plenitude from which histoiy has pulled it. Why has the 
overwhelming tendency of art historical uses of Foucault been to casually employ 
anemic versions of fragments of his work?
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I suggest that, unbefitting to a discipline that emphasizes close and careful scmtiny of 
its objects, it is because Foucault has yet to be properly read by art history; hence the 
misrecognition of the use of Las Meninas as “poststructuralist art histoiy.” Further, 
reflection on the histoiy of art history has often duplicated its procedures at one 
remove; see, for example, Moxey’s iconological reading of Panofsky’s iconological 
reading of Diner’s reading of the Italian Renaissance.” ® Thus, problems Owens 
identified with art history’s relationship to its objects come to be repeated at the level 
of reflection on art history. For instance the lack formally perceived in the object is 
now located in art history - it lacks a theory of power, a critique of representation and 
so on. The spectre of interpretation in infinite regress haunts many histories of art 
histoiy, particularly deconstructive ones. Reflecting on the Heidegger-Shapiro- 
Derrida debate, Stephen Melville imagined the Van Gogh in question hanging on a 
wall, with Shapiro and Heidegger arguing in front of it. Derrida, meanwhile is 
“watching it and them, reading it and them, writing.”” ’ If art historians are to take 
this activity as their model the imaginaiy galleiy will soon fill up with note-taking 
obseiwers, while Shapiro and Heidegger continue to argue over the ownership of 
(represented) shoes. As often happens in the crowded gallery or museum, we might 
well start to wonder what the point of this milling around really is.
It is possible, I think, to see in Foucault’s work an alternative to this unedifying 
scenario. Art historical reflection on the discipline has often seemed to have a self- 
denuciatory character -  it can seem driven by a purgatorial or masochistic fixation on 
its own flaws, as though it was the wrong way of thinking about art that propped up 
the whole ideological edifice. Gérard Memioz’ essay ‘Rlietoric and Episteme: Writing 
about ‘Art’ in the Wake of Poststmcturalism,’ exemplifies this ten d en cy .H av in g
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noted that Marxist critique of the discipline tended towards an economic reductionism 
that left its epistemological status untouched, he proposed a poststructuralist critique 
to address this. Embarrassed by “the methodological poverty of mainstream art 
history” in comparison to the “wealth of theoretical material produced outside the 
discipline” he suggests a Foucauldian archaeology of art history’s concepts, objects 
and choices.” ® Mermoz’ view, as presented in this essay, is that we just haven’t been 
hard enough on ourselves yet. Addressing the rise of S&M in the context of an 
inteiwiew on ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity,’ Foucault admitted that such 
practices constituted an “eroticization of power,” but differed from the forms of social 
power in being as a “strategic relation,” that was “always fluid. O f course there are 
roles, but eveiyone knows that those roles can be reversed ... you know very well that 
it is always a game.”” "* S&M is not a renunciation of power, but the introduction of 
reciprocality into power relations. Thus it might (humorously) serve as a metaphor for 
a reading of Foucault from within a somewhat embattled art histoiy. A polemical 
reading which pits him against art histoiy as bourgeois error is unproductive - it fails 
to read him truly or well - but another approach is possible.
A productive (though certainly dismptive) reading of Foucault from within art histoiy 
is both possible and desirable, but it depends on establishing parameters proper to the 
task. If this is done by posing the question, as Foucault himself did o f Nietzsche, 
“what is the maximum intensity to be gained from these texts, what transformations 
might they make possible?” we begin with an unstable, but far more promising 
problem. Foucault asks us, throughout his œuvre, though in changing ways, to be as 
historically minded as possible. This should scarcely be a problem for art historians -  
at least one would hope not. As already noted, such a project must begin with a close
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attention to what is being said in Foucault’s texts and to where their challenge lies.
The point is not to seek the contours of a Foucauldian ait history, but to work through 
the transformations that an enforced collision between a Foucauldian critical strategy 
that utilises aesthetics, and art histoiy (conceived as an inteipretation of both 
aesthetics and history) might produce. If  we are going to take anything from art 
history with us as we read Foucault it should be its anxieties, its hesitations, for it is 
here that its theoretical and methodological interest lies. Not because in those 
moments when its explanations suddenly seem forced, when it equivocates over 
contradictory interpretations, we can see beneath its surface to its true nature (its 
unconscious philosophising, its bourgeois presumption), but because here it is facing 
up to a problem we can hardly neglect -  how to write histoiy faced with unstable 
objects, that is historical ones. Thus, it cannot be assumed from the outset that art 
history must be the object of condemnation for Foucauldian critique. It is possible that 
it fits less comfortably amidst the anthropological, teleological thought of the 19th 
century than is often assumed to be the case.
Paul Veyne’s laudatoiy essay ‘Foucault Revolutionizes History’ strongly suggests 
that this might indeed be the case. Veyne urges historians to recognize the 
fundamentally, quintessentially, historical basis of Foucault’s thought; to recognize 
him, in fact, as “the first completely positivist historian.”” ® This claim is based on a 
convincing insistence on Foucault’s nominalism, as the tool by which he de- 
ontologises categories such as “the governed” or “madness” in showing them to have 
“little more in common than the name.”” ® This procedure, as already noted earlier in 
this chapter, depends on taking as the level of description and analysis simply what is 
said and done, without assuming any internal ontological consistency beyond the
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practice itself. Here we have a notion of history with which ait history ought to be 
entirely comfortable, in its aim of specifying the particularity of its objects of 
analysis. “Objects seem to determine our behaviour,” Veyne writes, “but our practice 
determines its own objects in the first place ... The relation determines the object, and 
only what is determined exists.” ^^  ^The recognition of such determining relations 
within art history as practice, with its reliance on the reproductive power of 
photography, and the mnemonic, or at least “preseiwing” power of the museum, can 
be traced back to Duchamp. It is in this sense that Thierry de Duve has proposed 
“nominalism” as an apt description for Duchamp’s historical contribution to the de- 
ontologisation of art; with Fountain he shows us that “art was a proper name.”^^  ^
What remains to be said here is that nominalism in this sense is what opens the space 
for action; to Veyne’s designation of Foucault as a nominalist we need to add the 
word “opportunistic.” For it is by exploiting the tension between the consistency of 
words and the heterogeneity of practices that Foucault’s histories seek to have an 
effect on the present. The “images” which are so memorable in his texts “flash” (to 
borrow Benjamin’s apt phrase) into the present to question it. Again, to underscore 
the point, there is no reason in prineiple why art history should not be able to 
contribute to such a project of opportunistic nominalism; but it needs to be recognized 
also that it cannot simply defer to Foucault’s “authority” on this point. His histories 
are a provocation and an example, but they do not lay ahistorical or apolitical 
foundations for a systematic methodology. As with Duchamp, it would be a betrayal 
to remake Foucault in the guise of an omniscient author-function. The point is to 
exploit the avenues of critique that they have authorized, that is made possible, 
permissable, not to reify their author-ity.
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To read Foucault with art histoiy in mind offers the chance to take seriously, as an 
integral part of his wider projeet, his aesthetics. This means not just largely neglected 
texts on Bataille, Blanchot, Klossowski, Roussel and other “transgressive” writers, but 
also the very modes in which Foucault writes his own texts as instances of “effective” 
histoiy that aim to provoke active reading, the interrelation of ethical and aesthetic 
relations in the theme of the care of the self as a modem practice of an “aesthetics of 
existence.” Such a reading suggests both a methodological and a political value 
pertains to the kinds of analysis -  historical and attentive to form -  that art history has 
habitually practiced, even as it shifts the aesthetic into a field expanded far beyond art 
objeets and pursues the project of a critical ontology of ourselves conceptualised in 
What is Enlightenment? and other of Foucault’s late works. In the following chapter I 
seek to further demonstrate the interrelation between aesthetic, epistemological and 
ethical concerns in Foucault’s texts, whilst also showing how this bears on the themes 
of loss of self and the eritique of originality.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Delirious Writing
We must give up trying to know those to whom we are linked by something essential; by 
this I  mean we must greet them in the relation with the unknown in which they greet us as 
well, in our estrangement. Friendship, this relation without dependence, without episode, 
yet into which all o f the simplicity o f life enters, passes by way o f the recognition o f the 
common strangeness that does not allow us to speak o f our friends but only to speak to 
them, not to make them a topic o f conversations (or essays), but the movement o f 
understanding in which, speaking to us, they reserve, even on the most familiar terms, an 
infinite distance, the fundamental separation on the basis o f which what separates 
becomes relation. Here discretion lies not in the simple refusal to put forward 
confidences (how vulgar this would be, even to think o f it), but it is the interval, the pure 
interval that, from me to this other who is a friend, measures all that is between us, the 
interruption o f being that never authorizes me to use him, or my bwwledge o f him (were 
it to praise him), and that, fa r from preventing all communication, brings us together in 
the difference and sometimes the silence o f speech.
Maurice Blanchot, Friendship.
Friendship is just one o f the forms given to the care o f the self. Eveiy man who really 
cares for himself must provide himself with friends.
Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutic o f the Subject.
242
To make the transition from Foucault’s writing on art, to writing as an art contributing to 
the aesthetics of a positive loss of self, an analysis of the text ‘Photogenic Painting,’ 
written by Michel Foucault on the painting of Gérard Fromanger is helpfid (Fig. 64). This 
text is exceptional in a number of ways, but it is noteworthy not least because it is really 
the only text in which Foucault ostensibly takes on the role of “art historian,” that is, the 
role of evaluating and locating an artist and his works in a historical context.^ As Adrian 
Rifkin has noted in his own essay on Fromanger, Foucault, and Deleuze, we have become 
used to philosophers’ assumption of the moral authority to supply art with its meaning 
and value in a situation in which “ait seems more and more to exist for, or by virtue of, 
the quality of the philosophical discourse that can be directed at it.”  ^If, as Rifkin 
suggests, “an indiscreet over-inteipretation of art is an effect of philosophy’s narcissistic 
requirements for representation of its own power,” Foucault certainly doesn’t play the 
role of Narcissus in his essay on Fromanger.^ Recalling that the mirror-play o f Las 
Meninas figured for Foucault the impossible status of the subject of representation 
included in his own representations, we can assume that Foucault may recognize 
something of himself in Fromanger’s images, but it is not his identity, certainly not as a 
philosopher seeking conformation of his “moral authority.”
Fromanger’s painting attracted the attention of a group of Parisian intellectuals in the 
1970s, including Foucault, Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who recognized in his work an 
affinity with their own, and Foucault gladly wrote an essay. Photogenic Painting for the
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catalogue of the Desire is Everywhere exhibition of 1975. This catalogue was, Rifkin 
tells us, “a thin, red-covered pamphlet that was generously illustrated without being in 
any way a self-important publication.”'^  Whereas David Macey in his biography of 
Foucault refers to this as a “gesture of friendship” in which Foucault patronised (in both 
senses) the young artist, Rifkin takes issue with this interpretation, suggesting that a more 
reciprocal relation was established by this gesture.^ He points to the quite obvious 
pleasure that Foucault took in addressing these paintings, and notes that the work of both 
theorist and painter alike emerged in “a moment of Parisian sociability and friendships 
anchored in and nourished by a succession of political projects and aspirations.”  ^I agree 
with Rifkin that what we have here is not philosophy extending its kudos to art: what is 
most notable about the essays that Deleuze and Foucault wrote on Fromanger is the lack 
of overbearing interpretation, the refusal to treat these paintings as awaiting philosophical 
rescue. Nor is there any recourse to a symptomology - they don’t seek to read in 
Fromanger the malaise of the present, or the crises of a subject. For both Deleuze and 
Foucault, Fromanger’s images open up possibilities - of an aesthetic project of action, of 
a critical relation to the past. I would like to return to the question of ‘Photogenic 
Painting’ as a gesture o f friendship, but first I will set out its argument, and the context of 
its composition. In what follows I cite Foucault’s text extensively, as not only its content, 
but also to a great extent its tone and form are crucial.
Fromanger worked in the 1970s in series, using found images from mass media sources, 
as well as his own photographs taken for the purpose, but not with their aesthetic, or 
“painting-genic” qualities in mind, He projected these images onto his canvas in a
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darkened studio, and, without a drawing stage, painted, using commercial colours, 
under/over the projected image. In many of his paintings of the early 1970s, Fromanger 
included a representation of his own silhouette in his paintings, fixing the shadow that 
fell on the canvas as he worked, but in the form of a generic black portrait (Figs. 65-67). 
Deleuze noted that “Fromanger’s model is the commodity. Eveiy kind of commodity: 
vestimentaiy, balneal, nuptial, erotic, alimentaiy .. . everything is rendered in terms of 
the single model, the Commodity, which circulates with the painter”; a painter who is 
included in this circulation through his trademark silhouetted image.^ Yet, in paintings 
made up entirely of colour relationships, this omnipresent image of the painter hardly 
operates as a sovereign subject. As Deleuze points out, in the system of hot and cold 
colours Fromanger sets in motion “black does not exist, the black painter does not exist. 
His shadow as it falls across the images he produces does not signify a privileged 
position; it is the afterimage of someone that was once present before the work, but is 
now another node in a system of commodities. Fromanger’s silhouette is everywhere “but 
there is no mirror there for anyone.”^
Foucault’s essay too, as we might expect recalling again the analysis of Las Meninas, 
takes up the question of the painter’s shadow, but in a historical reading that touches on 
the relationship between painting and photography, and seeks, through Fromanger’s 
work, to give it a new meaning. He opens the essay with the words of Ingres: 
“photography is no more than a series of manual operations.” ’^  What if painting could be 
described this way too, asks Foucault in response, what if it too was a series of manual 
operations? “And what if one were to combine them, alternate them, superimpose them.
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intertwine them, if one effaced or exalted the one by the other?” The strangeness of that 
last phrase deseiwes to be underscored. "Effaced or exalted”? As if effacement might 
have something of the character of an exaltation about it...
Foucault’s second paragraph begins like his first, with Ingres on photography: 
"Photography is very beautiful, but one cannot admit it.”” Foucault counters this remark 
with an evocation of Fromanger’s work, although at this stage he remains unnamed, 
anonymous. “When painting re-covers the photograph,” Foucault writes, “occupying it 
insidiously or triumphantly, it does not admit that the photograph is beautiful. It does 
better: it produces the beautiful hermaphrodite of instantaneous photograph and painted 
canvas, the androgyne image.” Already, I think, it is clear that this exhibition catalogue 
essay is up to something - our critical suspicions are aroused by this unguarded 
introduction. Having evoked Ingres in his first paragraph, Foucault has gone on to 
suggest Fromanger’s practice produces hermaphrodite, androgyne images. If the first 
gesture, the evocation of Ingres, seems more than a little grandiose, not to mention art 
historically far-fetched, the second, the claim of “androgyny,” takes on outlandish 
importance when one considers the world-historical significance Foucault had given to 
the notion of the heterogeneous in his preface to The Order o f Things. He had written 
there that he detected “a worse kind of disorder than that of the incongruous” (the 
juxtaposition of umbrella and sewing-machine -  or of Ingres and Fromanger, we might 
add), and this would be the disorder of the heteroclite, the heterotopia. To quote 
Foucault:
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"'Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there is 
nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; 
they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries 
where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical. Heterotopias 
are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because 
they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle 
common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the 
syntax with which we constuct sentences but also that less apparent syntax 
which causes words and things (next to and opposite one another) to ‘hold 
together.’ ... Heterotopias ... dessicate speech, stop words in their tracks, 
contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths 
and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.” ’^  (xvii-iii).
Foucault, of course, does not see the disturbing, dessicating, sterilizing effects of the 
heteroclite as regrettable —indeed they are evidence of the ‘end of man’ that The Order o f 
Things famously announces. So, to return to the essay under consideration, we can see 
that Foucault’s description of Fromanger’s images as hermaphrodite, androgyne, exceeds 
the implied art historical link to Ingres -  that it constitutes an excessive claim with regard 
to a series of paintings that may be many things, but surely can’t be said to be one of the 
signs of “Man’s” extinction; indeed, have attracted relatively little attention outwith a 
clique of French intellectuals. If the opening of ‘Photogenic Painting’ begins in 
excessive, even overblown fashion, Foucault turns, in his third paragraph to a more 
restrained history of the heteroclite painting/photograph. He writes:
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‘The years 1860 to 1880 witnessed a new frenzy for images, which 
circulated rapidly between camera and easel, between canvas and plate 
and paper - sensitised or printed; with all the new powers acquired there 
came a new freedom of transposition, displacement, and transformation, of 
resemblance and dissimulation, of reproduction, duplication and trickery 
of effect. It engendered a wholesale theft of images, an appropriation still 
utterly novel, but already dextrous, amused and unscrupulous.
Photographers made pseudo-paintings, painters used photographs as 
sketches. There emerged a vast field of play where technicians and 
amateurs, artists and illusionists, unworried about identity, took pleasure 
in disporting themselves. Perhaps they were less in love with paintings or 
photographic plates than with the images themselves, with their migration 
and perversion, their transvestism, their disguised difference. Images -  
whether drawings, engravings, photographs or paintings -  were no doubt 
admired for their power to make one think of other things; but what was 
particularly enchanting was their ability, in their surreptitious difference, 
to be mistaken one for another.”’'’
Along with the development of professional image-making, facilitated by the 
development of cheaper and easier to operate cameras, Foucault notes that there emerged 
an amateur practice, or rather a series of practices, which confused the two media of 
painting and photography. These would include: photomontage; overdrawing and
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overpainting, developing photographs on silk fabric “sensitised with a preparation of 
cadmium chloride, benzoin and mastic” or on eggshells “treated with silver nitrate”; 
photographs printed on lamp-shades or on lamp-glass -  a panoply of hybrid forms which, 
according to Foucault, constituted a “shared practice of the image, accessible to all,” a 
field of aesthetic play in which amateurs and professionals alike “unworried about 
identity” could play.”’  ^Here there is an interesting parallel with Walter Benjamin’s 
‘Little History of Photography,’ which argues that the rapid industrialisation and 
commercial exploitation of photography prevented the philosophical import of its rise 
and fall from being investigated. Benjamin, writing in 1931 and with Surrealism in mind, 
thought he could discern a return to photography’s first heroic decade in which, although 
photography was already appropriated for gain and thus moved into the commercial 
sphere, this appropriation was carried out by “hucksters and charlatans” whose efforts 
Benjamin describes as akin to closer to the fairground than to industry.’’’
Benjamin identified photography’s usuipation of the ability to make likenesses and imply 
their permanence as its characteristic professional achievement, one which meant that it 
was not painting in general, but the portrait miniature, which was replaced by 
photography. He notes that by 1840 many professional miniaturists had turned to 
photography as a profession, and were aided by their “craft” background rather than any 
specific painterly artistic sensibility in the making of their images. Soon, though, business 
encroached and, with voguish references to antiquity, self-conscious artfulness and 
posing, instituted the decline of photography. Describing a photograph of Kafka as a 
child, Benjamin notes the various props which decorate the studio in which he is posed:
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the studio itself is seen as occupying an ambiguous location “between execution and 
representation, between torture chamber and throne room.””  He also sees, in distinction 
from early photography, Kafka’s gaze as looking out at the world in an “excluded and 
godforsaken” manner.’^  It is in contrast to this that aura, designating the special quality 
that early photographs possesses in Benjamin’s eyes, is first introduced, as the “medium” 
which “lent fullness and security” to the gaze of subjects “even as it penetrated that 
medium.””  Technically this was the result of the effect of the subject’s emergence in 
light out of a purely dark background. The aura is conceived in a double sense here, as 
both formal property determined by the technical limits of the first cameras, and as 
something more; the product of the meeting of photographer as technician and subject as 
“a member of a rising class equipped with an aura that seeped into the very folds of the 
man’s frock coat or floppy cravat. ... in this early period subject and technique were as 
exactly congment as they become incongruent in the period of decline that immediately 
followed.” ’^’ The technical and social bases of the aura were historically outmoded in this 
period. Knowing conspiracy with the production of the image ruins it for Benjamin, as if 
for the gaze to be present it has to be captured unconsciously, as part of the “unconscious 
optics” which he conceives as emergent in the technically enhanced vision of 
photography. If the interest of early photography for Benjamin lies is in its condensation 
of class histoiy and technical limit, for Foucault it turns on the implication of an escape 
from such identities and limits.
Foucault, though sharing Benjamin’s sense of the possibilities inherent in photography.
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an antipathy to photography as Art, and a certain nostalgia for the “heroic” phase, 
determines this relationship differently. It is precisely in the staged recreation of painting 
in photography (and vice versa) which Benjamin deprecates that Foucault detects 
something valuable. Interestingly, in a paragraph that links the descriptions of 
professional and amateur photo-painting Foucault asks: “How might we recover this 
madness, this insolent freedom that accompanied the birth of photography?” -  a 
formulation that suggests Foucault is aligning his own work with the somewhat cavalier 
history of photography he is setting out, and which (he has already hinted) he sees 
Fromanger as the exemplar of.^‘ The very next sentence implies the same again, though 
with reference to a different part of Foucault’s ouevre. He writes of this playfiilly 
heteroclite ‘birth of photography’: “In those days images travelled the world under false 
identities. To them nothing was more hateful than to remain captive, self-identical, in oiie 
painting, one photograph, one engraving, under the aegis of oiie author.”^^  Here, I think is 
an allusion to the themes of impersonality Foucault had developed in The Archaeology o f 
Knowledge and in ‘What is an Author?’ He wrote, in a famous passage that introduces 
the former text:
‘What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much 
pleasure in writing, do you think that I would keep so persistently to my 
task, if I were not preparing -  with a rather shaky hand -  a labyrinth into 
which I can venture, in which I can move my discourse, opening up 
underground passages, forcing it to go far from itself, finding overhangs 
that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I can lose myself and appear
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at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the 
only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do 
not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police 
to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we 
write’, (Fig. 68)
How, then, do Fromanger’s images contribute to this project of anonymity, of 
labyrinthine retreat from identity? Having described the perhaps rather marginal 
nineteenth-century practices of “photo-painting,” Foucault turns to addressing an art 
historical development with which we are perhaps more familiar. The playful practice of 
the image, he asserts, was halted by the professionalization of photography (the 
commercialization of development and so on) and the purifying aesthetics of 20th century 
modernism, which expelled the image from painting in favour of the “abstract.” With 
these developments, in Foucault’s view “the photographic professionals have fallen back 
on the austerity of an ‘art’ whose internal mles forbid the crime of plagiarism.” '^’ He does 
not conceal his regret:
“Gloomy discourses have taught us that one must prefer the slash of the 
sign to the round-dance of resemblance, the order of the syntagm to the 
race of simulacra, the grey regime of the symbolic to the wild flight of the 
imaginaiy . . .  As a result of which, deprived of the technical ability to 
produce images, subordinated to an art without images, subjected to the 
theoretical obligation to disqualify them, forced to read them only like a
252
language, we could be handed over, bound hand and foot, to the power of 
other images, political and commercial, over which we had no power,”^^
Here we can clearly see that Foucault’s conception of the potential for artistic critique of 
images is at one with Owens’s as set out in Representation, Appropriation and Power. 
Both regard inattention to the images which surround us as dangerous. Yet a difference 
emerges, I think, in their treatment of “transparency.” For Owens, the transparency of 
contemporaiy representation is like that of Classical painting, it is a concealment of the 
material support, and thus an ideological and deceptive mse: it is what we have to see 
through in seeing-through (per-specere, perspective). According to this logic revealing 
the material support reveals the power, Absolutist or capitalist, which acts through its 
representational capability. Much of postmodern critique has been launched in pursuit of 
this aim. Foucault, however, draws on another image of “transparency”; that of 
Fromanger, standing before his canvas at the moment he turns off the projector which has 
conveyed the image he paints onto that canvas, removing the transparency to reveal a 
painting that must stand on its own. What is revealed are not the conditions by which the 
representation existed, by which it concealed its true nature. What is left when Fromanger 
removes the transparency is an image in this of what Foucault terms an event. In 
‘Critique and Power’ Foucault called for an “eventialization” (événementialisation) of 
histoiy -  meaning a process by which, in connecting “mechanisms of coercion and 
contents of knowledge” would not establish “what is true or false, justified or not 
justified, real or illusoiy, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive” but rather how 
power-knowledge creates “positivities,” events of truth.^^ The key dimension of such an
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eventialization for Foucault is that it opens up a space of possibility -  “and consequently 
of reversibility” -  in relation to given structures of power-knowledge; spaces that can be 
exploited by “archaeology, strategy, and g e n e a l o g y . I n  his “photogenic painting” 
practice Fromanger has not seen through the photograph to a ruse of power, or to the 
truth of an object, he has created an event that slips out of his hands and into circulation 
with myriad other image-events, in a way that Foucault celebrates.
In Foucault’s art histoiy lesson it is Pop Art and hyperrealism that have “re-taught us the 
love of i m a g e s . T h e y  have done so through a rediscovery of the photo-painting hybrid, 
not seeking a renewed relationship with the object of representation after modernist 
abstraction, but reconnecting with the energy of images in endless circulation. Whereas 
artists have traditionally used optical and photographic devices to capture the object more 
securely, Foucault suggests that hyper-realists paint images as images, there is nothing 
under the surface to be unveiled or shown to be more real. Rather than an essence of an 
object, or the nature of a medium, what is produced in such work “is not a painting based 
on a photograph, nor a photograph made up to look like a painting, but an image caught 
in its trajectoiy from photograph to painting.”^^  Fromanger is exemplary in his 
enthusiastic endorsement of this launching of images into the (commodified) world 
where infinite others already circulate. In contrast to the Debord-inspired lamentation of 
the virtualization wrought by “spectacle” and the reign of images in postmodernity, 
Foucault affirms the possibilities inherent in such a development.
To explain how Fromanger is at the forefront of this rediscovery of the pleasure of the
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image, Foucault turns to his technique, evoking the hours spent staring at projected 
transparencies seeking “the event which is taking place and which continues endlessly to 
take place in the image, by virtue of the image.” ”^ In illustration of his analysis Foucault 
presents Fromanger’s images of a prisoner’s rebellion at Toul prison (Fig. 69). Here 
Fromanger has applied coloured blocks and dots across his photo-painting canvas. 
Foucault notes that the press photos from which these images are derived are ubiquitous; 
but, he asks, “who has seen what is happening in it? What commentary has ever 
articulated the unique and multiple event which circulates in it? In scattering a handful of 
multicoloured dots whose position and colour are not calculated in relation to the canvas, 
Fromanger draws countless celebrations from the photograph.” The context of this 
example is crucial: if Foucault is praising the vision of Fromanger in seeing the 
celebratoiy image-event in the press photo, he praises himself too -  all the more so when 
we consider that although Fromanger was a member of the Groupe d ’information sur les 
prisons which drew national attention to issues of capital punishment, the poor conditions 
in which prisoners were held, and questioned the “right to punishment” itself, it was 
Foucault who was its most prominent figure.^’ A process of identification is subtly at 
work in this essay, one that is veiy much part of a cultural-political situation in which, in 
the early 1970s “Foucault’s biography was part of a collective biography.”^^  Here, then, 
is one figure of the loss of self that Foucault sought -  that produced in political 
commitment -  but other modes can be discerned in ‘Photogenic Painting.’
After 1972 Fromanger modified his methodology, reworking identical photographs in 
differing ways, rather than submitting different photographs to the same process. And -
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crucially for Foucault’s reading -  he no longer incoiporated his black shadow on the final 
image. Where once the painting had caught the painter between the transparency and the 
canvas, amidst the street and its commodity forms, the image now held all this in itself 
without needing to represent it directly. Foucault writes of the “streetsweeper” series as 
revealing the image to contain “a whole series of events buried in the distance: rain in the 
forest, the village square, the desert, the swarming people. Images the spectator does not 
see come from the depth of the space, and impelled by an obscure force they spring out 
from a single photograph to diverge in different paintings” (Fig. 70).^  ^In Foucault’s 
analysis, Las Meninas’s representational system converged on the place where “Man” 
was to emerge at the end of the 18th century, the paradoxical place of the sovereign 
subject. Fromanger’s images, at least in Foucault’s reading, do not converge on anything.
The disappearance of the painter’s silhouette figures the possibilities that emerge in the 
absence of man. Fromanger is no longer the author of his own work, which passes on 
images through the photograph - transparency - painting series:
“Earlier, in the painter’s sombre presence (passing in the street, silhouetted 
between the projected transparency and the screen on which he paints, 
remaining in the end on the canvas) acted in a way as a sort of intermediaiy 
moment, the point where photograph and canvas were pinned together. Now .
. . the image is fired off by a firework-engineer of whom not even the shadow 
is any longer visible.” '^’
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Given the vibrant, cavalier and laiidatoiy tenor of Foucault’s essay it is worth risking a 
response in kind. It is possible to locate a number of identifications Foucault makes with 
Fromanger’s work: the painter’s shadow seems to stand for Foucault’s own struggle to 
dispense with the shadow cast by the anthropological subject, and its disappearance for 
the “archaeological, strategic, genealogical” project Foucault was undertaking in the 
1970s; Fromanger’s method is seen as a “sling-shot” for images, propelling them into a 
“myriad surging i ma ge s , wh i l s t  Foucault’s own aim for his critical project is that it 
contribute to his “becoming anonymous one day” and being able “to obliterate one’s 
proper name and to lodge one’s voice in that great din of discourses which are 
pronounced.” ’^’ It is justifiable, I think, to suggest that Foucault identifies himself and his 
work not only with Fromanger, but also with the images he puts into circulation. In this 
sense he might indeed be seen as in some way outlining a model of an art historical 
strategy that accepts excessive identifications, particularly when they tend towards a loss 
of self and loss of author-ity. The art of history, the art of anonymity, and the art of the 
self, all form part of Foucault’s critical ontology of ourselves, which must be considered 
in part an aesthetic enterpise. Through a non-polemical reading, rather than an image of 
Foucault as destroyer of art history, we see a body of thought that in its concerns and 
techniques seems to respond to a range of problems art history finds itself with at the start 
of the 21st century. How is it to contribute to a questioning of today?, how is it to avoid 
antiquarianism?, how is it to orient itself in a wider field already occupied by Visual 
Studies etc? Perhaps attention to Foucault’s own struggles will provide an outline of a 
response to these questions.
257
Adrian Rifkin, quoting Foucault’s remark on purchasing a painting by Tobey and finding 
himself “inside it, convinced that I should never get out,” makes a connection to 
Fromanger, whose paintings, also admired by Foucault, could hardly be more different. 
Playing on this juxtaposition and connecting it to Foucault’s personal life (the 
contradiction between his “eventual sexual utopianism” and “Zen secrecy”) Rifkin 
suggests that “something of the complexities of the author-function we call Foucault” is 
caught “between the antinomic surfaces of two such different artists’ canvases. I 
would also suggest that a close reading of Foucault’s conclusion to ‘Photogenic Painting’ 
leads us to a more historically specific and less narrowly personal interpretation of the 
contradiction Rifkin notes. Foucault’s last two paragraphs read as follows:
“The present exhibition closes on two paintings, two foci of desire. At 
Versailles: a chandelier, light, glitter, disguise, reflection, mirror; at this 
symbolic centi'e, where forms were ritualised in the sumptuousness of 
power, everything is decomposed in the very glitter of the pomp and the 
image discharges a volley of colours. Royal fireworks, Handel falling like 
rain; at the Bar of the Folies Royales, Manet’s mirror shatters into 
fragments; the Prince in drag, the courtier is a courtesan. The greatest poet 
in the world officiates, and the regulated images of etiquette take flight at 
a gallop, leaving behind them only the event of their passage, the 
cavalcade of colours gone off elsewhere.
Beyond the steppes, in Hu-Xian, the amateur peasant painter applies
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himself. Here is no mirror or ehandelier. His window opens on no 
landscape, but onto four bands of flat colour that find themselves 
transposed in the light that bathes him. From Court to discipline, from the 
greatest poet in the world to the seven hundred millionth humble amateur, 
a multitude of images bursts out, and this is the short-circuit of painting.”^^
In her “series introduction" to the volume containing Foucault’s essay Sarah Wilson 
refers to this comparison, summing it up as the contrast of depictions of “the extravagant 
individualism of a poet at the Versailles Opera and the simplicity and authenticity of a 
Chinese peasant painter.” Whilst this seems to have falsified Foucault’s actual phrasing -  
where has Wilson got “simplicity and authenticity” from? -  this contrast does seem 
particularly relevant. Wilson sees its significance in relation to Fromanger and 
“revolution as a contemporary problem”; I read it as much more ambiguously addressing 
Foucault’s inteipretation of his own relation to Fromanger. Note that the contrast is 
summed up in the phrase “from court to discipline,” the historical transition that was the 
centre of Foucault’s attention in the mid-1970s and the subject of Discipline and Punish.
I would rather suggest that this juxtaposition figures a genuine dilemma in Foucault’s 
thought in the 1970s: how to square a desire for an active revolutionaiy politics with a 
continued interest in “limit-experienee” (derived from an engagement with Bataille) that 
depends to an extent on an excessive individualism taken to the point where the subject 
shatters. It is not in the content of ‘Photogenic Painting’ that we begin to see Foucault’s 
response to his dilemma, but rather in the form. It is to the form of the laudatoiy essay 
that I will now turn.
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As we have seen, ‘Photogenic Painting’ is characterized by its exeess - an excessive 
praise, an excessive identification between Foucault’s project and Fromanger’s paintings, 
and an excessive identification on Foucault’s part between his own wish for dispersed, 
anonymous subjectivity and his analysis of Fromanger’s images. These qualities are not 
unique to ‘Photogenic Painting’ in Foucault’s oeuvre. His essays on Georges Bataille, 
Maurice Blanchot, Pierre Klossowski, and particularly Gilles Deleuze share its laudatory, 
celebratoiy quality. Note, for example, the statement made in a review of two of 
Deleuze’s books, that “perhaps one day, this centuiy will be known as Deleuzian.” Even 
‘Photogenic Painting’, ostensibly about Fromanger, alludes to Deleuze in its consistent 
references to “desire” - a key Deleuzian term, and one that Foucault usually eschews in 
favour of “power.” This form of writing, in which authorial identity is porous to the 
concepts of others, and seems to collapse the boundaries between the subject and object 
of its discourse, is not only to be found in ‘Photogenic Painting’ but is common to a 
network of texts written by and on Foucault, and it is these that I now address.
Eleanor Kaufman has addressed the importance of the networks of laudatory exchange 
between Bataille, Blanchot, Foucault, Deleuze and Klossowski in her book The Delirium 
o f Praise?'^ Kaufman, rather than focusing on this nexus in terms of its social dimension 
(i.e. as a grouping of male intellectuals of a certain class in French society) considers the 
form  of the encomium as revealing of a textually mediated intersubjective relation that 
has its own critical potential. She cites Denis Hollier’s suggestion, à propos the College
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of Sociology, that the intense group dynamic fostered and fomied in the laudatoiy 
exchange of texts in French literary-philosophical culture was “a mechanism of erasure, a 
machine for desubjectified, impersonal enunciation.”'^ ® Such an erasure was, as we have 
seen already, something Foucault actively sought as part of a project of desubjectivation, 
and so it is little surprise that his essays on Bataille, Blanchot, Deleuze and Klossowski 
(amongst others) abound with the kind of excessive claims Kaufman addresses in her 
invaluable study, and which ‘Photogenic Painting’ is but a muted instance of.'^  ^The term 
“delirium” is used by Kaufman to describe “the ecstatic breakdown of identity that occurs 
when it is no longer discernible what thought belongs to whom and whose voice is being 
heard at any given moment.”'^  ^Delirium, or rather délire has a tradition in French culture 
as a concept deployed in both literary and philosophical work in the twentieth century, 
and often used as a way to cross or erase the boundaries between the two.'^^
Amongst the key features of such delirious writing is “an experience of possession, a loss 
of control by the subject” which negates an instrumental relationship to language; 
language “masters” the subject rather than vice versa. As a temporal, repetitious form 
language is both “always tending towards death as the end of a process of repetition” and 
“always tempting the subject to try to discover the seeret of his origin which always 
evades him.”'^  ^Language is both inadequate to the subject’s desire for meaning, and 
excessive in its proliferating polysemy. The strategy of the delirium of praise is to 
endorse rather than contest this situation. The consequences for the form of the 
philosophical encomium are the evasion of “critique” properly speaking, and an inversion 
of the expected modality of intellectual tribute: rather than restraint there is an outpouring
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of hyperbole. As the epigraph to this section suggests (by Blanchot, in tribute to Bataille), 
the only fitting response to the duty of friendship is to refrain from commentary and to 
speak to rather than o/the other. This is in itself consonant with Bataille’s hostility to 
“writing ow” as a controlled discourse which operates reassuringly “in a realm over which 
it has taken possession, one it has inventorised after first elosing it off, to make sure it is 
absolutely safe. This discourse runs no risk at all: it is not uneasy about the future, it 
steadily expands.”'^® Against such a limited and delimiting notion of writing. Bataille 
affirmed the values antipathetic to it, particularly incompleteness and death. Blanchot’s 
epigraphically cited words come after Bataille’s death, and the laudatory form maintains 
an intimate relationship with death, and, consequently, with spectrality, with the ghost to 
whom one is bound to speak. As Kaufman demonstrates, the excessive textual machine 
of the encomium is one way of fulfilling the antinomic obligations of praising and not 
writing on\ by pushing language or, rather, form, to a delirious limit where it turns into its 
reverse, into silence.'^  ^And such a silence is itself, in Kaufman’s argument, and those of 
the essays she writes on, like a specter summoned by a profusion of chatter.
One of the figures for this effect, drawn by Bataille in writing on Blanchot, is the 
acrobat, as one launched (like excessive praise) into a void. A “vertiginous movement” 
without foundation, excessive praise is an affirmative act which doesn’t leave grounds for 
a response from the other, nor indeed does it maintain the boundary between the subject 
and the object of its expression.'^^ This elision of the difference between oneself and the 
one who is praised is figured in Michel de Montaigne’s ‘On the Education of Children’ in 
terms of citation as digestion. By incorporating another in the body of one’s own text, or
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one’s own thought, one breaks a relationship of mastery and enters into a properly 
philosophical exchange. Just as honey is the result of bees “pilfering” from flowers, but is 
nonetheless something new, so borrowed texts can be transformed into a new substance. 
Whilst Montaigne defends his own habit of frequent quotation by arguing that it is both 
openly revealed as such and amounts to an appropriation into his discourse rather than a 
deceptive conferral of authority by proxy, he emphasises only the latter feature when it 
comes to the pupil whose education the essay concerns: “Let him conceal all that has 
helped him, and show only what he has made of it. Plunderers and borrowers make a 
display of their buildings and their purchases, not of what they have taken from others.” ®^ 
A properly philosophical education must instil independence in the pupil by teaching 
self-mastery, not mere obedience to masters. If ‘On the Education of Children’ suggests 
an appropriative ethos which makes others one’s own, Montaigne’s seminal essay ‘On 
Friendship’ -  cmeial, perhaps foundational, for the ethics and aesthetics of the “delirium 
of praise” -  works in the opposite direction, in a self-estrangement through an exeessive 
identifieation with the other.^’
Montaigne opens his treatise on friendship with a metaphor for his own writing. 
Montaigne notes that a painter in his employ “chooses the best spot, in the middle of each 
wall, as the place for a picture,” and fills the surrounding empty space with grotesques -  
“fantastic paintings with no other charm than their variety and strangeness.”^^  It is to 
these that Montaigne compares his own writing: “what are these things of mine, indeed, 
but grotesques and monstrous bodies, pieced together from sundry limbs, with no definite 
shape, and with no order, sequence, or proportion except by chance.”^^  He denies having
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the skill for a “fine, finished picture” and so instead “borrows” one from his friend 
Etienne de la Boétie. The text in question. The Vohmtaiy Servitude, was to have appeared 
as Chapter 27 in the Essays, but Montaigne eventually decided against publishing it, as a 
consequence of its problematic appropriation by Huguenot pamphleteers, under the title 
of The Protest, in 1576. The vexed question of whether to disown, on la Boétie’s behalf, 
this piece of writing is negotiated by Montaigne at the end of his essay, in a not entirely 
convincing way. He offers an apologia for la Boétie’s “boyhood” treatment of a 
“common theme which has been a thousand times worn threadbare in different books” 
whilst also affirming its sincerity and earnestness, so as not to betray his friend as a 
deceitful author: “he was too conscientious to deceive even in jest.” '^^  These issues of 
fidelity to the friend, of textual legacies for which one is responsible though not the 
author of, set against the necessity of speaking for or as the friend will be returned to in 
relation to Derrida’s writing on Paul de Man. Montaigne, having been bequeathed la 
Boétie’s unpublished papers as well as his library, was in the position to substitute twenty 
nine sonnets by his friend for the controversial essay, and so the gesture of incorporation 
was made in any case.
We can see, in Montaigne’s description of his own writings as “monstrous bodies” 
composed of several parts, a continuity with the themes of the essay on education.
Indeed, The Voluntaiy Servitude is mentioned in that essay, as an example of the ways in 
which past authors can be usefully inteipreted.^^ If the gesture of making la Boétie’s 
writing the centrepiece of the Essays seems to fall within the kind of deferential citation, 
symptomatic of a lack of independent judgement, that Montaigne condemned, we find
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that the rest of On Friendship is, in fact, concerned precisely with establishing an entirely 
different paradigm for the relationship between the two men. This establishment of 
friendship as a paradigm revalues practices of textual quotation / appropriation / 
incorporation as forms of interpersonal relation. The bonds of duty that arise from 
friendship, and their conflicts with other duties, are treated extensively by Montaigne -  
once again through the prism of Classical precedent, to whieh he defers. But also clearly 
at stake is Montaigne’s responsibility towards la Boétie as the surviving friend, writing in 
the wake of the other. This includes a responsibility for the dissemination of his work, 
which has become Montaigne’s property, and On Friendship can be read as an aesthetic 
response to the ethics of a friendship in mourning.
The importance of The Voluntary Servitude in relation to these themes, and therefore of 
its proposed inclusion in the Essays, is emphasised by Montaigne, who stresses the 
scarcity of la Boétie’s textual traces, and gives The Voluntary Servitude an extra 
interpersonal significance
“because it was the means of our first acquaintance. For it was shown to me a 
long time before I met him, and gave me my first knowledge of his name, 
thus preparing the way for that friendship which we preseiwed as long as God 
willed, a friendship so complete and perfect that its like has seldom been read 
of, and nothing comparable is to be seen among the men of our day.”^^
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la Boétie’s writing, then, brackets the friendship; it both pre-empts and outlasts its “real” 
interpersonal instance. The Voluntary Servitude substitutes for the absent friend, just as 
Montaigne conceives of his own writings are substitutes for his person.^^ Note here that 
the text becomes the privileged locus of both friendship’s existence and its 
memorialization -  “its like has seldom been read o f ’ -  and that the friendship seems to 
either exist outwith “our day” -  like a Classical text perhaps -  or to mark a transition to a 
new contemporaiy age, characterised as that in whieh Montaigne finds himself after the 
“perfect” friendship. Both friendship and its writing seem to take place outside of time.
Having introduced the idea of the (almost) incomparable friendship between himself and 
la Boétie, Montaigne turns to the task of defining this “perfect” relationship in distinction 
from other common, and lesser, inteipretations of the term “friendship,” Although 
friendship, in the elevated sense Montaigne wishes to give it, is in one sense a social 
achievement (thus, “of a perfeet soeiety friendship is the peak”) most of the definition 
depends on the exclusion of forms of social obligation. Friendship must be free of 
motivations other than “friendship itself’ -  in fact, the mixing of other interests makes 
relationships “so much the less f r i e n d s h i p s Having made fHendship self-identical by 
definition, Montaigne seems obliged to define it negatively, to keep it free of 
contamination, and to delineate it more clearly than this first attempt achieves. In doing 
so, Montaigne argues that a child could not be friends with its father, as too great a 
disparity in age and status precludes the free exchange by which true friendship is 
sustained: paternal authority could not be properly challenged by a child, and such 
challenges, in the form of “admonitions and reproofs” are “one of the first duties of
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friendship.”^^  Nor is brotherhood any more amenable to friendship -  Montaigne quotes 
Plutarch’s interlocutor: “I do not value him any more highly for having eome out of the 
same hole.”®® Of course, Montaigne notes, the name of “brother” is to be esteemed, but 
when it is applied metaphorically to friendship rather than imposed on us by actual 
kinship. The disparities and rivalries which are an inevitable part of familial relations are 
excluded from friendship, as is marriage as “continuance in it being constrained and 
compulsory.”®' Friendship occurs in the unconstrained exercise of free-will or it doesn’t 
deserve the name.
Nor, despite suggestions to the contrary detectable in Montaigne’s tone, is sexual 
attraction compatible with friendship. The affection for women may be “more active, 
hotter and fiercer” but it is “changeable,” “fickle”: in other words, Montaigne attributes 
to the desire for women the attributes usually taken to characterise women themselves 
and, in contrast, he finds in friendship “a general and universal warmth, temperate, 
moreover, and uniform, a constant and settled warmth, all gentleness and smoothness, 
with no roughness or sting about it. What is more, in sexual love there is only a frantic 
desire for what eludes us.”®^ Unlike sexual desire, friendship is strengthened not 
weakened by its enjoyment -  its economy is quite different, and does not depend on the 
elusive. Montaigne acknowledges that both himself and la Boétie were occasionally 
seized by “those fleeting affections” but that the higher passion pursued its course “on 
proud and lofty wing, and looking disdainfully down on the other as it pursues its way far 
below.”®^ It seems, then, that while sexual love (for women) cannot turn to friendship or 
participate in it, friendship (between men) can incorporate sexual attraction or “affection”
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and as men are uniquely capable of bearing the intensity of feeling and responsibility 
proper to it.
It is not quite that sexual relations are incompatible with friendship, because Montaigne 
argues that a friendship that extended to the body as well as the soul would “be a fuller 
and more complete friendship.”®'' What Montaigne terms “that alternative, permitted by 
the Greeks,” which some of his remarks would seem to endorse, is in turn, however, 
excluded from friendship. Though Montaigne writes that “our morality rightly abhors it,” 
homosexual relations are exempted for reasons of the economy, rather than the nature, of 
Greek sexual ethics and aesthetics.®® The first reason given for this incompatibility is the 
disparity of age and station between lovers, whieh eharacterized the ideal relations 
between erastes and eromenos\ as with paternalism too great a disparity precludes the 
reciprocity proper to friendship. Secondly, Greek erotics was based on youthful beauty; 
thus the desire of the older citizen for the loved youth is not based, as friendship should 
be, on knowing the mind of the other. All that might potentially compromise the 
disinterestedness of friendship, or disturb its harmony by asymmetric obligations 
(whether between father and son, or lover and loved in Greek sexual ethics), is excluded 
by Montaigne from the “perfect” form he praises in this essay.
Having defined friendship negatively, Montaigne attempts a more positive 
characterization. In the highest form of friendship the two “mix and blend one into the 
other in so perfect a union that the seam which has joined them is effaced and disappears. 
If I were pressed to say why I love him, I feel that my only reply could be: ‘Because it
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was he, because it was I’.”®® Friendship, then, has a paradoxical character, insofar as it is 
both a result of the contingent particularities of each partner, but also produces their 
dissolution:
“Such a friendship has no model but itself, and can only be compared to 
itself. It was not one special consideration, nor two, nor three, nor four, not 
a thousand; it was some mysterious quintessence of all this mixture which 
possessed itself of my will, and led it to plunge and lose itself in his; 
which possessed itself of his whole will, and led it with a similar hunger 
and a like impulse, to plunge and lose itself in mine. I may truly say lose, 
for it left us with nothing that was our own, nothing that was either his or 
mine.”®^
The issue of textual propriety/property that arises from Montaigne’s publication of la 
Boétie’s work amongst his own is given a twist by the characterization of the friendship 
between them: if nothing of theirs could be said to be solely owned, how are we to 
understand Montaigne’s use of la Boétie’s texts? The ethic of appropriation outlined in 
On the Education o f Children, where citation is acceptable when it takes another’s text 
only to affirm it as one’s own, and remains unconstrained by over-deference, is here 
taken further. For now it is no longer a question of the other’s words becoming the 
vehicle of one’s own opinions, but of the dissolution of self and other to the point where 
individual identification becomes impossible. One’s words may not be one’s own.
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Such a loss of self is, as we have seen, part of the motive force driving the “delirium of 
praise.” It is also problematic with regard to the ethical obligation to the friend, the 
injunction not to betray them: what if one doesn’t know what one is saying? For 
Montaigne “the secret that I have sworn to reveal to no other, I may without peijury 
communicate to him who is not another -  but is myself.”®^ It is precisely in terms of 
peijuiy that Jacques Derrida has explored his own obligation of fidelity to his friend Paul 
de Man, an obligation that he reads through Montaigne’s claim in ‘On the Education of 
Children’ that “who follows another follows nothing. He finds nothing, and indeed is 
seeking nothing.”®'' In a paradox analogous to those that proliferate in laudatoiy 
exchange, Derrida argues that to follow too faithfully is a betrayal. Using the 
etymological relation of acolyte (he who follows) to anacoluthon (the rhetorical figure of 
what -grammatically -  does not follow) Derrida argues that these two figures can’t be 
opposed, that “in order to follow in a consistent way, to be tme to what you follow, you 
have to intermpt the following.” ®^ This is a figure for Derrida’s own ethies of reading and 
writing, which involves close following of texts, a reiteration of them that allows, as 
much as possible, the text to speak in its own (spectral) voice, but also a deconstructive 
“displacement” that introduces something new. For Derrida “displacing is the only way 
to pay homage, to do justice. If I just repeat, if I inteipret ‘following’ as just repetition ... 
just repeating, not animating, it’s another way of betraying.”^' It was according to the 
logic of ‘doing justice to’ that Derrida wrote his tribute to Foucault after the latter’s 
death, reopening a debate on the writing of madness that had led to their estrangement.^^ 
But rather than reiterating the confrontation between Foucault and Derrida here, it is 
more advisable to tty to animate it by introducing something new. To use Derrida to
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elucidate Foucault might seem a betrayal of the latter given his antipathy to 
deconstruction’s particular form of emphasis on textuality, but it is a move that might 
also instantiate the kind of faithful breaking that Derrida figures as anacoluthonP It is 
with this in mind that I review the argument of Derrida’s extraordinarily rich essay on de 
Man, ‘ “Le Parjure,” Perhaps: Storytelling and Lying.’
This essay is itself part of network of sociality amongst a textual community insofar it 
was written for Hillis Miller (a elose friend and deconstructive accomplice of de Man and 
Derrida), and also continues Derrida’s series of texts on de Man after his death in 1983, 
which were given a new urgency with the revelation (in 1987) of de Man’s 
collaborationist journalism in World War II Belgium. ‘ “Le Parjure,” Perhaps' turns on a 
work of fiction that may be factual and a fact that may be a fiction. The openly fictional 
work is Henri Thomas’s novel Le Parjure and the fact that might be a fiction is a remark 
that Derrida claims de Man made to him: “If you want to know a part of my life, read 
‘Holdeiiin en Amérique’,” -  the story reprinted as the novel Le Parjiire.^^ This novel tells 
the stoiy of Stéphane Chalier, a figure clearly based on de Man, who leaves Belgium 
promising to write a work entitled ‘Holderlin in America,’ and whilst working at an 
American university is discovered to have peijured himself in making a second marriage 
whilst failing to declare a first. In Denida’s reading, the double figure of le parjure as 
naming (in French) both “peijury” and “peijurer” (and, of course, the name of the novel 
itself) is only one of a series of uncanny doublings and uncertainties that pervade the text. 
Not the least of these is the doubling of Stéphane’s flight from Europe to America, and 
the secret that comes to catch him up, by de Man’s own secret past and its (posthumous)
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discoveiy. Other sueh doublings or complications of identification arising in and around 
the text include: ‘Holderlin in America’ (the story Stéphane promises to write), which is 
also ‘Holderlin en Amérique’ (the story Henri Thomas did write), and de Man’s own 
work on Holderlin, carried out in America. Emergent from these complications is the 
crucial identification of the character of the “narrator-witness” with the peijurer. And, 
just as the narrator-witness of Le Parjure has a responsibility to his friend Stéphane, and 
ends up having to try to write a “report-confession” for him, as him, so Derrida found 
himself in 1987 in the position of having to speak for de Man’s past.®^®
Not only de Man’s reputation, but also that of deconstruction as an interpretative practice, 
was at stake in the debate surrounding his war-time journalism. As Derrida notes in ‘ “Le 
Paijure,” Perhaps,' de Man’s own brilliant deconstructive reading of Rousseau sought to 
establish the impossibility of confession -  a claim that appeared post-1987 to be a self- 
exculpatory gesture in itself.^® Derrida’s own response has been critiqued as exemplifying 
“deconstruction’s inability to eome to terms with the ethical dimension of 
inteipretation.”^^  Rather than an evacuation of the ethical, in fact, we find in Derrida’s 
reading of a case of perjury in fiction a strong assertion of ethical responsibility. This 
responsibility is not, however, grounded in the surety of the “I” but a consequence of its 
non self-sameness. This is figured in Le Parjure, and Demda’s reading, where it is 
repeated over and over, by the response of Stéphane when asked how he could have 
perjured himself in “a little lapse of memory” on the day of his second wedding: “Just 
imagine, I was not thinking about it.” For Derrida such a lapse is internal to the 
possibility of thinking, just as the possibility of perjury is internal to the structure of the
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promise. “If there is no thinking without the risk of forgetting ... then what is called 
thinking? And forgetting? What is called not thinking?”^^  If, as Derrida suggests, it 
would be “inhuman and indecent” to ask the subject to answer for all its ethical 
obligations continuously, as though nothing was forgotten and the subject remained 
always unchanged, how does the ethical figure? For the “the sublating negation of time is 
the very essence of fidelity, of the oath, and of sworn faith,” but who can promise not to 
be effected by time, not to change?^" What if “I am another, /  is another”? This is indeed 
the case, but it is not, in Derrida’s view, a justified grounds for the abnegation of ethical 
responsibility.
It is in the anacoluthon that Derrida finds a figure both for the effects in the text and his 
engagement with it. For, like the narrator-witness of the novel, his reading (of Thomas, 
de Man, Miller) turns into an ethical act: the requirement to speak in the place of the 
other, to make an impossible confession. Thus Derrida’s insistence on the non­
consistency of the self is figured through an unavoidable act of fidelity to the friend. In 
other words, just as the narrator-witness takes on the role of making what is an account of 
someone else’s peijurous lapse, so Derrida insists on the necessity of signing for one’s 
own acts even in the absence of a permanent lucidity that would make them the acts of a 
self-same subject. But there is a further twist, because Derrida also argues that this 
following, which is the prerogative of the acolyte must itself culminate in a breaking off, 
an anacoluthon. This is the point (in a deconstructive reading) where fidelity to the text 
and its internal logic produces a difference, and it is here, Derrida states that he takes 
responsibility with what he terms a “counter-signature ... which both confirms the first
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signature ... and is nevertheless opposed to it; and in any case it’s new, it’s my own 
signature.” ®^ The lesson Derrida derives from Le Parjure is that perjury and fidelity, 
betrayal and faithfulness are not to be opposed, but thought together. And we should also 
note that the “real” referent of this lesson -  Paul de Man -  as well as the author who both 
betrayed and was faithftil to him in writing a novel that revealed a his part of his life, and 
Derrida himself, constantly change places in an argument that itself is faithfiil to Le 
Parjure but makes it also say something else. Denida, de Man, Stéphane, the narrator 
witness, Hillis Miller, all seem to haunt each other in Derrida’s text. As Derrida himself 
put it:
“the narrator, as a narrator, is a suiwivor; because, when you tell a story, 
especially when you sign a confession, you already write something which 
might in principle survive. The stoiy, and the true subject of the story -  
and the book now, because the two men are dead -  is a suiwivor. It is a 
ghost story in a certain way. When I say this I am speaking as the ghost of 
Paul de Man, as the ghost of Henri Thomas.” '^
Thus we have not only the identification of one author with (the ghosts of) others, but 
also the identification of the author-narrator with the body of their text. This, as already 
noted, was Montaigne’s conception of the Essays, and as well as echoing him, Derrida 
echoes de Man’s own ‘Montaigne and Transcendence.’ In this text de Man reads 
Montaigne as writing so entirely in the present: the “past collapses straightaway into
274
oblivion,” and if Montaigne doesn’t tiy to maintain consisteney with his past ideas this is 
because “literally, he has forgotten them.”^^  Further, in de Man’s reading, “his book is 
actually written from the point of view of Death -  of a man who is already dead.” ®^ 
Perhaps it is in recognition of this series of identifications that Derrida so often wrote as 
i f  he were a ghost already. There is a profound poignancy in reading such writing now, 
after him. There is also an obligation to read him through this excessive proeess of 
identifications that blurs the lines between fiction and reality, presence and absence, the 
personal and the communal, the other in the self, the other as the self. This aesthetic 
blurring or undecidability is not, as we have seen with the notion of the “counter- 
signature,” the evacuation of the ethical -  a point expanded by Hillis Miller.
In a lucid exposition in The Ethics o f Reading, Miller (to whom, remember, Derrida’s 
Parjure is addressed), strongly reffites the charge that deconstmction is a relativism that 
falsely endorses any and all uses or interpretations of a text. In faet, the ethical moment 
proper to reading tends in precisely the opposite direction. In terminology which Derrida 
follows closely in addressing himself to de Man (and Miller), Miller writes that this 
moment is one “in which there is a response to the text that is both, necessitated, in the 
sense that it is a response to an inesistible demand, and free, in the sense that I must take 
responsibility for my response and for the further effect, “inter-personal,” institutional, 
social, political, or historical, of my act of reading.” '^' This is, in other words, a Kantian 
ethics in which freedom takes the form of a “You Must!” ®^ Further, the ethies of reading 
are not only a matter of literaiy scholarship: they inflect reading across philosophy, 
politics and history too, so that the literary tropes accompanying these discourses (on the
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inside, as it were; like a lining) are “in some way a cause and not merely an effect.” ®^ 
Deconstmction, then, makes an injunction or “irresistible demand” of its own: to treat 
textual form as a cause and thus let it work in/on the critique that addresses it.
Derrida offered an intriguing self-description to the effect that he was a person “dying to 
be unfaithful in a spirit of fidelity.”^^  The many possible ways of reading such a 
statement, which condenses many themes of friendship and the ethics of reading, again 
indicates the complexity which accompanies the anacoluthonic form, and again 
corresponds to an incessant demand. For Derrida goes on to say that he is an “heir” who:
“came to think that, far from the secure comfort that we rather too quickly 
associate with this word, the heir must always respond to a sort of double 
injunction, a contradictoiy assignation: It is necessaiy first of all to know 
and to know how to reaffirm what comes “before us,” which we receive 
even before choosing, and to behave in this respect as a free subject... it 
is necessary to do everything to appropriate a past even though we know 
that it remains fundamentally inappropriable, whether as a question of 
philosophical memoiy or the precedence of a language, a culture, and a 
filiation in general. What does it mean to reaffirm? It means not simply 
accepting this heritage but relaunching it otherwise and keeping it alive.
We can cannot choose it, but we can choose to keep it alive. Here the problematic which 
itself animated the first two chapters of this thesis returns in a different aspect. The two
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scenes, of the possible animation(s) of museal art and the animation of a philosophical 
tradition should in fact be superimposed. To risk a rather presumptuous conclusion, the 
first may depend on the second; and in art theoiy they may be mutually implied; spectral 
thinking to accompany spectral aesthetics... The advantage of Derrida’s formulation, and 
what it adds to the outcome of the extended inteipretation of The Distance (a kiss with 
string attached), is that it avoids the two false solutions to the problem of unthought; it 
neither avows remainder-less reflexive choice nor negates all agency in an utterly non- 
accessible Real, Rather it counter-signs for both what it has to follow, and what it can 
break with, returning responsibility to a subject that is not presumed to be self-identical 
but is assumed to be ethical. With this formulation in mind, I turn now to Foucault’s own 
anacoluthonic relationship to Nietzsche.
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Nowadays I  prefer to remain silent about Nietzsche. When I  was teaching philosophy I  
often used to lecture on Nietzsche, but I  wouldn h do that anymore today. I f  I  wanted to be 
pretentious, I  would use ‘the genealogy o f morals ’ as the general title o f what I  am doing, 
... Nietzsche’s contemporaiy presence is increasingly important. But I  am tired ofpeople 
studying him only to produce the same kind o f commentaries that are written on Hegel or 
Mallarmé. For myself I  prefer to utilise the writer Hike. The only valid tribute to thought 
such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to inform it, to make it groan and protest. And if  
commentators then say that I  am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is o f 
absolutely no interest.
Michel Foucault, ‘Prison Talk.’
“My kind of “pity.” -  This is a feeling for which I  find no name adequate: I  sense it when 
I  see precious capabilities squandered, e.g ., at the sight o f Luther: what force and what 
insipid backwoodsman problems! (at a time when in France the bold and light-hearted 
skepticism o f a Montaigne was already possible!) Or when I  see anyone halted, as a 
result o f some stupid accident, at something less than he might have become. Or 
especially at the idea o f the lot o f mankind, as when I  observe with anguish and contempt 
the politics o f present-day Europe, which is, under all circumstances, also working at the
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web o f the future o f all men. Yes, what could not become o f “man ” i f— / This is a kind o f  
“compassion “ although there is really no “passion ” I  share.
Nietzsche, Will to Power: 367 (1885)
Lured by style and tendency, 
you follow and come after me?
Follow your own self faithfully - 
take time - and thus you follow me.
Nietzsche, The Gay Science.
Perhaps the most common shared point of reference and site of affiliation for the authors 
whom Foucault praised, and was praised by in turn, was Nietzsche. From Klossowski’s 
1969 Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, to Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy of 1961, 
to Bataille’s On Nietzsche of 1945, the post-war philosophical landscape in France was in 
large part shaped by a use of Nietzschean ideas to attempt a break with both the Cartesian 
subject and the distinction between literature and philosophy as forms The centrality of 
Nietzsche’s thought for Foucault in particular is evidenced not only in the implicit taking 
up of Nietzschean themes -  most noticeably with Discipline and Punish, which can be 
read as a historical extension of The Genealogy o f Morals, and Volume One of The 
History o f Sexuality (entitled The Will to Knowledge in “rather extravagant homage” to 
Nietzsche)"® -  but also in the many references to him that occur in Foucault’s discourse 
and in his dialogues. These references operate veiy much in the logic of the delirious 
encomium, and do so, significantly, at moments in Foucault where he is accounting for
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the very possibility of his own project, and locating its origin. It is these moments that I 
address here, rather than pursuing a “deeper” analysis of Foucault’s Nietzscheanism.
Such an approach, which concerns itself with the function of the word “Nietzsche” at the 
surface of Foucault’s texts is consonant with both his “opportunistic nominalism” and the 
Derridean ethics of reading figured by the anacoluthon, the following that breaks off, 
betrays, in order to be faithful. I will argue that Foucault’s textual relation to Nietzsche is 
anacoluthonic, but in a way which exploits tropes already established in this discussion, 
including the use of excess to invoke silence (and vice versa), as well as the erasure of 
difference between self and other that was for Montaigne the essence of friendship. One 
way to make the anacoluthonic break might be, I suggest, to push fidelity in the form of 
identification to its breaking point.
David Macey has attempted to retrace the moment of Foucault’s first engagement with 
Nietzsche. He deems it unlikely that this occuiTcd during his student days; but it seems 
that he read the Untimely Meditations during the summer of 1953. Foucault drove to 
Rome with his friend Maurice Pinguet in August of that year, and whilst there, the latter 
recalls, Foucault would be constantly immersed in this text."' The significance of 
Nietzsche to the orientation of Foucault’s initial theoretical project is registered in the 
unpublished “complementaiy thesis” (required by the Sorbonne’s doctoral regulations 
and submitted along with Madness and Civilization) which is an introduction to Kant’s 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point o f View. Here the question of Nietzsche’s relation 
to Kant is raised in terms that will reappear in The Order o f Things:
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“Nietzsche’s undertaking might be understood as finally putting an end to 
questions about man. Is not the death of God in effect manifest in a doubly 
murderous gesture which, by putting an end to the absolute, is at the same 
time the murder of man himself? ... Is it not possible to conceive of a 
critique of finitude which would be liberating with respect to both man 
and the infinite, and which would show that finitude is not an end, but that 
curve and knot of time in which the end is beginning? The trajectory of the 
question Was ist der Mensch? through the field of philosophy ends in the 
answer which challenges and disarms it: de Übermensch."^^
In discussions of his own intellectual trajectory Foucault frequently asserts the role of 
Nietzsche as that of making possible a break with the hegemonic French versions of 
“anthropology”; that is, phenomenology, French Hegelianism (including Marxism) and 
existentialism. Cmcially, in these statements Nietzsche appears both utterly singular -  r/ig 
figure responsible for implanting in Foucault the “desire of doing personal work,”"® -  and 
part of a series of figures who together establish the possibility of the anonymous 
discourse beyond Man. Hence, it is via Bataille and Blanchot, but also through Bachelard 
and Canguilhem that Foucault gets to Nietzsche."'' It is perhaps one of the key features of 
Foucault’s nomination of Nietzsche as the origin of his own works that it frequently 
occurs in association with other names. Thus in Madness and Civilization we have 
sentences like: “the life of unreason no longer manifests itself except in the lightning- 
flash of works such as those of Holderlin, of Nerval, of Nietzsehe, or of Artaud”;"® and 
evocations of the “madness of Nietzsche, the madness of Van Gogh or of Artaud.”"® In
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The Order o f Things: “we are led back to the place that Nietzsche and Mallarmé 
signposted when the first asked: Who speaks?, and the second saw his glittering answer 
in the Word itself’;"^  in a discussion of ‘The Cogito and the Unthought’ and thought as 
perilous act, we have: “Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud, and Bataille have understood this on 
behalf of all those who tried to ignore it”."^  In ‘The Retreat and Return of the Origin’ a 
path passing from “Hegel to Marx and Spengler” is opposed to that of “Holderlin, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger.”"" Thus Foucault introduces a lineage that helps him break 
from a lineage; as he does when he suggests that his interest in “people like Georges 
Bataille, Friedrich Nietzsche, Maurice Blanchot, and PieiTC Klossowski, who were not 
philosophers in the institutional sense of the term” resulted from the faet that “their 
problem was not the constraction of a system, but a construction of a personal 
experience. At the university, by contrast, I had been trained, educated, driven to master 
those great philosophical machines called Hegelianism, phenomenology.” '"® The veiy 
possibility of Foucault’s project as a historically-based, nonsystematic form of thought -  
that is, as genealogy -  is thus linked to the break with philosophy achieved in experiences 
which function as a “wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is 
no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution.”'®' This notion of 
experience extends to Foucault’s sense of his own textual practice: “however eiudite my 
books may be, I’ve always conceived of them as direct experiences aimed at pulling 
myself free of myself, at preventing me from being the same.”'®^ Nietzsche is here one 
figure amongst several credited with establishing this possibility, but he is also posited as 
the origin of such experience, for those others and, ultimately, for Foucault. Nietzsche is, 
as we shall see, posited as the origin of thinking against the origin.
282
Indeed, it is conspicuously the case that Nietzsehe is given total priority in the possible 
end of Man when, at the conclusion of The Order o f Things, Foucault evokes the 
possibility of a new dawn. He writes that “it will be said that Holderlin, Hegel, 
Feuerbach, and Marx all felt this certainty that in them a thought and perhaps a culture 
were coming to a close, and that from the depths of the distance, which was perhaps not 
invincible, another was approaching.” '®® However, Foucault interjects, “this close, this 
perilous imminence whose promise we fear today, whose danger we welcome, is 
probably not of the same order”; and it is Nietzsche, again, who is credited with 
responsibility for the contemporary possibility of thought. It is Nietzsche who, in 
“offering this future to us as both promise and task, marks the threshold beyond whieh 
contemporary philosophy can begin thinking again.” '®'' In phrasing that, in its reprise of 
his supplementaiy thesis, demonstrates the continuity of Foucault’s thinking of 
Nietzsche’s historical role, he claims that “rather than the death of God -  or, rather, in the 
wake of that death and in a profound correlation with it -  what Nietzsche’s thought 
heralds is the end of his murderer; it is the explosion of man’s face in laughter, and the 
return of masks.”'®® Such a claim resonates with Nietzsche’s own interest in the mask as 
a figure, and also provides a form for Foucault’s own laudatory essay on Deleuze, 
‘Theatrum Philosophicum.’ In an extraordinary passage Foucault moves from a 
discussion of Nietzsche as thinker of the sign and “Eternal Return” to a crediting of 
Deleuze with the opening anew of the space of thought. Foucault writes: “from an 
always-nomadic and anarchic difference to the unavoidably excessive and displaced sign 
of recurrence, a lightening storm was produced which will bear the name of Deleuze:
283
new thought is possible; thought is again possible.” This (excessive) praise is quickly 
followed by a repetition of the terms in which Nietzsche’s importance is framed in The 
Order o f Things. I quote at length to give the frill effect of this passage, which locates in 
Deleuze a resurgence of philosophy and figures this in multiple forms:
“genital thought, intensive thought, affirmative thought, acategorical 
thought -  each of these an unrecognizable face, a mask we have never 
seen before; differences we had no reason to expect but which 
nevertheless lead to the return, as masks of their masks, of Plato, Duns 
Scotus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and all other philosophers. This is 
philosophy not as thought but as theater -  a theater of mime with multiple, 
fugitive, and instantaneous scenes in which blind gestures signal to each 
other. This is the theater where the laughter of the Sophist bursts out from 
under the mask of Socrates; where Spinoza’s modes conduct a wild dance 
in a decentered circle while substance revolves about it like a mad planet; 
where a limping Fichte announces “the fractured I // the dissolved self’; 
where Leibniz, having reached the top of the pyramid, can see through the 
darkness that celestial music is in fact a Pierrot lunaire. In the sentry box 
of the Luxembourg Gardens, Duns Scotus places his head through the 
circular window; he is sporting an impressive moustache; it belongs to 
Nietzsche, disguised as Klossowski.” ®^^
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This evocation of a masked (or perhaps more accurately hallucinatoiy, spectral) 
“community” of thinkers is not only a matter of retracing an intellectual lineage, but is a 
form  in which Foucault frequently presents Nietzsche. In the last interview given before 
his death Foucault suggested that it was indeed in combination that Nietzsche had 
become singularly important to him. Foucault moved from reading Heidegger in 1951- 
52, to Nietzsche in 1953. Whereas, Foucault states, Nietzsche “by himself’ said nothing 
to him, “Nietzsche and Heidegger -  that was the philosophical shock.”’®^ Yet when it 
comes to characterising the development of his own project shortly after this remark 
Foucault asserts “I am simply a Nietzschean, and I tiy ... to see with the help of 
Nietzsche’s texts -  but also with anti-Nietzschean theses (which are nonetheless 
Nietzschean!) -  what can be done in this or that domain.” It doesn’t seem that there is 
any question of a “simple” Nietzscheanism if it, of necessity, involves the combination of 
Nietzsche’s thought with that of others. Further, to return again to the dynamics of 
laudatory exchange, there is a complex relationship at work in the tension between being 
Nietzschean and discoursing on this theme. For Foucault also notes that he has written 
little on either of his two main influences, and argues that “it’s important to have a small 
number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but on whom one 
doesn’t write. Perhaps some day I’ll write about them, but at that point they’ll no longer 
be instmnients of thought for me.”^^  ^What should would-be exegetes of Foucault make 
of such a statement? It both holds out the promise of a kind of textual unconscious to be 
mined, and suggests that the veiy form of writing that would reveal this would in itself be 
undermining of the usefrilness of thought. Could one write “on” Foucault and think with 
him, use him as an instrument of thought?
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Foucault’s presentation of liis Nietzscheanism is emblematic of a series of linked 
problems which I will raise here: what does Foucault’s notion of the originary role of 
Nietzsche amount to?; in what ways is it amenable to analysis?; what does it mean to say 
“I am simply a Nietzschean”?; can one agree with Foucault that “it’s important to have a 
small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but on whom one 
doesn’t write,” while at the same time writing on him?; finally, and inextricably linked 
with the other questions raised here, what is the meaning (that is, the effect) of Foucault’s 
evocation of Nietzsche? Rather than attempt a “deep” analysis of Foucault’s fundamental 
Nietzscheanism, I will follow the simple traces of his evocations, the appearances of 
“Nietzsche” in his texts, and in so doing attempt to think through some implications of its 
style as a gesture.
In Nietzsche and the Question o f Interpretation, Alan Schrift suggests that the 
extraordinary renewal of interest in Nietzsche’s work that took place in French 
philosophical circles during the 1960s and 1970s was sparked by two publications,: 
Heidegger’s two-volume Nietzsche and Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy both 
published in 1961.^'  ^These two books established to a large extent the particular 
direction that Nietzsche inteipretation was to take in France: crudely, one could 
characterise this by saying that Heidegger’s thinking of “will to power” as the last stage 
in the metaphysical forgetting of the “Being of beings” was largely reacted against, whilst 
Deleuze’s emphasis on Nietzsche as the thinker of multiplicity and difference was mostly 
affirmed. By the 1980s and 1990s, the Nietzschean strain of thought in French
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philosophy, having become itself a hegemonic form, was rejected by a subsequent 
generation as a break from the politically and epistemologically serious legacy of critical 
thought. This position is articulated in Vincent Descombes’ philosophical survey Modem 
French Philosophy and in the essays collected in Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, edited 
by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut. The veiy title of the latter work, part of an ongoing 
attempt by its authors to put the Nietzschean philosophers of the 1960s in their place (in 
both senses), is indicative of the importance of taking one’s distance from Nietzsche as a 
gesture of superseding the generation of Foucault and Deleuze.
Two colloquia punctuate the period of intense Nietzscheanism in France: firstly, the 
Royaumont colloquium on Nietzsche, held July 1964, at which Deleuze,
Foucault, Gianni Yattimo, Jean Wahl, Karl Lowith, and Pierre Klossowski (among 
others) gave papers. Also present were Giorgio Colli and Mazzimo Montinari who 
reported on progress towards a full edition of collected works of Nietzsche. (Foucault and 
Deleuze, who each praised the other in their papers, were to oversee the production of a 
French edition of the collected works, publication of which began in 1967 with 
Klossowski’s translation of The Gay Science and was completed 1990 with a new 
translation of Untimely Meditations)}^^ The second conference took place at Cerisy-la- 
Salle in July 1972, and saw papers presented by several of the protagonists of Royaumont 
(including Deleuze, Klossowski, and Lowith), as well as contributions from Derrida, 
Sarah Kofman, and Jean-François Lyotard. The proceedings of both conferences were 
published, joining the large volume of works explicitly addressing Nietzsche produced in 
France during the period 1960-1980. The title of the Cerisy conference, Nietzsche
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aujourd’ hui is particularly interesting, as it signals the sense in which Nietzsche seemed, 
in 1972 at least, to be essential to any concept of “philosophy today,” rather than a 
historically remote figure.
Foucault’s paper at Royaumont, later published as ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,’ took as its 
subject the techniques of inteipretation to be found in these three “masters of suspicion.” 
Behind his analysis of this theme, Foucault stated, was what he termed the “dream” of a 
possible encyclopaedia of interpretative techniques, which are argued to be characteristic 
of an epoch. Foucault starts his discussion with the postulate that language has, at least in 
Indo-European cultures, always aroused two modes of suspicion: firstly, that language 
“does not mean exactly what it says. The meaning that one grasps, and that is 
immediately manifest, is perhaps in reality only a lesser meaning that protects, confines, 
and yet in spite of eveiything transmits another meaning, the latter being at once the 
stronger meaning and the “underlying” meaning.”  ^ The second suspicion Foucault 
identifies is the notion that language might exceed verbal form, that there might be other 
non-linguistic signs in the world -  in nature, animals and so on. We shall see that neither 
of these suspicions are adequate to Foucault’s conception of the modern inteipretive 
techne, though the place given to allegoiy will be of significance.
If these suspicions are already apparent with the Greeks, Foucault argues, they have not 
yet disappeared, and indeed take on a new force and urgency from the nineteenth centuiy, 
since we believe “that mute gestures, that illnesses, that all that tumult around us can 
speak; and more than ever we are listening in on all this possible language, trying to
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intercept, beneath the words, a discourse that would be more essential.”  ^ Each Western 
culture has had its own system / technique / method of interpretation -  “its own ways of 
suspecting that language means something other than what it says, and of suspecting that 
there is language other than language.”  ^ To throw light on nineteenth century 
inteipretation -  in which, Foucault says, we remain implicated -  we require a “remote 
reference point” to allow us to recognise its particularities in contrast to a counter­
example. Foucault uses the inteipretative stmctures of the 16^ ’^ century for this purpose. In 
a passage that is clearly recognizable as a version of the historical analysis elaborated in 
far greater detail in ‘The Prose of the World’ (the second chapter of The Order o f Things) 
Foucault summarizes the reliance of 16^ '^  century inteipretation on the principle of 
resemblance, which provided its possibility and locus. When two things resembled each 
other “something wanted to be said and could be deciphered.”*
In The Order o f Things one of Foucault’s reference points for the epistemological 
operation of resemblance is Montaigne. In his essay ‘On Experience,’ Montaigne evokes 
the infinite regress of the dictionary definition as a metaphor for the endlessness of 
interpreting texts:
“A stone is a body. But if you press the point: And what is a body? -  A 
substance. -  And what is a substance? and so on; you will end by driving 
the answerer to exhaust his dictionary. One substitutes one word for 
another that is often less well understood. I know what Man is better than I
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know the meaning of Animal or Mortal or Rational. To resolve one doubt, 
they present me with three; it is the Hydra’s head.”**^
Montaigne is concerned in this essay with two subjects in particular -  law and habit. 
Conceiving of the world as multifarious and particular by definition, Montaigne sees any 
law as necessarily arbitrary in its application, unable to respond to the specificity of 
events. And, if no number of laws could ever comprehend the infinity of cases, 
inteipretation will always be necessaiy. Even if a supposedly fixed reference point is 
taken, conflict of interpretations ensues: “those men who think they can lessen and check 
our disputes by referring us to the actual words of the Bible are deluding themselves, 
since our mind finds just as wide a field for controverting other men’s meanings as for 
delivering its own. Could there be less spite and bitterness in comment than in 
invention?”**^  This problem of the endlessness of inteipretation and counter­
interpretation is not limited to biblical texts, but applies to all that become subject for 
commentaiy. “The hundredth commentator passes it on to his successor in a thornier and 
more crabbed state than that in which he first discovered it. When did we ever agree in 
saying: ‘This book has had enough. There is nothing more to say about it?’.”*'^  It is on 
this infinity at work in inteipretation that Foucault cites Montaigne as evidence of the 
sixteenth-centuiy episteme:
“There is more trouble in interpreting interpretations than in interpreting 
the things themselves, and there are more books about books than on any 
other subject; we do nothing but write comments on one another.... Is not
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the principle and most famous branch of modern learning to understand 
the learned? Is this not the common and final puipose of all our studies? 
Our opinions are grafted one on another.”*^®
Foucault presents us with an analysis of how words and things intersected in the sixteenth 
centuiy to produce an epistemology. Montaigne’s statement is taken as an example of 
how in this epistemology “Language contains its own inner principle of proliferation.”’^ * 
Resemblance, the organizing principle of sixteenth-centuiy knowledge, had four key 
figures: convenientia; aemulatio; analogy; and sympathy. These figures describe the way 
the world is self-identical thanks to different, but interdependent, relationships of 
resemblance. But for man to understand the meanings of these resemblances a secondaiy 
level of resemblance, that of signs, or rather signatures, is necessaiy. Foucault gives the 
following example: the sixteenth-century perceived a “sympathy” between aconite and 
the eye, the grounds of this perception themselves lying in the visible resemblance found 
in a “signature on the plant, some mark, some word, as it were, telling us that it is good 
for diseases of the eye.” *^  ^This signature is the resemblance of aconite seeds to eyes.
Resemblance is only knowable through the deciphering of such signs, which themselves 
take the form of resemblances adjacent to that which is signalled. If we call 
“hermeneutics” the knowledge that makes signs speak, and “semiotics” the analysis of 
the laws that link them, then, Foucault argues, we can see that:
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“the sixteenth centuiy superimposed hermeneutics and semiology in the 
form of similitude. ,.. The nature of things, their coexistence, the way in 
which they are linked together and communicate is nothing other than 
their resemblance. And that resemblance is visible only in the network of 
signs that crosses the world from one end to the other.
This ubiquity of resemblance as both mark and content means that, as Montaigne’s 
reference to the dictionary indicates, knowledge must be pursued infinitely, drawing its 
certainty only by a cumulative process that is never-ending. Hence, Foucault suggests, 
the sixteenth century’s propinquity for compilation, for the accumulation of the things 
and the signs that resembled one another. The sixteenth century episteme was, because of 
this, “plethoric yet absolutely poverty-stricken.”*^'* Montaigne’s remarks that in his era 
the trouble lies in “inteipreting inteipretations” are not, for Foucault, “the statement of 
the bankruptcy of a culture buried beneath its own monuments” but rather an indication 
of “the inevitable relation that language maintained with itself in the sixteenth century.” 
In an order of things and signs based on similitude language can “accumulate to infinity 
... no longer able to halt itself,” because it cannot close the play of resemblance.*^^
But, Foucault states, commentaiy on resemblance proceeds on the assumption that 
beneath the surface of the text one interprets there is something essential, which one is 
failing to adequately know. The epistemological configuration of the sixteenth centuiy 
was thus caught in the gap between the two precepts -  the “primal Text” (i.e. the “word 
of God”) and the “infinity of Interpretation .”*^  ^The world is made up of signs and thus
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discourse on them proliferates infinitely, but alongside, in fact underpinning this 
proliferation is the dream that such infinite inteipretation might be brought to an end if 
access to the “primal written word” were possible.
In two inteiwiews with Raymond Bellour that accompanied the publication of The Order 
o f Things, Foucault was pressed on the dual role given to Nietzsche in that work; both 
exemplaiy of and exempted from  the archaeological inquiry conducted there. Foucault 
responded by arguing that Nietzsche’s insight was that “the rediscovery of the dimension 
proper to language is incompatible with man.” It is the delirious, infinite dimension of 
language that Nietzsche points to -  a dimension indicated in the episteme of resemblance, 
but subdued in sixteenth-centuiy thought by the guarantee of the primal word. Nietzsche, 
as a figure in Foucault’s text, thus moves back to the configuration of knowledge that 
preceded the modem anthropological thought, and forward “prophetically” to what lies 
beyond such thought. He indicates “that where there is a sign, there man cannot be, and 
that where one makes signs speak, there man must fall silent.” On the other hand, 
Foucault also stated that if The Order o f Things were to be re-written, he “would try not 
to give Nietzsche that ambiguous, utterly privileged, metahistorical status I had the 
weakness to give him.”'^^  In what follows I hope to show that Nietzsche does indeed 
enjoy an “utterly privileged” status in Foucault’s texts Nietzsche, Freud, Marx in 
particular). I will then show how he retains a vitally ambiguous place in Foucault’s œuvre 
- without which it would not be possible - as a non-originaiy origin, a non-foundational 
foundation. The “weakness” to which Foucault refers would be that of betraying
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Nietzsche’s insights in making him into the veiy figure of a philosophical master he 
wrote against.
‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,’ in its doubling of the chapter on resemblance in The Order o f 
Things, but with the difference of an explicit Nietzschean dimension which is elided in 
the latter, raises the suspicion that the book, which makes its debt to Nietzsche 
exorbitantly, excessively clear in other places, is permeated by Nietzsche throughout, that 
is, even where his name is not inscribed. He is present as a ghost, as it were, at the origin 
of its thought. The question remains of the appropriate interpretative strategy by which to 
pursue this suspicion. In search of an answer I turn back to ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx.’
The interpretative techniques resulting from the organisation of the world as resemblance 
were suspended by the development of Western thought in the Classical age; but the 
thought of the nineteenth century, especially with Nietzsche, Marx and Freud has opened 
up a new possibility of inteipretation Foucault argues. Nietzsche, Marx and Freud have, 
Foucault announces, “founded once again the possibility of a hermeneutic.” *^  ^I 
underscore here founded once again -  a phrase that alerts us to Foucault’s reluctance to 
locate an absolute origin of what he terms hermeneutics, and note that while this re­
founding of interpretative possibility is here attributed to all three of the “masters of 
suspicion,” Foucault will end his essay by crediting it only to Nietzsche.
Foucault describes the works of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx as ‘wounds’ in Western 
thought, they possess a “shock effect” that he attributes to the “uncomfortable position”
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of utilising techniques of interpretation which “concern us ourselves, since we, the 
interpreters, have begun to inteipret ourselves by these techniques. With these teclmiques 
of interpretation, in turn, we must interrogate those interpreters who were Freud, 
Nietzsche and Marx, so that we are peipetually sent back in a peipetual play of 
mirrors.” ’^ ** The evocation of an abyssal mirror-play puts us in mind of Foucault’s 
interpretation of Las Meninas and of the two, differently valued, modes of the infinite or 
labyrinthine that Foucault identifies; namely the infinite being of language as délire 
which undoes, destabilises, de-essentialises, transforms, and which is celebrated; and the 
infinite playing out of “Man and his Doubles,” which Foucault sees as formative of the 
object/subject of the human sciences and opposes. It is not yet clear, at this point in 
Nietzsche, Freud, Marx how Foucault is going to value the “uncomfortable” 
interpretation of the inteipreter as an infinite task.
In a key passage, Foucault clarifies the nature of the transition he sees being made in 
interpretive techniques during the nineteenth centuiy. Freud had seen his “discoveiy” of 
the unconscious as a third “narcissistic wound” in man’s self-image, after those made by 
Copernicus and Darwin, and Foucault suggests that Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx, 
constitute
“mirrors in which we are given back images whose perennial wounds 
form our narcissism today. .,. [they] have not in some way multiplied the 
signs in the Western world. They have not given a new meaning to things 
that had no meaning. They have in reality changed the nature of the sign
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and modified the fashion in which the sign in general can be interpreted....
Have not Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche profoundly modified the space of 
distribution in which signs can be signs?”*^*
On a minor point of style: at this point in the text the shifting order of priority of this 
triumvirate seems to be merely a question of good form, of avoiding excessive repetition, 
but finally, as we shall see, it is indeed a question of priority to be resolved in favour of 
Nietzsche. With Foucault’s suggestion of a transformed functioning of the sign circa 
1900 the usefrilness of the comparison with the episteme of resemblance is now clear -  it 
provides a vivid example of a different spatial organization of signs, and thus paves the 
way for Foucault’s claim that interpretation is a historically variable frinction of the 
“nature” and “distribution” of signs, and thereby for his analysis of the historical 
contribution of the “masters of suspicion” to this function. In the sixteenth centuiy signs 
were homogenously disposed in a homogenous space -  “they referred from man to 
animal, from animal to plant, and reciprocally.”*^  ^From the nineteenth centuiy signs 
were arranged in “depth” in a much more highly differentiated space. This “depth” is not 
that of interiority, but of exteriority. Foucault privileges Nietzsche in his exposition of 
this point. Nietzsche critiques the notion of interior depth as a philosophical invention, 
and his hermeneutic suspicion is directed at showing that that it is other than what it 
claims to be:
“Nietzsche shows how it implies resignation, hypocrisy, the mask; so that 
the inteipreter must, when he examines signs in order to denounce them.
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descend along the vertical line and show that this depth of interiority is in 
fact something other than what it says ... [W]hen one interprets one can 
trace this descending line only to restore the glittering exteriority that was 
covered up and buried. For if the interpreter must go to the bottom 
himself, like an excavator, the movement of interpretation is, on the 
contrary, that of a projection, of a more and more elevated projection, 
which always leaves depth above it to be displayed in a more and more 
visible fashion: and depth is now restored as an absolutely superficial 
secret...
This, Foucault says, is comparable to Marx’s demonstration of the platitudinous 
operations of bourgeois ideology: Marx shows that the treasured and mysterious 
prevailing conceptions commodity, class, and so on, are in fact reifications of existing 
property relations. Turning to the third member of the triumvirate, Foucault describes 
Freud’s space of interpretation as more than a topology of consciousness and the 
unconscious, but as involving also the rules of treatment and the practices of analysis 
itself, that is a discourse. At this stage, though each thinker has been treated 
independently, and their contributions to modern interpretation have been treated as 
equivalent and related, the remainder of ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx’ takes a rather different 
turn.
Foucault moves from an analysis of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx’s alteration of “the space 
of distribution in which signs can be signs” to his second theme: interpretation, with the
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“masters of suspicion,” becomes “an infinite task.”*^'* In contrast to the infinite relation of 
signs in the sixteenth centuiy, that of the signs found by/in psychoanalysis, Marxism and 
Nietzsche appears “because there is irreducible gaping and openness”; an incompleteness 
of interpretation which appears “in the form of the reflisal of beginning.”*^  ^I underscore 
this refusal o f beginning as a key motif for Foucault’s essay, and my inteipretation of it. 
Especially significant here is that Foucault’s way of “refusing beginning” is to pass it on 
to Nietzsche, who himself stands (in Foucault) for the refusal of beginning. It is this 
gesture itself that I am interested i n - a  gesture both Nietzschean, and a betrayal of 
Nietzsche; the first because, as Judith Butler shows in The Psychic Life o f  Power, this 
circular figure is precisely how Nietzsche proposes a non-originary description of the 
origin of the subject, the second because it involves a speaking of, and deferral to, 
Nietzsche as origin.
It is also with these three, especially Nietzsche and Freud, that one sees another 
characteristic of modern hermeneutics: it seems that inteipretation carried through as an 
infinite task might reach an “absolute point” which would be “a point of rupture.”*^  ^Here 
we have the reappearance of theme of the disappearance of man, undermined by the 
irruption of the infinite of language. Thus the question raised earlier as to how Foucault 
values the infinite character of inteipretation begins to be answered -  it takes its place 
alongside other apocalyptic signs of the transition to a post-humanist episteme. It remains 
however to evaluate the individual contributions of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx to this 
process.
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Interpretation remains incomplete in Nietzsche: having announced the death of God, the 
external point of authority that guarantees univocal meaning in language, Nietzsche’s 
own genealogical tracing of the “origins” of concepts and words can, by its own 
admission, never come to an end. Foucault links the thinking of this incompleteness, as 
he does in other discussions of labyrinthine language, to madness. Alan Schrift has 
identified the labyrinth as the basic metaphor for the text in Nietzsche, a metaphor used in 
relation to his own writings; for instance, Zarathustm is described in Ecce Homo as a 
“labyrinth of daring knowledge.”*^  ^It is on account of the exacerbated labyrinthine 
quality of Nietzsche writings that he sees “strength, courage and a “predestination for the 
labyrinth” as the traits which his “rightâil readers” must possess. This is to say, armed 
with the knowledge that a labyrinth can also be a goldmine, these readers will have both 
the courage to enter the textual labyrinth and the strength to commandeer what is to be 
found t h e r e i n . Fo u c a u l t  writes of the consequences of venturing into this labyrinth 
(which is his privileged figure for textuality also): “What is in question in the point of 
rupture of interpretation, in this convergence of interpretation on a point that renders it 
impossible, could well be something like the experience of madness.”*'*** Such an 
experience was at stake, albeit in different veiy ways, in both Nietzsche’s and Freud’s 
discourses, though it is clear in this essay, even more so when writings such as Madness 
and Civilization are taken into account, that it is Nietzsche who for Foucault pursues this 
interpretative delirium to its radical conclusion.
The incompleteness of interpretation leads to two fiirther constitutive postulates of 
modern hermeneutics. The first is that as everything is already interpretation “there is
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nothing to inteipret.” Here, again, although ideology and the symptom are “interpreted 
inteipretations” it is Nietzsche who is privileged. We can assume, I think, that Foucault is 
drawing in his formulation of this point on division 481 of The Will to Power where 
Nietzsche asserts “Against positivism, which halts at phenomena -  “There are only facts''’ 
- 1 would say: No, facts are precisely what there is not, only inteipretations.”*'**. In a 
further Nietzschean twist to the formulation “there is nothing to interpret,” Foucault adds 
that inteipretation “does not clarify a matter to be interpreted, which offers itself 
passively; it can only seize, and violently, an already-present interpretation, which it must 
overthrow, upset, shatter with the blows of a hammer.”*'*^ It is in precisely these terms 
that Foucault expresses the affinity between Nietzsche and his own interpretative 
methodology: “when it comes to determining the system of discourse on the basis of 
which we still live, as soon as we are obliged to question the words that still resonate in 
our ears, that are mingled with those we are tiying to speak, then archaeology, like 
Nietzschean philosophy, is forced to work with hammer blows.”*'*^ In ‘Nietzsche, Freud, 
Mai-x’ Foucault presents Nietzsche’s specific contribution to the inteipretation of 
interpretation in similar terms: “Nietzsche seizes interpretations that have already seized 
each other.”*'*'* Here I underscore that (at least in my reading) this is the essence of what I 
have termed Foucault’s own “opportunistic nominalism.” As an example, Foucault cites 
Nietzsche’s analysis of the etymology of agathos in the first treatise of The Genealogy o f  
Morals. Agathos (“good,” “noble,” “brave”) does not mean because it signifies a factual 
state of affairs, but because it is an idea of the nobility who have interpretive values based 
on their status. “This is what Nietzsche means when he says that words have always been
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invented by the mling classes; they do not denote a signified, they impose an 
interpretation.” Interpretations are not secondary to signs.
Whereas for the sixteenth century the sign was benevolent -  resemblance “simply proved 
the benevolence of God and separated the sign from the signifier by only a transparent 
veil” -  with Nietzsche, Freud and Marx in the nineteenth centuiy, the sign (which is 
preceded by inteipretation) becomes malevolent.*'*^ This is the case with money (for 
Marx), symptoms (with Freud), and, in Nietzsche, is true of “words, justice, binary 
classifications of Good and Evil” which are “masks.”*'*^ This new function for signs of 
masking interpretations makes the sign itself the container of “negative concepts, of 
contradictions, of oppositions.”*'*'^  The second constitutive postulate of modern 
hermeneutics identified by Foucault is that interpretation is obligated to carry itself on 
infinitely. This, in turn, has two consequences: firstly, interpretation becomes 
interpretation “by whom?” -  one does not interrogate the signified but “who posed the 
interpretation,” because “the basis of inteipretation is nothing but the interpreter.”*'*^ 
Obviously this is not to be taken as proposing the question of “who?” in the sense of a 
hermeneutic of the sovereign subject as source of its own representations, but as itself a 
nexus of violently imposed inteipretations (capitalist, oedipal, Christian, etc. -  “who?” is 
a question of exteriority, not of origins). Nietzsche’s interpretation of agathos could again 
serve as an example, where philology reveals the noble origin of the morality it 
participates in.*'*** Secondly, “inteipretation must always inteipret itself and cannot fail to 
turn back on itself. In opposition to the time of signs, which is a time of definite terms, 
and in opposition to the time of the dialectic, which is linear in spite of everything, there
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is a time of inteipretation, which is circular.”*^** Thus interpretation is obliged to retrace 
its steps to reinterpret itself.
Foucault contrasts the “death” of inteipretation -  the belief in signs as originary and 
coherent -  with its “life,” which is found in the Nietzschean assertion that there are, in 
fact, only interpretations. Foucault asserts that semiology and hermeneutics must be 
enemies, a historical lesson that many contemporaries forget, because semiology 
corresponds to belief in the coherent systemacity of signs, and thus
“abandons the violence, the incompleteness, the infinity of inteipretations in 
order to enthrone the terror of the index or to suspeet language. Here we 
recognize Marxism after Marx. On the contrary, a hermeneutic that wraps 
itself in itself enters the domain of languages which do not cease to implicate 
themselves, that intermediate region of madness and pure language. It is there 
that we recognize Nietzsche.”*^*
At the last we find that the rebirth of the possibility of hermeneutics, previously credited 
to the three “masters of suspicion,” is, for Foucault, really Nietzsche’s achievement.
It is not without significance that in Foucault’s last sentence Nietzsche is without 
“followers” -  there are not Nietzscheans in the same sense as there are Freudians and 
Marxists, something that seems part of Foucault’s positive valuation of his interpretative 
techne. At the last Marx is not on the “good” side of Foucault’s valuation of infinite
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interpretation after all, and Freud is abandoned without a word. Interpretation in the sense 
of the “hermeneutic,” as opposed to the merely “semiological,” is to be credited solely to 
Nietzsche. Though Foucault’s argument here could certainly be read in the context of the 
competing analyses of the place of language in contemporary thought -  especially, as his 
argument with Derrida over Descartes and the “evil genius” would prove, because 
Foucault resisted a purely linguistic account of historical phenomena - 1 am more 
interested in the game being played around the evocation (invocation) of Nietzsche. 
Foucault’s final comment about “Marxism after Marx” links up with his remarks in 
‘What is an Author?’ about the break that occurs between the founders of a discourse and 
its followers. ‘Nietzsche, Freud and Marx’ also addresses much of the teiTain of The 
Order o f Things -  not just in its discussion of resemblance, but also in the priority it gives 
to Nietzsche in relation to the notion of a rupture with the semiological structures 
coterminous with “the age of Man”. I cite again Foucault’s remark to Raymond Bellours, 
a propos The Order o f Things, that he regretted giving Nietzsche an “utterly privileged, 
metahistorical status.” To which Bellours replied, in a perceptive comment that correctly 
identifies this ambiguous, “utterly privileged” place for Nietzsche as a key locus of 
Foucault’s entire project:
“But, in that case, how can one restore Nietzsche to archaeology without 
the risk of being false to both? There seems to be an insurmountable 
contradiction in that very fact. ... Isn’t Nietzsche precisely the locus where 
all signs converge in the irreducible dimension of the subject, anonymous
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by dint of being itself, anonymous by the fact that it incorporates the 
totality of voices in the form of fragmentaiy discourse.”’^ ^
Bellours goes on to add this comment -  Nietzsche is in fact missing from the book, and 
that Foucault’s own “presence” in The Order o f Things coiTesponds precisely “to the 
impossible anonymity you dream of, an anonymity that, being told, can only signify a 
world without written speech or, to the point of madness, the circular literature of 
N i e t z s c h e . I t  is the latter option that Foucault would, one guesses, prefer. One of his 
routes to “impossible anonymity” is exactly an attempt to defy in his own “circular 
literature” the either/or of the presence of Foucault and Nietzsche.
My own interpretation of ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx’ is, if we remain consistent with its 
argument, not a perspective on a fact but on what is already an interpretation. Nor is my 
inteipretation impartial; it is shaped by my positing of the importanee of Nietzsche in 
Foucault’s thought. This is not to say that I don’t think that my interpretation is correct 
(or following Nietzsche’s transvaluation of value, perhaps, good). Interpretation in the 
sense Foucault gives it here -  a Nietzschean sense, which I affirm -  is always violently 
imposed, and can only be deemed good according to the value of the will-to-power of 
which it is an instance. The affirmation and acknowledgement of the infinite play of 
inteipretation as such, and the reflisal of the closure of this process, is one criteria for 
such a positive valuation for Nietzsche.* '^* Following Foucault and de Man, and their 
insistence on the constitutive status of “blindness” for any knowledge, it is necessaiy to 
note that this goal may only be achieved elliptically. Any interpretation must do violence
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insofar as it quite incorrectly neglects the multiplicity and difference of the world as 
interpretation. Textual strategies may negotiate between these two imperatives: to 
interpret openly and participate in the abyssal infinity of interpretation; and to remain 
intelligible within conventions of language use that operate to deny this abyssal quality. If 
I use nominalism of a sort (the pursuit of instances of “Nietzsche”) to bracket out a 
portion of Foucault’s œuvre from the endless inteipretive play of his texts, I do not do so 
arbitrarily, but with the aim of revealing and participating in a textual strategy which I 
interpret as performed and, as it were, authorised, by Foucault and Nietzsche. Nietzsche, 
as we shall see, is an especially usefiil (non) starting point, which Foucault always seems 
to come back to.
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I f  interpretation were the slow exposure o f the meaning hidden in an origin, then only 
metaphysics could interpret the development o f humanity. But i f  interpretation is the 
violent or surreptitious appropilation o f a system o f rules, which in itself has no essential 
meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation 
in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development o f 
humanity is a series o f interpretations. The role o f genealogy is to record its history. 
Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, Histoiy.’
Only he who changes remains akin to me.
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil.
Except fo r a few  exceptions, my company on earth is mostly Nietzsche...
Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche.
Nietzsche, reflecting on how to find oneself outwith convention, argues that rather than 
burying inwards in search of “depth,” which is a harmful and fmitless search, for one can 
never reach a point at which one can say “this is no longer outer shell” one should ask, 
instead
“what have you tmly loved up to now, what has drawn your soul aloft,
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what has mastered it and at the same time blessed it? Set up these revered 
objects before you and perhaps their nature and sequence will give you a 
law, the fundamental law of your own true self. Compare these objects 
with one another, see how one completes, expands, surpasses, transfigures 
another, how they constitute a stepladder upon which you have clambered 
up to yourself as you are now; for your true nature lies, not concealed deep 
within you, but immeasurably high above you, or at least high above that 
which you usually take yourself to be. Your educators and formative 
teachers reveal to you what the true basic material of your being is, 
something in itself ineducable and in any case difficult of access, bound 
and paralysed: your educators can only be your liberators.” *^^
Here we find Nietzsche, describing Schopenhauer as Educator, producing through 
rhetorical excess a fiction of such a liberator, one that corresponds more to his own needs 
than to what Schopenhauer actually wrote, most of which, in point of fact, Nietzsche 
vehemently opposed. Such a fictioning of influences is registered elsewhere in relation to 
friendship; for instance in number 30 of the ‘Preludes in German Rhyme’ to The Gay 
Science: “I do not love my neighbor near, / but wish he were high up and far / How else 
could he become my star?”*^** For Nietzsche the setting up of irreconcilable antagonisms 
or unattainable exemplars was crucial to the development of his will-to-power, in a way 
that is both central to his rhetorical style, and deeply problematic for any interpreter who 
wishes to get close to him. In Nietzsche’s view it is “Better a whole-hearted feud / Than a 
friendship that is glued,” This attitude is pushed further when Nietzsche expounds,
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later in The Gay Science, on ‘Star Friendship,’ Writing of a relationship estranged by 
“exposure to different seas and suns” -  an different exposure that makes the two former 
friends unrecognisable to each other -  Nietzsche insists that they might yet be “venerable 
for each other.” This would not mean an interpersonal closeness, but an anonyniised, 
distanced elevation: “There is probably a tremendous but invisible stellar orbit in which 
our different paths and goals may be included as small parts of this path; let us rise up to 
this thought. ... Let us then believe in our star friendship even if we should be compelled 
to be earth enemies.” As with the passage on Schopenhauer, we find Nietzsehe 
projecting a fictive companion out of reach as part of an elaboration of self.
Nietzsche’s entire œuvre can be seen as enacting the dual call for  and rejection p/" friends 
as companions, those who accompany or follow. The contradictoiy desire for singularity 
and for companionship in thought might even be seen as stractural to Nietzsche’s writing, 
most particularly in the way it determines the excessive qualities of his style(s) -  pushing 
both laudatory and denunciatoiy modes to extremes, the figure of Zarathustra would 
represent one pole of this dynamic, as would those instances where Nietzsche anticipates 
his reception by kindred spirits. An example of such anticipation can be found in the 
epode to Beyond Good and Evil where he writes, in phrases that conclude the book:
“Oh life’s midday! Oh second youth! Oh garden of summer! I wait in 
restless ecstasy, I stand and watch and wait - it is friends I await, in 
readiness day and night, new friends. Come now! It is time you were here!
308
This song is done - desire’s sweet cry died on the lips: a sorcerer did it, the 
timely friend, the midday friend - no! ask not who he is - at midday it 
happened, at midday one became two...
Now, sure of victory together, we celebrate the feast of feasts: friend 
Zarathiistra has come, the guest of guests! Now the world is laughing, the 
dread curtain is rent, the wedding day has come for light and 
darkness...
Here, strangely, we find Nietzsche’s solitude ended by his own fiction, by Zarathustra 
himself, in the splitting of the “I” into guest and (implicitly) host. Whilst this is an 
occasion for celebration, throughout Nietzsche’s aphoristic writings in particular one 
finds contrasting and severe defenses of his singularity.'*^^ Thus he acknowledges that one 
may write with the aim of not being understood. It is the puipose of “the more subtle laws 
of any style” to “keep away, create a distance, forbid “entrance,” understanding” even as 
“nobler spirits” are addressed."^' In what reads as a moment of doubt or hesitation about 
the strategy Nietzsche was to pursue in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, (the beginning of which 
was included at the end of The Gay Science, as division 342 of the First Edition) he 
writes: “must not anyone who wants to move the crowd be an actor who impersonates 
himself?” To map this back on to the “delirium of praise” we could define this as a 
double injunction to the reader: both to make Nietzsche into a “star” to follow, and also 
as a “«oh me legereT^^^ Thus we can incorporate Nietzsche too in the coipus of
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(Nietzschean) writers for whom “friendship” as theme is central to a discourse that con­
fuses philosophy and literary/poetic modes. The attraction of this confusion is lies 
perhaps in the complicity generated in it between writer and reader, subject and object, 
praise and silence, in the excessive rhetorical structures of identification and narration, 
which metaphysics (and history) disavows. But to assimilate Nietzsche in this way is, 
inevitably, to break with him, at least in part, because, again in defense of his singularity, 
he argues that “those who want to mediate between two thinkers show that they are 
mediocre; they lack eyes for seeing what is unique.”'*’"' What is aimed at, in distinction 
from such a mediocre mediation, is the properly anacoluthonic break with Nietzsche that 
presents the plurivocality of his writing and doesn’t reduce it to a singular origin, which, 
as we shall see, would be a truly unfaithful act of following. The watchword for the 
reading attempted in distinction from this might well be Deleuze and Guattari’s opening 
statement in A Thousand Plateaus: “since each of us was several, there was already quite 
a crowd.”'^  ^How, then, to figure this in reading and thinking Foucault’s genealogy -  the 
name he gave to his critical histories from the early 1970s onwards?
Questions of lineage are obviously important when one’s critical approach is described as 
genealogy. We are used to thinking of lineage now in terms of privilege -  of cultural 
reproduction through patrilinear inheritance for example. The conception of creativity as 
shaped by Oedipal conflict between father and son -  exorbitantly manifest in Harold 
Bloom’s The Anxiety o f Influence -  seems to confirm this suspicion. A history of art, any 
histoiy, rooted in this conception must surely end up suffering not just from “the anxiety 
of influence” but also an unsupportable patriarchal bias. As an example I turn to the
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words of a fictional representation of a real historical figure. In Act 2 Scene 4 of Tony 
Kushner’s Angels in America we find Roy Cohn, a New York lawyer notorious for his 
support of several Republican administrations, his closeted homosexuality, and his death 
from AIDS (which he attempted to pass off as liver cancer), lecturing his legal protégé on 
lineage as privilege:
“everyone who makes it in this world makes it because somebody older 
and more powerfril takes an interest. The most precious asset in life, I 
think, is the ability to be a good son. You have that Joe. Somebody who 
can be a good son to a father who pushes them farther than they would 
otheiwise go. I’ve had many fathers, I owe my life to them,..” '^ *’
Roy Cohn, it needs to be noted, is thinking of Joe McCarthy here! When his protégé 
intellects that his own relationship to his father was very difficult, Roy responds ‘Then 
you have to find other fathers, substitutes...”'*’^  Could one imagine a figure more 
antithetical to Foucault than Roy Cohn, the Republican closet-case, advocate of nepotism 
in the interests of perpetuating the ailing elite? Yet, if we can bracket for a moment the 
Oedipal dimension of Roy’s analysis, he seems in fact to be raising a very pertinent 
question. I stated at the outset that Foucault’s “genealogy” as a critical historical 
approach is indebted to Nietzsche. The question of how to be a “good son” to Nietzsche 
is a veiy difficult one, but the idea that one can in a sense “chose” substitute fathers is 
pertinent to the way Foucault characterized his relation to Nietzsche, and indeed to 
Nietzsche’s notion of “star friendship.” As we have seen he credited Nietzsche with
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providing a way of escaping the education in phenomenological thought which had 
provided Foucault with his initial intellectual inheritance, which had provided a filiation 
to the philosophical fathers Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger. Is the patriarchal the 
appropriate mode to figure what is escaped toi
Foucault’s much-cited polemic in ‘What is an Author?’ is aimed at the prevalent 
conception of the author as a source of signification, as a source of ever-proliferating 
meaning, as characterized by priority, in all senses. As ever in Foucault, at stake is the 
reversal of the question of how histoiy and discourse are to be accounted for on the basis 
of the creative subject -  the “anthropological” question -  in favour of an inquiry into how 
the subject as a form is to be accounted for historically.'*’^  Also at issue is “writing” in 
relation to this problematic. Reversing conventional attitudes, Foucault characterizes the 
“author function” as a restriction on the production of meaning, the creation of a limit 
around the “cancerous and dangerous proliferation of significations.”"’'' Though by habit 
we think of the author as “the genial creator of a work in which he deposits, with infinite 
wealth and generosity, an inexhaustible world of significations,” in fact, according to 
Foucault, rather than this transcendental figure the author is “a certain Rmctional 
principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short by which 
one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, 
decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.” '™ Our notions of authorship as originary 
genius are then a cover for the fact that the author functions to constrain discourse.
“When a historically given function is represented in a figure that inverts it, one has an
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ideological production. The author is therefore the ideological figure by which one marks 
the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.”"*' If Foucault concedes that 
there is no possibility of fictive writing outwith constraint, he certainly anticipates a 
reconfiguration of the “author function,” perhaps its disappearance and a new mode of 
existence for poly semons texts. After the death of the author would come the life of the 
text. In this new episteme discourses of all kinds would “develop in the anonymity of a 
murmur.” This anonymity would negate the questions habitually asked of texts and 
referred to their authors. Rather than debating the authenticity or originality of a text, we 
could ask “Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for 
himself?”'™ Foucault evokes here themes that are, as we have seen central to his thought 
- anonymity, appropriation, the assumption of varied positions. Interestingly it is in the 
second essay in which Foucault explicitly, and for the last time, addresses Nietzsche, that 
we can see the importance of these themes to his thought, to the very possibility of the 
works gathered under his name. It is in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ that Foucault 
indicates the ways in which he negotiates his self-proclaimed Neitzscheanism and his 
questioning, seen in ‘What is an Author?’ of the individual subject as either object of 
interpretation or source of meaning.
As it is origin that is at stake here, I focus on the text that was Foucault’s original 
introduction to Nietzsche (and my own, for that matter); namely, ‘The Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life,’ the second of the Untimely M e d i ta t io n s This text, 
in large part an anti-Hegelian polemic, is particularly pertinent as it addresses the
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problem of lineage directly. As Nietzsche exalts Goethe, and lambasts the historians of 
his own time, he continually finds ways in which the will to knowledge manifest in 
history leads to unhappiness and nihilism, to inaction. In contrast to the “dust-eating” 
histoiy of philologists and others Nietzsche proposes that Life needs history insofar as it 
pertains to living man “as a being who acts and strives”, “as a being who preserves and 
reveres”, and “as a being who suffers and seeks deliverance.”'™ Corresponding to these 
needs are three modes of historical knowledge -  Monumental, Antiquarian, and Critical. 
Each mode has its “uses and disadvantages” and must be employed in conjunction with 
the others if it is to avoid becoming a kind of dead, and deadening knowledge. Each 
mode can become dangerous if pursued for its own sake. These forms of history become 
disadvantageous when not controlled by necessity, when they fall into the hands of the 
“critic without need, the antiquaiy without piety, the man who recognises greatness but 
cannot himself do great things.”™^ Nietzsche elaborates on the pros and cons of each 
mode of historical knowledge, seeing in the Monumental a useful counter-example to 
present, which throws into relief contemporaries who are “feeble and hopeless idlers” 
climbing on pyramids or wandering round art galleries. Such “monuments” of attainment 
as Goethe spur us out of resignation, acting as “teacher, comforter and admonisher” and 
motivates us to join with the “human mountain peaks’” of history, whose achievements 
attest to the “solidarity and continuity of the greatness of all ages.” '™ Thus such useful 
monuments are not be left adrift in a remote past, but are themselves untimely -  they 
light up the present. There are, concomitantly, disadvantages to the monumental mode: it 
necessitates requires forgetting in its very functioning -  it perforce negates the specific 
circumstances of past instances of greatness, and thus of how impossible it is that they
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should occur again. Monumental history deals in generalities, and doing so exalts effects 
over causes. It is the understanding of past greatness as effects in themselves that motivate 
the ambitious and alive, but this runs the risk of producing a history indistinguishable 
from fiction -  and thereby misrepresenting the past. For if value is found in 
monumentality, and that is conferred by history, how can the present by valued? In fact, 
Nietzsche argues, “connoisseurs” of the monumental militate against the creation of new 
monuments of greatness by making the authority of the monumental derive from its 
pastness:
“Monumental history is the masquerade costume in which the hatred of the 
great and the powerhil of their own age is disguised as satiated admiration for 
the great and the powerhil of past ages, and muffled in which they invert the 
real meaning of that mode of regarding histoiy into its opposite; whether they 
are aware of it or not, they act as though their motto were: let the dead bury 
the living.”'™
The antiquarian mode is, in turn useful in that by preserving and revering the past makes 
it a place of identification for the antiquary, testifying to the resilience of his culture. 
Again citing Goethe, Nietzsche describes the antiquarian mode as allowing access to a 
community of like souls, even to perceiving the soul of one’s nation as his own: 
antiquarian knowledge gives one “the contentment of a tree in its roots, the happiness of 
knowing that one is not wholly accidental and arbitrary but grown out of a past as its 
heir...”™^ Again, this has disadvantages as its flip-side; specifically the risk of an
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attenuated, local view of histoiy which endangers the past in isolating historical 
phenomena to bring them close as objects of appreciation and preseiwation. Assuming the 
value of the past as such leads to reverence for the old without discrimination, a 
reverence that can “mummify” what it preserves. (As, it wouldn’t be hard to argue, is 
often the case with art...). Assuming that age confers value leads to historians “content to 
gobble down any food whatever, even the dust of bibliographical minutiae.”™"
Finally, the critical mode of histoiy is useful for judging -  for enabling negative 
evaluations of the past in the name of life and the present. If we can’t free ourselves from 
a relation of some kind to previous generations, what we can do is
“confront our inherited and hereditaiy nature with our own knowledge of it, 
and through a new, stem discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in 
ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature 
withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in 
which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one did 
originate...”'™
To conclude this summaiy, the disadvantage of the critical mode is that it suspends the 
necessary element of forgetfulness, which Nietzsche has already argued is the basic 
condition for the possibility of happiness and life. This forgetting, we might remember, is 
at the heart of Derrida’s reading of the multiplicity of identity in Le Parjure
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The force and direction of Nietzsche’s polemic here poses a problem for anyone wishing 
to treat him as a historical figure. Clearly there are many ways in which a historical 
understanding of his thought would be a betrayal of that thought, many ways to become a 
Nietzschean in a sense that Nietzsche would violently oppose. We have seen that 
Nietzsche gave considerable thought to how he might be received as a historical figure -  
the extent to which he expected his “true” audience, the “we” he continually evokes in his 
writings, to be in the future. Thus we can I think hypothesize that alongside its anti- 
Hegelian bluster, and its evocation of a reborn Gennan culture, the second Untimely 
Meditation is concerned with Nietzsche’s own reception, and with warning off the wrong 
kind of followers. What options are available, then, to someone who wishes to take up 
Nietzsche’s thought? Wouldn’t accepting Nietzsche’s view of historical relations here 
mean a reverence for history over life, a mummification of his coipus, a self-abnegation 
that Nietzsche would characterise as weakness? Is to be a Nietzschean to betray 
Nietzsche?
The most effiisive, excessive, of Foucault’s writings on Nietzsche is ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History’ of 1971. The title itself implies the central theme of the essay -  the 
utter identification of the name of Nietzsche, and the practice of genealogy, with the very 
possibility of a useful Histoiy. This essay is, on one level, a traditional commentary, 
seeking to clarify another thinker’s terminology. But it also goes much further, setting out 
the /om  of Foucault’s history writing as genealogy, whilst also accounting for its 
epistemological possibility. Foucault sums up, and endorses, Nietzsche’s attack on 
traditional histoiy, drawing attention to a necessaiy distinction made between unsprung
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(origin) as the object of historical enquiiy and herkunft (descent) and entstehung 
(emergence) as the objects of genealogy.
Nietzsche is opposed to the pursuit of ursprung, Foucault writes “because it is an attempt 
to capture the exact essence of things, their purist possibilities, and their carefully 
protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that 
proceed the external world of accident and succession.”'™ Nietzsche recognises no such 
forms -  “no facts, only interpretations” -  and therefore opposes an interpretative mode 
which “necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original 
identity.” '™ This is not to say that historical knowledge is impossible, merely that its 
explanations are not characterized by ideality, but by the bmtal and antagonistic forces of 
contingency. Historical knowledge itself as an interpretative techne emerged from “the 
personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of reason.” '™ Here we have a key 
aspect of Foucault’s Nietzschean project - the metaphysical belief in essence or identity is 
replaced by the idea that everything arises from historical contingency. There is no 
“Reason” or telos behind history -  history is entirely explicable, on the condition that 
metaphysics, and any notion of a necessaiy succession in the order of the forms of 
reason, is left behind.
This assertion leads to a second key point. Genealogical attention to history leads to 
laughter at the solemnities of the origin.” (Recall here that Foucault’s uneasy laughter at 
Borges’s Chinese encyclopaedia is an (preceding) echo of the laughter of the 
ilbermensch}^^ Already there is a doubling of author and subject at work.. .).'™ We tend
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to think of things as most pure at their conception or inception. In fact, Foucault argues, 
origins are lowly, base, they do not precede a Fall. Linked to the commonly assumed 
prestige of the origin is the postulate that it is a privileged site of truth, albeit one 
obscured. It is this assumption that structures the knowledges that find it elusive: “the 
origin makes possible a field of knowledge whose function is to recover it, but always in 
a false recognition due to the excesses of its own speech. The origin lies at a place of 
inevitable loss.” '™ The origin is the Holy Grail of traditional history, and of metaphysics, 
but one that is explicitly denied to historians and philosophers by their own concept of it.
It is this melancholic knowledge that Nietzsche replaces with a genealogy which doesn’t 
assume that its object eludes it. Indeed it is by drawing on accessible histoiy (that is, 
interpretations) that the genealogist can “dispel the chimeras of the origin.” '™ Here, 
again, a key point: the genealogist needs histoiy, it is not just distinct from, but a weapon 
against metaphysics. In histoiy the various lowly and disparate sources of contemporary 
concepts, values and objects are to be found. Genealogy will, therefore, commit itself to 
at least one value held dear by historians -  an attention to detail. “Genealogy is grey, 
meticulous and patiently documentary.. .it must record the singularity of events outside of 
any monotonous finality.” What it patiently records, Foucault writes, is precisely “what 
we tend to feel is without histoiy ... not in order to trace the gradual curve of their 
evolution but to isolate the different scenes where they are arranged in different roles” -  
a phrase that sutures Nietzsche’s genealogy of ressentiment and morality to Foucault’s 
own analyses of madness and sexuality (amongst other things) normally deemed 
^historical, or those such as reason or penal practice which are thought to progress
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Rather than origins, then, the proper objects of genealogical analysis are descent and 
emergence. Descent -  -seems to refer, in its etymological connotations, to a
kind of racial or blood heritage. However in Nietzsche, Foucault argues, it is not a 
principle of continuity or of unitaiy beginnings. Genealogy doesn’t describe the evolution 
of a species or describe racial destiny. “On the contraiy, to follow the complex course of 
descent is to maintain events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the 
minute deviations -  or conversely, the complete reversals -  the errors, the false 
appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things which continue to 
exist and have value for us.. .” '™ Descent does not provide a heritage, or foundations, 
rather it fragments and unsettles -  “it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined 
consistent with itself.” '"' This is why genealogical history always has the characteristics 
of critique; it does not establish foundations but disturbs them.
Entstehung, emergence, as a process described by genealogy, displaces the notion that a 
phenomenon can be known by appeal to its culmination (an example of which would be 
positing the modern penal system as the final solution to a perpetual, gradually resolved 
problem of criminality, or modern sexual attitudes as a liberation of a once repressed 
innate desire, both moves that Foucault vigorously contests). “We believe that feelings 
are immutable, but eveiy sentiment, partieularly the noblest and most disinterested, has a 
history” -  historical knowledge is the antidote to this view that feelings -  or the body in 
its materiality -  could provide a principle of continuity or unity across time.'"^ 
Genealogical analysis of emergence, in contrast, posits the beginnings of objects, subjects
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and practices in a violent clash of powers seeking to impose interpretations: it “seeks to 
re-establish the various systems of subjection: not the anticipatoiy power of meaning, but 
the hazardous play of dominations.” '™ Thus power becomes a cmcial part of any 
genealogical analysis, it is a conflict of power that is delineated as the circumstance and 
condition of emergence. Further, “the forces operating in histoiy do not obey destiny or 
regulative mechanisms, but the luck of the battle.”'™ There is, as a result of this, no 
subject of an emergence -  it is an anonymous precipitate of intersecting and conflicting 
power relations; the outcome of which is not society’s “progress” (as a lessening of 
violence), but the installation of “each of its violences in a system of rules ... [which 
proceed] from domination to domination.” '"^  Such rules are empty and can be seized, 
bent, redirected, reversed. Whereas metaphysics seeks meaning in a lost origin, 
genealogy follows the luck of the battle. Genealogy, then, is a histoiy of the formation of 
what seems most natural, most ahistorical, using the minute details of the past to show 
the lowly and disparate descent, the violent emergence, of our values and concepts.
What is the relation between traditional history and genealogy, conceived as “wirkliche 
Historic” or effective histoiy? Foucault emphasizes that Nietzsche, from the time of his 
second Untimely Meditation onwards, questions any histoiy that assumes a 
suprahistorical perspective:
“a histoiy whose function is to compose the finally reduced diversity of time 
into a totality fully closed upon itself; a history that always encourages 
subjective recognitions and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the
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displacements of the past; a histoiy whose perspective on all that precedes it
'i
implies the end of time, a completed development. The historian’s history !
finds its support outside of time and claims to base its judgements on 
apocalyptic objectivity. This is only possible, however, because of its belief 
in eternal truth, the immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness 
as always identical to itself.... On the other hand, the historical sense can 
evade metaphysics and become a privileged instmment of genealogy if it 
reflises the certainty of absolutes.”'"^
It is the kind of perspective, then, “capable of shattering the unity of man’s being through 
which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of the past.”'™
Historical objectivity would only be possible if histoiy were over and one thus had an 
archimedean point from which to objectify the past.
Foucault outlines three main senses in which genealogy opposes traditional history:
firstly it parodie, it does not seek the pathos of “recognition”; secondly, it is 4
Idissociative and opposes itself to history-as-continuity; thirdly, it is sacrificial, and I
opposes history as a form of knowledge/tmth. Genealogy reveals that “the instinct for 
knowledge is malicious” and that what is sacrificed in its procedures is “the unity of the 
subject.”'™ Genealogy shows that knowledge cannot be grounded in man as nothing in 
man is ahistorical. The contemporary form of man can be explained historically because 
history, descent and emergence, the luck of the battle and the play of dominations has 
produced him.
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As Foucault’s essay draws to a close it becomes even more Nietzschean in tone, to the 
point where it is sometimes unclear, as the language of the citations and of the 
“commentary” become intertwined. Thus, with ‘The Uses and Disadvantages of History 
for Life’ clearly in mind Foucault asserts that whereas traditional histoiy is given to 
contemplating “distances and heights” -  the noblest periods, the greatest achievements 
and so on -  it does so “by getting as near as possible, placing itself at the foot of its 
mountain peaks, at the risk of adopting the famous perspective of frogs.”'"" In contrast 
genealogy, or “effective histoiy,” grasps what is already close to it, in an act which 
violently dispossesses it of its distanced and prestigious status.
The genealogy of traditional histoiy shows it to be of “humble birth” -  signalled by its 
self-effacement -  one form of which is its claim to “accept eveiy thing without making 
any distinctions ... Historians argue that this proves their tact and discretion. After all, 
what right have they to impose their tastes and preferences when they seek to determine 
what actually occurred in the past?” "^" Nietzsche, unsurprisingly, sees this as a total lack 
of taste. “Objectivity,” and “accuracy” cloak the feeble perspective of traditional history. 
The traditional historian has to “mimic death in order to enter the kingdom of the dead” 
(note here the echo of Nietzsche’s “let the dead buiy the living”. . Just as does 
Nietzsche in ‘The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,’ Foucault stresses the 
importance of forgetting, of not being in thrall to all that has gone before. How is this to 
be done? It is a matter of doing as Nietzsche did, in turning history into something else: 
“only by being seized, dominated and turned against its birth” was history made into
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genealogy.^™
While in the Untimely Meditations Nietzsche had reproached critical histoiy for elevating 
truth over life, Foucault sees him later in his work as seizing hold of the historical 
sensibility and reshaping monumental reverence into parody, antiquarian preservation 
into affirmation of discontinuity, and, in the most Foucauldian of these Nietzschean 
transformations, “the critique of the tmth held by men in the present becomes the 
destruction of the man who maintains knowledge by the injustice proper to the will to 
knowledge.” ™^ How, then, does Foucault do justice to Nietzsche? It is certainly not 
through parody, for this essay is absolutely in earnest; not through a dissociation of the 
line running from Nietzsche to Foucault; and by no means does it suggest an injustice is 
to be peipetrated on its subject. Yet this is not to offer an immanent critique, to suggest 
that it is undennined by a contradiction of content by form. For that contradiction is an 
apt response to the double injunction of Nietzsche; his call for followers who take 
responsibility for their own selves -  who “counter-sign,” in Derrida’s terms.
‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, Histoiy’ is, I would argue, to be understood in terms of the 
economy of laudatoiy exchange, of unconditional affirmation, that characterized 
Foucault’s “literary” writings, rather than as philosophical critique. It is notable that it 
was written for a collection of essays published in posthumous tribute to one of 
Foucault’s teachers, Jean Hyppolite -  the eulogy being one of the laudatoiy forms that 
appears most commonly within the intellectual sociality of twentieth century French 
culture.^™ That Foucault should chose to write on Nietzsche in place o/Hyppolite is also
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actor and the bad, and between the mask that masks itself, and that which appears as 
such. If Strauss must wear the mask of the classic, Nietzsche writes, “I wish he were a 
good actor and knew better how to imitate the style of naïve genius and the classic. For it 
remains to be said that Strauss is in fact a bad actor and utterly worthless as a stylist.”^™ 
In Alan Schrift’s Nietzsche and the Question o f Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics 
and Deconstruction it is the interpretation which appears as such that is shown to be the 
goal of Nietzsche’s philosophy, whilst in Nietzsche: Life as Literature Alexander 
Nehamas argues that Nietzsche achieved this through a style that established himself-
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noteworthy. Again and again it is Nietzsche who Foucault presents as behind the writers 
he most praises -  Blanchot, Bataille, Klossowski, Deleuze. In doing so he echoes Bataille 
who wrote: “My life with Nietzsche as a companion is a community. My book is this 
community.”^™ In Bataille’s case, to write On Nietzsche necessitated ''experiencing” him, 
and meant “pouring out one’s lifeblood,” and the result of this is a text that combines 
autobiographical reflection by the author with extensive quotation from his subject.^"*'
The reader experiences an excess of identifications and an absence of commentary that 
makes such an experience more likely, even as it dissolves the singularity of the authorial 
function.
Nietzsche makes this community of writers possible by being a mask that can be worn 
without implying a depth behind the mask; a place from which to speak which is not an 
origin, an authority which is not an author function. In the first Untimely Meditation
Nietzsche mocks the philosophical pretensions of David Strauss, particularly his
i;
masquerading as a genius - but interestingly he also draws a distinction between the good
'
and his truth claims -  as literary figures. Even more importantly, Paul de Man 
demonstrated that Nietzsche, in his deconstruction of the law of non-contradiction (the 
very foundation of philosophical tmth) instantiated an undecidability of rhetorical 
(literaiy) and logical f o r m s . T h e  evaluative criteria emergent from such a paradigm are 
inevitably, therefore, at least partly aesthetic in character. It is the latter which is relevant 
here - Foucault’s affirmation of Nietzsche is none too subtle, it operates through the 
excessive strategy of laudatory exchange, but it also passes from this mode into a more 
complete fiision with the mask Nietzsche provides, his disappearance from Foucault’s 
texts occurs at exactly the point in which he is internalised into genealogy as method. 
Deferring in this most intimate way with Nietzsche, who stands for origin, Foucault 
preseiwes and makes implicit the immanence of his project to the circumstances of its 
enunciation. The games between speaking of, speaking through, and writing on in 
Foucault’s treatment of Nietzsche are played out so as to remain faithful by breaking. The 
anacoluthonic mode is thus the means by which Foucault can be both properly 
Nietzschean; he stands in Nietzsche’s place, in place of him as it were. But doing so 
obviously Foucault acknowledges his own non-originality, passing this on to a figure 
who his himself multiple, untimely, and who writes against originality. Nietzsche is a 
mask that appears as such.
Foucault’s reflection on the themes of ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ is in fact an 
astonishing and sustained manifesto of his own genealogical project, an illumination of 
the methodological and critical principles of the historical sense at work in Discipline and 
Punish, The History o f Sexuality and other writings of the 1970s and 1980s. But it also
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speaks to (and from) the precepts of the French literary-philosophical culture of délire. 
There is an excessive identification operative in the essay which makes it quite different 
in tone from ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Mai%. ’ The “voices” of Nietzsche and Foucault (who 
writes, ostensibly, as a critical philologist) intermingle throughout, in a tone of mutual 
affirmation. Rather than critique in the genealogical sense, rather than tracing the descent 
and emergence of Nietzsche’s own thought, Foucault’s essay continually reinstates his 
centrality, unsuipassability, one might say his originality. But this affirmation itself, this 
preserving and monumentalising of Nietzsche, is precisely what allows Foucault to 
occupy his own critical position. And it is precisely here, with the most intense 
affirmation of Nietzsche, and the most excessive closure of the distance from him, that 
Foucault’s writing on him ends, as if it is indeed through the delirium of praise that one 
reaches the proper silence. Moreover, it is as though this same transition effects that 
which changes a “master” whom one quotes and writes on into the figure of a “friend” 
whom one speaks to and as, and is no longer distinct from. Hence, in Foucault’s writing 
on and thinking with Nietzsche we see how an aesthetics (of délire), an ethics (of 
reading), and an epistemology (not foundational, but emergent in the violent immanence 
of genealogy) are productively superimposed.
The textual traces of Nietzsche in Foucault’s work present a contradictory figure; origin 
(of Foucault’s philosophical autonomy) and refiiter of origins; ground of possibility and 
destroyer of foundational concepts; exemplar of the délme of the labyrinthine being of 
language, with its concomitant absence of work as corpus {le désoeuvrement) and author
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of the Nietzschean œuvre analysed in Nietzsche, Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History. If the textual strategies of these last two essays in particular present a chain a 
identifications that seem to displace critical discourse as it would usually be understood, 
they can be read as implicated in the logic of The Archaeology o f Knowledge, where 
Foucault’s evocation of the text as a labyrinth in which to lose oneself is presented in 
terms which imply an identification of author and text. That his discussion of œuvre, 
book, and author in the Archaeology and in ‘What is an Author?’ seem to propose such 
an identification as a principle of critical analysis fiirther complicates matters. Foucault 
seems to suggest that he, as an author, is no more than the statements he has made (if his 
argument is consistently applied at least), and that such statements are certainly not to be 
assumed to possess any unity due to their shared association with his name. Yet it is 
precisely by means of a oppoifunistic nominalism that Foucault organises his histories, 
and finds the possibility of their articulation.
It is by the name “madness” that Foucault has access to a histoiy of practices that he can 
then show do not have a common object. The consistency of the name lends an illusion of 
continuity to an object that has none in essence. This nominalistic strategy itself amounts 
to a Nietzschean inheritance in Foucault’s thought and brings us back once again to the 
question of how to understand the relation between the two. If Foucault’s reading of 
Nietzsche takes the proper name as a pretext for the gathering together of various 
statements, which are articulated differently at different points in his (Foucault’s) texts, 
he can be seen as being consistent in his application of his own argument. Yet it is clear 
that he goes further, in invoking Nietzsche as a point of origin; one that seems to displace
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the question of origins. Thus Foucault’s relation to Nietzsche can be characterized as one 
of fidelity and betrayal, or rather betrayal as fidelity- as we have already seen, Nietzsche 
makes it very hard to be a Nietzschean without betraying him (one cannot be a 
Nietzschean without betraying Nietzsche -  reads two ways, either one can’t be a 
Nietzschean, or one can, but only by betrayal). In turn my own treatment of Foucault has 
this quality -  to make of his work an œuvre is to organize his statements according to an 
author-function and thus to betray his thought, but if this is done in name only, if the 
gathering of texts is nominal, if it doesn’t assume an originary point in the subject, it 
perhaps remains faithful after all.
Nietzsche’s assessment of the historical sensibility of his own time, and its detrimental 
effect on life, on action, leads him to propose that the degree at which study of history 
becomes harmfiil must be determined. This degree depends on what Nietzsche terms the 
“plastic power” of a man / people / culture. He defines “plastic power” as follows:
“the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and 
incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace 
what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds. ... The stronger the innermost 
roots of a man’s nature, the more readily will he be able to assimilate and 
appropriate the things of the past; the most powerful and tremendous nature 
would be characterized by the fact that it would know no boundary at all at 
which the historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would draw into itself
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and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign to it, and 
as it were transform it into blood.” "^"
An appropriation that becomes blood, that is, as it were, the appropriation of a lineage, 
the making of oneself into a descendant, or better an incorporated “friend” -  this is 
precisely how to characterize Foucault’s relation to Nietzsche as exemplified clearly in 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, and more opaquely in his other texts. And yet this 
appropriation takes the form of an affirmation of precisely Nietzsche’s own concept of 
the historical sense governed by a “plastic power.” Foucault becomes Nietzsche to 
become himself; Nietzsche is a mask that can be worn to clear the space for a relation to 
history that serves the present.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Escaping From / To Identity
We believe, in any event, that the body obeys the exclusive laws o f  physiology, and 
that it escapes the influence o f history, but this too is false. The body is moulded by a 
great many distinct regimes ... it constructs resistances. ‘Effective’ history differs 
from the history o f historians in being without constants. Nothing in man - not even 
his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis fo r  self-recognition or fo r  
understanding other men ... History becomes ‘effective’ to the degree that it 
introduces discontinuity into our very being - as it divides our emotions, dramatizes 
our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself.... knowledge is not made 
fo r  understanding; it is made fo r  cutting.
Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.
O f Bodies changed to other forms I  tell;
You Gods, who have yourselves wrought every change.
Inspire my enterprise and lead my lay 
In one continuous song from  nature’s first 
Remote Beginnings to our modern times.
Ovid, Metamorphoses.
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Baclcward Turn baclcward o Time in your flight 
Bring me my childhood just fo r  a night 
Father come back from your Echoless shore 
And be in the midst o f those you adore.
Many Houdini.
At the top of Frank Lloyd Wright’s Guggenheim Museum in New York, 
incongruously framed by its pristine white walls and lit by its crystalline cupola, a 
figure dressed in industrial protective clothing and face-mask is concentratedly 
engaged in an arcane ritual. He repeatedly moves between propped steel plates and a 
propylene burner, on top of which is a vat of molten petroleum jelly. Hurling the 
liquefied jelly against the propped metal, the protagonist sends a slow stream of clear 
liquid down the incline of the Guggenheim’s famous ramp. This is Matthew Barney’s 
Cremaster 3 and the figure in the protective gear is none other than Richard Serra. 
Barney incorporates SeiTa and his artistic practice within a section of the film that is a 
microcosm of the Cremaster Cycle project, and has him re-enact an iconic moment 
from his own sculptural practice of the late 1960s and early 1970s, with Barney’s own 
signature material -  Vaseline -  displacing Serra’s original molten lead (Fig. 71). How 
might one make sense of this outlandish act of appropriation, and the art work of 
which it is only one part?
The trajectory of this thesis has moved from the conditions of contemporaiy criticism, 
via a consideration of themes of appropriation, image, and cinematic narrative, to an 
analysis of the importance of loss of self and textual aesthetics for Foucault’s
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historiography. To bring these themes together and offer a forward-looking 
conclusion, this Chapter offers an analysis of Matthew Barney’s appropriations of 
Serra -  treating him both as an art-historical figure and as a site of phantasmatic 
identification -  and of the (still) famous magician and escapologist, HaiTy Houdini. It 
is my contention here that Barney’s appropriation of Serra suggests a way of 
rethinking Hal Foster’s notion that postmodern art “tropes” its predecessors and, 
further, that Barney’s identification with Houdini not only offers one way into his 
hermetic conceptual and iconographie system, but that Houdini can also figure 
something for the art historian -  a possible way back out again to a position from 
which to read it in a broader cultural context.
This Chapter attempts to put into practice the hypothesis that criticism which 
embraces the types of spectatorial identification exemplified by cinema can negotiate 
a positive reading of the ambivalence of postmodern culture. The paradigm of critical 
writing developed in October -  which provided the general theoretical frame for 
Chapters One and Two of this thesis -  struggles to achieve this in relation to 
contemporary art in general, and Matthew Barney in particular. The antipathy of 
October’s editorial heavyweights, most particularly Benjamin Buchloh, to Barney is 
clearly expressed in their survey o f Art Since 1900} For Buchloh, Barney’s success 
testifies to the fact that “the mnemonic dimension in a r t ... is the most susceptible to 
fetishization and spectacularization” and that as much as historical memoiy can 
oppose such processes, the form validated in contemporary art merely delivers “the 
aesthetic capacity to construct memory images to the voracious demands of an 
apparatus that entirely lacks the ability remember and reflect historically.”  ^This same 
objection was lodged by Rosalind Krauss against video art, on the grounds that its
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defining medium was not grounded in material specificity, but rather in the 
psychological condition of narcissism/ In Krauss’s reading, the narcissistic 
indistinction of subject and object is “the prison of a collapsed present... a present 
time which is completely severed from a sense of its own pas t ... totally cut-off from 
hi s t o ry . Bu t ,  following Buchloh’s own insistence that no particular artistic paradigm 
can be considered inherently critical, can’t we reassert the fundamental ambiguity of 
technological spectacularization as theorised by Benjamin, and argue that no 
paradigm is inherently regressive either; at least not when it contains the resources to 
support a critical inteipretation that opens up the historical mnemonic dimension? It is 
precisely such an interpretation that I attempt here, seeking to “cut” historical scenes 
into the present of Barney’s films. Further, against Krauss’s negative estimation of 
narcissism, I argue that it can play a role in this project.
In different ways Lou Andreas-Salome and Julia Kristeva propose Narcissus as a 
positive, creative figure. For Andreas-Salome he figures the intensity of passionate 
engagement with both self and world as “Narcissus the Magician”; for Ki'isteva he 
faces up to “the vertigo of a love with no object other than a mirage.”  ^Unlike Scottie 
in Hitchcock’s Vertigo who can’t face the void of his desire, Narcissus in Kiisteva’s 
account could potentially overcome this emptiness at the core of the subject. Whereas 
Scottie, like Ovid’s Narcissus, is made both murderous and suicidal by his love for a 
fake, Kristeva’s Narcissus “lives because he truly loves this ‘fake’ ... he neither needs 
to have it nor to be it.”  ^His desire is not without an object, because ^Hhe object o f  
Narcissus is psychic space; it is representation itself fantasy. But he does not know it 
and he dies. If he knew it he would be an intellectual, a creator of speculative fictions, 
an artist, writer, psychologist, psychoanalyst.”  ^Barney’s work, I shall try to show.
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speaks to such psychic space and suggests that “speculative fictions” may contribute 
to a contemporaiy re-imagining of the relations between self and world.
Barney’s increasingly elaborate films have developed a complex, and frequently 
esoteric, aesthetic vocabulaiy, including a personal mythology of sorts. The five-part 
Cremaster Cycle (1994-2002) and the Drawing Restraint series (1988-2005, and 
ongoing) form the core of Barney’s activity, and are incredibly rich and engaging 
pieces, which present notable problems for art historical interpretation. Indeed, the 
initial reception of these works within art histoiy, and in the cultural journalism which 
quickly latched onto them, conspicuously stmggled to go much beyond an evocation 
of the confusion of the interpreters. The effect is often like reading a description of an 
opera by someone who has no idea w haf s being sung about; hence detailed accounts 
of iconographie elements within the films rarely added up to much, beyond pointing 
to the lavish production values and outlandish frames of reference in the work. Rarely 
-  Lena Relyea’s 1991 Artforum exhibition review being a notable exception -  was the 
art historical location of the work addressed.^ This unsatisfactoiy state of affairs is 
(over)compensated for by the initiates of Barney’s hermetic imaginary -  figures such 
as Nancy Spector, Richard Flood and Neville Wakefield -  whose writing often tends 
towards the reduplication of Barney’s own (admittedly fascinating) aesthetic 
universe.^ This dimension of writing on Barney, which reached its apotheosis in the 
exhibition catalogue for 2002’s Cremaster blockbuster at the Guggenheim (a 
publication that is essentially an interpretative handbook to the work) is, to continue 
the musical analogy, akin to the literalist interpretations of music E.M. Forster’s 
satirises in Howard’s End, in which elephants and goblins populate a Beethoven 
scherzo}^ In other words, here it is all too clear what everything “is” and criticism
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becomes merely the recovery of what is encrypted in the forms of the work; i.e. it 
becomes akin to what Foucault terms “commentary.”
If the generally uninfomiative quality of much critical writing on Barney “from 
without,” as it were, suggests an opportunity for serious and prolonged engagement 
with the intricacies of his iconography, the “insiders” view presents a veiy real 
problem to such a project, for if Barney’s “libretto” is so unequivocal -  if each 
element is given a determinate place, and detailed accounts of this published -  what is 
the purpose of further writing? I argue that it is precisely to establish a critical 
genealogy of the work, by moving both inside and outside its own terms, and in so 
doing, to estimate its value to the present. The Cremaster Cycle, and Barney’s work in 
general, has effectively operated without the aid of critical writing in this sense, and 
so seems to bear out the pessimistic conclusions drawn by the October roundtable on 
art criticism (discussed in my introduction), which decried the galleiy-star nexus as 
sidelining the critic in favour of pure market logic. But it hardly seems satisfactory 
that the response to this should be the abandoning of an incredibly ambitious and 
aesthetically engaging body of work to a reception taking the form of either cynical 
dismissal (à la Buchloh) or hyperbolic praise.' ' My aim here is to strategically draw 
on the connotations of Serra and Houdini in Barney’s use of them, in each instance 
attempting to indicate how following through on these identifications opens the work 
out to broader questions; specifically (and unlikely as it may seem!) to Walter 
Benjamin’s analysis of cinema’s potential role in the transformation of art, and to 
feminist theorisations of phallic authority. First though, an exposition of the basic 
thematics of Barney’s work is in order.
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A former college football star, one time medical student aiming for a career in plastic 
surgeiy, and (briefly) male model, Barney is “the most important American artist of 
his generation” if you believe the New York Times/^ Barney’s art is rich in eveiy 
sense, his films, videos, sculptures, installations and photographs produce a symbolic 
universe hybridized from sport and pop culture, as well as literary, psychoanalytic, art 
historical, and scientific narratives spliced with the artist’s own biography. The 
Cremaster Cycle, begun in 1994 and completed in 2002, takes in a variety of genres, 
cinematic and televisual styles, appropriated narratives, and symbolically loaded 
locations. It features costuming by Isaac Misrahi and Manolo Blahnik, and cameo 
appearances by Norman Mailer and Ursula Andress, as well as Serra. The Cycle’s 
associative / metonymic logic even sees Johnny Cash represented as a death metal 
band jamming with a hive of bees. In his films, up to and including the Cremaster 
Cycle, Barney appears as a startling array of characters - his personae have included 
serial killers. Masonic apprentices, athletes, pipers, Hollywood starlets, satyrs, 
magicians, giants. Often using prosthetics to drastically alter his appearance - 
including the appearance of his genitalia, Barney presents his body, and those of his 
co-stars, as constantly morphing sites for the expression of psychological and 
biological states (Fig. 72). The Cycle’s representation of in utero biological 
differentiation and post-natal psychical development, via appropriated cultural 
narratives blurs the line between bodily fact and cultural fiction, and seems to invite 
inteipretation to respond in kind. Key to understanding Barney’s oeuvre, I would 
argue, have been two constants: first the foregrounding of his own body and of bodily 
metaphors in the work, and second, his identification with, and imaginative use of, 
Houdini’s mythology alongside his own.
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Barney’s early video pieces often presented him playing Houdini in the guise of “The 
Character of Positive Restraint” -  a protagonist, like all of Barney’s alter-egos, made 
up of drives but seeming to lack agency. Exti'apolating from a remark of Houdini’s 
that he could intuit the workings of any lock -  even one not yet invented -  hy 
“absorbing” it, Barney conceptualized Houdini according to his own esoteric 
understanding of the process of form-making. Reflecting on the training of his own 
athletic body through hypertrophic growth, whereby muscle tissue is placed under 
strain to exhaust it and produce enlargement, Barney developed a theory of form in 
which resistance is cmcial to development -  whether physical, psychical, or artistic. 
Barney proposed a three-part schema for the creation of form -  Situation, Condition, 
Production. Situation is a zone of pure potential, in which raw drive is conceived as 
sexually charged but as yet useless. This raw energy is processed through Condition, a 
zone conceived on the model of a “disciplinary funnel” in the body -  digestion as a 
metaphor for forming. Finally, in stage 3 -  Production -  form enters the world via 
anal or oral channels. Barney quickly revised this model, removing the stage of 
production and short-circuiting the system he had proposed. “The internal matrix 
would then oscillate exclusively between Situation and Condition, between desire and 
discipline, in a never-ending, self-referential, autoerotic cycle.” As Barney himself 
put it “if Production is bypassed ... the head goes up the ass, and the cycle flickers 
between Situation and Condition, between discipline and desire.”'"' The creation of 
such a self-referential hermetic system poses an obvious problem of interpretation. To 
what extent can we penetrate this world? Can we enter into Barney’s aesthetic without 
following him up his own ass?
Short-circuiting this self-created and somewhat perverse schema seemed to Barney to
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open on to the kinds of areas in which his art was already involved -  specifically a 
kind of narcissistic confusion of self and world in which the boundaries between the 
human and the mechanical, the male and female, the erotic and the auto-erotic, the 
psychical and the physical no longer hold. These ideas are summarized in Barney’s 
“Field Emblem,” ubiquitous in his work since 1988 (Fig. 73). The Field Emblem 
represents an orifice and its se lf  enclosure, but also describes the body as stadium or 
playing field. The embodiment of the Field Emblem idea, Houdini functions in 
Barney’s early work as a representative of narcissistic auto-eroticism.'^ In 1989’s 
video action FIELD DRESSING (orifill) Barney, as Houdini, naked apart from a 
climbing harness, lowers himself from the galleiy ceiling to a Vaseline field emblem 
below and attempts hermetic se lf  enclosure by filling all his orifices with Vaseline. 
This action also exemplifies the way Barney often reverses nomiative relations 
between part and whole, and between bodily and architectural space. Lowering and 
raising himself between the refrigerated floor and the heated ceiling Barney becomes 
a part object -  as though controlled by the cremaster, the muscle which raises and 
lowers a man’s testicles in response to temperature and fear."’ This approach, and the 
metaphorical use of Houdini was developed further in Barney’s twin 1991 
installations Transexualis, which featured gym equipment sculpted from Vaseline, 
and kept solid by walk-in fridges (Fig. 74).'^ Included in these installations was 
human chorionic gonadotrophin, a hormone only produced in the placenta -  
metaphorically turning the gallery into a bodily space, a womb. The Transexualis 
installation also featured prosthetic plastics and medical devices for opening, 
inspecting, and intervening in the body. All this provided the setting for a chase 
between “Houdini” and an antagonist based on a famous American football player 
(LA Raiders star Jim Otto, representing an “extrovert” counterpart to Houdini’s
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hermeticism, an openness to penetration), in which Houdini at one stage appears in 
drag in an attempt to evade his opponent (Figs. 75-77).'^ That Barney’s sculptural 
media tend to be substances, devices or apparatuses for the metamorphosing of the 
body -  whether in foetal development, surgical procedures or athletic training, 
emphasizes that he is interested in the body as a site of transfomiation and change.
His conception of the body could aptly be characterized as “hormonal” insofar as this 
terminology reflects not only Barney’s actual practice, but also implies a iion- 
ontological understanding of gender, which acknowledges biological difference 
without organizing it into permanent and originary binaristic categories of identity.
Barney’s use of sport as a metaphor for conflict, and for willed transformation of the 
body through resistance, lends itself to being critiqued from two points of view. 
Firstly, for Theodor Adorno sport itself is a deformation of the ludic dimension of 
experience, which demonstrates that rather than expanding possibilities for authentic 
play “the crisis of semblance may engulf play as well, for the harmlessness of play 
deserves the same fate as does harmony, which originates in semblance. Art that seeks 
to redeem itself from semblance through play becomes sport.” '  ^Adorno’s 
thoroughgoing antipathy to sport in all fonus is based in his understanding of it as 
play made into Duty -  “a ritual in which the subjected celebrate their subjection. 
Secondly, Barney’s representational games with normatively illegible, anomalous 
genitalia could be interpreted as a classical defensive fetishistic move. Freud writes:
“In very subtle instances both the disavowal and the affirmation of the
castration have found their way into the construction of the fetish itself.
This was so in the case of a man whose fetish was an athletic support-
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belt which could also be worn as bathing drawers. This piece of 
clothing covered up the genitals entirely and concealed the distinction 
between them. Analysis showed that it signified that women were 
castrated and that they were not castrated; and it also allowed of the 
hypothesis that men were not castrated, for all these possibilities could 
equally well be concealed under the belt -  the earliest mdiment of 
which in his childhood had been the fig-leaf on a statue.” '^
David Lomas cites this passage in a discussion of Miro’s drawing practice, and 
emphasises that against the narrative of the fixity of gender, the fetishist’s disavowal 
can be read as the disruption of “a normative adult body schema”; a disruption which 
results in “a feeling of unbridled libidinal energy, excessive and polymorphously 
p e r v e r s e . T h e  fetishism of the ‘athletic support man’ would, then, be “a refusal to 
submit to the binary oppositional tenus overseen by the phallic signifier that organise 
sexual difference under p a t r ia rc h y .B a rn e y ’s work seems to enact a similar refusal, 
albeit in such a way that the feminism-inspired tenor of Lomas’s terms cannot be 
immediately mapped onto it. There is more (and less...) going on here than a 
deconstruction of logocentrism.
The Houdini-Otto conflict came to a conclusion, with neither side victorious, in 
Ottoshaft (1992), Barney’s contribution to Documenta I X (Figs. 78-80). This piece, 
which to a greater extent than before incorporated site as protagonist and as 
imaginary bodily space, was a key stepping stone to the dynamics of The Cremaster 
Cycle. And just as Ottoshaft metaphorically exploited the various physical sites of 
Kassel, so 1993’s Drawing Restraint 7 posited Manhattan Island as a body.
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continually entered and exited by three Satyr characters in a limousine, via each of its 
interconnecting tunnels and bridges. Drawing Restraint 7 combined mythology (the 
stoiy of the flaying of Marsyas from Ovid’s Metamorphoses) with the search for 
narcissistic self-enclosure (again) -  figured by Barney as an immature “kid” satyr 
perpetually chasing his own tail -  and connected the hubristic struggle to make form 
with the confusion of body and world, body and machine (Figs. 81, 82).^"' Thus the 
basic working methods which have informed Barney’s work since 1994 were 
established gradually, from an initial approach which operated in (relatively) 
conventional terms of task-orientated performance video, to a much more elaborate 
aesthetic.
Making an imaginative leap from the fact that the human embryo becomes male or 
female when hormones influence the ascent or descent of initially undifferentiated 
“buds” to become ovaries or testes, the Cremaster Cycle extrapolates from the ascent 
and descent of the adult testes that there might be forces of resistance to the definitive 
and final gendered identity of the body. Broadly it describes the growth of an embryo 
from its initial phase of “pure potential” when it is yet to become male or female, 
through a struggle against differentiation to a final definitive metamorphosis to 
masculine form, presented as tragic death. In presenting masculinity as both 
biological destiny and heroic failure, Barney successfully elaborates a polymorphous 
repertoire of self-representations, succeeding, at least in fantasy, in escaping the 
normative limits of legible masculinity. Telling a story about the inevitability of 
differentiation, Barney fashions for himself a series of alter-egos who play out 
alternative possibilities, and presents normative masculine identity as the loss of these
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possib ilities.
By means, as indicated already, of a confusion of body and world, of self and other, 
cultural myth and personal biogi'aphy, Barney plays out an extraordinarily rich and 
elaborate system. The Cremaster Cycle moves from the description of the 
undifferentiated state, represented by chorines on Barney’s hometown football field in 
Cremaster 7; through the dark Western of Cremaster 2, based largely on Noiinan 
Mailer’s extraordinary journalistic novel The Executioner’s Song, Mormon doctrine, 
and the life-cycle of bees; the Oedipal struggle of Cremaster 3, drawing on Masonic 
mythology, psychoanalytic discourses on narcissism, and the construction of the 
Chiysler Building; to the panic of Cremaster 4, where Barney appears as a man / ram 
hybrid struggling to tunnel into the Isle of Man. From numbers 2 to -7 we see Barney’s 
protagonists (played by himself) stmggling against differentiation, as all the while -  
as we might expect given his basic conception of form-making -  they provide the 
very resistance necessary for differentiating growth. Cremaster 5, a tragic opera set in 
Budapest, presents the failure to maintain the state of undifferentiated wholeness 
Barney’s characters had sought (whether this wholeness is pre-natal, pre-symbolic, 
narcissistic, or anal-sadistic). It ends with the death of Houdini (played by Barney) as 
he jumps, in manacles representing both ovaries and testicles, from the Lanchid 
bridge, the possibility of deferring fully differentiated masculinity seemingly at an 
end.“
Having sketched what is only one possible reading of the Cremaster Cycle, I shall 
now turn to the role, or roles Houdini plays within it. He appears first in Cremaster 2, 
played by none other than Norman Mailer (Fig. 83). As the author of The
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Executioner’s Song -  the book that provides the narrative elements of Barney’s film -  
Mailer brings a triple paternal dimension to the role of Houdini/^ Firstly, he is the 
“creator” of the film’s protagonist Gary Gilmore (famous for insisting, despite hope 
of clemency, that the state of Utah execute him in 1977, for his confessed double 
murder) insofar as Gilmore’s life story is primarily known through Mailer’s book. 
Secondly, in that book Mailer suggests that Houdini may have been Gilmore’s 
grandfather. Finally -  Mailer brings with him to the role his own reputation as a 
particularly masculine figure. Cremaster 2 opens with an extraordinary scene in 
which Gary Gilmore’s conception is represented as a séance earned out by his 
grandmother (a medium known as Baby Fay La Foe) spliced with the process of 
reproduction in the bee hive.^^ Cremaster 2 ends with a representation of Houdini 
having just performed Metamorphosis -  one of his signature tricks - at the World’s 
Columbian Exposition in 1893. As he prepares for his performance, Houdini is made 
an offer by Baby Fay, who is hoth historical character here and the Queen of the 
hive.^^ In the Cycle’s only lines of spoken dialogue she attempts to seduce Houdini, 
sensing that his trans-gender Metamorphosis makes him a rival. Thus Cremaster 2 
ends with three seemingly simultaneous events: Houdini’s performance of 
Metamorphosis’, the implication of a sexual union which (may have) lead to Gilmore’s 
birth; and the representation of Gilmore’s death, three moments which seem to be 
equivalent in the hermetic logic of the Cycle.
Cremaster 3 makes use of another hermetic system -  Freemasonry. This may in itself 
be a reference to Houdini, who achieved the rank of Master Mason in the St. Cecile 
Lodge in New York, but the film also refers back to Houdini’s role in Cremaster 2. 
One of the first scenes in Cremaster 3 reveals the outcome of Houdini’s encounter
351
with Baby Fay, in what is a typical confusion of chronology and sequence within the 
Cycle. Gary Gilmore digs himself out from under the foundations of the Chrysler 
Building, metamorphosed, through “the space of Houdini” (i.e. his meaning within 
Barney’s cosmology), into a female coipse (Fig. 84). This splices the substitution 
tnek Metamorphosis with one of Houdini’s many spectacular feats of escapology -  
digging himself out of a coffin buried fully 6 ft. below ground. It also confuses 
Gilmore’s death in 1977, with his birth, and Houdini’s possible paternal relation to 
Gilmore in the 1920s (when he met Baby Fay) with his performance at the World’s 
Columbian Exposition in 1893. This is typical of Barney’s sculptural approach to 
narrative, and points up, I think, the problems his work presents for anyone with the 
hubris to tiy and inteipret it. One is faced with a wealth of historical and cultural 
allusion, processed through a hermetic system that digests this material to its own 
ends: historical events and personages seem to be merely grist to Barney’s mill.
Cremaster 4 alludes in various aspects of its design to “the period of the “physical 
culture” in which Houdini and these other perfomiance artists took on the Victorian 
ideal of how physicality should be expressed.”^^  It also features Barney in a couple of 
particularly Houdini-esque actions, but it is the fifth and last film in the Cycle that 
foregrounds Houdini as Barney’s alter-ego most clearly. Set in Budapest it features 
Ursula Andress as the “Queen of Chain” (Fig. 85), whose tragic story is told as an 
opera. Matthew Barney plays three roles in Cremaster 5 -  “The Queen’s Diva,” “Her 
Giant,” and “Her Magician” (Houdini) (Figs. 86-88). As noted earlier, this film 
describes the final differentiation of the foetal body into a male form, figured 
primarily through Her Giant in a scene which takes place in the Gellert Baths in 
Budapest. As is typical of Barney’s aesthetic system a camera shot which starts to
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move down to look through the Queen’s thrown to the Baths below, is cut with one 
moving up under her dress, suggesting that the action described takes place in her 
body. I have already indicated that differentiation means death for the Cremaster 
system, whose protagonists struggle to maintain a narcissistic, pre-natal wholeness. 
This is indicated by Cremaster 5 ’s tragic tone, which centres on a love affair between 
the Queen and Her Magician (Fig. 89). '^  ^It is characteristic of Barney’s work that pre­
natal physical development and post-natal psychological development are hybridised 
in narratives made up of digested cultural and biographical material. Here Houdini’s 
intensely close relationship with his mother is overlayed on a tragic love stoiy 
between Queen and Magician and the biological metaphor pursued throughout the 
Cycle as a whole. The Magician’s death is represented by the re-enactment of one of 
Houdini’s famous bridge-jumps (Fig. 90). Yet this moment, which narratively appears 
to be the tragic culmination of a love stoiy between The Queen of Chain and Houdini 
as Her Magician is also a moment of possibility -  in fact a moment of birth, as the 
libretto makes clear. The Queen of Chain’s lament for her lost lover begins:
The o f March -  in the final freeze o f that year
This was our first and painfully, our very last 
Over the Danube
I  left you there on a bridge o f chain^^
2 4 "’ March 1874 was Houdini’s birthday; thus the Cremaster Cycle’s basic modus 
operandi -  the overlaying or hybridization of pre-natal biology and post-natal psychic 
development -  is concluded by the birth of the figure whose resistance to the loss of 
wholeness and non-differentiation (whether intrauterine or pre-symbolic) has driven it
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from the start. The implication, figured by two teardrops falling from the Queen of 
Chain into the Danube, is that either there is a cyclical return to the beginning of the 
process, or that there is an escape from its seemingly all-pervasive logic. Houdini the 
escapologist, and Houdini, the narcissistic “Character of Positive Restraint,” figures 
both possibilities, and thus also serves as a figure for the art historical interpreter, who 
can either traverse Barney’s fantasy and emerge outwith its terms, or remain caught in 
its hermetic logic. It is this dual role of Houdini in the Cremaster system - as both 
emblem of hermetic self-enclosure and as escapee from its logic that first made me 
think of him as perhaps a privileged figure for the kind of engagement with Barney’s 
work I wanted to attempt - one that could move between his hermetic system and a 
world of historical and art historical meanings outside it. This approach seems to me 
appropriate to Barney’s aesthetic insofar as it means engaging in the very kind of 
identification with Houdini that he employs, though to different ends, and abandoning 
the kind of inteipretative distance that tends to undermine art historical discussion of 
art practices that trouble traditional artist-object-viewer relations. The Cremaster 
Cycle’s ending in “death,” with the birth of Houdini, then, provides the starting point 
for this analysis.
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Perhaps one can define the times, and the individual people who live through them, by 
their exits; by what they think o f  themselves as having to escape from, and to 
confront, in order to live the lives they want. Every modern person has their own 
repertoire o f elsewheres, o f  alternatives — the places they go in their minds, and the 
ambitions they attempt to realise -  to make their actual, lived lives more than 
bearable. Indeed the whole notion o f escape — that it is possible and desirable -  is like 
a prosthetic device o f the imagination. Adam Philips, Houdini’s Box.
The magician is the beloved fairy god-mother o f  capitalism. 
Jorge Luis Marzo, ‘Sleight of Hand.’
Born Ehrich Weiss, in 1874, Harry Houdini arrived in America in 1878, and made his 
stage debut at 9, as “Ehrich, Prince of the Air.” His stagename (which would become 
his only name) came from an Anglicization of his nickname -  Ehrie -  and an 
appropriation of the surname of legendary French Magician Robert-Houdin. Like 
many immigrants Houdini had to suffer frequent misspellings of his name before he 
made it: he was billed as “Houdin,” “Hunyadi,” “Hondini,” Robert Houdini, and even, 
with his wife, “The Houdinese.” His own repertoire of stagenames and acts was 
hardly less varied: he appeared as Professor Murat, Cardo, and for a period as Projea,
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Wild Man of Mexico. The requirement to metamorphose his act in search of success 
lead Houdini to tiy his hand at comedy, musical skits, even promotion - mnning a 
short-lived Burlesque act. If this constant change was familiar to Houdini, who had in 
his teens already worked at various jobs, including factory worker and messenger boy, 
it constituted nonetheless something he wanted to escape from, and not just for 
economic reasons.
Houdini was troubled all his adult life by his memoiy of his father as a failed 
immigrant - a German speaking rabbi who couldn’t find an American congregation, 
and had to seek work as a butcher, a mohel, and finally as a factory worker alongside 
his son. In later life Houdini would, in what was clearly a compensatory manner, 
exaggerate his father’s social status and learning - he had a Ph.D., he fled Europe after 
a noble duel, and so on. Houdini would also seek to buy back the books his father had 
been forced to sell, building what would become a massive collection and eventually 
employing Harvard’s theatre librarian to organise the more than 50, 000 books on 
religion, magic, drama and Spiritualism that he had acquired. Houdini’s description of 
his father’s death in 1892 is particularly revealing of his relation to his mother 
(Cecilia), for Houdini reported his father’s last words as an instmction to look after 
her.^^ Whether or not this was actually the case or a rewriting of history, Houdini 
certainly saw it as his role. Hopelessly devoted to his mother, who called him “little 
papa,” Houdini would subtitle a photo of himself with his wife and mother “my two 
sweethearts,” and well into adult life would reprise his childhood habit of listening to 
his mother’s heartbeat while she held him.^"' He described the news of her death in 
1913 as “a shock from which I do not think recovery is possible.” These twin factors 
“his father’s failure in America, and his own passionate love for his mother -
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provided some of the psychological ingredients which Houdini would turn into one of 
the most engaging and compelling of modernity’s performative practices.
But that was still some way off when, appearing in the early 1890s in “dime 
museums” -  a kind of human equivalent of the cabinet of curiosity -  Houdini, 
together with his wife Bess, shared the bill with performing monkeys, sprinting 
contests for fat ladies, and such wonders as Unthan, an armless violinist, and Count 
Oiioff, the “Human Window Pane” (advertised with the promise “you can see his 
heart beat! you can see his blood circulate! ”).^  ^If Houdini felt an affinity with the 
likes of the Human Window Pane, (being, as he noted, “classed a freak too”) the dime 
museum was nonetheless a context he wanted to escape from and, although it went 
relatively unnoticed at first, one of the key ingredients for his elevation to a different 
kind of public attention -  one where he would be an exemplar rather than a freak -  
was already in place. On the dime museum circuit Bess and Houdini performed 
between 9 and 14 shows daily, and their tour-de-force was a stunt called 
Metamorphosis, a substitution cabinet effect Harry had done since starting out, 
notably at the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago (Fig. 91). A 
contemporary magazine described how Metamorphosis worked -  but not of course, 
how it was done:
“ ...to the audience and to the close inspection of the volunteers upon the 
stage, the time-worn tmnk was shown, and its four sides, bottom and 
cover well sounded to prove the absence of trickeiy. Next there were 
given for examination a black flannel bag, seven feet in length, a yard or 
so of tape and some sealing wax. Houdini’s next request was that his
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committee securely encase him in the previously examined sack, tightly 
bound its mouth together with heavy tape already in their hands, and 
secure the knots with sealing wax.”
Houdini would then be then shut inside a padlocked and roped trunk, which is in turn 
enclosed in a cabinet. “Mrs Houdini, standing at the open curtain, makes the 
following announcement. “Now then, I shall clap my hands three times, and at the 
third and last time I ask you to watch CLOSELY for - the - EFFECT.” At this, she 
rapidly closes the curtain and vanishes from sight, yet instantaneously the curtain is 
reopened - this time by Houdini himself.
Houdini would open the still padlocked and roped trunk and reveal Bess inside. To 
audiences the trick could seem, literally, miraculous. Especially, as Houdini pointed 
out on his earliest adverts for Metamorphosis, “the time consumed in making the 
change is THREE SECONDS!” Houdini would experiment and tinker with 
Metamorphosis throughout his career, but at this still formative stage he was 
particularly aware of the aspects that heightened the audience’s engagement with the 
drama he was presenting. Three are of particular importance here. Firstly, 
Metamorphosis drew a far better response when performed with Bess than with any of 
his “brothers.” Perhaps because he seemed a more prepossessing showman when 
juxtaposed with his barely five-foot bride, perhaps because there was something 
exciting, in all senses, about the suggestion that Houdini had changed into a female 
version of himself - an ambiguity suggested by the performers’ stage name - the 
Houdinis - that had not been presented when Harry was one half of “The Brothers 
Houdini.” Secondly, it was not necessary for Bess to be released from the bag for the
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trick to be deemed a success with the audience -  it was Harry’s release that was 
dramatized and which satisfied the audience’s motional investment in the trick. 
Finally, when Houdini combined the substitution effect with what he called “the braid 
trick” -  having his hands tied behind his back with rope or braid -  Metamorphosis 
seemed all the more miraculous, and all the more compelling for the audience.^^ 
Houdini hyped his act relentlessly, claiming to have wowed the world with 
Metamorphosis in his 1895 flyers. But i f  Metamorphosis could genuinely amaze 
audiences, Houdini had yet to find the act, and perhaps more importantly the stage, 
that would catapult him to global celebrity. His escape to that fame and success were 
to come from dramatizing escape itself.
It is no surprise that a man whose name remains synonymous with escapology should 
have tried to make a career for himself in what is perhaps modernity’s most 
characteristic place of escape (or at least escapism): the cinema. Houdini, who opined 
that “the moving picture is the most wonderful thing in the world,” made his big- 
screen debut in 1918 in The Master Mystery, pitting his wits against “Automaton,” a 
proto-cyborg villain, and winning a huge global audience in the process.^^ Yet 
Houdini’s cinematic career could not match his “live” theatrical feats for sheer 
excitement. However skilfully, however strenuously, he might perform his escapes for 
the camera, the mediation of that camera meant he simply could not compel an 
audience to believe its eyes when it was witness to the “impossible.” It was this ability 
that had marked Houdini out from the start of his career as a dime theatre performer.
As an immigrant who literally made his name in America, Houdini exemplified the 
entrepreneurial spirit applied to self-creation and self-promotion. What is interesting
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about his rise to global fame is the extent to which it relied on a theatricalization of 
escape, and an appeal to the popular imaginaiy, rather than an actual pre-eminence as 
a magician. Indeed, most of the feats with which Houdini made his name, including 
Metamorphosis were variants on well-established, and frequently performed, stage- 
magic tricks. What Houdini had on his competition, though, was a canny sense of 
how to dramatize both his escapes and his masculine body, and in doing so to compel 
the imaginaiy investments of mass audiences in him. From around 1906 his act began 
to incorporate public and obviously strenuous (sometimes exaggeratedly strenuous) 
stunts. He escaped from a kind of fantasia of modern sites of restraint: straitjackets, 
handcuffs, prison cells, and, in one spectacular run in Boston, a “crazy crib” (a bed 
designed to hold the violently insane. Fig. 92) as well as a selection of modem 
industrial and commercial objects: a hot-water tank, a milk-can, packing cases, and 
perhaps most tellingly, a modified roll-top desk.^^ Later he turned to the public stunts 
for which he is perhaps still most famous; inverted straitjacket escapes hanging from 
buildings, and manacled bridge jumps; feats which could draw crowds of many 
thousands. He underwent self-imposed trials of his skill -  and veiy visibly his strength 
and endurance -  in which the audience watched him risk the profoundest 
metamorphosis -  death -  only to thrill as he emerged unscathed. It is this aspect of 
Houdini’s escapology that Adam Philips has analyzed as the tme content of all his 
s tu n t s .H e  dramatized a kind of metamorphosis in which the end result was that he 
stayed the same: in the face of the entrapping products of modernity, the threats to 
masculinity of a changing social order, and death itself, Houdini remained Houdini -  
unique, unsurpassable, his own man.
Perhaps we can see what was at stake for Houdini’s audiences if we consider another
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of his signature escapes. He made it a point of principle that, on arrival in a new town, 
the first thing he would do was break out of jail, with the Press in attendance to 
guarantee maximum publicity. Often performing these escapes naked (to add to the 
mysteiy of how it was done) and, when possible, from the cells of notorious criminals 
(to add to the emotional charge), Houdini found a brilliant means of self-mythology 
and free publicity (Fig. 93). Appealing at once to the fear of imprisonment in 
whatever form, and to the fear of a criminality that could not be contained, Houdini 
allayed anxiety in one form while stoking it in another. Key to this, as John Kasson 
has argued, was Houdini’s presentation of his own body as prodigious (and self- 
made) in a culture that widely subscribed to anxieties about the emasculating 
consequences of m od e rn i ty .A  passionate opponent of Spiritualism, Houdini had no 
desire for his audience to ascribe magical powers to him. However much he presented 
his feats as inexplicable, he wanted them to be understood as unique achievements of 
his physical strength and skill, as bodily miracles. He went to great lengths to preserve 
that uniqueness; against those who emerged as challengers, and those who 
appropriated, or approximated, his name, often revealing his rivals’ secrets as “tricks 
of the trade.
Houdini’s body -  repeatedly beset by self-imposed dangers -  was the sign and 
guarantee of his uniqueness and indefatigability. Houdini’s signature escapes were 
often performed naked or nearly naked, a fact that as well as implying a lack of 
trickeiy, gave a libidinal dimension to the identifications of his audience. That 
Houdini’s male body -  under threat, but resilient -  should have become such a 
popular spectacle, is unsurprising given the oft-remarked disparity between the 
symbolic authority of the masculine subject position and the experiential travails of
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men in modernity. Houdini provided a site of identification and desire for his 
audience that allowed them to escape the uncertainties of identity via the repeated 
escapes of a performer whose name and body both seemed to guarantee his 
uniqueness. The powerful effect that this could have on an audience is shown in 
Houdini’s reception in Glasgow September 22nd 1904. After performing the packing 
case escape, which is a relatively simple effect, depending on misdirection and 
strength but can be dazzlingly effective, Houdini was given a hero’s reception. He 
recorded in his diaiy: “mob waited for me, took me shoulder high, carried me home 
and upstairs. I had to make a speech from the w i n d o w . T h e  unprecedented, and 
therefore thrilling, possibility of seeing Houdini fail, possibly paying the ultimate 
price for failure, kept audiences anxious and enthralled. But it was his success that 
they cheered; Houdini’s unique ability to escape from failure, entrapment, death (both 
real and symbolic), was what his fans wanted from him.
If at least one factor in Houdini’s success was his repeated dramatization of the threat 
to masculine identity, and his escape from this threat to an identity secured via an 
appropriated (yet self-given) name, coupled with a male body that emerged unscathed 
from the most severe dangers, then we might hypothesize that it was his performance 
of an unassailable phallic masculinity that compelled his audiences’ imaginary 
investment. Yet, as Judith Butler has argued in Bodies that Matter, the performative 
basis of such phallic identity, its reliance on repeated citation, is the condition of its 
possible subversion. The veiy repetition of Houdini’s escapes, then, testified to the 
persistent need for the performing of a constructed identity, and implied, at least, the 
possibility of a disruption to that perfomiance. That Butler’s own subversion of 
psychoanalytic theory (particularly that of Lacan) is based on deconstructing the
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distinction between the symbolic and the imaginaiy (guaranteed by the phallic 
signifier) is highly significant for my argument here. Butler deconstructs the role of 
the phallus in both Freud’s and Lacan’s versions of subject formation, and argues with 
regard to the latter that the distinction between imaginaiy and symbolic (which 
describes the passage to a sexed subject position within language) cannot hold.' '^* 
While Houdini’s performance of masculinity worked according to a reiterated 
phallogocentric logic, Matthew Barney appropriates aspects of Houdini’s biography 
in actions, videos and films that consistently explore the identificatoiy and libidinal 
possibilities of refusing the foreclosure of the symbolic and figure instead the 
morphogenetic possibilities of narcissism, anal-eroticism and psychosis.
*  *  *  *
2003’s media “silly season” seemed sillier than most thanks to the fascination with 
two famous self-made Americans. Whilst in the U.S. Austrian-born bodybuilder 
turned movie-star Arnold Schwarzenegger made what remarkably turned out to be a 
successful bid for the Governorship of California, thousands of people flocked to 
London’s South Bank to watch contemporary magician David Blaine spend 40 days 
in “isolation,” getting thinner in a suspended glass box, from which he not only failed 
to escape, but failed to even try to escape (Fig. 94)! Both men are descendants of 
archetypes from the birth of the modern media in America; both are presented as self- 
made men who by force of will -  and the canny use of publicity -  have transformed 
themselves into icons, of physical development on the one hand, and psychic 
development on the other. And both, it should be added, have claimed their 
Americanness, through this veiy process. The most interesting thing about both
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Schwarzenegger’s electioneering and Blaine’s stunt was the way in which they 
cleverly used the media to present themselves to the public, and thereby attract the 
intense involvement of at least sections of their publics in what they were doing.
In their differing though related self-presentations Blaine and Schwarzenegger were 
merely following in the footsteps of their most famous precursors - Houdini (the most 
famous and most astutely self-pubhcisizing magician of the 20th century), and 
Eugene Sandow (the founder of modern body building). Houdini and Sandow shared 
the bill at various points in their careers, and as John Kasson has argued, both were 
involved in projects of performative masculinity that spoke powerfully to the massive 
popular audiences they attracted."^  ^A brief discussion of Sandow’s presentation of a 
masculine ideal will, in addition to the previous discussion of Houdini, help throw 
some light on some of the cultural and historical resonances of Matthew Barney’s 
own performance of masculinity.
Eugene Sandow anived in America in 1893 via Prussia and England, and quickly 
became one of the most famous bodies in the Western world. In a stage act that 
combined feats of strength -  performing military drills using a man instead of a rifle, 
lifting pianos (and pianists) -  with poses designed to show off his physique. Sandow 
set a new standard for male physical development and self-presentation. Playing both 
sculptor and statue Sandow imitated classical poses - the reference to high culture 
providing cover for the more libidinous aspects of the interest in his nearly naked 
body. These aspects were less well concealed in Sandow’s society soiree appearances 
- in which female guests would be encouraged to touch his exemplary body. Sandow 
was praised not just for his sheer strength, but also for his beauty. Dudley Sargent -
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the leading promoter of physical education in America - declared Sandow to be 
proportionally “the Perfect Man.” He wrote of his first examination of Sandow: “[he] 
is the most wonderful specimen of man that I have ever seen. He is strong, active and 
graceful, combining the characteristics of Apollo, Hercules and the ideal athlete.
There is not the slightest evidence of sham about him. On the contrary, he is just what 
he pretends to be” (Fig. 95).'^ '^
This last comment is particularly interesting in that it highlights a certain anxiety 
about the performative aspect of Sandow’s masculinity. Wliile he helped establish the 
theme of physical and moral self-fashioning as a key component of American ideals 
of masculinity -  ideals pursued by, among others, Charles Atlas (the one-time 97- 
pound weakling Angelo Siciliano) and President Theodore Roosevelt -  Sandow’s 
route to this position had more than a touch of the theatrical about it."^  ^Not all his 
feats of strength were achieved the hard way; he required more than a little stagecraft 
to defeat rivals for his title as the world’s strongest man -  substituting weakened 
chains that could be easily snapped for example. This brings us back to the stagecraft 
of Houdini, but before turning to him, I would like to summarise the importance of 
Sandow in this discussion. Sandow’s body spoke to a variety of anxieties in American 
culture - allaying some, while creating others. In his own biographical accounts 
Sandow attributed his will-to-(self-)forming to seeing classical statuary in Rome -  an 
experience which threw modem male bodies into stark relief. Sandow’s father 
explained the discrepancy with reference to the excessive comfort of modern life: it 
was modernity itself, he argued, which put masculinity in jeopardy, feminizing the 
male body through inactivity At the same time, of course, modernity seemed to be 
empowering women - leading to anxieties about the stability of gender identity on
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both sides. A 1908 essay by psychoanalyst Fritz Wittels entitled ‘The Natural 
Position of Women’ put it explicitly: “women bemoan the fact that they did not come 
into the world as men; they try to become men through the feminist niovement.”'^ ^
The possibilities of a metamorphosis in gender relations, with masculinity under 
threat from modernity itself provoked considerable anxiety. Sandow’s body showed 
this was not inescapable, but at the same time it created the basis of anxious 
comparison for men who could not help but look on Sandow’s body in relation to 
their own. That this comparison was part of the discursive role of Sandow’s highly 
publicised body was clear at the World’s Columbian Exposition at which he was one 
of the main attractions. Alongside the exotic foreign bodies found at so many of the 
19^ ’^ -century expositions, visitors to the Columbian show could see statues 
representing the average body - based on Dudley Sargent’s measurements of Harvard 
and Radcliffe students, and of course the body of the Perfect Man, Sandow. Sandow’s 
body was an icon of masculinity attuned to the anxieties of the modern world, 
presented in a way that exploited emergent media and engaging with the libidinous 
attractions and confusions attendant to identification with a “perfect” body.^^
As Houdini aged, so the strenuousness his stunts demanded became more exhausting 
for him. It was in response to this Houdini sought out a new role for himself. If he 
couldn’t wow cinema audiences the way he could a live public, he soon found another 
way to present himself as unique - by performing a metamorphosis from master of 
mystery to America’s most famous démystifier. It is here that identifying (with) 
Houdini as the key protagonist in Barney’s imaginary suggests another model of art 
history; for as démystifier Houdini insisted on a materialist understanding of
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performances that suggested powers beyond the humanly achievable. If as an escape 
artist, he masterfully occassioned identification with his fantastic powers, Houdini 
was vehemently against such fantasy crossing the line into the exploitation of the 
most deeply held hopes of those who identified with him. This was how he perceived 
Spiritualism, against which he waged a relentless campaign.^^
Though the psychological roots of this role are complex in Houdini’s case, the key 
catalyst came from his encounter with Sir Arthur Conan-Doyle. A former pupil of 
Sandow’s and an advocate of vigorous masculinity in general, Doyle is of eourse most 
famous as the creator of Sherlock Holmes. If Holmes is the arch-rationalist and, 
moreover, the detective whose reasoning has been seen as a model for art-historical 
investigation, his creator was of a much more mystical inclination.^^ By the early 
1920s, when he came to know Houdini, Doyle was a zealous believer in Spiritualism 
and -  unwisely -  attempted to convert Houdini, whom he believed to clearly possess 
genuinely magical powers. For two reasons Houdini was a very unlikely convert; 
firstly because he literally knew the tricks of the trade, having himself performed 
Spiritualist effects in the 1890s, and second because so much was at stake for him in 
the notion of the return of the dead. Longing more than anything to communicate with 
his lost mother, Houdini could not bear to see such reunions faked. Flattered by the 
Doyles’ attention he agreed to participate in a séance with them. In a massive 
misjudgement of Houdini’s character. Lady Doyle claimed to be channelling Cecilia 
Weiss -  hoping this would convince Houdini of the reality of psychic phenomena. 
Whether she could have done so is doubtful, but her supposed “spirit-writing” guided 
by Cecilia Weiss was scuppered by two discrepancies. The first thing Lady Doyle 
“channelled” from Houdini’s Jewish mother was a Cross (!), and this was followed by
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various words of comfort to her son in English: as a non-assimilated immigrant, 
Cecilia spoke, wrote and understood only German.^^
The encounter with the Doyles provoked Houdini into a veiy high profile anti- 
Spiritualist crusade - including lecture tours, demonstrations of Spiritualist tricks of 
the trade, polemical books, the employment of undercover investigators and most 
famously, participation in scientific studies of Spiritualist phenomena. Along with 
Harvard professors and New York journalists Houdini formed part of a committee 
which investigated America’s most plausible medium - Mina Crandon, known as 
“Margery.” Margeiy claimed to be able to summon forth her dead brother Walter, 
who would perform an aiTay of psychic effects. Houdini went to extraordinaiy lengths 
to prove Walter was nothing other than Mina Crandon herself, that her psychic 
phenomena were skilfully performed magic tricks, and that those she had convinced 
were taken in by her sexual allure as much as anything. Houdini attempted to devise a 
trap for Margery from which she could not escape -  an elaborately designed box 
utterly restricting her movement (Fig. 96). Amongst the many factors determining 
Houdini’s battles with Spiritualism, obviously including his relationship to his 
mother, perhaps the most important was, as Adam Phillips suggests, the challenge it 
presented to his achieved identity. If “magic” was really magical, if it was the product 
of ghostly forces, then Houdini himself was neither unique nor the author of his own 
success -  both accomplishments crucial to his sense of self. He wanted to perform 
escapes his audience couldn’t explain, but that they knew he had mysteriously 
achieved by force of will and bodily strength and skill; to be the unmasker who 
couldn’t be unmasked. Neither must we overlook the gendered nature of the contest 
with Spiritualism -  which established a public fomni for female magicians, in what
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had previously been a male preserve. If Margery could be seen as performing a 
version of Metamorphosis in reverse -  finding a way of performing a male identity -  
this was both troubling and fascinating for the men who sat at her séances. It was also 
something that Houdini wished to expose as impossibility. For all his own 
metamorphoses he was always escaping to an unassailable identity that he had 
performatively achieved and maintained by playing on the key anxieties of his age, 
and moving between the world’s of mystery and demystification.
So far I have contrasted two historically situated performances of male identity. I have 
presented Houdini and Sandow as a “self-made men” who dramatized and performed 
a masculine identity that could sui'vive the emblematic traps and risks of modernity 
and its discontents. Houdini’s performances depended on his literal embodiment of 
the symbolic authority and masteiy that he continually risked losing; he was always 
escaping so as to remain the same, to emerge unscathed, to confirm his unassailable, 
self-same identity. The lesson of the comparison to be made with Matthew Barney 
does not depend on a contrast between the “reality” of Houdini’s bodily risks, and the 
artifice of Barney’s prosthetic imaginary. Escape is staged and performed by Houdini 
every bit as much as by Barney -  but with different props and to different ends. It is a 
question of what is escaped from and to. For Harry Houdini escapology was a way to 
uniqueness, pre-eminence and a self-same identity fully and legibly embodied. With 
Matthew Barney artistic practice is a way to escape from identity in this homogenous 
sense.
Representations of male bodies in both popular cinema and sport tends to focus on 
fantasies of mobility that are at odds with the physical abilities of the audiences that
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they aimed at, a disparity that constitutes their identificatory appeal. Advertising 
featuring sports stars in particular works this seam, showing footballers or basketball 
players as able to master space like superheroes rather than athletes. The Hollywood 
bloekbuster seems now to consider such masteiy an indispensable element -  the 
Spiderman franchise is perhaps the most obvious recent example.^"^ If Barney’s self­
representations tend toward the heroic, they do so not so much through the fantasy of 
spatial mobility and mastery (though the Cremaster Cycle is full of characters 
climbing, tunnelling etc., they always do so laboriously) but through a mobility in 
representation itself. Barney’s prosthetic representation of the body, in which the 
phallus is displaced as the organising principle of normative morphogenesis, and the 
states normatively conceived as surpassed in subject formation (narcissism, anal- 
eroticism) are presented as a goal (albeit a frustrated one), seems to me to be a highly 
important development in the histoiy of performed male embodiment. If, under 
phallogocentrism, materiality has been identified with what Butler terms “formless 
femininity,” Barney’s representation of the male body as just sueh a zone of 
morphological fluidity, suggests that the normative intelligibility of sex can be re­
articulated, re-imagined, and that such re-imaginings can be the object of audience 
identification.^^
Barney takes discourses on / of the male body, whether medical, Freudian, or athletic, 
as material, whilst at the same time he presents the materiality of the body as 
discursively transformed, in part by postmodern or feminist interventions in the “body 
politic.” His approach gives form to one possible mode of a Foucauldian “Care of the 
Self,” a way of making the body and embodied (non)identity available to be worked 
on. This remains, as it does in Foucault, ambiguous - a question of tarrying with the
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norms that produce and define identity - in Barney’s case his trained body refers back 
to the self-formed masculinities of Houdini, Sandow, Roosevelt, or Arthur Conan- 
Doyle, but it also participates in the prosthetic world of what Donna Haraway has 
termed the “cyborg" body -  showing both the possibilities enabled by modem 
technology and the ever greater extent to which power moves through “capillaries” to 
invest bodies/^ If the description of modern power as moving through ever finer 
capillaries was a metaphor for Foucault, it becomes almost literal in the contemporary 
world described by Haraway -  where technology intervenes in and on the body, 
enabling and controlling at the same time/^
Matthew Barney’s work presents a narcissistic masculinity which can’t hold the 
boundaries between itself and the world, male and female, pre- and post-natal, the 
physical and the psychical. It refers to the world of possibilities opened up by medical 
and cosmetic interventions in / on the body, but also shows the risks of hubristic self­
forming. Unlike Orlan, and her production of a “surgical s e l f f o r  example, Barney 
represents such possibilities more than he embodies them, but in doing so he shows 
how anxieties around masculinity may have changed. While Houdini sought an 
unassailable and stable identity, manifest in his bodily development and skill, Barney 
performs an elusive move in the opposite direction -  resisting finality, singularity, 
self-sameness, or autonomy -  at least in the fantasies he creates. The fact that his 
work has managed to operate in contexts outwith “pure” fine art is not only a 
consequence of its spectacular visual aspect; it is also a consequence of the way it 
proposes to audiences a “Houdini-like escape from the rigidifying determinations of 
sexual difference. As Judith Butler herself has acknowledged, it is interesting that 
the hypothesis of the performativity of gender, exemplified by drag in Gender
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Trouble and recanted in Bodies That Matter, was so enthusiastically received.^^ 
“Wliat’s interesting is that this voluntarist interpretation, this desire for a kind of 
radical theatrical remaking of the body, is obviously out there in the public sphere. 
There’s a desire for a fully phantasmatic transfiguration of the body.”^^  The dialectic 
in Foucault between the desire to escape from  identity as subjection, and to identity as 
non-essential practice or care of the self can thus be mapped, particularly with regard 
to gender, onto a broad audience, indeed perhaps onto our culture in general. Barney’s 
fame, like Houdini’s in his own time, is achieved through a representation of the male 
body that speaks to our culture and its anxieties, pointing to the kinds of escapes to 
and from identity we find most compelling, and with which we can identify.
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I  guess fo r  me i f  i t ’s erotic, i t ’s auto-erotic 
Matthew Barney.
The particular character of Barney’s appropriation of Serra requires detailed analysis. 
As indicated above, it operates at the first level by re-enacting an iconic moment from 
Serra’s career -  one that already connotes generational influence as a matter of 
recoding. The lead splashing pieces of the 1960s and 70s participated in a wider 
interpretation of Pollock, and modernism, according to a “phenomenology of 
making,” a new interest in conditions of viewing, and in site specificity (Fig. 97).^^ As 
Rosalind Ki'auss has argued, this was essentially a matter of thinking through the non­
idealised implications of Pollock’s working methods as based on process, gravity and 
horizontality.^^ This was developed by Serra in the 1970s as he moved away from a 
hegemonic minimalist notion of sculpture, to one based on “a structuring of materials 
in order to motivate a body and to demarcate a place: not a fixed category of 
autonomous objects, but a specific relay between subject and site that frames the one 
in temis of the other, and transforms both at once.”*^"^ Serra explains the particular 
orientation of his practice towards industrial materials and techniques, most 
dramatically in his recent Torqued Ellipses, as a preference for engineering over 
sculpture.®^ If this is nothing too remarkable for Serra -  “little boys like bridges” he 
observes -  for Hal Foster it connects to a particularly “American ethos of building as 
analogue of self-building,” which also surfaces in Whitman and Hart Crane’s 
hymning of the Brooklyn Bridge, for in s ta n c e . I f  for Foster and Buchloh, Serra’s
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evocation of industrial engineering already risks mystifying the contemporary reality 
of artistic (and commodity) production, Barney’s use of Serra’s work might, on this 
historical model, seem to erase the dialectical subtlety with which it related to 
Pollock, spectacularizing what had been a materially based praetice.^^ However, this 
is not to take into account either the fact that Barney remakes Serra’s work with his 
own signature material, and that within the narrative of the Cremaster Cycle, the 
relationship between the two artists is multi-layered and complex.
The trope by which Barney incorporates his own is aptly figured by Harold Bloom’s 
theory of “strong misreadings” as forms of poetic influence.^^ Specifically, amongst 
the six modalities of the anxiety of influence Bloom outlines it is apophrades, or the 
return of the dead, which most closely describes the gesture of incorporation Barney 
makes in relation to Apophrades, in Bloom’s typology, is the figure in which
the later (influenced) poet holds his work open to the precursor, seeming to return to a 
state of apprenticeship yet achieving the impression of having authored the 
precursor’s work. In apophrades
“the tyranny of time almost is overturned, and one can believe, for startled 
moments, that they are being imitated by their ancestors ... the triumph of 
having so stationed the precursor, in one’s own work, that particular 
passages in his work seem to be no presages of one’s own advent, but 
rather to be indebted to one’s one achievement... The mighty dead return, 
but they return in our colours, and speaking in our voices..
Bloom’s theory relies on a potent mix of Nietzscheanism and Freudianism and
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operates essentially on an Oedipal model augmented by a notion of askesis. Thus both 
the Oedipal rivaliy and the primordial murder of the father (the event which sees him 
return as Name, symbolic authority) provide Bloom’s figure of the influential, 
anxiety-making poet/^ The achievement of the “tmly strong poet” is to maintain 
himself, via askesis as “both Prometheus and Narcissus.”^^
Narcissism -  primary narcissism -  is the key term for Bloom’s analysis. It is 
ultimately a narcissistic pleasure in the self that is at the core of the experience of 
poetic beauty. Further, the very basis of poetic influence as a development of the ego 
away from identification (which narcissistically subsumes the precursor) is 
complicated by this persistent narcissistic pleasure so that Bloom argues “that each 
ephebe’s initial appearance of being found by a precursor is made possible only 
through an excess of self-love. Apophrades, when managed by the capable 
imagination, by the strong poet who has persisted in his strength, becomes not so 
much a return of the dead as a celebration of the return of the early self-exaltation that 
first made poetry possible.”^^  Again, this formulation is particularly relevant to 
Barney’s appropriation of Serra insofar as that gesture takes place in a film series 
stmctured by narcissism (both as, to some extent an autobiographical statement, and 
more abstractly in terms of its thematics), in a film, Cremaster 3 which within the 
Cycle is the most explicitly narcissistic of the series, in a portion of that film which as 
a choric interlude narcissistically contains all of the Cycle, and, moreover, in a 
narrative which sets up Serra as the Oedipal father to Barney’s apprentice. This last 
narrative element is complex: Serra features in Cremaster 3 as himself, as the 
architect of the Chrysler Building, and as Hiram Abiff (the architect of Solomon’s 
Temple and, in Masonic lore, the patriarchal figure murdered by his apprentices for
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refusing to impart the secrets of the universe)/'^ These elements are conspicuously 
interlinked so that, for example, when Serra is playing the architect of the Chrysler 
Building, he builds two towers which relate to the pillars of Solomon’s Temple, to 
Serra’s own Skullcracker stack piece (Fig. 98), and, in another instance of 
apophrades, to Barney’s own imageiy (specifically his “Field Emblem” which 
provides the form of one of the towers, Fig. 99). This interlinking, or overlaying, 
figures the narcissistic basis of Cremaster 3, in which Barney, Serra, the Chrysler 
Building itself (as well as the Guggenheim) are all manifestations of the psychic and 
biological changes occurring to one organism. The most relevant theoretical account 
of such phantasmatic indetemiinacy concerning the boundaries of the self is Lacan’s 
famous concept of the “mirror-stage.”
Following Freud’s hypothesis of narcissism as a component of normal psychological 
development,^^ Lacan suggests in the famous mirror-stage paper, that the subjeet’s 
passage from an initial state of undifferentiated libido to ego-identity is not decisive 
or complete. Cmcial to this is Lacan’s thesis of man’s “premature” birth,^^ which 
results in an initial inferiority to the chimpanzee in terms of “instrumental 
intelligence” though not in terms of the ability to use the mirror for self-perception.^^ 
It is this disparity which produces the split in the subject, when the not yet self- 
sufficient baby, unable to master its motor-capacity can make a visual identification 
with an imago of a gestalt body.
“This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans 
[pre-verbal] stage, still sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling 
dependence, would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic
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matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is 
objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before 
language restores to it, in the universal, its frinction as subject.”^^
This primordial, or Ideal “I” is what makes the secondary step of transferring libido to 
external objects. For Lacan the key point here “is that this form situates the agency of 
the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction, which will always 
remain ineducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only rejoin the 
coming-into-being of the subject symptomatically.”^^  The mirror-stage operates “to 
establish a relation between the organism and its reality” and is specifically a response 
to man’s “prematurity of birth” in the form of a “temporal d ia le c t ic .T h e  most 
significant consequence of this is that as “a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated 
from insufficiency to anticipation” the mirror-stage achieves for the subject “caught 
up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality ... to the assumption of the armour of 
an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid stincture the subjeet’s entire 
mental development.”^^  Thus the dialectic of the mirror-stage sees the fragmented 
body emerge as a retrospective effect of the fantasy of the Ideal gestalt imago, and it 
is the fall back into the fantasy of fragmentation in adulthood that reveals the 
significance of the mirror-stage.
In dreams the “armoured” I is symbolized, argues Lacan, by “a fortress or a 
stadium.”^^  This brings us back to Barney, whose interest in the sports stadium is 
marked throughout his œuvre -  from the omnipresent “field emblem” to the 
transfoimation of the Guggenheim rotunda into an athletic arena, complete with blue
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Astroturf flooring. Here the stadium figures Barney’s notion of hermetic self­
enclosure and resistance to it, that is, in Lacan’s terms, the narcissistic collapse of 
self-world objectivity, the reversal of the identifications constitutive o f the I via the 
mirror-stage. Within the Cremaster logic, then, rather than secure symbol of the 
armoured subject, the stadium is both the site of contest over the direction of an 
organism’s development, and (as the location of Cremaster 1 -  the film representing 
the pre-differentiated state) the locus of intrauterine wholeness.
As Norman Biyson has pointed out, the chorine choreography of Cremaster 7, in a 
quite uncanny way, brings to mind both Busby Berkeley musicals and, in another 
stadium, “another system of totally controlled group movement,” namely Leni 
Riefenstahl’s Olympia (Figs. 100-102).^^ Did, Bryson asks, the choreographer of 
Hollywood kitsch and the propagandist of Nazi social transformation “dream the 
same dreams?” '^^  As already argued above, in Barney’s art this devolves on the 
hubristic effort to hybridize the body, whether via athletics or aesthetics; a project 
which it remains ambivalent about; celebrating it at the level of form, questioning it at 
the level of narrative. There is an ambivalence here for critical theory too, relating to 
the utopian and destructive facets of technological advance. The attempt to think 
through this ambivalence is one of the salutary features of Benjamin’s Artwork essay, 
and it is to this that I turn now. Two recent interpretations in particular determine the 
lessons I draw from it -  Susan Buck-Morss’s focus on fascist aesthetics, and Miriam 
Hansen’s focus on cinema as the “blue flower in the land of technology,” the potential 
locus of a redemptive transformation of m odern ity .T he relevance of this line of 
inquiiy to Barney’s work is both specific and general; my aim is to map the work, 
negatively and positively, onto the two strong interpretations of Benjamin: Buck-
378
Morss’s attack on ‘««aesthetic’ narcissistic and fascist fantasies of autogenesis; and 
Hansen’s defence of cinematic experience as a non-auratic mode. The point is 
precisely not to resolve the antinomy of these two readings, but to insist on their 
juxtaposition, their dialectical mutuality. The challenge for the art historian / theorist 
faced with interpreting Barney’s work is not to fall for one position or the other, either 
the techno-pessimist or the techno-utopian, but to recognise and deal with the 
profound ambivalence of both at once.
One of the key lines of argumentation Buck-Morss pursues is a historically based 
reading of Lacan’s mirror-stage. The mirror-stage paper’s central hypothesis of a 
specular misrecognition of bodily unity, retrospectively producing the fantasy of the 
“body-in-pieces” has been historically connected to fascism by Hal F o s te r ,b u t 
Buck-Morss suggests going beyond that historical comparison, to suggest that “the 
mirror stage can be read as a theory o f fascismC^^ The mirror stage itself works on a 
retrospective logic, the deferred action of the symptom, but Buck-Morss wishes to 
transpose this to modernity, as the context of “the experience of the fragile body and 
the dangers to it of fragmentation that replicates the trauma of the original infantile 
event.”^^  She notes that Lacan’s first version of the mirror-stage thesis, which entered 
common theoretical parlance in its 1949 version, was in fact contemporaneous with 
the Artwork essay; in 1936, after having delivered the paper in its first form at 
Marienbad, Lacan attended the Olympics in Berlin. The fascist aesthetics of this 
event, documented by Riefenstahl in Olympia,^^ literally presented the regimented 
body as an “armor against fragmentation”, a body “numbed against feeling”; indeed, 
Buck-Morss notes, the very word narcissism “comes from the same root as 
narcotic!” ®^ Fascism’s utilisation of aesthetics as a social narcotic, and the way it
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manipulates a narcissistic stmcture of subjectivity is Buck-Morss’s interpretation of 
Benjamin’s dire warning against the aestheticization of politics, with which the 
Artwork essay concludes.
The fascist narcotic is only one instance of a general compensatory effort in the social 
sphere to adapt the subject to the qualitatively new “shock” effect of industrialised 
modernity -  a traumatic effect impacting on both psychic and physical integrity. 
Another manifestation of such a compensatoiy aesthetic occurs in Wagner’s concept 
o f the Gesammtkunstwerk, which Buck-Morss, citing Adorno, critiques as offering an 
illusory and falsely consoling “reunification” of the senses that is at root ersatz and 
inauthentic, a superimposition of unity where none exists. For Adorno, Wagner 
“would like single-handed to will an aesthetic totality into being, casting a magic spell 
and with defiant unconcern about the absence of the social conditions necessary for its 
survival”^^  The inauthentic and illusory unity of the Wagnerian Gesammtkunstwerk is 
an instrumental response to modernity’s destructive impact on human apperception; 
“The task of his music is to hide the alienation and fragmentation, the loneliness and 
the sensual impoverishment of modern existence that was the material out of which it 
was composed” or, in Adorno’s most scathing phrase, “to warm up the alienated and 
reified relations of man and make them sound as if they were still human.
Significantly, it is precisely in these terms that Benjamin Buchloh expresses his 
opposition to Barney’s practice. If in the 1980s “artistic production was subsumed 
into the larger practice of the culture industry, where it now functions as commodity 
production, investment portfolio, and entertainment” then, for Buchloh, Barney “has 
articulated, that is to say exploited, those tendencies. In that sense he is a proto-
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totalitarian artist ... a small-time American Richard Wagner who mythifies the 
eatastrophic conditions of existence under late c a p ita l is m .I f ,  it should be clear by 
now, I am not in sympathy with such a view, it does at least have the merit of locating 
Barney’s work in a context where it is taken seriously beyond its own terms. It does 
so by seeing it as a symptom of the very processes Benjamin identified as destroying 
tradition. To specify these processes further, Buck-Morss gives a genealogy of two 
parallel historical developments -  of modem aesthetics and an ««aesthetic technics 
both of which respond to modernity’s assault on the human seiisorium.
Against the tendency to treat “aesthetics” as a catch-all concept for the troubling 
residues of irrationality in the modern, Buck-Morss works back through the history of 
this diminution of the aesth e tic .S h e  notes that it is the (masculin!st) myth of 
autogenesis that giminds modern aesthetics as such. “What seems to fascinate modern 
‘man’ about this myth is the narcissistic illusion of total control. The fact that one can 
imagine something that is not, is extrapolated in the fantasy that one can (re)create the 
world according to plan.”^^  Here Barney’s interest in autogenesis would seem to place 
him on the side of modern aesthetics in Buck-Morss’s reading (albeit that his 
narratives figure, unlike the modem “fairytale” of autogenetic creation, the possible 
consequences o f such hubristic over-reaching). The feminist interpretation of this 
myth reveals it to buy an autogenetic aesthetics at the cost of the coiporeal and the 
sexual: “it is precisely in this castrated form that the being is gendered male -  as if, 
having nothing so embarrassingly unpredictable or rationally uncontrollable as the 
sense-sensitive penis, it can then confidently claim to be the phallus. Such an 
««aesthetic protuberance is this artefact: modern man.”^^  Thus both 
maternal/reproductive femininity and homosexual sensuality are repressed in support
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of this autonomous masculinity in nineteenth-centuiy philosophical discourse, which 
presents the “autotelic subject a sense-dead, and for this reason a manly creator, a self­
starter, sublimely self-contained.”^^  Buck-Morss’s Benjaminian recovery of aesthetics 
from this fantasy works by a historical genealogy of the human sensory apparatus 
itself.
This genealogy assumes the cognitive-sensorial as entwined with the world to the 
extent that subject / object distinctions are beside the point. Buck-Morss terms this 
non-autonomous aesthetic-perceptual consciousness the “syiiaesthetic system” -  a 
system “decentred from the classical subject” and “wherein external sense- 
perceptions come together with the internal images of memory and anticipation.” ®^ 
This is an “open” system and hence one deeply effected by transformations in 
perceptual conditions; specifically the “shock” effect of modern, industrialised life. 
But this openness can be foreclosed, and with the onslaught of modernity on the 
senses, bodily affect and sensoiy reflection are negated in favour of a non-response to 
excessive stimuli. Just as the factoiy-machine automatizes motion, so there is a 
counterpart effect of “sectioning” time as “repetitive moments without development”; 
a process which destroys the “syiiaesthetic system’s” capacity to respond to the world: 
“rather than incorporating the outside world as a form of empowerment, or 
“innnervation”,” it now takes on the role of “defensive reflex.”^^  To protect both body 
and mind from trauma it must become an ««aesthetics, a numbing of the subject. 
Crucially, for Buck-Morss, once “aesthetics changes from a cognitive mode of being 
“in touch” with reality to a way of blocking out reality” political agency is disabled: 
without authentic experience there is no basis for a political orientation.^®^
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“Anaesthetics” became, towards the end of the nineteenth century an increasingly 
“elaborate technics,” deployed not only to facilitate surgery (more and more the 
consequence of industrial accidents and modem warfare, both shocks against the 
integrity of the body) but also to defend against neurasthenia, conceived as a 
shattering or fragmentation of the psyche. The ability to immobilise either surgical 
patient’s body or neurasthenic’s over-stimulated brain with drugs (from ether to 
opium) was the chief medical / psychological response to the modern (lack of) 
experience. The key point is that for Benjamin, in an analogous way, “in the 
nineteenth centuiy, a narcotic was made out of reality itself.” ®^* This is the 
phantasmagoria of modernity, a “technoaesthetics” o f everyday life, which operates 
not by directly numbing, but by overstimulating the senses.^®  ^The phantasmagoric is 
the means by which the mass spectacle meets the individual in the form of a private 
dreamworld.^®® As Buck-Morss notes, this privatization of sense-experience is 
exacerbated in the present; whether in paekaged tourism, shopping malls, as well as 
“the individualized audiosensory environment of a “walkman,” the visual 
phantasmagoria of advertising, the tactile sensorium of a gymnasium full of Nautilus 
equipment.”*®'^  Again, here we could easily align Barney’s hermeticism and his use of 
gymnasium props with what Buck-Morss attacks as a phantasmogoric 
anaestheticisation of the subject.
If phantasmagoria is the compensatoiy social manifestation of the anaesthetic, 
Fascism’s genius is to rework the tripartite division of experience, characteristic of 
modern aesthetics as autogenesis, by placing the masses in the position both of 
observer and hyle (mute matter), whilst retaining the position of agent-surgeon for 
itself. It is by this positioning that “due to a displacement of the place of pain, due to a
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consequent niis(re)cognition, the mass-as-audience remains somehow undisturbed by 
the spectacle of its own manipulation.” This is exemplified for Buck-Morss in Leni 
Reifenstahl’s Triumph o f  the Will (1935), in which the massed bodies form a 
cinematic aesthetic surface. “The aesthetics allows an anaestheticization of reception, 
a viewing of the “scene” with disinterested pleasure, even when that scene is the 
preparation through ritual of a whole society for unquestioning sacrifice and 
ultimately, destruction, murder, and death. The “aesthetics of surface” by which 
fascist aesthetics presents the social body to the individual offers “a reassuring 
perception of the rationality of the whole .., which when viewed from his or her own 
particular body is perceived as a threat to w h o le n e s s .T h e  representation of the 
social mass as
“a deindividualized, formal, and regular pattern ... is already present in 
Wagner’s operas in the staging of the chorus, which anticipates the 
crowd’s salute to Hitler. But lest we forget that fascism is not itself 
responsible for the transformed perception, musical productions of the 
1930s used this same design motif (Hitler was an aficionado of American 
musicals).”
To recall Norman Bryson’s question re: Cremaster 7, it would seem on this reading 
that Berkeley, Reifenstahl, Hitler and Barney do indeed dream the same anaesthetic 
dreams. But the Artwork essay offers another way to read the aesthetics of cinema, 
and to resist this hyperbolically negative interpretation.
384
According to Biick-Morss’s argument, the medical use of anaesthetics combined with 
the social technologies of visual presentation when, with the emergence of germ 
theory and the consequent emphasis on sterility, the pedagogic operating space was 
remade from a theatrical stage, into a kind of proto-cinematic apparatus, with 
projection screen etc. This formulation recalls Benjamin’s argument in the Artwork 
essay that the cameraman compares to the painter as surgeon does to magician. Yet 
Benjamin’s point is not that both are anaesthetic technicians, but that this comparison 
establishes cinema as the utopian form of technology par excellence. Benjamin writes:
“The magician maintains the natural distance between the patient and 
himself; though he reduces it very slightly by the laying on of hands, he 
greatly increases it by virtue his authority. The surgeon does exactly the 
reverse; he gi'eatly diminishes the distance between himself and the 
patient by penetrating into the patient’s body... In short, in contrast to the 
magician -  who is still hidden in the medical practitioner -  the surgeon at 
the decisive moment abstains from facing the patient man to man; rather, 
it is through the operation that he penetrates into him.” ^^ ^
Likewise, whereas “the painter maintains in his work a natural distance from reality, 
the cameraman penetrates deeply into its web.”**^  The paradoxical point upon which 
Benjamin insists here is that film’s vei*y mechanical technique, in its disguising of 
itself, presents “an aspect of reality which is free of all equipment... what one is 
entitled to ask from a work of art.” ^^ ' Thus the reaction of the masses shifts from a 
reactionary one to Picasso, to a progressive one to Chaplin, a reaction “characterized 
by the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment with the orientation
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of the expert... With regard to the screen, the critical and the receptive attitudes of 
the public coincide.”  ^ The key reason for this is the imbrication of individual and 
collective responses -  something that painting’s intimate conditions of viewing 
precludes.
Just as Freud brought attention to slips which had previously passed unnoticed so “the 
film has brought about a similar deepening of apperception.”  ^ Film isolates and 
precisely reveals behaviour -  a capacity which makes it of mutual (indeed, Benjamin 
goes as far as to say identical) value for art and science. Film as visual technology 
“extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, 
it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action.”  ^ Cinema is a 
playing out of shock that helps us deal with shock. It does so, Benjamin thinks, by 
engaging a mode of reception characterised as ‘distraction,’ so that whereas “a man 
who concentrates before a work of art is absorbed by i t ... In contrast, the distracted 
mass absorbs the work of art.” *^^  Benjamin’s attitude to this second mode of 
apperception goes against the grain of much modernist aesthetics in elevating 
precisely the qualities usually deprecated as the loss of c u l t u r e . T h i s  elevation is 
predicated on the positive estimation Benjamin makes of the habitual as a means of 
‘innervating’ transformed conditions of existence. Thus, for him, architecture is 
appropriated by the subject both optically (contemplation) and tactilely (by habit), and 
this indicates that “the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the 
turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means, that is, by contemplation 
alone. They are mastered gradually by habit, under the guidance of tactile 
appropriation.” ’ Art provides the condition for such transformation of apperception,
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by habituating the subject to what he would, as an individual avoid. This is the 
positive role Benjamin sees as being (potentially) played by film.
Buck-Morss’s account might lead us to align, as Buchloh does, Barney’s aesthetic 
with Wagner’s, and thus to see in it a failure to authentically respond to traumatic 
social conditions and their assault on the “synaesthetic apparatus.” This charge can be 
refuted by reference to Benjamin’s attitude to cinema as medium. Perhaps more 
serious, however, would be the charge that Barney’s basic conceptual focus on the 
narcissistic auto-eroticism wherein self / other, self / world boundaries are permeable 
and mutable, is in fact analogous to an overly successful internalisation of 
technology’s most damaging effects. This internalisation has been given a detailed 
analysis as a major component of the psychology of psychotic serial killing by Mark 
Seltzer. Seltzer notes that serial killers are unusually well-versed in professional and 
pop-psychological concepts of their activities, indicative of an assimilation of the very 
discursive power-knowledge which frames them. Ted Bundy would be a case in 
point: he expressed himself in “endless strings of mass media and pop-academic 
clichés ... as if the pages of Psychology Today were time-sharing his words..
It is precisely in terms of technologically-mediated mimesis and excessive 
identification (valorized in the present argument, and frequently in interpretations of 
Barney) that Seltzer discusses the psychology of the modern serial killer. In his 
argument “repetitive, compulsive, serial violence ... does not exist without this 
radical entanglement between foims of eroticized violence and mass technologies of 
registration, identification, and reduplication, forms of copy-catting and 
simulation.””  ^It is by excessive endorsement of the radical equivalence of bodies
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under capitalism, and of the informational and productive indifference towards the 
subject that the serial killer emerges -  and this takes place via over-identification: 
“The distinctions between fact and fiction and between bodies and information 
vanish, along the lines of an identification without reserve.” ’^ ’^ Both killers and 
detectives participate in such identification, the efforts of the latter attempting to make 
intelligible the intentions of the former.’^’
Uncannily, it is in terms veiy similar to Barney’s that Dennis Nilson expressed his 
simultaneous sense of oneness with Nature and of the mass populus as indistinct, 
already dead. A central feature of serial killing is that a pathological identification 
with others renders the self-other distinction inoperative. Hence, for Nilson, his 
relationship with the world “starts in narcissism and ends in confusion.””  ^ Seltzer 
argues that this identification that undoes identity operates through the subjective 
absorption in technologies of mechanical reproduction. “For Nilsen, it involved, 
above all, a fixation on min or images of his own made-up body and on the mirroring 
and photographing of the made-up, taken apart, and artifactualized bodies of his 
victims.””  ^The repetition of the dynamics of the mirror-stage is clear, with body-in- 
pieces and as gestalt both re-staged, and it is no coincidence that the serial killer 
encounters his victims as image.
For Seltzer it is characteristic of the serial killer that they are unusually typical, a 
“mass in person,” ’^ '’ Again, the dynamics of this resonate with Barney’s project, 
insofar as “this absorption in typicality and melting into place is bound up with 
another form of se lf  evacuation or devivification: a drive to make interior states 
audible, visible, and c o n t r o l l a b l e The dismemberment of others, the exploration
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of their interiors through violence, is thus an attempt at self-discovery projected onto a 
world not differentiated from the self. Nilsen and John Wayne Gacy, in their 
respective accounts of their crimes, present them as “suicides by proxy” -  as indeed 
Cremaster 3 treats Oedipal patricide, which in that film’s Masonic logic is a serial 
se lf  mortification; expressed in the chant “I die daily” performed by a hardcore punk 
band in the Guggenheim interlude, and in the simultaneous deaths of the various 
manifestations of Barney’s “self’ -  including the patriarchal Serra / Hiram character -  
that concludes the filin.” ^
Seltzer’s primaiy example of the serial killer’s narcissistic assimilation of/to the 
traumatic technological social context takes us back once again to the World’s 
Columbian Exposition, where Houdini and Sandow (and, at least fictionally in 
Cremaster 2, Barney) made exhibitions of themselves. Taking advantage of the 
crowds who flocked to the Wliite City and its pedagogic and populist attractions was 
Herman Webster Mudgett, a.k.a H. H. Holmes, who had constructed a 100-room 
building, one purpose of which was to provide rented accommodation, but which also 
served as a murder weapon -  with estimates of Holmes’s victims mnning into the 
hundreds. The so-called “Castle” was a maze-like house of traps, concealed passages, 
surveillance devices and “lethal architecture” (such as a fire-proofed gas-chamber), 
whose ways were only known by Holmes h i m s e l f . T h i s  building makes explicit 
“the intimacies of serial violence and machine culture” in “the strange prosthetic 
devices Holmes invented to process his victims. ... [His] inventions and self­
inventions make him something like an extreme limit case of the se lf  made man.” ’^ ^
If the “self-made man” is -  as we have seen with Houdini and Sandow -  usually 
considered to have achieved singularity, uniqueness, with the serial killer the
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achievement is rather an “exorbitant typicality” inseparable from “the subject’s over- 
identification with others and the subject’s over-identification with place.” ’^ ^
Holmes furnishes the most extreme example of this. Chicago -  which Seltzer sees as 
the turn of the centuiy “shock city” -  amongst other achievements, lead the way in 
mechanised butcheiy -  one meat-packing plant dispatching 60,000 head of cattle per 
day on its ‘WAassembly lines.””  ^In Seltzer’s thesis, subjectivity in a state of 
traumatic shock, failing to establish public/private and other boundaries is not to be 
thought only in the celebratoiy postmodern form as an openness to self-construction, 
but with the countervailing “endlessly endured imperative of self-production (a 
repetitive drill in autogenesis)”: an “internally divided logic of se lf  construction 
[which] is indissociable from the double-logic of prosthesis: the vexed intimacy with 
technology that defines the subject of machine culture.”” ’ Barney’s extensive use of 
prosthetics in the construction of his body-morphing representations seems to gloss 
over this latter po i n t . Ho we ve r ,  if  for Katharine Ott the metaphorical allusion to 
prosthetics in recent theory tends to elide the experiential conditions of those literally 
tasked with the self-constructive project of incorporating prostheses as part of their 
selves, Barney is arguably sensitive to this.’”  Along with SeiTa, his alter-ego in 
Cremaster 3 is Aimee Mullins, a double amputee who like Barney himself has been 
an athlete and model (Figs. 103-106).’”  The mutability of self-presentation achieved 
in the various prostheses Mullins wears in the film does not support what would be 
misleading claims for aesthetic-performative subjectivity inventing itself 
autogenetically - which would elevate this highly mediated instance beyond its 
bounds. On the other hand, it does at least point to the qualitative improvement that 
has taken place in prosthetic technology since, for example, the World’s Columbian
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Exposition, where nine different manufacturers vied for attention and custom, and 
promised to make amputees “whole” again. At this historical juncture, the increased 
social importance of appearance in an urban “society of strangers” meant that 
prosthetic technology (literally) propped nomiative identities.”  ^That Barney can 
aestheticise what is clearly not such normative embodiment seems to me a welcome 
sign.
Seltzer reads Holmes as literalizing the capitalist equivalence of commodities in 
relation to bodies. Counter-intuitively, the key point for Seltzer here is that the focus 
on the body is atavistic in its “violent materializations of the passion for 
equivalence.””  ^Naturally Barney’s films are not morally equivalent to the acts of a 
serial killer (!), but the point to be emphasised, against a binaristic opposition of 
“good” bodily equilibrium and “bad” (proto-fascist) narcissistic fantasy, is that it is 
precisely their phantasmatic virtuality that manifests a counter-movement to the 
atavism of a “refeudalised” alchemy of the body, and indeed to a fascist armouring of 
the self.”  ^To develop this point I now return to Benjamin’s Artwork essay, and more 
specifically to Miriam Hansen’s reading of it.
Hansen focuses on the utopian possibilities released in the technological shattering of 
tradition. Her argument forms a necessaiy counterpoint to Buck-Morss’s emphasis on 
Benjamin’s warning against the dire threat of the fascist aestheticisation of the 
political and experiential. To read both approaches together is to open up again the 
ambivalence which Benjamin’s thought consistently works with/in, and thereby to 
reinstate its challenge to artists and theorists. Slavoj Zizek has recently argued that 
Riefenstahl’s Olympia and Triumph o f  the Will should not be read as revealing the
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proto-fascist basis of all projects of mass participation, but as the fascist 
appropriation of specifically communist fomis of activity. “Along the same lines,” he 
writes “one should radically reject the notion that discipline, from self-control to 
bodily training, is inherently a proto-fascist feature.””  ^Rather, the task is to achieve a 
counter-appropriation, and to accept that rather than evidence of primordial, innate 
fascism, Riefenstahl’s varied cinematic projects reveal her as “inconsistent, caught in 
a web of conflicting forces.””  ^If Benjamin’s political call for the politicisation of art 
unequivocally binarises the options for artist and critic, this is not to say that 
eveiything exploited by fascism is to be abandoned to it.
Hansen refocuses the Artwork essay’s positive inteipretation of the role of cinema by 
reading as its “Ur-text” the second version of February 1936; doing so allows her to 
amplify the concept of Spielratim, a theme largely overlooked in the reception of the 
essay via the redrafted version included in Illuminations}'^^ Hansen notes that 
Benjamin’s argument is unusually binaiy in the canonical version of the Artwork 
essay, especially in opposing masses and aura\ a rhetorical device which functions to 
“crystallize” the intellectual’s choice, as unequivocally put in the conclusion to the 
Artwork essay, between communism and fascism, politicization and 
aestheticization.” ’ The Ur-text complicates this by locating aura within the 
constellation of “semblance and play.””  ^Here play is the concept which allows 
Benjamin “to imagine an alternative mode of aesthetics on a par with modern, 
collective experience, an aesthetics that could counteract, at the level of sense- 
perception, the political consequences of the failed -  that is, capitalist and imperialist, 
destructive and self-destaictive -  reception of technology.”’”  It is within this 
constellation that film takes on its particular significance for Benjamin. Play is, in
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Benjamin’s thinking generally, valorised as a mode of “innervation,” that is, as a 
repetitive habitual transformation of the experience of shock.’”  This conception is 
clearly articulated in the 1928 essay ‘Toys and Play,’ where Benjamin argues that it is 
“not a ‘doing as i f  but a ‘doing the same thing over and over again,’ the 
transformation of a shattering experience into habi t ... that is the essence of play.”’”
It is in these terms, Hansen argues, that Benjamin conceives of film as “the medium 
of repetition par excellence.”’'’^  One connotation of this, deriving from the trauerspiel 
study is that melancholia, as a form of repetition takes on a utopian, and distinctly 
non-Freudian value in Benjamin’s thought.’'’^  Another connotation is gambling as 
play -  Hasardspiel -  which is part o f Benjamin’s ongoing effort to theorise alternate 
modes o f apperception to those produced in the “bungled reception of technology”, a 
reception already manipulated by fascism.’”  The crucial point is that for Benjamin 
the ambiguous status of play is taken as a “point of departure, rather than a token of 
decline.” ’”  Spielraum constitutes that point as the positive consequence of the decline 
of an art of aura and semblance, and counter-intuitively it is here that Benjamin 
situates film.’^ ” Film qua art’s role is to work through the technological inteiplay 
between humanity and nature and thus provide the conditions for a positive 
transformation of apperception, or, to recall Buck-Morss’s term, the “synaesthetic 
system.” Benjamin saw in cinema a play-form of technology which might enable “the 
aesthetic mobilization of affective and cognitive processes that both depend upon and 
shape the viewer’s memory, imagination, and mimetic capacity.” ’^ ’ This is the part of 
his project which continues, insistently, to address the present, even as the political 
frame -  fascism or communism? -  which shaped its formation seems to have been 
superceded.
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Against the general decrying of spectacularisation, which is today often carried out in 
his name, Benjamin conceived of the triumph of the image as a political opportunity, 
with the circulation of images within a collectivity establishing the possibility of new 
forms of space-body-image relations. If  image-technology in its destructive aspect 
“annihilates” the individual, a reciprocal transformation of collectivity is called for.”  ^
In cinema specifically this is indicated by the actor’s "‘individual innervation of 
technology at the level o f production'''' which opens the possibility o f “collective 
innervation at the level of reception^ in the corporeal space of the audience assembled 
in the theatre, through processes of mimetic identification specific to cinema.””  ^
Benjamin thus “valorizes film for making self-alienation materially and publicly 
perceivable, in other words, quotable and available for action.”’”  Here Chaplin is 
cited as the cinematic icon who reveals the bodily and psychic consequences of 
fragmentation and alienated labour. Such a reading might provide one genealogy of 
Barney’s exploration of masculinity, one in which just as Chaplin innervated the 
production line, comically representing the overly-successful adaptation of the human 
body to the mechanical, Vito Acconci could be read as enacting the failure of 
compensatory superego injunctions, and Barney as inverting this concept of failure to 
become a perverse success.
Hansen rightly invokes the challenge of the virtual, digitised, spectacular age as one 
which Benjamin would not have pessimistically shirked: digitisation “opens up for 
human beings another, dramatically enlarged Spielraum^ a virtual space that 
significantly modifies the inten elations of body- and image-space and offers hitherto 
unimaginable modes of playful innervation.” ’^  ^This is precisely where the most 
positive, albeit emphatically not unambivalent, reading of Barney’s art takes place. He
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indicates that an innei*vation of hybridity and bodily transformation under the reign of 
image can be positively accomplished, at least within the privileged sphere of art. 
Significantly, the relevance of this extends far beyond the (identity) politics of 
representation, to the transformations in conceptions of embodiment and the ever 
greater mutability of bodies, with far-reaching consequences for both subjectivity and 
the extension of power through ever finer capillaries. The terms in which this is 
expressed indicates the three primary theoretical orientations of this thesis: a 
Benjaminian insistence of the ambivalence of technological transformation; a 
Foucauldian conception of power, and of the co-extensiveness of resistance to it; and 
a Zizekian acknowledgement of the problematics of reflexivity and identity politics as 
an outcome of poststructuralist/postmodernist critique. The full elaboration of this as a 
theoretical position depends on a complex negotiation of Foucault’s antipathy to 
psychoanalysis as discursive producer o f ‘sexuality’, Zizek’s rejection of Foucault for 
this very reason, and Benjamin’s dialectical conception of temporality with both.
Such a project seems to be a viable future direction emerging from this thesis, a 
positive move towards “following by betraying” as outlined in Chapter Four.
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Conclusion
For Buck-Morss “the camera can aid us in knowledge of fascism, because it provides 
an “aesthetic” experience that is nonauratic, critically testing, capturing with its 
“unconscious optics” precisely the dynamics of narcissism on which the politics of 
fascism depends, but which its own auratic aesthetics conceals.”” *^ This is not just a 
historical question for Buck-Morss: she argues that we must recognise our own . 
narcissism as a trait that functions “as an anaesthetizing tactic ... appealed to daily by 
the image-phantasmagoria of mass culture” and, moreover, “the ground from which 
fascism can again push forth.” Yet this is to miss the ambivalence that pertains 
even to such a pathologised subjective condition as narcissism. Just as Foucault’s 
aesthetics of the self suggests that opportunities for substantively transformed 
experiences of subjectivity exist, so Matthew Barney’s art reconfigures narcissism as 
a way of generating forms that work against the representation of self as armour.”  ^
The crucial point is that a melancholic attachment to lost sites of critique -  which, 
somewhat harshly perhaps, I attribute to Buchloh -  is ultimately not even contesting 
the production of meaning in other sites. Barney’s work may have been theorised in a 
particularly esoteric (even baroque) mix of psychoanalysis and pop culture references, 
but that is not to say that it should be understood exclusively in those terms. Or rather, 
the work itself suggests in its veiy treatment of psychoanalytic and cultural narratives, 
that they are not the ahistorical, ultimate horizon of meaning. In Barney’s art, 
particularly the Cremaster series, myths, novels, artists, technologies, and bodies are
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treated as so much material to be used -  as are the theories, especially psychoanalytic 
theories, that interpret them. The significance of this is that rather than confirm the 
omnipotence of psychoanalytic approaches, it implies that they may no longer be the 
distinctive interpretative technique of our time. Rather than exemplifying the fallen 
world o f ‘reflexive’ portfolio identities, of psychoanalysis as (self-) mythology, of art 
as commodified spectacle, by treating narratives as material to be sculpturally 
reformed or hypertrophically inflated, Barney’s art gestures towards the positive 
possibilities which accompany these phenomena.
In Judith Butler’s work, the political project of queering gendered identity operates 
with a psychoanalytic vocabulary transmuted by, amongst other things, its 
hybridization with Foucauldian insights, and thereby not dependent on an unchanging 
repetition of Freudian normativity. As she writes,
“the phallus appears as symbolic only to the extent that its construction 
through the transfigurative and specular mechanisms o f the imaginary is 
denied. Indeed, if the phallus is an imaginary effect, a wishful 
transfiguration, then it is not merely the symbolic status of the phallus that 
is called into question, but the very distinction between the symbolic and 
the imaginary.”” ^
The crucial achievement of this work is to politicise the imaginary through this 
questioning. The key term for Butler in this “resignification” of the phallus, 
disconnected from the penis, and from Lacan’s symbolic schema, is the “lesbian 
phallus.” Though deliberately left indeterminate in her argument,
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the lesbian phallus as “possible site of desire” is not an imaginary identification to be 
set against a real one.’^ ’’ Rather it serves to promote an alternative imaginaiy to a 
hegemonic imaginary, and to show, through that assertion, the ways in which the 
hegemonic imaginaiy constitutes itself through the naturalization of an exclusionary 
heterosexual moiphology.” ’^ ’ Matthew Barney’s prosthetic imaginary is likewise not 
to be set against the reality of the body, but rather set to work within the imaginary 
supports of the contemporary body politic. As Jay Prosser relates, in an extraordinaiy 
evocation of personal loss and desire, the surgical-prosthetic transformations of the 
body reach their limit in the constmction of a functioning (that is phallic) penis for 
female-to-male transsexuals. Yet, Prosser argues, “in spite of the fact that 
transsexuality is impossible, this in no way prevents it from e x i s t i n g . T h e  crucial 
theoretical point here is that the aesthetic as an imaginary, affective locus of 
subjective transformation offers the possibility of recovering (fiom) the past. Just as 
Benjamin held out hope for the politico-aesthetic worth of the ‘dialectical image’ that 
brought together past and present, and Foucault utilised an aesthetic approach to 
history-as-genealogy to disrupt the naturalised present, so here I have returned to 
these theorists, whose moment might be thought to have past, to insist on the 
continued value of their projects. For Prosser such returns are palinodie, and the 
palinode, “though tied up with loss and belatedness -  like transsexuality an attempt to 
get it right this time -  is ultimately restorative in realizing loss.”’”
This thesis began with a consideration of Cornelia Parker’s The Distance, an image of 
constraint. It concludes by identifying with Houdini as figure of the art historian, an 
identification that implies the possibility of an escape from constraint. Such an escape, 
it should be clear by now, is not a transcendence of the problematics of modernity or
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postmodemity, but a figure for the belief that critical potential exists within these 
problematics. If  art’s “living on” is in many ways an auratic living death, 
accompanied by art history’s melancholic attachment (to something it creates out of 
its very loss), then Barney’s art, and my interpretation of it, affirms that there is a 
future beyond the acceptance of this loss. Such a future need not only be the triumph 
of spectacular amnesia but might also offer new fantasy-frames for the 
reconfiguration of reality -  at least in theory. Two forms of melancholia need to be 
contrasted, rather than opposed to the closure of mourning: the attachment to the dead 
object that remains elusive, and Benjamin’s notion of the play o f melaneholy which 
recovers the past for the dialectical imaging of the present. Ai't histoiy tends too often 
to operate in the former mode.
Amongst Houdini’s attempts at originality and uniqueness was a bid to hold an 
aviation record -  on a par with Blériot, who made the first crossing of the English 
Channel in 1909 -  though in the end he had to settle for being ‘the first magician to 
fly in Australia.’’”  That he was attracted to aviation and the aeroplane as “the symbol 
of modern people’s hubris” -  the vehicle for their hope of “getting away from it all” -  
is hardly a surprise.’”  If Houdini was famous for falling from bridges, it is also 
unsurprising that he should be interested in flight as an escape from gravity, a way of 
maintaining the moment of weightlessness, which, as Michael Balint argues, repeats 
both “the veiy early mother-child relationship” and “the still earlier intrauterine 
existence, during which we were really one with our universe.” ’”  Flight is thus a kind 
of hubristic unity which transgresses the veiy limitations that constitute human 
mortality, and the Icarus myth suggests that the consequence of such hubris, such 
presumption of transcendence, is a fall to earth. The story of Icarus is almost always
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invoked as a cautionary tale against over-reaching, yet Phillips notes that it also 
implies “that we ti’ansgress in order to find  out i f  we can escape; to find  out just what 
... the instigators o f  the law are made The ambiguity of the myth, then, which
is usually effaced to affirm of the wisdom of a middle course, is that Icarus’s 
punishment is for an experiment with limits that is inherent to the hubris of flight 
itself as a rivalry with the Gods. The aeroplane is one of Benjamin’s examples of the 
failed reception of technology. Susan Buck-Morss writes:
“The airplane, miraculous object of the new nature, has no theological 
meaning in itself. That would be phantasmagoria ( -  one thinks of the 
image of Hitler’s plane flying divinely through the clouds in RiefenstahTs 
film ‘Triumph of the Will’). The airplane’s theological meaning in 
Benjamin’s sense emerges only in its ‘construction’ as a historical 
object.”’”
In other words, it is only when, in a double image or double view, both the 
“Messianic” potential and Hellish reality are juxtaposed that the dialectical meaning 
of this technology emerges. In a fragment for the Arcades Project Benjamin cites 
Pien'e-Maxime Schuhl’s 1938 Machinisme et Philosophie: “The bombers make us 
remember what Leonardo da Vinci expected of man in flight; that he was to ascend to 
the skies ‘in order to seek snow on the mountaintops and bring it back to the city to 
spread on the sweltering strteets in summer’.” ’”  Benjamin also cites Leonardo in this 
fragment, to the effect that his technological inventions should not be disseminated, 
for they will inevitably be exploited by “the wickedness of men.” ’^ ” The bomb- 
dropping airplane is in just this sense the dialectical antithesis of da Vinci’s utopian,
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Icarian, anticipation of human flight. As Benjamin puts it in the Artwork essay’s 
penultimate paragraph, “instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, [society] drops 
incendiaiy bombs over cities.” ’^ ’
Hansen draws attention to the way, in the Artwork Ur-text, that Benjamin set out the 
distinction between first (ritual) technology and (modem, mechanical) second 
technology in terms of the latter’s minimal use of human beings. This difference was 
figured by Benjamin as the culmination of ritual in human sacrifice, and the 
culmination of second technology “in the remote-controlled aircraft which needs no 
human crew.” ’^  ^For Benjamin this was, contrary to what we might expect, a sign of 
techology’s utopian potential; the positive repetition that, exemplified by cinema, 
creates Spielraum. Yet, as Hansen registers, the image of the remote-controlled 
aircraft for the contemporary reader suggests not the montage technique inherent to 
film, even less the child’s mimetic relation to the world in play, but rather “American- 
style electronic warfare (drones, cruise m i s s i l e s ) . A m o n g s t  the most poignant 
images of the Gulf War of 1991 was that of Iraqi troops attempting to surrender to an 
unmanned surveillance drone, which impassively relayed these increasingly desperate 
signals to remote intelligence officers, and thence to the global media. Here we 
recognise the central dilemma of the “panoptic” prisoner in Foucault’s account: the 
central place of power is empty, but its effects are dispersed throughout an 
architectural apparatus of knowledge-power both containing and creating the subject. 
The ambivalence of technology identified by Benjamin, and the ambivalence of 
power as identified by Foucault are increasingly complementary. If art histoiy is to 
have a politically effective dimension it has to respond to this state of affairs, both in 
recognising the negative, oppressive impact of an ever more visual / virtual culture on
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subjects (and art itself), and articulating the sites and strategies through which art 
might operate as critique. This was exactly how Foucault saw his project; it was 
emphatically not anaesthetic in its effects, but rather immobilizing, or paralyzing of 
the self-evident “acts, gestures, discourses” of the present, through a historical 
analysis that renders them problematic. Against the criticism that his work was 
anaesthetic in terms of its lack of a programme for action, Foucault insisted that 
“critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, “this, then, is 
what needs to be done.” It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who 
resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, 
essays in refusal. ... The problem ... is one for the subject who acts -  the subject of 
action through which the real is transformed.”’”  This positive response to the changes 
wrought by postmodernity must mean not only the analysis of symptoms, but an 
attempt to wrest from the present the potential to escape them.
At the beginning of this thesis I suggested that although it was possible to conceive of 
the period of critically engaged art and poststructuralist critique as over, I wished to 
strongly resist such a move. The group around the journal October have been perhaps 
the most successful exponents of such critical engagement, yet I wish to conclude by 
indicating how I have come to think that critique itself needs to move beyond the 
limits of their model -  which seems to culminate in their collaborative book Art Since 
1900: Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism -  not to break with it entirely, 
certainly not to revert to a prior state of affairs, but perhaps to “follow by betraying.” 
My project has shifted from its initial grounding in Octoberism, through a critique of 
its way of reading certain theoretical positions, to the beginnings of an alternate 
paradigm. One of the symptomatic features of Octoberism is a fundamental difficulty
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in mapping the present. There is, I contend, a resistance to any cultural practice that is 
inassimilable to what they have called “antimodernism,” conceived as a kind of 
dialectical expansion of central features of modernism itself (that is: specificity, 
critical self-reflexivity). This much is evident in Rosalind Krauss’s essay ‘Video: The 
Aesthetics of Narcissism,’ in the veiy first issue of October (in relation to Vito 
Acconci’s Centers), and in many essays since then. What is interesting m A rt Since 
1900 is how their inclination / ability to affirm art work as critically valuable tails off 
towards the end of the twentieth centuiy; when artistic practices are affirmed it is 
under the rubric of “obsolescence” and the “archival.” Does this evidence a kind of 
disavowed self-recognition of the fate of Octoberism itself? Or, more likely, doesn’t it 
show how much the critical judgements of the leading members of the group (and 
many who follow in their wake, or who have pursued parallel projects) have always 
been predicated on a negation of a postmodernity that has been defined in multiple 
ways, but usually, modemistically, as a kind of collapse into spectacle? In the end 
such models are fundamentally attuned to the kinds of challenges to the institution of 
art that were advanced in the 1960s and therefore struggle to plausibly tune in to 
much else, even when, as I tried to demonstrate in relation to Cornelia Parker, such 
challenges may still appear, albeit in new forms.
One of the key problems with a model which weighs critical value according to 
“antimodernist” criteria is that it misses or perfomiatively contradicts the lessons of 
the critical sources on which it draws. Alongside the failure to acknowledge the 
subjective and contingent bases of knowledge, a further crucial dimension of this 
problem emerges precisely in relation to the way that the postmodern present becomes 
determined as (political, aesthetic) catastrophe: simply, there is a failure to engage
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with the example of (for example) Benjamin and Foucault, who both ground their 
accounts of modernity in the historical exigencies of their respective presents, 
Foucault called for a “historical ontology of ourselves,” bringing together 
historiography and a form of self-relation, a practice of working on the self through 
knowledge. There is good reason for the Octoberists to avoid such a foregrounding of 
themsQlvQS in relation to their historiography, as this would force them to come to 
terms with their hegemonic rather than oppositional (“revolutionary”) status. (A 
symptom of this avoidance is in the continued negative dependency on Greenberg as 
an antagonist against which to maintain an oppositional pose, despite the fact that 
“Greenbergians” are notably thin on the ground). The question, I think, is why, in 
producing such an obviously canonizing book, they have - like Napoleon -  decided to 
end their revolution by crowning themselves?
The interesting thing for me about Art Since 1900 is that these issues -  commitment to 
continued / expanded modernism, interest in obsolescence and archive, refusal to 
incorporate or implicate the authorial position as part of what is theorised -  seem 
bound together, and imply specific directions in which to move beyond Octoberism 
without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Specifically, I think that it is 
necessary to ask how it might be possible to think through the subjective, desire- 
driven, identificatoiy bases of such elementary art historical procedures as connecting 
or “articulating” art works within larger narratives, in such a way that not only 
“excessive” performances of “fictioning history” but all such accounts would be fully 
implicated in the stakes of the present. It is this project that I have tried to begin here. 
Genealogy, as the use of histoiy to undemiine the se lf  evidence of the present, and
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aesthetics, as the affective mode by which trauma might be turned into spielraum, 
provide the tools for such a project.
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material o f the colours and auras activated by magnetic fields made from high-voltage electricity, 
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uncomfortable position of voyeurs.” Extreme Bodies: The Use and Abuse o f  the Body in Art, (Milan: 
Skira, 2003), 180-181.
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10, 1999, p. 63.
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117.
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visitors to the exhibitions were subject to the biological consequences of a low temperature...
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they are part will develop. Barney represented Houdini’s attempts to evade Otto and preserve a 
narcissistic wholeness of the organism via his drag act as the ‘Feminine Jim Blind,’ with East and West 
coast types (New York socialite and L. A. starlet). This, along with his presentation of his naked body
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Urinal (with etched fly), Schiphol Airport.
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Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, readymade, 1917 (lost). Photograph by Alfred Steiglitz,
as reproduced in The Blind Man.
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Marcel Duchamp, Boîtes-en-valise (centrepiece detail), 1942-54.
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Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1950, (requested and signed by Duchamp, selected by
Sidney Janis).
Fig. 5
Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1964, (fabricated replica by Arturo Schwarz, authorised
by Duchamp).
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Bruce Nauman, Self Portrait as a Fountain, photograph, 1966.
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Bruce Nauman, The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain, text printed on
transparent Mylar window shade. 1966.
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Robert Gober, Three Urinals, plaster, 1988.
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Andy Warhol, Oxidation Painting, acrylic ground (gesso), copper metalic paint, urine
on canvas, 1978.
Fig. 10
Cornelia Parker, The Distance (A kiss with string attached), marble and string, 2003.
Fig. 11
Anonymous, (drawing of The Distance, from Tate Education project).
Fig. 12
Anonymous, (drawing of The Distance, from Tate Education project).
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Auguste Rodin, The Kiss, Pentelican marble, 1901-4.
Fig. 14
Cornelia Parker, Words That Define Gravity, 1992.
Fig. 15
Cornelia Parker, Grooves in a Record That Belonged to Hitler, {Nutcracker Suite),
photograph, 1996.
Fig. 16
Cornelia Parker, The fly  that died on Judd, Fly found on Donald Judd’s aluminum
sculpture at Marfa, Texas, 2001.
Fig. 17
Cornelia Parker and Tilda Swinton, The Maybe, performance / installation view at
Serpentine gallery, London, 1995.
Fig. 18
Marcel Duchamp, sculpture-morte, almond paste and insects mounted on paper,
1959.
Fig. 19
Marcel Duchamp, TORTURE-MORTE, painted plaster and flies, on paper mounted
on wood, 1959.
Fig. 20
Damien Hxvsi, Armageddon (detail), house flies on canvas, 2002.
Fig. 21
Bing White, Fly Disaster 5, photograph, 1995.
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Cornelia Parker, The Maybe (detail), Charles Babbage’s brain, 1995.
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Andrea Fraser, Museum Highlights: A Gallery Talk, performance photograph, 1989.
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Fred Wilson, Mining the Museum (detail), installation view at the Maryland 
Historical Society, Baltimore, 1992.
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Michael Asher, installation view at The Art Institute of Chicago, Gallery 219, 1979.
Fig. 26
Peter Greenaway, “The Physical Self,” installation view at Museum Boijmans-Van
Beuningen, Rotterdam, 1991.
Fig. 27
Man Ray, Venus Restored, assemblage: plaster cast and rope, 1936/1971,
Fig. 28
Marcel Duchamp, Etant Donnés: 1° la chute d*eau, 2® le gaz d*eclairage, exterior 
view, Philadelphia Museum Of Art, 1946-66.
Fig. 29
Marcel Duchamp, Etant Donnés: 1° la chute d*eau, 2° le gaz d*éclairage, 1946-66, 
interior view, Philadelphia Museum of Art.
Fig. 30
Marcel Duchamp, Mile of String, installation view at “First Papers of Surrealism,” 
Coordinating Council of French Relief Societies, 451 Madison Avenue, New York,
1942.
Fig. 31
k
Marcel Duchamp, Sculpture fo r  Travellings rubber, 1918 (lost).
Fig. 32
Maya Deren, Witches Cradle^ (unfinished film), 1943, still showing Duchamp with
string.
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Man Ray, Enough Rope with inscription, from Objects o f My Affections manuscript,
1944.
Fig. 34
Mierle Laderman Ukeles, Now That You Have Heirs/AirSs Marcel Duchamps 
Philadelphia, 1973, performance photograph.
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Marcel Duchamp, A^ o/e written on telegraph card, 1917.
Fig. 36
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Marcel Duchamp, drawing sent to Florine Stettheimer, showing Duchamp’s route to
Buenos Aires.
Fig. 37
Postcard of S. S. Crofton Hall sent by Duchamp, 1917.
Fig. 38
Marcel Duchamp, To Be Looked at (from the Other Side o f the Glass), with One 
Eye, Close to, fo r  Almost an Hour, oil, silver leaf, lead wire, and magnifying lens on 
glass (cracked), mounted between panes of glass in a standing metal frame, on painted
wood base, 1918.
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Catalogue of “First Papers of Surrealism,” showing Duchamp’s In the Manner o f Paul
Delvaux, 1942.
Fig. 40
Marcel Duchamp, Cols Alités, drawing, 1959.
Fig. 41
Marcel Duchamp, Selected Details After Ingres / / ,  etching (second state), 1968.
Fig. 42
&—1.
Marcel Duchamp, Selected Details After Cranach and “Relâche, ” etching (second
state), 1967.
Fig. 43
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Marcel Duchamp, The Bee Auer, etching (second state), 1968.
Fig. 44
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Marcel Duchamp, The Bride Stripped Bare, etching (second state), 1968.
Fig. 45
Marcel Duchamp, Selected Details After Courbet, etching (second state), 1968.
Fig. 46
r
Marcel Duchamp, Selected Details After Rodin, etching (second state), 1968.
Fig. 47
4
Pieter Brueghel the Elder, The Fall o f  Icarus, oil on panel, c. 1558.
Fig. 48
Marcel Duchamp, “Lazy Hardware,” view of window installation by Duchamp and 
André Breton for publication of Breton’s Arcane 7 7 at Gotham Book Mart, New
York, 1945.
Fig. 49
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Marcel Duchamp, Mirrorical Return, etching, 1964.
Fig. 50
Plaster copy of Gradiva, as hung above Freud’s desk.
Fig. 51
Comparison between Pimen, The Virgin o f  Pimen, c. 1380, and Fountain (cropped). 
(As reproduced in Camfield ‘Duchamp’s Fountain: Aesthetic Object, Icon, or Anti-
Art’).
Fig. 52
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Victor Burgin, Gradiva, 1 of 7 black and white photographs with text, 1984.
Fig. 53
Victor Burgin, The Bridge (detail), photograph, 1984.
Fig. 54
Victor Burgin, The Bridge -  Venus Perdica , photograph, 1984.
Fig. 55
Comparison of Marcel Duchamp, y4/i /^ffic Cinéma, 1926 (film still) and Saul 
Bass, Vertigo title sequence (film still), 1958.
Fig. 56
Vertigo (Alfred Hitchcock, 1958), film still.
Fig. 57
Vertigo (Alfred Hitchcock, 1958), film still.
Fig. 58
Vertigo (Alfred Hitchcock, 1958), film still.
Fig. 59
Vertigo (Alfred Hitchcock, 1958), film still.
Fig. 60
Vertigo (Alfred Hitchcock, 1958), film still.
Fig. 61
The Student of Prague, (Henrik Galeen, 1926), film still (as reproduced in W. G.
Sebald, Vertigo).
Fig. 62
Diego Velazquez, Las Meninas, oil on canvas, 1656.
Fig. 63
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Perspectival diagram of elements of Las Meninas, (constructed by Joel Snyder and
Ted Cohen).
Fig. 64
Gérard Fromanger, Michel Foucault^ oil on canvas, 1974.
Fig. 65
Gérard Fromanger, Vert Véronèse, oil on canvas, 1972.
Fig. 66
I
Gérard Fromanger, Rouge de Cadmium clair, oil on canvas, 1972.
Fig. 67
Gérard Fromanger, Violet de Mars, oil on canvas, 1972.
Fig. 68
Photograph of Michel Foucault.
Gérard Fromanger, Existe, oil on canvas, 1976.
Fig. 69
Gérard Fromanger, En révolte à la prison de Toul II, 1974.
Fig. 70
Gérard Fromanger, comparison of Desert Street^ Savannah Street', Street o f my 
People', My Village Street, oil on canvas, 1974.
Fig. 71
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 3: The Order, (film still showing Richard Serra
splashing molten Vaseline), 2002.
Fig. 72
»
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 3, (production photograph showing “dental
operatory sequence”), 2002.
Fig. 73
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER i ,  (flag with “field emblem” and insignia), 2002.
Fig. 74
Matthew Barney, TRANSEXUALIS (decline), installation view, 1991.
Figs. 75-77
Clockwise from top left: Matthew Barney, DELA Y OF GAME [facility o f  
INCLINE], 1991 (detail); Matthew Barney, Radial Drill [facility o f  DECLINE], 
(production photograph), 1991; Matthew Barney, REPRESSIA [facility o f
INCLINE], (detail), 1991.
Figs. 78-80
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Matthew Barney, OTTOshaft, (details of OTTOdrone^ production stills), 1992.
Fig. 81
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Matthew Barney, Drawing Restraint 7, (production photo), 1993.
Fig. 82
Matthew Barney, Drawing Restraint 7, (production photo), 1993.
Fig. 83
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 2: Genealogy, 1 of 3 C-prints in acrylic frames
(shown unframed), 1999.
Fig. 84
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 3: Gary Gilmore, C-print in acrylic frame (shown
unframed), 2002.
Fig. 85
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 5: The Queen o f Chain, Gelatin-silver print in 
acrylic frame (shown unframed), 1997.
Fig. 86
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 5: her Diva, C-print in acrylic frame (shown
unframed), 1997.
Fig. 87
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 5: her Giant, C-print in acrylic frame, 1997.
Fig. 88
Matthew Barney, CREMASTER 5, (production photograph showing Matthew Barney
as her Magician), 1997.
Fig. 89
Matthew Bamey, CREMASTER 5: Elvâlàs, Gelatin-silver print in acrylic frame
(shown unframed), 1997.
Fig. 90
Houdini performing a manacled bridge jump.
Fig. 91
Poster for the Houdinis’ Metamorphosis.
Fig. 92
Houdini strapped to a “crazy crib.”
Fig. 93
Houdini naked in prison cell, Boston Tombs, 1906.
Fig. 94
f - « '
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David Blaine performing ‘Above the Below,’ Southwark, London, 2003.
Fig. 95
Sandow posing for cast of statue of “European Man,” 1901.
Fig. 96
Houdini in cabinet devised to thwart “Margery.’
Fig. 97
Richard Serra, Splashing, lead, 1969.
Fig. 98
1
Richard Serra, Skullcracker, steel, 1969.
Fig. 99y;v
Matthew Bamey, CREMASTER 3: Hiram Abiff, C-print in acrylic frame (shown
unframed), 2002.
Fig. 100
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Matthew Bamey, CREMASTER i ,  choreographic phase eleven (production still),
1995.
Fig. 101
Matthew Bamey, CREMASTER 7, choreographic phase three (production still),
1995.
Fig. 102
Olympia, (Leni Reifenstahl, 1936), film still.
Figs. 103-104
Aimee Mullins wearing graphite running legs Cover of Dazed and Confused
magazine. No. 46 (September
1998) showing Aimee Mullins.
Fig. 105
Matthew Bamey, CREMASTER 3: The Third Degree, 1 of 2 C-prints in acrylic
frames (shown unframed), 2002.
Fig. 106
Matthew Bamey, CREMASTER 3: Mahabyn, 1 of 3 C-prints in acrylic frames
(shown unframed), 2002.
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